

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY:

No end to internal displacement

A profile of the internal displacement situation

5 July, 2011

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Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

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OVERVIEW

No end to internal displacement

The Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) has a long history of displacement, both as a cause and consequence of the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict over land and resources. Forced displacement has consistently followed Israeli policies intended to acquire land, redefine demographic boundaries and divest Palestinians of ownership guaranteed under international law. In other cases, internal displacement has directly resulted from violence stemming from incursions and human rights violations.

More than 160,000 people are reported to have been internally displaced over the past four decades. Since the second intifada or uprising in 2000, the number of Palestinians displaced or at risk of displacement has risen sharply. Some 90,000 people are currently reported to be at risk of displacement as a result of Israeli policies such as restrictive and discriminatory planning, the revocation of residency rights, the expansion of settlements and the construction of the West Bank Separation Wall.

Human rights and humanitarian organisations have long called for the issue of forced displacement in OPT to be addressed and have warned of the continuing impact of Israeli policies, but the international community has only in the last few years begun to respond to such calls.

Israeli policies continued to cause displacement in 2011 despite international condemnation. More than 1,180 Palestinians were displaced as a result of house demolitions across the West Bank and East Jerusalem from January 2010 to June 2011, while tens of thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the Gaza Strip were still living in inadequate shelters, as the Israeli blockade in force since 2007 continued.

Background

In November 1947, UN General Assembly Resolution 181 recommended the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. During the war which followed the proclamation of the state of Israel in May 1948, more than 750,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled and became refugees (UN, November 1949; Bligh, January 1998). When the war ended, Israel retained roughly 80 per cent of what was formerly British Palestine. Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip, Jordan the West Bank, and Jerusalem was divided between Israel and Jordan along the Green Line set out in the 1949 Armistice Agreements.

Further hostilities in June 1967 between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Jordan resulted in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai peninsula. They displaced between 330,000 and 440,000 Palestinians, close to half them refugees of 1948, most of whom fled to neighbouring countries (Badil, September 2009). In violation of international law, Israel annexed East Jerusalem the same year. In 1980 it declared Jerusalem the united capital of Israel and in 1981 it annexed the Golan Heights. It returned Sinai to Egypt in 1982 as part of the Camp David Accords.

From 1987 to 1993, the first *intifada*, or uprising against the occupation, spread throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). Two years of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians from 1993 to 1995 led to the Oslo Accords. Envisaged as an interim agreement

pending a final settlement, the Oslo Accords divided OPT into three zones: Area A under full Palestinian control; Area B under Palestinian civil authority and Israeli security control; and Area C, which included approximately 60 per cent of the West Bank, under full Israeli control. The failure of subsequent negotiations to resolve “final status” issues such as the fate of East Jerusalem, the situation of Palestinian refugees and Israeli settlements helped trigger a second *intifada* in September 2000.

In June 2002, the Israeli government started building the West Bank Separation Wall. When completed it will be 760 kilometres long. Over 85 per cent of it will lie within West Bank, and the remainder will follow the Green Line. Israel has argued that the Wall is necessary to prevent Palestinian militants attacking its citizens by separating Israel and Israeli settlements from OPT (Israeli Ministry of Defence, 25 April 2005; B’Tselem, December 2005; UNRWA and OCHA, July 2008). The International Court of Justice (ICJ), however, has ruled its construction inside the West Bank illegal, and has called for all sections beyond the Green Line to be dismantled (ICJ, July 2004).

In 2003, UN Security Council Resolution 1515 endorsed the Road Map for Peace, a proposal put forward by the United States (US), Russia, the European Union (EU) and the UN (known collectively as the Quartet on the Middle East) as a means of reaching the two-state solution envisaged in Security Council Resolution 1397 of 2002.

In 2005, Israel withdrew its armed forces and around 7,000 settlers from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the West Bank. The Gaza Strip remained an occupied territory, however, as Israel retained “effective control” (UN CHR, January 2006; UN HRC, January 2008). In 2007, the Israeli government tightened the blockade of the Gaza Strip it had imposed in 2005 (HPN, September 2009), in effect denying residents a range of human rights and collectively punishing the civilian population (UN SC, 27 January 2009).

In 2006, Israel responded to elections which brought in a Hamas-led Palestinian National Authority (PNA) with stringent security measures. The US and the EU imposed sanctions on the PNA and withheld direct aid until Hamas condemned attacks on Israelis, recognised Israel and accepted previous agreements. Palestinian factional fighting led to Hamas seizing control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007. The rival Fatah group led a caretaker government in the West Bank, and the international boycott of PNA was lifted.

In late 2008 and early 2009, Israel launched a major three-week offensive in the Gaza Strip against Palestinian militants. A UN fact-finding mission, the Goldstone Report, subsequently established that Israel had violated humanitarian and human rights law and that its actions may have amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Palestinian militant groups were also identified as having committed possible war crimes (UN HRC, 15 September 2009). Following international pressure, Israel partially loosened the blockade of the Gaza Strip in 2010. Egypt formally opened the Rafah border crossing despite Israeli objections in May 2011; however, some restrictions remain (Al Jazeera, May 2011).

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have failed to regain momentum. In September 2010, the US government launched new peace talks, but they collapsed after three weeks following Israel’s refusal to stop settlement construction in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (Peace Now, August 2010; Al Haq, September 2010). PNA has continued to call for a complete halt to all settlement construction, as set out in UN Security Council resolutions, as a precondition for negotiations. Palestinian leaders have said that they will call upon the UN General Assembly to recognise Palestinian statehood in September 2011.

In light of recent developments elsewhere in the region, the Quartet has reiterated its support for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations to reach a conclusion before the end of 2011 (UN, February 2011;

EU, May 2011; NYT, May 2011; Haaretz, May 2011). In April, Fatah and Hamas announced a reconciliation agreement, reached under Egyptian mediation, that foresees the formation of a unity government.

Displacement figures

IDMC considers Palestinians who have been forcibly and arbitrarily displaced from their homes in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and who have remained in OPT, to be internally displaced people (IDPs). Under the Oslo Accords, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are considered a single territorial unit and so those displaced between the two areas do not qualify for refugee status. Figures include refugees from the 1948 and 1967 wars who have subsequently been displaced within OPT. These people, though not IDPs, are considered “secondary displaced refugees” to whom the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement still apply; they are included in IDP statistics (IDMC methodology note, August 2008).

There are no confirmed statistics on IDPs in OPT and the numbers provided by various sources are only estimates. Badil, a Palestinian NGO, suggested in 2009 that between 1967 and 2008 more than 129,000 people were displaced (Badil, January 2010). More recent figures available from various sources suggest up to at least 160,000 have been displaced since 1967, including at least 20,000 people still displaced in Gaza (Badil, January 2010; ICAHD July 2010; B’Tselem, January 2011; Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster, June 2011). Most of this displacement has occurred in Area C of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, along the Gaza Strip’s border with Egypt and in the buffer zone separating it from Israel.

The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions has reported that 24,800 houses have been demolished in OPT since 1967 (ICAHD, July 2010). The Israeli NGO B’Tselem has reported that over 13,000 people have had their East Jerusalem residency revoked, many of whom may have relocated to the West Bank (B’Tselem, January 2011).

Some 90,000 people are reportedly at risk of displacement in 2011, including more than 60,000 in East Jerusalem alone (OCHA, November 2009; OCHA March and May 2011). Communities most at risk include those in East Jerusalem; those in Area C of the West Bank, particularly Palestinians in the Jordan Valley, Bedouin communities, and those in “seam zones” between the Green Line and the Separation Wall; and those living in or near the extended buffer zone separating the Gaza Strip from Israel (Save the Children, October 2009; OCHA, January 2008).

Causes and patterns of displacement

Israeli policies have been responsible, both directly and indirectly, for internal displacement in OPT since 1967. These policies attest to the systematic use of forced arbitrary displacement to acquire land, redefine demographic boundaries and divest Palestinians of ownership rights guaranteed under international law (OCHA, 30 November 2009; ICAHD, March 2007; Al Haq, December 2007; Badil, 22 January 2008; CARE *et al.*, 25 February 2008).

According to a 2009 report by the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the human rights of IDPs, incursions and military clearing operations, evictions, land appropriations, house demolitions, settlements and related infrastructure, the Wall, violence by settlers and the revocation of residency rights in East Jerusalem have all caused forced displacement (UN HRC, May 2009). Restrictions on freedom of movement that make life untenable for many residents in Palestinian enclaves have also been responsible (UN HRC, May 2009; Al Haq, December 2007; CARE *et al.*, February 2008; Badil, September 2007).

In 2006, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in OPT, referring to displacement arising from the construction of the Separation Wall, commented that the situation

in OPT was analogous to what had been described as ethnic cleansing in other contexts (UN GA, October 2006). In 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur said that Israeli policy in East Jerusalem amounted to a gradual and incremental policy to achieve the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, and that the scale of Israeli settlements amounted to colonialist annexation (UN HRC, January 2011).

Israeli incursions in OPT and the situation in the Gaza Strip

Land clearance operations and military incursions by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have been among the leading causes of displacement, and the frequency of incursions in response to Palestinian militancy increased during the second *intifada*. Between 2000 and 2007, nearly 30,000 people were displaced by such operations (OCHA, October 2004 and July 2006; ARIJ, April 2006; UNRWA, November 2006; UN HRC, January 2008).

The 2008-2009 offensive in the Gaza Strip caused the highest rate of internal displacement since 1967. At the height of the conflict, nearly 120,000 Palestinians were displaced, and many more trapped in unsafe areas (OCHA January 2009; HRW, May 2010). Nearly 7,900 houses were demolished or seriously damaged, and nearly 59,000 suffered minor damage, caused by IDF as a result of the offensive and subsequent interventions (OCHA, July and September 2009; Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster, June 2011). Israeli incursions since the offensive have resulted in the damage of over 600 homes, affecting more than 3,000 people (Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster, June 2011).

Many of those affected are still displaced because of the Israeli blockade, which has denied Palestinians access to construction materials. At least 20,000 people are still displaced due to the destruction of or damage to their housing (Shelter Cluster, June 2011). By mid-2011 most of the minor damage to housing had been repaired, but only about 200 of the demolished houses and 1,500 of those seriously damaged had been rebuilt (Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster, June 2011).

In early 2011, the flow of construction material into the Gaza Strip was still only 11 per cent of the rate before the blockade (Oxfam *et al.*, November 2010; OCHA, March 2011). In January 2011, the UN estimated that total housing needs in the Gaza Strip had reached over 91,000 units, of which approximately 80,000 were needed to meet natural growth rates and replace derelict and unsanitary housing, and close to 11,000 to house those displaced in successive Israeli interventions (Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster June, 2011). In June 2011, Israel approved the delivery of construction material for UN projects to build 1,500 homes and 18 new schools (Haaertz, June, 2011).

People living in or near the buffer zone or other restricted access areas in the Gaza Strip continue to be at risk of displacement. In some areas, the buffer zone encroaches up to 1.5 kilometres into Palestinian territory, affecting an estimated 30 per cent of the cultivable land available (OCHA, March 2011). Israeli attacks and demolitions have either temporarily or permanently displaced 70 per cent of households living in or near the buffer zone since 2000 (Save the Children, October 2009). In 2010, 24 civilians in the buffer zone were killed and scores injured (OCHA, August 2010).

House demolitions and evictions

The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) estimated that more than 24,800 Palestinian homes had been destroyed between 1967 and 2010 as a result of military incursions, and punitive and administrative demolitions (ICAHD, April 2011). In 2005, the Israeli government declared it would no longer carry out punitive demolitions (MFA, 20 May 2004; B'Tselem, February 2002), which are illegal under human rights and international humanitarian law (HRW, October 2004; UNSC, 19 May 2004) The practice, however, has continued. In the Gaza Strip, such demolitions accounted for nearly ten per cent of all demolitions during the 2008-2009 offensive (COHRE, May 2009).

Israeli authorities have also continued to demolish Palestinian homes, infrastructure and livelihood structures, on administrative or judicial grounds, citing their failure to prove ownership or hold a building permit, or the building's location in a "closed military zone" or Israeli-designated nature reserve (OCHA, 27 May 2008; AI, June 2010). Since the Oslo Accords, administrative demolitions have mainly taken place in East Jerusalem and Area C of the West Bank. In East Jerusalem, the violation of building regulations is classified as a criminal offence, meaning Palestinian owners can be prosecuted under Israeli criminal law.

Palestinian construction is prohibited in 70 per cent of Area C, and a range of restrictions in the rest of the area make it virtually impossible to get a building permit (OCHA, December 2009). In practice, the Israeli authorities allow Palestinian construction in only one per cent of Area C, much of which is already built-up. Only 13 per cent of land in East Jerusalem is approved for construction, compared with the 35 per cent expropriated for Israeli settlements (OCHA, March 2011).

Over 94 per cent of Palestinian applications for building permits in Area C submitted between January 2000 and September 2007 were denied, leaving little choice for Palestinians but to build "illegally" and so risk the demolition of their buildings and displacement. From 2000 to 2009, 5,600 demolition orders were issued for Area C, and more than 1,600 buildings demolished (OCHA, May 2008 and December 2009). In East Jerusalem there were in early 2011 1,500 pending orders, putting 9,000 Palestinians at risk of displacement (IRIN, January 2011; OCHA, March 2011).

In 2010, more than 430 buildings were demolished in East Jerusalem and Area C, 45 per cent more than in the previous year (DWG, January 2011; AI, July 2010). Nearly 600 Palestinians, almost half of whom were children, were displaced, and the livelihoods of more than 14,300 people affected placing these communities at risk of displacement (OCHA, January, November, and December 2010; DWG, January 2009 and January 2010). Demolitions whether of houses or livelihood structures often affects entire communities. They include and are often accompanied by the seizure of livestock, equipment and other livelihood assets which heightens the vulnerability of those displaced, and the communities affected. From January to June 2011, the Israeli authorities demolished nearly 230 buildings, displacing more than 580 people (IRIN, April 2011; UNWRA June 2011; HRW June 2011).

East Jerusalem

Since 1967, Israeli policies, as reported by UN and NGOs alike, have sought to "Judaize" East Jerusalem, expanding the municipality of Jerusalem by 62 square kilometres into the West Bank, and maintaining a Jewish majority at the expense of the Palestinians in violation of international law (OCHA, March 2011; ICAHD, March 2007). In 1967, a census revealed 70,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and no Israelis (UNSC, September 1967); in 2011 an estimated 200,000 Israeli settlers reside in East Jerusalem alongside 270,000 Palestinians (OCHA, March 2011).

Given the extreme difficulty in obtaining a building permit, it is estimated that some 86,000 Palestinians have built in violation of Israeli regulations, and so risk having their homes demolished (UN, May 2011; OCHA, March 2011; HRW December 2010). Since 1967, the Israeli authorities have demolished some 2,000 houses (OCHA, March 2011). The same authorities have failed in many cases to implement court orders to seal or demolish Israeli settlers' illegal buildings (HRW, December 2010).

The Wall isolates East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, dividing Palestinian neighbourhoods and leading to the economic and social decline of entire communities. It also cuts access to livelihoods and public services in Jerusalem from the West Bank (UNWRA and OCHA, July 2008 and July 2007), and has left as many as 55,000 Palestinian residents of East

Jerusalem physically separated from the city as they live on the West Bank side of the Wall (OCHA, March 2011).

Palestinians with the right to reside in East Jerusalem, but who now find themselves on the West Bank side of the Wall, risk losing their residency under Israel's "centre of life" policy, which permits the revocation of the residency rights of Palestinians who stay outside East Jerusalem for seven years, or who are unable to prove that their "centre of life" is in Jerusalem (EU, November 2005; OCHA, March 2011). Israel revoked the residency rights of more than 13,100 people between 1967 and 2009, 4,500 of them in 2008 alone (B'Tselem and Hamoked, January 2004; Hamoked, December 2009; B'Tselem, January 2011).

Displacement caused by the Separation Wall

Construction of the Wall has displaced a significant number of people and threatens to provoke further displacement. In 2006, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in OPT referred to the creation of a "new generation of internally displaced persons" (UN CHR, 17 January 2006, para.20). A 2003 report estimated that the completed Wall would leave some 90,000 people at risk of displacement (RI, 25 September 2003), and a 2005 estimate by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) suggested that more than 14,000 people had been displaced in the 145 localities through which the Wall passes (PCBS, September 2005).

Construction of the Wall has also involved the confiscation of land and has severely limited access to livelihoods and services for those living alongside it (OCHA, 15 July 2009). As of 2010, an estimated 7,000 Palestinians outside East Jerusalem were living between the Wall and the Green Line in an area known as the "seam zone", designated by Israeli authorities as a closed military area (OCHA, June 2010). Those wishing to reside or access land in the seam zone face restrictive procedures to get a permit to do so (OCHA, October 2009 and June 2010). When completed, the Wall will isolate over nine per cent of the West Bank, mainly areas where Israeli settlements have been built. It was over 60 per cent complete in July 2010 (OCHA/WHO, July 2010).

Israeli settlements, settler violence and restrictions in freedom of movement

Israeli settlements, military infrastructure, designated closed areas and networks of Israeli-only roads and access points mean Palestinians' access to around 38 per cent of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, is either impossible or tightly controlled (OCHA, July 2007 and 22 January 2008).

By the end of 2009, more than 490,000 settlers were living in 149 settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (B'Tselem, July 2010). There were also more than 100 outposts which were not sanctioned but unofficially supported by Israel (B'tselem, July 2010; Peace Now, June 2009). The presence of these settlements and Israel's two-tier system in the West Bank which has been promoting life in them while stifling the growth of Palestinian communities, have caused forced displacement (Al Haq, September 2010; HRW, December 2010; OCHA March 2011).

Settlers attacks on Palestinians have also contributed to internal displacement (B'Tselem, December 2005 and May 2007; UN HRC, March 2009), and there was a dramatic increase in settler violence between 2008 and 2010. The perpetrators were rarely punished and children were often implicated in order to avoid criminal responsibility (UN HRC, March 2011; OCHA, November 2009; Yesh Din, May 2011). In 2009, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) identified 22 communities with a combined population of nearly 76,000 people as highly vulnerable to settler violence (OCHA, November 2009).

Restrictions on freedom of movement remain widespread in the West Bank although the situation eased somewhat in 2009 and 2010. There were an estimated average of 520 permanent checkpoints, road obstacles and other restrictions during 2010, plus an estimated monthly

average of 420 mobile checkpoints (OCHA, March 2011). Israel says the checkpoints are intended to protect its citizens from militant attacks (NYT, 28 April 2008), but as well as severely restricting the movement of ordinary Palestinians, many are subjected to humiliation and abuse at them. The checkpoints have also contributed to displacement (UN CERD, 17 August 2007; UN HRC, 21 January 2008; B'Tselem, 7 August 2007; ICRC, 12 December 2007; WB, 9 May 2007).

Israeli military orders no. 1649 and no. 1650, which came into force in 2010, have made it easier for the Israeli authorities to forcibly transfer or deport Palestinians from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip or outside OPT, potentially placing thousands of Palestinians at risk of displacement (Al Haq, April, May *and* June 2010). These new powers come on the back of legislation dating back to 1967 which has resulted in 150,000 Palestinians having their residency rights revoked (Al Haq, April 2010; Al Haaretz, May 2011).

Protection of displaced people and access to basic needs

All Palestinians in OPT, whether displaced or not, face acute protection concerns, including recurrent violence, restrictions on their movement, and discriminatory policies and regulations. Direct conflict between Israelis and Palestinians led to the deaths of 35 Palestinian and four Israeli civilians in 2010. More than 1,500 Palestinians and 45 Israelis were injured. At least 300 Palestinians were either injured or had their property damaged in more than 400 incidents involving settlers (OCHA, March 2011). During the 2008-2009 offensive in the Gaza Strip, more than 1,000 people were killed and more than 5,000 injured, nearly half of them women and children (OCHA, February 2009).

Displacement has led to long periods of instability for many Palestinians. More than half of the IDPs in the West Bank surveyed in 2007 had taken at least two years to find a permanent residence again (Save the Children, October 2009). In the Gaza Strip, as many as 40,000 people were still displaced after two years, as Israel's ban on the import of construction materials left them no choice but to remain with their relatives, in rented apartments, in makeshift accommodation next to the ruins of their homes, or in camps (HRW, May 2010).

House demolitions have led to children interrupting their education, and enduring a fall in living standards and reduced access to basic services. Six months into their displacement, some were still suffering psychological and behavioural problems (Save the Children, April 2009). In the Gaza Strip, children already marked by the trauma of displacement and chronic insecurity have also been exposed to rising domestic violence among displaced families (UN HRC, 15 September 2009; UNIFEM, 2009; OCHA, May 2009). At the peak of the offensive, more than half of those displaced were children (Save the Children, April 2009).

Displacement has had a major impact on the livelihoods of those affected. Many families have lost their homes and other property, and in the case of demolitions they face significant outlay in the form of fines for "illegal" building and the costs of demolition, which the Israeli authorities oblige them to pay. In the West Bank, families often continue to pay instalments long after their homes have been demolished, in many cases pushing them into debt (OCHA, March 2011). In the Gaza Strip, IDPs whose land lies in buffer zone face considerable difficulty in accessing it, while many others continue to live in damaged or makeshift homes (OCHA, October 2009 and November 2009; Aida, 3 September and 9 November 2009).

People at high risk of displacement, such as those living in the Jordan Valley, in seam zones and in the Gaza Strip buffer zone, are also likely to face greater protection concerns and economic, social and cultural isolation (Save the Children, October 2009). Assistance from local and international organisations is often not available, particularly in remote areas of the West Bank. More than half of displaced families surveyed in the West Bank in 2009 said they had received no humanitarian assistance at all (Save the Children, October 2009).

Durable solutions

There are no figures for IDPs who have returned to their places of origin, or for refugees in secondary displacement. The few cases of restitution or return in the West Bank have generally been in Areas A and B under PNA jurisdiction, while most displacement has taken place in Area C and East Jerusalem. In the Gaza Strip, returns have been limited by the import ban on construction materials and the continued expansion of the buffer zone.

Final status negotiations are likely to be the main platform for determining the parameters of durable solutions for IDPs and refugees alike. These negotiations should be subject to the international legal framework, particularly humanitarian law and human rights law as expressed in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The international community should be aware of the dangers of a “peace process between unequals” that does not adhere to such standards (UN HRC, January 2008).

Humanitarian access

Humanitarian agencies face a number of obstacles to the provision of assistance. West Bank staff need a permit to enter East Jerusalem, and their access to other areas is compromised by closures and other restrictions. Agencies trying to operate in Area C are particularly affected (OCHA, May 2010). The work of those in the Gaza Strip is impeded by the Israeli blockade, the buffer zone, unpredictable access and onerous administrative restrictions (OCHA, March 2010; Oxfam, November 2010).

Humanitarian agencies have also had to tread a careful line in respecting the policy of no contact with Hamas insisted upon by the international community and the organisation's role in coordinating aid delivery (HP, September 2009). Hamas itself has also impeded the humanitarian response, seized humanitarian shipments and suspended some programmes (OCHA, March 2010; HPN, 30 September 2009; PCHR, June 2010).

In mid-2011, a grouping of international NGOs highlighted the impact of Israeli restrictions in compromising the reach and quality of humanitarian and development interventions, and estimated their annual cost to international donors at \$4.5 million (AIDA, June 2011).

National and international responses

Israel's response as the occupying power

International organisations and NGOs have repeatedly condemned Israel's occupation of OPT as a breach of international law (UN HRC, January 2008 and January 2011). As the occupying power, Israel has obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law (UN HRC, January 2011, February 2009, ICJ, July 2004; ICRC, May 2008) which mean it is responsible for the basic needs of the occupied population. If it is unable or unwilling to comply, it is obliged to allow access for humanitarian agencies (ICRC, December 2009; UN HRC, January 2008).

Israel's policies in OPT, however, remain the main cause of arbitrary displacement in violation of human rights and humanitarian law. It tends neither to recognise the phenomenon nor provide solutions to it, durable or otherwise (Badil, September 2007; UN HRC, September 2009; OCHA, May 2009). In a few cases, compensation has been paid to those affected by the construction of the Wall, but applicants face formidable procedures and requirements to obtain it (IDMC, March 2008). The Israeli Supreme Court has, on occasion, addressed the causes of displacement by ordering the re-routing of the Wall, but in the vast majority of cases Israeli civil and military courts

have upheld the government's decisions (OCHA, November 2009; B'Tselem, March 2006; Adalah, July 2008).

Response of PNA and Hamas

PNA has been marred by political turmoil, poor governance, the limiting of its jurisdiction to Areas A and B, and repeated fiscal crises. It has, nevertheless, provided legal and financial help to victims of house demolitions and communities at risk of displacement in accordance with its limited means (Badil, 12 September 2007; IDMC, March 2008 and October 2010). The current Fatah-led PNA has included support for those affected by the separation Wall, demolitions and Israeli documentation policies (PNA, 2 March 2009). Since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip, the lack of funding and poor coordination between Palestinian organisations have impeded the assistance of displaced and non-displaced groups alike. Hamas has, however, sought to help IDPs through rent subsidies, compensation and rehabilitation, and is instrumental in coordinating the reconstruction effort (AFP, 24 January 2009; IDMC, December 2010; Haaertz, January 2011).

Hamas has taken in the lead in reconstruction efforts, and in January 2011 it announced plans to construct 1,000 housing units (Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster, January 2011). However in mid-2010 it was heavily criticised for destroying at least 20 homes, reportedly in an effort to rein in illegal construction, causing the displacement of 150 people (PCHR, May 2010; Al Jazeera, July 2010).

International response

There is no agency in OPT with a specific mandate to assist and protect IDPs, and this has led to shortfalls despite greater efforts in recent years to coordinate a response. In November 2007, the Inter-Agency Protection Sub-Working Group on Forced Displacement (DWG) was established under the auspices of the Protection Working Group (HPN, September 2009). DWG has a broad membership, and aims to ensure an effective response to the different phases of displacement and to appeal to the international community for the phenomenon to be addressed (HPN, September 2009).

The lack of protection for Palestinians, including IDPs and those at risk of being displaced, and the relative impunity of those causing the displacement, represent serious challenges for DWG (HPN, September 2009) in an operational environment that remains severely constrained by Israeli policies.

The cluster system, an initiative intended to ensure better coordination of the international humanitarian response, was applied in OPT in 2009. The UN's Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) has also made forced displacement one of several priorities (OCHA, 30 November 2010).

The international community, including the UN Secretary-General, the US and the EU, has repeatedly condemned Israeli actions in OPT and particularly in East Jerusalem (UN HRC March 2010). Though international agencies and NGOs have applauded such statements, many also criticise a persistent failure to take any meaningful action in the face of continued Israeli violations of international law, including arbitrary displacement (UN HRC, January 2011; Al Haq *et al.*, February 2011; CARE *et al.*, February 2008; Oxfam *et al.*, December 2009; UN HRC, 15 September 2009).

استمرار عمليات النزوح الداخلي

تحفل الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة بتاريخ طويل من النزوح، سواء كسبب أو كنتيجة للصراع الفلسطيني/العربي على الأراضي والموارد. ولطالما عقب النزوح القسري السياسات - الإسرائيلية

سيم الحدود الديمغرافية وتجريد الفلسطينيين الإسرائيلية الرامية إلى الاستحواذ على الأراضي وإعادة ترميم من أملاكهم التي يضمنها لهم القانون الدولي. وفي بعض الحالات الأخرى، نتجت حالات النزوح الداخلي بشكل مباشر عن العنف الناجم عن عمليات التوغل وانتهاكات حقوق الإنسان.

فمنذ اندلاع الانتفاضة الثانية. ربيعة الماضي لقد أفيد عن نزوح أكثر من 160.000 شخص خلال العقود الأربعة الماضية. ارتفع عدد الفلسطينيين النازحين أو المعرضين لخطر النزوح إلى حد كبير، 2000 في العام شخص معرضين لخطر النزوح نتيجة للسياسات الإسرائيلية، مثل التخطيط 90.000 حالياً إلى وجود نحو قسوق الإقامة وتوسيع المستوطنات وبناء جدار الفصل في الضفة الغربية التقييدي والتمييزي وسحب ح

لطالبما دعت منظمات حقوق الإنسان والعمل الإنساني إلى التصدي لمسألة النزوح القسري في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة، كما حذرت من استمرار تأثير السياسات الإسرائيلية، غير أن المجتمع الدولي لم يستجيب لهذه الدعوات سوى في السنوات القليلة الماضية يبدأ با

على الرغم من إدانة المجتمع 2011 وقد واصلت السياسات الإسرائيلية بالنسبة بالنزوح خلال العام لال فلسطينياً إلى النزوح جراء عمليات هدم المنازل في الضفة الغربية والقدس الشرقية خ 1.180 فقد اضطر أكثر من. الدولي نم فالألا تارشح لظ نيج يف، 2011 حزيران عام/حتى يونيو 2010 كانون الثاني عام/الفترة الممتدة من يناير 2007.النازحين داخلياً في قطاع غزة يعيشون في مساكن غير ملائمة، مع استمرار الحصار الإسرائيلي المفروض منذ العام

خلفية عامة

الصادر عن الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة 181 تضمن القرار رقم 47، في نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني عام 1948 وخلال الحرب التي تلت إعلان دولة إسرائيل في. توصية بتقسيم فلسطين إلى دولتين يهودية وعربية رين الأمم المتحدة، نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني) فلسطيني كانوا قد فرّوا أو طردوا ليصبحوا لاجئين 750.000 أكثر من 1948 أيار/مايو في المائة 80 و عند انتهاء الحرب، احتفظت إسرائيل بحوالي (1998 كانون الثاني؛ بلاي، يناير 1949 الثاني وقد سيطرت مصر على قطاع غزة والأردن والضفة الغربية، وتم تقسيم. من الأراضي التي كانت تشكل فلسطين البريطانية في السابق لخط الأخضر المنصوص عليه في اتفاقات الهدنة في العام 1949 القدس بين إسرائيل والأردن على طول ا

لقد أدت الأعمال العدائية الأخرى التي قامت في يونيو/حزيران عام 1967 بين إسرائيل ومصر وسوريا والأردن إلى احتلال إسرائيل للضفة الغربية والقدس الشرقية وقطاع غزة ومرتفعات الجولان وشبه جزيرة و فرار، 1948 فلسطيني، نصفهم تقريباً من لاجئي العام 440.000 إلى 330.000 فرت هذه الأعمال عن نزوح سببها. وقد أس أيلول/المركز الفلسطيني لمصادر حقوق المواطنة واللاجئين، سبتمبر /بديل) معظمهم إلى البلدان المجاورة بذلك القناتون الدولي، وأعلنت القدس عاصمة موحدة كما أن إسرائيل قد ضمت القدس الشرقية في العام نفسه منتهكة. (2009 لإسرائيل في العام 1980 وضمت هضبة الجولان في العام 1981. في المقابل، فهي قد أعادت سببها إلى مصر. في العام 1982 كجزء من اتفاقيات كامب ديفيد

ي ضد الاحتلال في سائر خلال الفترة الممتدة من العام 1987 إلى العام 1993، انتشرت الانتفاضة الأولى وقد أدت سنتا المفاوضات بين إسرائيل والفلسطينيين من العام. أنحاء الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة قسّمت هذه الاتفاقيات، التي صممت لتكون اتفاقيات مؤقتة ريثما يتم التوصل إلى. إلى عقد اتفاقيات أوسلو 1995 إلى 1993 بنية المحتلة إلى ثلاث مناطق: منطقة "أ" خاضعة بالكامل للسيطرة تسوية نهائية، الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة؛ منطقة "ب" خاضعة للسلطة المدنية الفلسطينية والسيطرة الأمنية الإسرائيلية؛ ومنطقة "ج" تشمل حوالي 60 في المائة من الضفة الغربية وخاضعة بالكامل للسيطرة الإسرائيلية. إن فشل ة في تسوية قضايا "الوضع النهائي"، مثل مصير القدس الشرقية ووضع اللاجئين المفاوضات اللاحق الفلسطينيين والمستوطنات الإسرائيلية، قد ساهم في اندلاع الانتفاضة الثانية في سبتمبر/أيلول 2000.

في يونيو/حزيران 2002، باشرت الحكومة الإسرائيلية ببناء جدار الفصل في الضفة الغربية، الذي وسيع أكثر من 85 في المائة منه ضمن حدود الضفة الغربية. كيلومتراً 760 بلغ طوله عند اكتماله الذي سي في حين أن الجزء المتبقي منه سيتبع الخط الأخضر. وقد رأت إسرائيل أن الجدار ضروري لمنع المقاتلين سرانيلية عن الأراضي الفلسطينية من مهاجمة المواطنين من خلال فصل إسرائيل والمستوطنات الإ مركز المعلومات - الفلسطينية المحتلة (وزارة الدفاع الإسرائيلية، 25 نيسان 2005؛ بتسليم الإسرائيلي لحقوق الإنسان في الأراضي المحتلة، ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2005؛ الأونروا ومكتب تنسيق ية قد رأت أن بناءه داخل الضفة الغربية أمر الشؤون الإنسانية، يوليو/تموز 2008). غير أن محكمة العدل الدول غير قانوني، ودعت إلى تفكيك سائر الأقسام الواقعة خلف الخط الأخضر (محكمة العدل الدولية، يوليو/تموز 2004).

على خطة خارطة الطريق المفضية إلى السلام، أي الطرح المقدم 1515 صادق قرار مجلس الأمن الدولي رقم 2003 في العام ما يُعرف باسم المجموعة الرباعية للسلام (من جانب كل من الولايات المتحدة وروسيا والاتحاد الأوروبي والأمم المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط) كوسيلة للوصول إلى حل الدولتين المطروح من قبل مجلس الأمن في القرار رقم 1397 الصادر في العام 2002.

مستوطن من قطاع غزة، فضلاً عن أربع مستوطنات في 7.000 انتها المسلحة ونحوفي العام 2005، سحبت إسرائيل قسراً بالسيطرة الفعلية" عليه (لجنة حقوق الإنسان" غير أن قطاع غزة ظل محتلاً مع احتفاظ إسرائيل بالضفة الغربية كانون/حده، يناير التابعة للأمم المتحدة، يناير/كانون الثاني 2006؛ مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة شددت الحكومة الإسرائيلية الحصار على قطاع غزة الذي كانت قد فرضته، 2007 في العام (2008 الثاني قوقح نم وعمجم نم ناكسلا عقولاً يف ةمراح، (2009 أيلول/شبكة الممارسات الإنسانية، سبتمبر) 2005 في العام (لمدنيين) مجلس الأمن الدولي، 27 يناير/كانون الثاني 2009 الإنسان وممارسة العقاب الجماعي على السكان ا

في العام 2006، ردت إسرائيل على الانتخابات التي جاءت بسلطة وطنية فلسطينية بقيادة حركة حماس من خلال اتخاذ تدابير أمنية مشددة. كما أن الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الأوروبي قد عمدا إلى فرض العقوبات على لطة الفلسطينية وحجب المساعدات المباشرة إلى حين تعلن حماس عن إدانتها للهجمات على الس الإسرائيليين وتعترف بإسرائيل وتعلن قبولها للاتفاقات السابقة. لقد أدى القتال بين الفصائل الفلسطينية إلى سيطرة حركة حماس على قطاع غزة في يونيو/حزيران 2007. فتولت منافستها، حركة فتح، قيادة حكومة انتقالية في الضفة الغربية وتم رفع المقاطعة الدولية للسلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية

نيلتاقلاً دض ةزغ عاطق وىلع عيباساً ةتالث رمتسا أربيك أموجه لينارسا تنتش، 2009 وأوائل العام 2008 في أواخر العام للأمم المتحدة لاحقاً، عبر تقرير غولدستون، أن إسرائيل قد الفلسطيين. وقد أظهرت بعثة تقصي الحقائق التابعة كما انتهكت كلاً من القوانين الإنسانية وحقوق الإنسان وأن الأعمال التي ارتكبتها قد تصل إلى حد جرائم الحرب والجرائم ضد الإنسانية (مجلس ن تكون جرائم حرب أفاد التقرير أن الجماعات الفلسطينية المسلحة قد ارتكبت جرائم من المحتمل أ و جزاء الضغوط الدولية، خفقت إسرائيل جزئياً (2009 أيلول/سبتمبر 15، حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة كما أن مصر قد فتحت رسمياً معبر رفح الحدودي على الرغم من الاعتراضات. 2010 حصارها على قطاع غزة في العام 1؛ غير أن بعض القيود لا تزال قائمة حتى اليوم (قناة الجزيرة، مايو/أيار الإسرائيلية في مايو/أيار 2011).

لم تتمكن المفاوضات الإسرائيلية الفلسطينية من استعادة زخمها. ففي سبتمبر/أيلول 2010، أطلقت أثر رفض حكومة الولايات المتحدة محادثات سلام جديدة، لكنها ما لبثت أن انهارت بعد ثلاثة أسابيع، على إسرائيل وقف بناء المستوطنات في الضفة الغربية، بما في ذلك القدس الشرقية (السلام الآن، أغسطس/آب 2010؛ مؤسسة الحق، سبتمبر/أيلول 2010). وقد واصلت السلطة الفلسطينية الدعوة إلى الوقف الكامل دولي، وذلك كشرط مسبق لبناء المستوطنات، على النحو المنصوص عليه في قرارات مجلس الأمن ال للمفاوضات. وقد أفاد القادة الفلسطينيون أنهم سيدعون الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة للاعتراف بالدولة الفلسطينية في سبتمبر/أيلول 2011.

في ضوء التطورات الأخيرة التي شهدتها أماكن أخرى في المنطقة، جددت المجموعة الرباعية دعمها للمفاوضات شباط/الأمم المتحدة، فبراير) 2011 الإسرائيلية من أجل التوصل إلى نتيجة قبل نهاية العام-فلسطينية الفليس أيار/؛ صحيفة هآرتس، مايو 2011 أيار/؛ نيويورك تايمز، مايو 2011 أيار/؛ الاتحاد الأوروبي، مايو 2011 لتوصل إليه بوساطة مصرية، والذي نيسان، أعلنت حركة فتح وحماس عن عقد اتفاق مصالحة، تمّ في أيار/أبريل (2011 يقضي بتشكيل حكومة وحدة وطنية

الأرقام المتعلقة بحالات النزوح

يعتبر مركز رصد النزوح الداخلي الفلسطيني الذين أُجبروا بشكل تعسفي على النزوح من منازلهم في قطاع غزة والضفة الغربية، والذين بموجب اتفاقيات أوسلو، و يُعتبر قطاع غزة مع الضفة. أشخاص نازحين داخلياً بقوا في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة، كما وتشمل الأرقام اللاجئين. الغربية وحدة إقليمية واحدة، مما يعني أن النازحين بين المنطقتين لا يُعتبرون مؤهلين للحصول على صفة اللاجئ ويُعتبر هؤلاء الأشخاص، ل الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة الذين اضطروا لاحقاً إلى النزوح داخ 1967 و 1948 جزءاً حربي على الرغم من عدم كونهم نازحين داخلياً، كلاجئين نازحين من جديد، تنطبق عليهم أحكام المبادئ التوجيهية بشأن النزوح الداخلي؛ كما يتم (ية، أغسطس/آب 2008 إدراجهم في الإحصاءات المتصلة بالنازحين (مركز رصد النزوح الداخلي، مذكرة منهج

ما من إحصاءات مؤكدة عن النازحين داخلياً في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة، وما الأرقام المقدمة من مختلف المصادر سوى مجرد المركز الفلسطيني لمصادر حقوق المواطنة /لقد قد قُدرت إحدى المنظمات غير الحكومية الفلسطينية، بديل تقديرات

2008 و 1967 أن عدد النازحين الفلسطينيين خلال الفترة الممتدة بين العامين 2009 العام واللاجئين، في كانون الثاني/المركز الفلسطيني لمصادر حقوق المواطنين واللاجئين يناير /بديل) نسمة 129.000 قد فاق نازح منذ العام 1967، بما في ذلك 160.000 أما الأرقام الأحدث المتوفرة من مصادر مختلفة فتشير إلى ما لا يقل عن 20.000 ما لا يقل عن 20.000 شخص لا يزالون نازحين في قطاع غزة (بديل/ المركز الفلسطيني لمصادر حقوق المواطنين واللاجئين، يناير/كانون الثاني 2010؛ اللجنة الإسرائيلية لمناهضة هدم المنازل يوليوس/تموز نبلي لحقوق الإنسان في الأراضي المحتلة، يناير/كانون الثاني مركز المعلومات الإسرا - 2010؛ بتسليم 2011؛ المجموعة المشتركة بين الوكالات المعنية بالإيواء، يونيو/حزيران 2011). وقد حدث معظم هذا النزوح في المنطقة "ج" في الضفة الغربية والقدس الشرقية، على طول حدود قطاع غزة مع مصر والمنطقة العازلة تفصلها عن إسرائيل التي

وقد أفادت اللجنة الإسرائيلية لمناهضة هدم المنازل عن هدم 24.800 منزل في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة مركز - منذ العام 1967 (اللجنة الإسرائيلية لمناهضة هدم المنازل، يوليوس/تموز 2010). كما أبلغ بتسليم اضي المحتلة عن إلغاء إقامة أكثر من 13.000 شخص في المعلومات الإسرائيلية لحقوق الإنسان في الأر مركز المعلومات الإسرائيلي لحقوق - القدس الشرقية، مع نقل الكثير منهم إلى الضفة الغربية (بتسليم (الإنسان في الأراضي المحتلة، يناير/كانون الثاني 2011). ال العام 2011، بما في ذلك أكثر من تشير التقارير إلى وجود نحو 90.000 شخص معرضين لخطر النزوح في القدس الشرقية وحدها (مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2009: مكتب 60.000 تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس/آذار و مايو/أيار 2011). من المجتمعات الأكثر عرضة لخطر النزوح تلك لمنطقة "ج" من الضفة الغربية، لا سيما الفلسطينيين في غور المتواجدة في القدس الشرقية؛ وتلك في الأردن والمجتمعات البدوية وتلك التي تعيش في "مناطق التماس" بين الخط الأخضر وجدار الفصل؛ وتلك التي تعيش في أو بالقرب من المنطقة العازلة الممتدة التي تفصل قطاع غزة عن إسرائيل (منظمة إنقاذ (ر/تشرين الأول 2009؛ مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، يناير/كانون الثاني 2008 الطفولة، أكتوب

أسباب النزوح وأماطه

لقد كانت السياسات الإسرائيلية هي المسؤولة، سواء بصورة مباشرة أو غير مباشرة، عن النزوح الداخلي على الاستخدام المنهجي للنزوح في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة منذ العام 1967. تشهد هذه السياسات القسري والتعسفي كوسيلة للاستحواذ على الأراضي وإعادة ترسيم الحدود الديمغرافية وتجريد الفلسطينيين من حقوق الملكية التي يضمنها القانون الدولي (مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، 30 دم المنازل، مارس/آذار 2007؛ مؤسسة الحق/نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2009؛ اللجنة الإسرائيلية لمناهضة ه ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2007؛ بديل/ المركز الفلسطيني لمصادر حقوق المواطنين واللاجئين، 22 يناير/كانون الثاني 2008؛ منظمة "كير" الدولية ومجموعة من المؤلفين، 25 فبراير/شباط 2008

اص للأمم المتحدة المعني بحقوق الإنسان للنازحين داخليا، فقد أدت كل عن الممثل الخ 2009 وفقاً لتقرير صدر في العام من عمليات التوغل وعمليات التطهير العسكرية والإخلاء والاستحواذ على الأراضي وهدم المنازل والمستوطنات فوق الإقامة في البنى التحتية ذات الصلة وجدار الفصل والعنف المرتكب من قبل المستوطنين وسحب ح القدس الشرقية إلى النزوح القسري (مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة، مايو/أيار 2009؛ مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2010). كما أن القيود المفروضة على حرية التنقل بنية قد ساهمت بدورها في ذلك (مجلس التي تجعل الحياة صعبة للعديد من المقيمين في الجيوب الفلسط "حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة، مايو/أيار 2009؛ مؤسسة الحق، ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2007؛ منظمة "كير الدولية ومجموعة من المؤلفين، فبراير/شباط 2008؛ بديل/ المركز الفلسطيني لمصادر حقوق المواطنين (واللاجئين، سبتمبر/أيلول 2007

نع هنيح يف، تلتحملا فينبطسلفلا يضار ألاف ناسنابلا قوقح ةلاحب ينعملا تحتتملا مأمال قياسلا صاخلا ررقملا قلع، 2006 في العام النزوح الناجم عن بناء جدار الفصل، أن الوضع في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة كان مماثلاً لما تم وصفه على أنه تطهير عرقي في صاخلا ررقملا دافاً، 2011 وفي العام (2006 تشرين الأول/الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة، أكتوبر) سياقات أخرى للأمم المتحدة أن السياسة الإسرائيلية في القدس الشرقية هي بمثابة سياسة تدرجية لتحقيق التطهير العرقي للفلسطينيين وأن حجم لاستعماري (مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة، يناير/كانون المستوطنات الإسرائيلية قد وصل إلى حدّ التوسع ا (الثاني 2011

عمليات التوغل الإسرائيلية في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة والوضع في قطاع غزة

لقد كانت عمليات تطهير الأراضي والتوغل العسكرية التي قامت بها قوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية من بين رئيسية للنزوح، كما أن وتيرة عمليات التوغل التي جاءت رداً على الحركة المسلحة الفلسطينية قد زادت خلال الانتفاضة الأسبب ال 2000 وقد بلغ عدد الأشخاص الذين اضطروا إلى النزوح جراء هذا النوع من العمليات خلال الفترة الممتدة بين العامين .الثانية نسبق الشؤون الإنسانية، أكتوبر/تشرين الأول 2004 ويوليو/تموز 2007 نحو 30.000 شخص (مكتب ت 2006؛ معهد البحوث التطبيقية في القدس، أبريل/نيسان 2006؛ الأونروا، نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2006؛ (مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة، يناير/كانون الثاني 2008).

غزة في أعلى معدل نزوح داخلي منذ العام 1967. ففي ذروة على قطاع 2009-لقد تسبب هجوم العام 2008 الصراع، نزح حوالي 120.000 فلسطيني، وحوصر عدد أكبر في مناطق غير آمنة (مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، يناير/كانون الثاني 2009؛ هيومن رايتس ووتش، مايو/أيار 2010). كما أن نحو 7.900 منزل قد منزل تعرض لأضرار طفيفة، تسببت بها قوات 59.000جسيمة، فضلاً عن حوالي تهدم أو تعرض لأضرار الدفاع الإسرائيلية نتيجة للتدخلات الهجومية واللاحقة (مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، يوليو/تموز وسبتمبر/أيلول 2009؛ المجموعة المشتركة بين الوكالات المعنية بالإيواء، يونيو/حزيران 2011). وقد سفرت عمليات التوغل الإسرائيلية منذ بدء الهجوم عن تضرر أكثر من 600 منزل، مما أثار في أكثر من 3.000 (شخص) المجموعة المشتركة بين الوكالات المعنية بالإيواء، يونيو/حزيران 2011.

ين من الوصول إلى مواد البناء ما زال العديد من الأشخاص المتضررين نازحين جراء الحصار الإسرائيلي الذي حرم الفلسطيني المجموعة المشتركة بين الوكالات)شخص على الأقل نازحين بسبب الدمار أو الأضرار التي لحقت بمساكنهم 20.000 فما زال المعنية بالإيواء، يونيو/حزيران 2011). بحلول منتصف العام 2011، كان قد تم إصلاح معظم الأضرار من تلك التي تكبدت 1.500 منزل من مجموع المنازل المهدامة و 200 أنه لم يتم بناء سوى حوالي الطفيفة في المساكن، غير (المجموعة المشتركة بين الوكالات المعنية بالإيواء، يونيو/حزيران 2011)أضراراً جسيمة.

ة فقط من معدل مافي أوائل العام 2011، كانت نسبة تدفق مواد البناء إلى قطاع غزة لا تزال نحو 11 في المائ قبل الحصار (أوكسفام ومجموعة من المؤلفين، نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2010؛ مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس/آذار 2011). في يناير/كانون الثاني 2011، قدرت الأمم المتحدة أن إجمالي الاحتياجات منها لتلبية 80.000 الملحة إلى حوالي السكنية في قطاع غزة قد بلغ أكثر من 91.000 وحدة، مع الحاجة وحدة لإيواء النازحين جراء 11.000 معدلات النمو الطبيعي واستبدال المساكن المهجورة وغير الصحية، ونحو العمليات الإسرائيلية المتعاقبة (المجموعة المشتركة بين الوكالات المعنية بالإيواء، يونيو/حزيران وافقت إسرائيل على تسليم مواد البناء إلى مشاريع تابعة للأمم المتحدة، في يونيو/حزيران 2011. (2011 ترمي إلى بناء 1.500 منزل و 18 مدرسة جديدة (صحيفة هآرتس، يونيو/حزيران 2011).

لا يزال الأشخاص الذين يعيشون بالقرب من المنطقة العازلة أو غيرها من المناطق التي يصعب الوصول إليها في بعض المناطق، تصل المنطقة العازلة إلى كيلومتر. المفروضة في قطاع غزة عرضة لخطر النزوح بسبب القيود في المائة من الأراضي المتاحة للصالح للزراعة (مكتب 30 ونصف داخل الأراضي الفلسطينية، مما يؤثر في ما يقدر بنحو ات وعمليات الهدم الإسرائيلية إلى النزوح وتنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس/آذار 2011). لقد أدت الاعتداء في المائة من الأسر التي تعيش في أو على مقربة من المنطقة العازلة منذ العام 70 المؤقت أو الدائم لنسبة 24 شهدت المنطقة العازلة مقتل، 2010 وفي العام. (2009 تشرين الأول/منظمة إنقاذ الطفولة، أكتوبر) 2000 (ت) مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، أغسطس/آب 2011مدنياً وجرح العشرا.

هدم المنازل وعمليات الإخلاء

منزل فلسطيني قد تهدم بين العامين 24.800 بحسب تقديرات اللجنة الإسرائيلية لمناهضة هدم المنازل، أكثر من اللجنة الإسرائيلية) و2010 نتيجة لعمليات التوغل العسكرية وعمليات الهدم العقابية والإدارية 1967 لمناهضة هدم المنازل، أبريل/نيسان 2011). في العام 2005، أعلنت الحكومة الإسرائيلية عن توقفها عن مركز المعلومات - تنفيذ عمليات الهدم العقابية (وزارة الشؤون الخارجية، 20 مايو/أيار 2004؛ بتسيلم نظراً إلى تناقضها مع قانون حقوق الإنسان (2002 شباط/أيار الإسرائيلي لحقوق الإنسان في الأراضي المحتلة، فيبر 19؛ مجلس الأمن الدولي 2004 تشرين الأول/هيومن رايتس ووتش، أكتوبر) والقانون الإنساني الدولي ي ففي قطاع غزة، شكلت عمليات الهدم هذه حوال. غير أن هذه العمليات قد استمرت في الممارسة العملية. (2004 أيار/مايو، مركز حقوق الإسكان وحالات الإخلاء) 2008-2009العشرة في المائة من مجموع عمليات الهدم التي نفذت خلال هجوم (مايو/أيار 2009).

كما واصلات السلطات الإسرائيلية هدم منازل الفلسطينيين وبناهم التحتية وهاكل سبل رزقهم، وذلك إثبات الملكية أو امتلاك ترخيص للبناء، أو بموقع البناء لأسباب إدارية أو قضائية، متحججة بعجزها عن

في "منطقة عسكرية مغلقة" أو محمية طبيعية إسرائيلية (مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، 27 مايو/أيار 2008؛ منظمة العفو الدولية، يونيو/حزيران 2010). منذ اتفاقيات أوسلو، جرت معظم عمليات الهدم الإدارية في القدس الشرقية، يُصنف انتهاك قوانين البناء كجريمة جنائية، وفي الضفة الغربية "ج" لشرقية والمنطقة في القدس ا مما يعني أنه يمكن محاكمة المالكين الفلسطينيين بموجب القانون الجنائي الإسرائيلي.

قيود المفروضة على باقي يحظر على الفلسطينيين البناء في 70 في المائة من المنطقة "ج"، كما أن مجموعة ال كانون الأول/مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، ديسمبر) المنطقة تجعل الحصول على رخصة بناء أمراً شبه مستحيل في الممارسة العملية، لا تسمح السلطات الإسرائيلية للفلسطينيين بالبناء سوى في واحد في (2009). في المائة من الأراضي في القدس الشرقية 13 وحدها نسبة. ير جزءا سيق وتمّ لابناء عليها كالأ عزجلاً نأ'ألع، "ج" المائة من المنطقة مكتب تنسيق) في المائة من الأراضي التي تمت مصادرتها من أجل بناء المستوطنات الإسرائيلية 35 قد رخصت للبناء، مقارنة بـ (الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس/آذار 2011).

والتي قدمت خلال "ج" في المائة من طلبات تراخيص البناء الفلسطينية في المنطقة 94 لقد تمّ رفض أكثر من ريف نيبينيسلفل تاريخاً نم ليلقلا كرتي أمم، 2007 أيلول/سبتمبر 2000 كانون الثاني/الفترة الممتدة بين يناير خلال الفترة. للنزوح البناء بشكل "غير قانوني"، والمخاطرة بالتالي بتعرض مبانهم للهدم وتعرضهم مبنى (مكتب 1.600 نم رتكا مده متو، "ج" أمر بالهدم في المنطقة 5.600 صدر، 2009 و 2000 الممتدة بين العامين تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، مايو/أيار 2008 وديسمبر/كانون الأول 2009). في القدس الشرقية، كان هناك في فلسطيني عرضة لخطر النزوح (شبكة الأبناء 9.000، مما يجعل أوائل العام 2011 1.500 أمر قيد الانتظا (الإنسانية (إيرين)، يناير/كانون الثاني 2011؛ مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس/آذار 2011).

هامده مت يتلا لزانملا ددع قوفي امب يا، "ج" مبنى في القدس الشرقية والمنطقة 430 نم رتكا مده مت، 2010 في العام ؛ منظمة 2011 كانون الثاني/الفريق العامل المعني بالنزوح، يناير) في المائة 45 خلال العام السابق بنسبة فلسطيني، نصفهم تقريبا من الأطفال، إلى النزوح، كما أن سيل رزق 600 لقد اضطر نحو (2010 تموز/العفو الدولية، يوليو مكتب تنسيق الشؤون) جعل هذه المجتمعات عرضة لخطر النزوح شخص قد تأثرت جراء ذلك، ممّ 14.300 أكثر من ؛ الفريق العامل 2010 كانون الأول/تشرين الثاني وديسمبر/كانون الثاني ونوفمبر/الإنسانية، يناير غالباً ما تؤثر عمليات الهدم، سواء تلك (2010 كانون الثاني/يناير 2009 كانون الثاني/المعني بالنزوح، يناير وهي تشمل وغالباً ما تترافق مع مصادرة الماشية. بي تستهدف المنازل أو هياكل كسب الرزق، في المجتمعات بأكملها الت خلال الفترة. والمعدات وغيرها من الأصول المعيشية، الأمر الذي يزيد من ضعف الأشخاص النازحين والمجتمعات المحلية المعنّية مبنى، مما أدى إلى 230 هدمت السلطات الإسرائيلية نحو، 2011 أيار/والممتدة بين يناير/كانون الثاني وماي نزوح أكثر من 580 شخص (شبكة الأبناء الإنسانية (إيرين)، أبريل/نيسان 2011؛ الأورو، يونيو/حزيران 2011). (2011؛ هيومن رايتس ووتش، يونيو/حزيران 2011).

القدس الشرقية

،تيلية، حسبما أفادت كل من الأمم المتحدة والمنظمات غير الحكومية منذ العام 1967، سعت السياسات الإسرا كيلومتراً مربعاً من أراضي الضفة 62 القدس الشرقية من خلال توسيع حدود بلدية القدس بمسافة "تهويد" إلى ،تب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية (مك) الغربية، والحفاظ على غالبية يهودية على حساب الفلسطينيين بما يُعتبر انتهاكاً للقانون الدولي تادادعتلا دحاً تيب، 1967 في العام (2007 آذار؛ اللجنة الإسرائيلية لمكافحة هدم المنازل، مارس 2011 آذار/مارس السكانية أن 70.000 فلسطيني كانوا يعيشون في القدس الشرقية من دون وجود إسرائيليون هناك (مجلس مستوطن إسرائيلي يعيشون في القدس 200.000 يلاوح ممتف، 2011؛ أما في العام (7 الأمن الدولي، سبتمبر/أيلول 196 (فلسطيني) مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس/آذار 2011 270.000 الشرقية جنباً إلى جنب مع

مدوا إلى البناء بشكل فلسطيني قد ع 86.000 نظراً إلى الصعوبة البالغة في الحصول على رخصة بناء، تشير التقديرات إلى أن الأمم المتحدة، مايو/أيار 2011؛ مكتب) غير قانوني وماناف للأنظمة الإسرائيلية، ممّ يعرض منازلهم بالتالي لخطر الهدم تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس/آذار 2011؛ هيومن رايتس ووتش، ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2010). فقد بلغ عدد الإسرائيلية على هدمها منذ العام 1967 حوالي 2.000 منزل (مكتب تنسيق المنازل التي أقدمت السلطات الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس/آذار 2011). وقد فشلت السلطات نفسها في الكثير من الحالات في تنفيذ أوامر المحكمة القاضية بختم أو هدم مبان غير شرعية لمستوطنين إسرائيليين (هيومن رايتس ووتش (لأول 2010: ديسمبر/كانون ا

يعزل جدار الفصل القدس الشرقية عن بقية الضفة الغربية، إذ يقسم الأحياء الفلسطينية ويؤدي إلى تدهور اقتصادي واجتماعي في كما أنه يحدّ من قدرة الوصول إلى سيل الرزق والخدمات العامة في القدس من الضفة الغربية. المجتمعات المحلية بأسرها ؛ وهو قد ترك نحو (2007 تموز/يوليو 2008 تموز/تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، يوليو الأورو ومكتب)

مكتسب) فلسطيني من سكان القدس الشرقية مفصولين مادياً عن المدينة لأنهم يعيشون على جانب الضفة الغربية من الجدار 55.000 (تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس/آذار 2011).

عون بالحق في الإقامة في القدس الشرقية، غير أنهم يجدون أنفسهم اليوم في جانب الضفة الغربية إن الفلسطينيين الذين يمتد مركز الحياة" التي تنتهجها إسرائيل، والتي تسمح" من الجدار، معرضون لخطر فقدان حقهم في الإقامة، في ظل سياسة لمدة سبع سنوات، أو أولئك الذين يسحب حقوق الإقامة للفلسطينيين الذين يقيمون خارج القدس الشرقية لا يستطيعون إثبات أن "مركز حياتهم" هو في القدس (الاتحاد الأوروبي، نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2005؛ مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس/آذار 2011). وقد سحبت إسرائيل حقوق الإقامة من أكثر من 13.100 مركز المعلومات - في العام 2008 وحده (بتسليم 500 شخص بين العامين 1967 و2009، من بينهم 4 مركز الدفاع عن الفرد، يناير/كانون الثاني-الإسرائيلي لحقوق الإنسان في الأراضي المحتلة وهو موكيد مركز المعلومات الإسرائيلي - مركز الدفاع عن الفرد، ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2009؛ بتسليم 2004؛ هو موكيد (أراضي المحتلة، يناير/كانون الثاني 2011 لحقوق الإنسان في ال

النزوح الناجم عن جدار الفصل

لقد أدى بناء الجدار إلى نزوح عدد كبير من الأشخاص، وهو يهدد بالتسبب في المزيد من النزوح. في العام محتلة إلى أشار المقرر الخاص للأمم المتحدة المعني بحالة حقوق الإنسان في الأراضي الفلسطينية ال، 2006، 2006، كانون الثاني/يناير 17، مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة) "جيل جديد من النازحين داخلياً" نشوء شخص يواجهون خطر 90.000 أن الجدار سيخلف عند اكتمال بنائه نحو 2003 وقد قدر تقرير صادر في العام (20 الفقرة سبتمبر/أيلول 2003)، كما أن تقديرات الجهاز المركزي للإحصاء 5 النزوح (الرابطه الدولية للاجئين، 2 الفلسطيني للعام 2005 أشار إلى أن أكثر من 14.000 شخص قد اضطروا إلى النزوح في 145 محلة من تلك الواقعة على خط بناء الجدار (الجهاز المركزي للإحصاء الفلسطيني، سبتمبر/أيلول 2005).

يضاً عمليات مصادرة للأراضي، كما أنه حدّ بدرجة كبيرة من قدرة وصول السكان المقيمين على طوله إلى لقد شمل بناء الجدار أ كان، 2010، اعتباراً من العام (2009 تموز/يوليو 15، مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية) سبل الرزق والخدمات خضر، في منطقة تعرف باسم نحو 7.000 فلسطيني خارج القدس الشرقية يعيشون بين الجدار والخط الأ منطقة التماس" التي حولتها السلطات الإسرائيلية إلى منطقة عسكرية مغلقة (مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، يونيو/حزيران 2010). يواجه الأشخاص الراغبون في الإقامة أو الوصول إلى أي أرض في منطقة مكتب تنسيق) بة للحصول على تصريح للقيام بذلك التماس العديد من القيود من جهة الإجراءات المطلوب عند اكتمال بنائه، سيؤدي الجدار إلى عزل (2010 حزيران/يونيو 2009 تشرين الأول/الشؤون الإنسانية، أكتوبر/أكتوبر ي أن أكثر من 60 أكثر من تسعة في المائة من الضفة الغربية، خاصة المناطق التي تمّ فيها بناء المستوطنات الإسرائيلية، مع الإشارة إل في المائة منه كان قد اكتمل بحلول يوليو/تموز 2010 (مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية/منظمة الصحة العالمية، يوليو/تموز 2010).

المستوطنات الإسرائيلية وعنف المستوطنين والقيود المفروضة على حرية التنقل

ة والمناطق المغلقة وشبكات الطرق ونقاط الوصول إن المستوطنات الإسرائيلية والبنى التحتية العسكري المخصصة فقط للإسرائيليين إنما تعني أن قدرة وصول الفلسطينيين إلى حوالي 38 في المائة من الضفة الغربية، بما في ذلك القدس الشرقية، هي إما مستحيلة أو تخضع لرقابة مشددة (مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، يونيو/تموز 2007 و2 (يناير/كانون الثاني 2008 الشؤون الإنسانية، يوليو/تموز 2007).

بحلول نهاية العام 2009، كان أكثر من 490.000 مستوطن يعيشون في 149 مستوطنة في الضفة الغربية، مركز المعلومات الإسرائيلي لحقوق الإنسان في الأراضي المحتلة - بما في ذلك القدس الشرقية (بتسليم بؤرة استيطانية لم تخضع للعقوبات وإنما كانت تحظى 00 يوليو/تموز 2010). كما كان هنالك أكثر من 1 مركز المعلومات الإسرائيلي لحقوق الإنسان في الأراضي - بدعم غير رسمي من قبل إسرائيل (بتسليم المحتلة، يوليو/تموز 2010؛ السلام الآن، يونيو/حزيران 2009). لقد أدى وجود هذه المستوطنات والنظام ل إسرائيل في الضفة الغربية الذي يدعو إلى العيش فيها في حين يخلق نمو المزودج المتبع من قب التجمعات السكانية الفلسطينية، إلى حالات من النزوح القسري (مؤسسة الحق، سبتمبر/أيلول 2010؛ (هيومن رايتس ووتش، ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2010؛ مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس/آذار 2011).

- تداءات المستوطنين الموجهة ضد الفلسطينيين قد ساهمت بدورها في النزوح الداخلي (بتسليم كما أن اع مركز المعلومات الإسرائيلي لحقوق الإنسان في الأراضي المحتلة، ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2005 ومايو/أيار ادة ملحوظة في أعمال العنف 2007؛ مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة، مارس/آذار 2009)، وكان هنالك زي

كما أنه نادراً ما كانت تتم معاقبة. 2010 و 2008 المرتكبة من قبل المستوطنين خلال الفترة الممتدة بين العامين، مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة (الجنّة وغالباً ما كان يتم إشراك الأطفال من أجل تفادي المسؤولية الجنائية منظمة؛ ييش ديين 2009 تشرين الثاني/مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، نوفمبر 11 مارس/آذار 20 حدد مكتب الأمم المتحدة لتنسيق الشؤون، 2009 في العام. (2011 أيار/متطوعين من أجل حقوق الإنسان، مايو وطنين) (مكتب شخص معرضين لعنف المسبب 76.000 مجتمعاً محلياً مع مجموع عدد سكان يقارب 22 الإنسانية وجود (تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2009).

2009 لا تزال القيود المفروضة على حرية التنقل منتشرة في الضفة الغربية على الرغم من تراجع حدة الوضع نوعاً ما في العامين، القيود خلال العام 2010 و 2010. فقد كان هنالك نحو 520 نقطة تفتيش دائمة وعوائق على الطرق وغيرها من شهري يقدر بـ 420 نقطة تفتيش متنقلة (مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية بالإضافة إلى متوسط مارس/آذار 2011). وتفيد إسرائيل أن الهدف من نقاط التفتيش هو حماية مواطنيها من هجمات المقاتلين إلى فرض القيود المشددة على حركة نيويورك تايمز، 28 أبريل/نيسان 2008، غير أنه بالإضافة) وقد ساهمت. المواطنين الفلسطينيين العاديين، يتعرض الكثير من هؤلاء للإذلال والاعتداء عند هذه الحواجز لجنة الأمم المتحدة للقضاء على التمييز العنصري، 17 أغسطس/آب) نقاط التفتيش أيضاً في زيادة حالات النزوح مركز - التابع للأمم المتحدة، 21 يناير/كانون الثاني 2008؛ بتسليم 2007؛ مجلس حقوق الإنسان المعلومات الإسرائيلي لحقوق الإنسان في الأراضي المحتلة، 7 أغسطس/آب 2007؛ اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر، 12 ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2007؛ البنك الدولي، 9 مايو/أيار 2007).

على، 2010 اللذان دخلا حيز التنفيذ في العام، 1650 و 1649 الإسرائيليان رقم لقد سهّل الأوامر العسكرية السلطات الإسرائيلية نقل أو ترحيل الفلسطينيين بشكل قسري من الضفة الغربية إلى قطاع غزة أو خارج الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة، مما وتأتي. (2010 حزيران/يونيو/نيسان، مايو/مؤسسة الحق، أبريل) يعرض الآلاف من الفلسطينيين لخطر النزوح مما أدى إلى سحب حقوق الإقامة 1967 هذه السلطات الجديدة على خلفية تشريعات يعود تاريخها إلى العام (لـ 150.000 فلسطيني (مؤسسة الحق، أبريل/نيسان 2010؛ صحيفة هآرتس، مايو/أيار 2011).

إلى الاحتياجات الأساسية حماية الأشخاص النازحين وقدرة الوصول

يواجه الفلسطينيون المقيمون في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة كافة، سواء كانوا نازحين أو لا، شواغل خطيرة في ما يتعلق بالحماية، بما في ذلك العنف المتكرر والقيود المفروضة على تحركاتهم والسياسات مدنياً من 35 ر بين الإسرائيليين والفلسطينيين إلى مقتل والأنظمة التمييزية. وقد قد أدى الصراع المباشر إسرائيلياً 45 فلسطيني و 1.500 كما أصيب أكثر من 2010 من الإسرائيليين خلال العام 4 الفلسطينيين و حادثة انطوت على تورط 400 فلسطيني قد أصيبوا أو تضررت ممتلكاتهم في أكثر من 300 كما أن ما لا يقل عن على قطاع 2008-2009 وقد أسفر هجوم العام. (2011 آذار/مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس) مستوطنين مكتب تنسيق) لافطالو ءاسنلا نم أبيرقت مهفنن، 5.000 شخص وجرح أكثر من 1.000 غزة عن مقتل أكثر من (الشؤون الإنسانية، فبراير/شباط 2009).

وقد أفاد أكثر من م الاستقرار بالنسبة إلى العديد من الفلسطينيين لقد أدى النزوح إلى فترات طويلة من عدم أنهم قد اضطروا إلى الانتظار ما لا يقل عن 2007 نصف النازحين في الضفة الغربية الذين تمّ شملهم في مسح أجري في العام وفي قطاع . (09 السنتين قبل إيجاد مسكن دائم من جديد (منظمة إنقاذ الطفولة، أكتوبر/تشرين الأول 20 غزة، كان ما يصل إلى 40.000 شخص لا يزالون نازحين بعد مرور عامين، إذ أن الحظر المفروض من قبل إسرائيل على استيراد مواد البناء لم يترك لهم أي خيار سوى الإقامة مع أقربائهم أو في شقق مستأجرة أو في (ن رايتمس ووتش، مايو/أيار 2010 مساكن مؤقتة بجانب أنقاض منازلهم أو في مخيمات (هيوم

لقد أدت عمليات هدم المنازل إلى انقطاع الأطفال عن دراستهم واضطرابهم إلى تحمّل مستويات معيشية متدنية ومحدودية قدرة الوصول إلى الخدمات الأساسية. وبعد مرور ستة أشهر على نزوحهم، كان لا يزال البعض يعاني من مشاكل نفسية وفي قطاع غزة، يواجه الأطفال الذين سبق وعانوا من صدمات ما (2009 نيسان/أيار) إنقاذ الطفولة، أبريل وسلوكية (منظ مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم) بعد النزوح وانعدام الأمن المزمّن ارتفاعاً في نسبة العنف المنزلي في أوساط الأسر النازحة لمتحدة الإنمائي للمرأة، 2009؛ مكتب تنسيق الشؤون المتحدة، 15 سبتمبر/أيلول 2009، صندوق الأمم الإنسانية، مايو/أيار 2009). وفي ذروة الهجوم، أكثر من نصف هؤلاء النازحين كانوا من الأطفال (منظمة إنقاذ الطفولة، أبريل/نيسان 2009).

عائلات منازلها قد أسفر النزوح عن آثار كبيرة على سبل رزق المتضررين منه. فقد فقدت الكثير من ال غير" وغيرها من الممتلكات، وفي حالات الهدم، فهي تتكبد نفقات كبيرة بشكل غرامات على البناء وفي الضفة الغربية، غالباً ما تستمرّ الأسر. وتكاليف الهدم التي تلزمها السلطات الإسرائيلية بتسديدتها "القانوني ا يضطربهم في العديد من الحالات إلى الاستدانة (مكتب تنسيق الشؤون يدفع أقساط منازلهم لفترة طويلة بعد هدمها، ممّ

الإنسانية، مارس/آذار 2011). وفي قطاع غزة، يواجه النازحون الذين تقع أراضيهم في المنطقة العازلة صعوبات كبيرة في الوصول إليها، في حين لا يزال كثيرون آخرون يعيشون في منازل متضررة أو مؤقتة يثق الشؤون الإنسانية، أكتوبر/تشرين الأول 2009 ونوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2009؛ رابطة مكتسب تنس) (الوكالات الإنمائية الدولية، 3 سبتمبر/أيلول و9 نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2009).

كما أن الأشخاص الأكثر عرضة لخطر النزوح، مثل أولئك الذين يعيشون في غور الأردن ومناطق التماس زلة في قطاع غزة، يواجهون أيضاً قدرأ أكبر من الشواغل والمخاوف من جهة الحماية، فضلاً عن العزلة الاقتصادية والمنطقة العازلة غالباً ما لا تكون المساعدات من (2009 تشرين الأول/منظمة إنقاذ الطفولة، أكتوبر) والاجتماعية والثقافية ق النائية من الضفة الغربية. فقد أفاد أكثر من نصف المنظمات المحلية والدولية متاحة، لا سيما في المناطق أسر النازحين الذين شملهم المسح في الضفة الغربية في العام 2009 عن عدم تلقيهم لأي مساعدات إنسانية (على الإطلاق) (منظمة إنقاذ الطفولة، أكتوبر/تشرين الأول 2009).

الحلول الدائمة

ادوا إلى ديارهم الأصلية أو اللاجئين الذين يعيشون حالات نزوح ثانوية مما من أرقام محددة للنازحين الذين ع إن حالات التعويض أو العودة القليلة التي تمت في الضفة الغربية إنما شملت بشكل عام (الذين اضطروا إلى النزوح من جديد) معظم حالات النزوح قد المنطقتين "أ" و"ب" الخاضعتين لولاية السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية، في حين أن وقعت في المنطقة "ج" والقدس الشرقية. أما في قطاع غزة، فقد تعرقلت عمليات العودة بسبب الحظر المفروض على استيراد مواد البناء والتوسع المستمر في المنطقة العازلة.

الم الحلول الدائمة المحتملة أن تكون المفاوضات بشأن المركز النهائي هي المنطلق الرئيسي لتحديد مع المتاحة لكل من النازحين واللاجئين على حد سواء. يجدر بهذه المفاوضات الخضوع للإطار القانوني الدولي لا سيما القانون الإنساني وقانون حقوق الإنسان على النحو المنصوص عليه في "المبادئ التوجيهية بشأن ه" للمخاطر المترتبة على أي "عملية سلام بين جهات غير متساوية ينبغي للمجتمع الدولي التنبؤ". التشريد الداخلي (لا تلتزم بهذه المعايير (مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة، يناير/كانون الثاني 2008).

قدرة وصول المساعدات الإنسانية

موظفو هذه الوكالات العاملون في الضفة. تواجه الوكالات الإنسانية عدداً من العقبات التي تحول دون تقديم المساعدة الغربية بحاجة إلى تصريح لدخول القدس الشرقية، كما أن قدرتهم على الوصول إلى المناطق الأخرى تصطدم مكتب) هي الأكثر تأثراً بهذا الوضع "ج" إن الوكالات التي تحاول العمل في المنطقة. بالإقالات وغيرها من القيود سانية، مايو/أيار 2010). أما عمل الوكالات الناشطة في قطاع غزة، فيصطدم بالحصارت تنسيق الشؤون الإن الإسرائيلي والمنطقة العازلة وعدم إمكانية الاعتماد أو التنبؤ بقدرة الوصول والقيود الإدارية المرهقة (مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس/آذار 2010؛ أوكسفام، نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2010).

لقد اضطرت الوكالات الإنسانية أيضاً إلى أن توخي الحذر واحترام سياسة عدم الاتصال بحركة حماس التي يصر عليها المجتمع الدولي ودور المنظمات في تنسيق عمليات تقديم المساعدة (شبكة الممارسات الإنسانية، سبتمبر/أيلول 2009). كما استجابة الإنسانية من خلال مصادرة شحنات المساعدات الإنسانية أن حركة حماس نفسها قد أعاققت بدورها الا ،وتعليق بعض البرامج (مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، مارس/آذار 2010؛ شبكة الممارسات الإنسانية (سبتمبر/أيلول 2009؛ المركز الفلسطيني لحقوق الإنسان، يونيو/حزيران 2010).

منظمات غير الحكومية لادولية لإي تسليط الضوء على تأثير القيود المفروضة منذ قبل لا نم عمجت دمع، 2011 في منتصف العام 4.5 إسرائيل على قدرة وصول ونوعية التدخلات الإنسانية والإنمائية، وقدر التكلفة السنوية لهذه الآثار على الجهات المانحة الدولية بنحو (وليبة، يونيو/حزيران 2011 مليون دولار أميركي (رابطة الوكالات الإنمائية الد

الاستجابات الوطنية والدولية

استجابة إسرائيل بصفتها سلطة الاحتلال

لقد أدانت المنظمات الدولية والمنظمات غير الحكومية بشكل متكرر الاحتلال الإسرائيلي للأراضي الفلسطينية باعتباره خرقاً للقانون الدولي (المتحدة، يناير/كانون الثاني 2008 ويناير/كانون الثاني 2011 مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم) وبصفتها السلطة القائمة بالاحتلال، لدى إسرائيل التزامات بموجب القانون الإنساني الدولي وقانون حقوق الإنسان (مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة، يناير/كانون الثاني 2011، فبراير/شباط 2009؛ محكمة

مما يعني أنها المسؤولة عن (2008 أيار/؛ اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر، مايو/2004 تموز/العدل الدولية، يوليو/ تلبية الاحتياجات الأساسية لسكان الأراضي المحتلة. وفي حال عدم تمكنها أو رغبتها في الامتثال لهذه الأراضى (اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر، 2009؛ مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة، يناير/كانون الثاني 2008).

غير أن السياسات التي تطبقها إسرائيل في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة تبقى هي السبب الرئيسي فهي لا تعترف في غالبية الأحيان بالظاهرة كما أ لقانون حقوق الإنسان والقانون الإنساني للنزوح التعسفي الذي يشكل انتهاكاً، بديل/ المركز الفلسطيني لمصادر حقوق المواطنين واللاجئين) أنها لا تقدم حلولاً لها، سواء دائمة أو غير ذلك؛ مكتب تنسيق 2009 يول/سبتمبر/أيلول 2007؛ مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة، سبتمبر/أكتوبر 2009 وفي بعض الحالات القليلة، تم دفع التعويضات للمتضررين جراء بناء جدار الفصل، غير أن (2009 أيار/الشؤون الإنسانية، مايو/المتقدمين بطلبات التعويض يضطرون إلى الخضوع لإجراءات ومتطلبات هائلة قبل الحصول عليها) مركز وكانت المحكمة العليا الإسرائيلية قد تناولت في بعض الحالات أسباب النزوح من خلال (2008 رصد النزوح الدولي، مارس/أذار/إصدار أمر بإعادة توجيه مسار الجدار، غير أن المحاكم الإسرائيلية المدنية والعسكرية قد أيدت قرارات الحكومة في الغالبية العظمى من مركز المعلومات - مبر/تشرين الثاني 2009؛ بتسليم الحالات) مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، نوف/المرکز القانوني لحقوق الأقلية - الإسرائيلي لحقوق الإنسان في الأراضي المحتلة، مارس/أذار 2006؛ عدالة (العربية في إسرائيل، يوليو/تموز 2008).

استجابة السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية وحركة حماس

نية الفلسطينية بالأضطرابات السياسية وضعف الحكم وحد ولايتها بالمنظمتين لطالما تخيطت السلطة الوطنية غير أنها قد قدمت المساعدة القانونية والمالية إلى ضحايا عمليات هدم المنازل والمجمعات والأزمات المالية المتكررة "ب" و "أ" المركز الفلسطيني لمصادر حقوق/بديل المحلية المعرضة لخطر النزوح بما يتوافق مع إمكانياتها المحدودة (ب تشرين/أكتوبر 2008 آذار/؛ مركز رصد النزوح الداخلي، مارس/2007 أيلول/سبتمبر 12، المواطنين واللاجئين وقد شملت السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية الحالية بقيادة حركة فتح دعماً للمتضررين من جدار الفصل وهدم المنازل (2010 الأول لإسرائيلية المتصلة بإصدار الوثائق الرسمية) السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية، 2 مارس/أذار/السياسات منذ تولي حماس السيطرة على قطاع غزة، أدى النقص في التمويل والضعف في التنسيق بين (2009 على حد المنظمات الفلسطينية إلى الحؤول دون تقديم المساعدة لكل من مجموعات النازحين وغير النازحين، سواء. غير أن حركة حماس قد سعت إلى مساعدة النازحين من خلال إعانات الإيجار والتعويضات وإعادة التأهيل كما أنها تقوم بدور محوري في تنسيق جهود إعادة الإعمار (وكالة فرانس برس، 24 يناير/كانون الثاني 2009؛ صحيفة هآرتس، يناير/كانون الثاني 2011 مركز رصد النزوح الداخلي، ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2010؛

تتولى حركة حماس قيادة جهود إعادة الإعمار، وكانت قد أعلنت في يناير/كانون الثاني 2011 عن خطط لبناء وحدة سكنية (المجموعة المشتركة بين الوكالات المعنية بالإيواء، يناير/كانون الثاني 2011). غير 1.000 منزلاً، حسبما أفيد في 20 لانتقادات شديدة بسبب تدمير ما لا يقل عن 2010 العام أنها قد تعرضت في منتصف، المركز الفلسطيني لحقوق الإنسان) شخصاً 150 محاولة لكبح البناء غير القانوني، مما تسبب في نزوح (مايو/أيار 2010؛ قناة الجزيرة، يوليو/تموز 2010).

الاستجابة الدولية

في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة متخصصة في تقديم المساعدة والحماية للنازحين داخلياً، مما أدى إلى وجود نقص في ما من وكالة عاملة وفي هذا المجال على الرغم من الجهود الإضافية التي بذلت في السنوات الأخيرة من أجل تنسيق الاستجابة لفرعي المشترك بين الوكالات المعني بالنزوح لماعلا قيرفلا سياسات مت 2007 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر (القسري تحت رعاية الفريق العامل المعني بالحماية) شبكة الممارسات الإنسانية، سبتمبر/أيلول 2009 يتسم الفريق العامل الفرعي المعني بالنزوح القسري بعضوية واسعة، وهو يهدف إلى ضمان قيام استجابة، مناشدة المجتمع الدولي للتصدي لهذه الظاهرة (شبكة الممارسات الإنسانية تفعالة لمختلف مراحل النزوح و (سبتمبر/أيلول 2009).

إن اندماج الحماية للفلسطينيين، بما في ذلك النازحون والأشخاص المعرضون لخطر النزوح، فضلاً عن إفلات الجهات المتسببة بالنزوح من لفريق العامل الفرعي المعني بالنزوح القسري (شبكة الممارسات العقاب، يشكلان تحدياً خطيراً بالنسبة إلى الإنسانية، سبتمبر/أيلول 2009) في بيئة تشغيلية لا تزال مقيدة بشدة جراء السياسات الإسرائيلية راضي لقد تم تطبيق نظام المجموعات، وهي مبادرة تهدف إلى ضمان قيام تنسيق أفضل للاستجابة الإنسانية الدولية، في الأ الفلسطينية المحتلة في العام 2009. كما أن عملية النداء الموحد للأمم المتحدة قد جعلت من مسألة النزوح (القسري واحدة بين عدة أولويات) مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، 30 نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2010).

والولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الأوروبي، مراراً وتكراراً لقد أدان المجتمع الدولي، بما في ذلك الأمين العام للأمم المتحدة الإجراءات التي تتخذها إسرائيل في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة، خاصة في القدس الشرقية (مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة، مارس/آذار 2010). وعلى الرغم من أن الوكالات الدولية والمنظمات غير حبت بمثل هذه التصريحات، فالكثير منها ينتقد أيضاً هذا المضي بعدم اتخاذ أي إجراء في مواجهة الانتهاكات الإسرائيلية الحكومية قدر المستمرة للقانون الدولي، بما في ذلك النزوح التعسفي (مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة، فين، فبراير/شباط 2011؛ منظمة "كير" الدولية/يناير/كانون الثاني 2011؛ مؤسسة الحق ومجموعة من المؤل ومجموعة من المؤلفين، فبراير/شباط 2008؛ أوكسفام ومجموعة من المؤلفين، ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2009؛ (مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة، 15 سبتمبر/أيلول 2009).

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Background

Chronology of Events 1948 - 2011

- In June 1967, Israel occupies Sinai of Egypt; Gaza Strip, and West Bank (including East Jerusalem), and Golan Heights of Syria. Security Council calls upon Israel to withdraw from Occupied territories in resolution 242 enunciating land for peace principle, repeated in Resolution 338. Following the 1973 war, negotiations leads to peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and an armistice between Israel and Syria.
- The UN General Assembly recognised the Palestinians' right to sovereignty in Resolution 3236. In 1979-1980, Security Council resolutions condemned the establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem as contravening international law.
- In 1988, the Palestine National Council formally committed the PLO to a two-state solution, called for an international peace conference on the basis of UN resolutions 242 and 338 and for Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967.
- In 1987-1993, in back drop of hardening Israeli policies of occupation, the first mass Palestinian uprising— Intifada—against the Israeli occupation began in Gaza Strip and quickly spread to the West Bank. It took the form of civil disobedience and stone-throwing against the heavily-armed Israeli troops.
- Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 reinitiated bilateral and multilateral negotiation tracks, culminating in the Oslo Accords in 1995 which established the Palestinian Authority and granted Palestinians right to self government in Gaza Strip and in Jericho in the West Bank. Palestinian National Authority was established in 1996 following elections of the Palestinian National Council, and Yasser Arafat was elected President.
- By 1999, the schedule outlined in the Oslo Accords was not adhered to, with further withdrawals hindered by disagreements over final status issues. Tensions and failure of arriving at political settlement would lead to second intifada – also known as al Aqsa intifada in 2000.
- Following Hamas election in the Palestinian Legislative Elections in January 2006, Israel and international community boycott the Palestinian National Authority. Intra-Palestinian tensions escalate through 2006 to 2007 culminating in June 2007 in Hamas taking control of Gaza Strip, and formation of new government by the Palestinian President.
- Shortly thereafter, the international community pledge support to the Palestinian National Authority, with the United States leading Annapolis peace conference held in November 2007 while the international community boycotted Hamas led authority in Gaza Strip increasingly under blockade/sanctions.
- On 27 December 2008, following a gradual escalation in violence in November, Israel launched the large-scale military Operation "Cast Lead" on Gaza Strip, marking the most victims and displacement since 1967. Palestinian authority withdraws from direct peace talks as result of the Israeli offensive in Gaza Strip. The Goldstone Report was formally presented to the HRC in September 2009. On 5 November, the UN General Assembly called upon Israel and the Palestinians to undertake investigation into serious violations.
- Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas decided to postpone elections scheduled for 24 January 2010, allegedly due to frustration by the lack of progress in peace negotiations and because of the opposition of Hamas. In June 2010, The Human Rights Council adopted a

resolution condemning the 31 May Gaza flotilla incident and calling for an independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the incident

- In September 2010 direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations resumed in Washington DC with a one-year time limit, however talks soon fail as Israeli settlement construction resumes. In February 2011, a draft resolution originally tabled on 18 January condemning Israeli settlement activity was vetoed by the US with the other 14 members of the Council voting in favour.
- In April 2011, Fateh and Hamas announced reconciliation efforts were successful and the formation of unity government, however difficulties persisted. In May 2011, Egyptian government announced the permanent opening of the Rafah border with Gaza Strip, though restrictions remained.

24 February 2011	UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry briefed the Council and called for credible and effective international intervention in the peace process.
18 February 2011	A draft resolution originally tabled on 18 January condemning Israeli settlement activity was vetoed by the US with the other 14 members of the Council voting in favour.
23 January 2011	<p>The Israeli government-appointed <u>Turkel Commission</u> released its first report, which concluded that Israel did not contravene international law and Israeli soldiers acted in self-defence during the flotilla raid in 2010. The report also said that Israel's blockade is lawful.</p> <p>A <u>press release</u> from the Turkish government characterised the Israeli actions on 31 May 2010 and its blockade of Gaza as devoid of legal basis. It also recalled that the facts of the incident were confirmed by the Human Rights Council's fact-finding mission (Israel did not cooperate with this mission).</p>
19 January 2011	Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe <u>briefed</u> the Council before its regular open debate, noting growing tensions evidenced by a significant increase in rockets and mortars being fired from Gaza into Israel and Israeli incursions and airstrikes into Gaza.
13 January 2011	Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said the conditions to restore relations with Israel were an apology and compensation for the families of the nine people killed in the flotilla incident.
10 January 2011	Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed growing international concern about unilateral expansion of illegal Israeli settlements.
9 January 2011	<p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected criticism of settlement activity in East Jerusalem by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton while the EU foreign policy head Catherine Ashton stated that "settlements are illegal under international law, undermine trust between the parties and constitute an obstacle to peace."</p> <p>The Palestinian foreign minister confirmed an ongoing diplomatic effort to secure as much international recognition of an independent Palestinian state as possible by September 2011.</p>

7 January 2011	Chile recognised Palestine as an independent state following several other South American recognitions of Palestine in late 2010, including Brazil.
5 January 2011	A Wikileaks of a March 2008 US diplomatic cable indicated that Israeli policy had been to keep the Gaza economy on the “brink of collapse.”
2 January 2011	Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu urged Palestinians to focus on negotiations for a final peace deal rather than focus on settlements
31 December 2010	Abbas announced the time had come for a new peace plan which should be framed by the Quartet and based on UN Security Council resolutions.
21 December 2010	A draft resolution was submitted to the Council by Lebanon on behalf of the Arab Group addressing Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory and peace negotiations.
15 December 2010	Abbas briefed the Arab League in Cairo which subsequently announced that resumption of talks would require assurances of a serious offer to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. The US House of Representatives unanimously passed a non-binding resolution calling on the US to not recognise a unilaterally declared Palestine and veto any UN Security Council resolution to establish or recognise Palestine outside of a negotiated agreement.
13 December 2010	US Middle East Envoy George Mitchell returned to the region to discuss the situation with Israeli and Palestinian leaders.
5 - 6 December 2010	Turkish and Israeli officials met in Geneva in an effort to repair relations. However, the process collapsed after the Israeli foreign minister intervened and rejected compromise on the issue.
December 2010	A US plan for a ninety-day partial settlement moratorium in exchange for a package of US incentives was abandoned after its rejection by Israel.
23 November 2010	Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe briefed the Council stressing the importance of a return to Israeli-Palestinian talks, and calling on Israel to halt all illegal settlement construction and to fulfill its Roadmap obligations.
22 November 2010	The Israeli Knesset passed a bill requiring a two-thirds majority in parliament before withdrawal from East Jerusalem or the Golan Heights and a national referendum if that majority is not satisfied.
26 September 2010	The Israeli settlement moratorium expired without any extension and building in settlements restarted.
21 September 2010	A Quartet statement was issued that strongly supported direct talks and commended the Israeli settlement moratorium and urged its continuation.
17 September 2010	Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry briefed the Council on the direct Israeli-Palestinian talks and reaffirmed the UN position that Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories is illegal under international law.
2 September 2010	Direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations resumed in Washington DC with a one-year time limit. (Previous direct talks were terminated after Israeli incursions into Gaza in December 2008.)
20 August 2010	The Quartet issued a <u>statement</u> that negotiations should resolve

	all final status issues leading to a settlement that ends the occupation which began in 1967 and results in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state. It also noted a one year time-frame for negotiations.
17 August 2010	Assistant-Secretary-General Oscar Fernandez-Taranco briefed the Security Council (S/PV.6372).
2 August 2010	The Secretary-General announced his Panel of Inquiry into the 31 May Gaza flotilla incident (S/2010/414) which the Council welcomed on 3 August (SC/10001). The Panel held its first meeting in New York on 10 August.
29 July 2010	The Arab League offered its endorsement of direct Israeli-Palestinian talks conditioned on a clear time frame, specific terms of reference and a monitoring mechanism.
21 July 2010	Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe briefed the Council on the Middle East followed by an open debate (S/PV.6363 and resumption 1).
21 June 2010	The Quartet welcomed the shift in Israel's blockade of Gaza and urged that all goods to be delivered through land crossings.
20 June 2010	Israel announced an adjustment to the Gaza blockade—shifting from a positive list (goods that are allowed) to a negative list (goods that are banned)—after growing international pressure from the US, EU, and the UN in the weeks following the Gaza flotilla incident.
2 June 2010	The Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the 31 May Gaza flotilla incident and calling for an independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the incident (A/HRC/RES/14/1).
1 June 2010	The Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/9) calling for an impartial investigation into the 31 May Gaza flotilla incident.
31 May 2010	Israeli naval forces boarded a six-ship flotilla in international waters. The flotilla's intent was to break the Israeli naval blockade and deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza. A confrontation on the Mavi Marmara resulted in nine civilian deaths, all Turkish nationals including one dual US-Turkish national.
18 May 2010	Special Coordinator Robert Serry briefed the Council (S/PV.6315) on the start of US-mediated proximity talks and the need for a different and more positive strategy towards Gaza.
14 April 2010	The Security Council held an open debate after the briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe, who said that a crisis of confidence between the parties had prevented a resumption of peace talks (S/PV.6298 and resumption 1).
24 March 2010	The Secretary-General briefed the Council on the meeting of the Quartet in Moscow, his own visit to the region and his intention to attend the Arab League Summit in Libya in late March.
19 March 2010	The Quartet met in Moscow.
5 March 2010	Speaking to the press, the president of the Security Council expressed Council "concern at the current tense situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem".
18 February 2010	Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe briefed the Council expressing concern regarding stalled negotiations and urged Israel and the Palestinian Authority to accept US Special Envoy George Mitchell's proposal for proximity talks.

27 January 2010	Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Oscar Fernández-Taranco briefed the Council followed by an <u>open debate</u> on the Middle East.
25 January 2010	Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced a committee had been formed to investigate Human Rights violations.
22 January 2010	Israel reimbursed for damage to UN facilities during the conflict, resolving the financial aspects arising from a UN Board of Inquiry investigation. Israel did not accept legal responsibility for the incidents.
20 January 2010	US Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, George Mitchell, travelled to the region to meet Israelis and Palestinians in a continued effort to get the parties back to the negotiating table.
25 November 2009	Israel announced a ten-month slow-down in settlement activity. However, it excluded East Jerusalem and also permitted natural growth in existing settlements.
5 November 2009	The General Assembly endorsed the <u>Goldstone Report</u> in <u>resolution 64/10</u> and requested the Secretary-General to report on implementation of the resolution “with a view to considering further action...including [by] the Security Council.”
16 October 2009	The HRC endorsed <u>the Goldstone Report’s</u> recommendations.
7 October 2009	The Council held closed consultations at the request of Libya to discuss the Goldstone Report.
29 September 2009	The Goldstone report was formally presented to the Human Rights Council but a decision on a Palestinian draft resolution endorsing the Goldstone report’s recommendations in full was deferred to its next session in March 2010.
22 September 2009	Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas attended a tri-lateral meeting with US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
17 September 2009	The Council was informed during its regular monthly briefing that President Abbas had signaled his intention to hold elections in January 2010.
15 September 2009	The UN released its report on the Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (<u>the Goldstone Report</u>).
14 August 2009	In Gaza, over one hundred people were injured and 28 deaths resulted from fighting between Hamas and an armed radical group that had criticised Hamas for failing to attack Israel more vigorously and for not imposing strict Sharia law.
26 June 2009	The Quartet meets in Trieste, Italy.
5 May 2009	The Secretary-General submitted a summary of the report of the UN Board of Inquiry into nine incidents involving UN facilities and personnel in Gaza between 27 December and 19 January.
22 April 2009	Israel released the results of internal investigations into its role in Gaza. Some mistakes were acknowledged but the investigations found that the Israeli army acted according to international law during its operation in Gaza.
3 April 2009	The Human Rights Council announced the appointment of Richard Goldstone to lead the fact-finding mission to investigate human rights and humanitarian law violations related to the recent conflict in Gaza.
24 March 2009	In Israel, the Labour party joined the government coalition led by Benjamin Netanyahu.
19 March 2009	Israeli newspapers published accounts by Israeli soldiers alleging mistreatment of Palestinian civilians.

16 March 2009	A group of eminent international judges and investigators <u>called</u> on the Secretary-General to establish a UN commission of inquiry to investigate serious violations of international humanitarian in the conflict and recommend on prosecution of those responsible.
13 March 2009	After a meeting of experts in London, the UK, the US, Canada Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway agreed on a <u>programme of action</u> to stop the flow of weapons to Gaza.
10 March 2009	The committees established on 26 February began work in Cairo.
2 March 2009	An international donors' conference on reconstruction in Gaza was held in Sharm el-Sheikh. \$4.48 billion was pledged, to be paid over the next two years.
27 February 2009	US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that reconciliation will not mean progress unless Hamas accepts Israel's right to exist and previous peace agreements.
26 February 2009	13 Palestinian groups including Hamas and Fatah agreed to form five committees to address security services in Gaza and the West Bank, the formation of a unity government, reform of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the holding of elections, and reconciliation.
12 February 2009	The Secretary-General announced that a Board of Inquiry, led by Ian Martin and composed of four members, had begun its work investigating incidents involving death and damage at UN premises in Gaza between 27 December and 19 January.
10 February 2009	Parliamentary elections took place in Israel. President Shimon Peres asked the leader of the opposition Likud party, Benjamin Netanyahu, to form a new government.
29 January 2009	The UN launched an appeal for \$613 million for Gaza's relief and reconstruction.
21-25 January 2009	Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes visited the Middle East following the ceasefire.
21 January 2009	Israel's full troop pullout from the Gaza strip was completed. The Palestinian Authority recognised the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and requested it to investigate war crimes by all sides during the conflict.
20 January 2009	The Secretary-General visited Gaza and said the UN would work with any united Palestinian government to rebuild.
18 January 2009	French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak co-headed by a summit between Arab and European leaders with the aim to consolidate the ceasefire.
18 January 2009	Hamas agreed to a one-week ceasefire.
17 January 2009	Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire.
16 January 2009	Israeli tanks redeployed to the periphery of Gaza City.
16 January 2009	US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed a bilateral accord with Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni aimed at preventing arms smuggling into Gaza.
16 January 2009	The General Assembly adopted a resolution (<u>A/ES-10/L.21/Rev.1</u>) demanding an immediate end to the Gaza conflict and full respect for Security Council resolution 1860.

15 January 2009	Israeli tanks entered Gaza City and UNRWA was hit by Israeli shells.
14 January 2009	Ban Ki-moon began a mission to the Middle East to strengthen diplomatic efforts to obtain a ceasefire. He met with officials in Cairo, Amman, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Ankara and Damascus and attended the Arab-European summit held in Sharm el-Sheikh on 18 January and the Arab Economic Summit held in Kuwait on 19 January.
12 January 2009	At a news conference on 12 January Ban laid out key points for settling the crisis: agreement on an immediate ceasefire with, at a minimum, a halt to rocket attacks by Hamas militants and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza; international cooperation to stop the smuggling of weapons into Gaza; full re-opening of border crossings into Gaza; and reconstruction after violence ends.
10 January 2009	Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas met Egyptian President Mubarak in Cairo. Egypt said it would not accept foreign troops on its side of the border with Gaza to stop arms smuggling.
9 January 2009	Three Hamas leaders went to Cairo to hold negotiations in view of reaching a ceasefire agreement with Israel.
8 January 2009	The UN suspended food deliveries in Gaza after a UN truck came under Israeli fire which led to the death of two UNWRA staff.
6 January 2009	French President Nicolas Sarkozy met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and together they proposed a <u>three-point plan</u> to solve the crisis.
6 January 2009	Israeli ordinance struck a UN school housing displaced persons in the Jabaliya refugee camp, killing between thirty and forty people. Israel said that it had come under mortar fire from inside the school.
5 January 2009	The Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Qatar, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt and Morocco and Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa arrived in New York to push for a Security Council resolution.
3 January 2009	Israel began a ground incursion into the Gaza Strip.
31 December 2008	The EU and the Quartet called for a permanent ceasefire. The US emphasised that it should be durable and sustainable, compelling Hamas to end its rocket attacks. Arab foreign ministers met in Cairo in an emergency session of the Arab League.
30 December 2008	The EU issued a statement proposing an immediate ceasefire, humanitarian action and stepping up the peace process, including the inter-Palestinian reconciliation.
29 December 2008	Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on both Israel and Hamas to halt violence and curb inflammatory rhetoric while Palestinian and Egyptian UN Ambassadors asked the Council to bring Israel into compliance with its press statement SC/9559 .
27 December 2008	Israel began an intense air campaign (operation "Cast Lead") against Gaza with the aim to prevent further rocket firing from Hamas. The Council held an emergency meeting at the demand of Libya.
19 December 2008	The six-month ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip expired.

16 December 2008	Following the convening of the Quartet in New York, the Council held a meeting on the situation in the Middle East (S/PV.6045) with the presence of the Quartet principals (Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana). The Council adopted <u>resolution 1850</u> , declaring its support for the Annapolis peace process and its commitment to the irreversibility of bilateral negotiations.
3 December 2008	The Council held a meeting at the request of Libya (S/2008/754) to discuss the interception by Israeli gunboats of a Libyan ship carrying humanitarian aid bound for the port of Gaza (S/PV.6030).
25 June 2008	A Palestinian rocket attack on southern Israel took place. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (a group aligned with Fatah) claimed responsibility. Israel responded by again closing the borders.
24 June 2008	The Quartet (consisting of the EU, the UN, Russia and the US) met in Berlin and issued a statement urging the parties to refrain from any steps that undermine confidence or could prejudice the outcome of the current peace negotiations.
23 June 2008	French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who was visiting Israel, said that there can be no peace without stopping settlements.
19 June 2008	An Egyptian-mediated six-month ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in Gaza took effect. Israel agreed to cease its blockade of the Gaza strip.
15 June 2008	US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that Israel's announcement had a negative effect on current peace talks.
2 June 2008	The Secretary-General voiced deep concern at an Israeli announcement of plans to build 1,300 new housing units in East Jerusalem, calling on Israel to freeze all activity, including natural growth, and to dismantle outposts erected since March 2001.
1 and 2 March 2008	Council members held a weekend session to discuss the growing violence in the Gaza Strip and southern Israel in response to a Libyan request for a meeting to address the situation.
27 November 2007	Over forty states and international organisations gathered in Annapolis. President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert agreed to a joint understanding committing themselves to an intensive negotiating process with a view to concluding a peace agreement before the end of 2008 "...resolving all outstanding issues, including all core issues without exception."
March 2007	US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited the Middle East.
21 February 2007	The Middle East Quartet met in Berlin.
2 and 9 February 2007	The Middle East Quartet met in Washington D.C.
4 January 2007	Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Israeli Prime Minister Olmert met in Sharm el-Sheikh to revive the peace process.
January 2007	Violence erupted between Palestinian rival factions Hamas and Fatah after President Abbas announced plans to call early elections following the collapse of unity government talks with Hamas.

23 December 2006	Mahmoud Abbas met with Ehud Olmert in Jerusalem to discuss the reviving of the peace process
25 November 2006	An agreement was reached between Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas to establish a mutual ceasefire in Gaza.
17 November 2006	The General Assembly convened in an emergency special session.
15 November 2006	The Middle East Quartet met in Cairo.
15 November 2006	A special session of the Human Rights Council was convened to address the situation in Gaza.
9 November 2006	An urgent meeting of the Security Council, called for by the Arab Group, was convened.
8 November 2006	Eighteen Palestinians, mostly women and children, were killed. Mahmoud Abbas said a massacre had been committed and demanded intervention by the UN.
1 November 2006	The Israeli army carried out air strikes and encircled the town of Beit Hanoun.
28 June 2006	Israel launched an operation in the Gaza Strip to recover the Israeli soldier kidnapped by Hamas and stop Qassam rocket fire into Israel. It turned into a large-scale conventional battle between Hamas and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) that lasted until November. The operation did not succeed either in recovering the kidnapped soldier or in stopping the rocket attacks.
25 June 2006	Hamas kidnapped an Israeli soldier and killed two others, demanding the release of Palestinian prisoners.
9 May 2006	The Quartet endorsed a temporary mechanism to funnel assistance directly to the Palestinian people, bypassing the newly elected Hamas government.
March-December 2006	After the Fatah movement of the Palestinian Authority President, Mahmoud Abbas, refused to join a government led by Hamas, tensions between the two factions escalated. Several Hamas and Fatah leaders were assassinated and violent street clashes erupted in Gaza, leaving many dead.
28 March 2006	Ehud Olmert was elected Israeli Prime Minister.
26 January 2006	Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections and Ismail Haniya, Hamas leader, became the Palestinian Authority Prime Minister. Israel, the US, the EU (considering Hamas a terrorist organisation) and some Arab states suspended all foreign aid, upon which Palestinians depend, promising to resume it if Hamas recognised Israel, accepts agreements made by the defeated Fatah regime and denounces violence. Despite the suspension of aid and border interdictions imposed by Israel, Hamas was able to smuggle enough money into the Palestinian territories to maintain some basic services. The defeated Fatah party maintained control over most of the Palestinian security apparatus.
4 January 2006	Ariel Sharon suffered a massive stroke, leaving the leadership of Israel in the hands of Ehud Olmert.
August-September 2005	Israel pulled out from four West Bank settlements and from Gaza.
8 February 2005	Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, President Mubarak of Egypt and King

	Abdullah II of Jordan met in Sharm el Sheikh. Abbas and Sharon announced an end to violence.
9 January 2005	Mahmoud Abbas was elected President of the Palestinian Authority.
11 November 2004	Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat died.
9 July 2004	The International Court of Justice ruled that the Israeli security barrier violates international law and should be dismantled. The UN General Assembly later adopted a resolution demanding that Israel cease the construction of the wall and dismantle its structure (A/RES/59/124 of 25 January 2005). Israel said it would ignore the resolution.
8 December 2003	The UN General Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/14 asking the International Court of Justice for an opinion on the legality of the Israeli security barrier in the West Bank.
19 November 2003	The Council passed resolution 1515 endorsing the roadmap for peace.
30 April 2003	The Quartet released a roadmap to peace in the Middle East, composed of several phases monitored by the Quartet with the ultimate goal of reaching an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement in 2005. The first phase would be dedicated to ending violence, normalising Palestinian life and building Palestinian institutions. The second phase would focus on consolidating the achievements of the first phase and on the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders. In the last phase, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would be taking place.
January 2003	Following a series of terrorist attacks in Israel, Israel initiated incursions in the Gaza Strip and Nablus with numerous civilian casualties.
10 April 2002	The Quartet, comprising the US, the UN, Russia and the EU, was founded with the aim of mediating the peace process. It issued its first statement calling for a two-state solution.
March-April 2002	In retaliation for a series of suicide bombings, Israel conducted operation "Defensive Wall" re-occupying the West Bank—including the city of Jenin—arresting Palestinian leaders and containing Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat in a compound in Ramallah.
March 2002	Saudi Prince Abdullah announced a peace plan, according to which Israel would withdraw from the occupied territories in return for Arab recognition. On 12 March, the Security Council adopted resolution 1397 , demanding an "immediate cessation of all acts of violence" and "affirming a vision of a region where two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders".
January-March 2002	Palestinian militants carried out an intense campaign of attacks against Israelis.
April 2001	In an effort to calm the violence in Israel/Palestine, the US appointed George Mitchell to lead an inquiry into the uprising. The Mitchell Commission concluded that immediate ceasefire was necessary, along with a complete freeze on Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. CIA director George Tenet negotiated a ceasefire. Neither initiative broke the cycle of bloodshed.

6 February 2001	Ariel Sharon was elected prime minister in Israel by an electorate favouring a tougher approach to Israel's "Palestinian problem". Sharon intensified security measures. Assassinating Palestinian militants, air strikes and military incursions into Palestinian self-rule areas became common. Palestinian militants, meanwhile, stepped up suicide bomb attacks in Israeli cities.
December 2000-January 2001	Peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians began in Washington DC and continued at Taba. They ended inconclusively.
28 September 2000	Palestinians initiated riots after Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount. This was the beginning of the second Intifada.
July 2000	Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, US President Clinton and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat met at Camp David in a failed attempt to complete the final status negotiations.
4 May 1999	The five-year interim period defined by Oslo for a final resolution passed without being fully implemented. Withdrawals from occupied land were hindered by disagreements and final status talks (on Jerusalem, refugees, settlements and borders) stalled.
October 1998	The Wye River Plantation talks under the aegis of US President Bill Clinton resulted in an agreement for further Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank, release of political prisoners and renewed Palestinian commitment to the Oslo accords.
Early 1996-1999	A series of devastating suicide bombings in Israel were carried out by Hamas. Israel's new Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who had been campaigning against the Oslo deals under the motto "peace with security", lifted a freeze on building new settlements in the occupied territories.
January 1996	Elections allowed the Palestinians to set up the Palestine National Authority (PNA) as a negotiating partner representing the Palestinians, and as an administrative authority over the Palestinians. Yasser Arafat was elected President.
4 November 1995	Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli, Yigal Amir.
28 September 1995	The Oslo Interim Agreement was signed. It granted the Palestinians right to self-government on the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho in the West Bank through the creation of the Palestinian Authority. It called for a redeployment of the Israeli Army to allow elections to take place.
26 October 1994	Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty, guaranteeing Jordan the restoration of its occupied land and equitable share of water from the Yarmouk and Jordan rivers, and defining Jordan's western borders. It also had a normalisation and defense and security component. Finally, the treaty outlined a number of areas in which negotiations would continue.
4 May 1994	Israel and the PLO reached an agreement in Cairo on the initial implementation of the 1993 Declaration of Principles. This document specified Israel's military withdrawal and envisaged further withdrawals during a five-year interim period during which solutions to the key issues were to be negotiated—such as the establishment of a Palestinian state, the status of Jerusalem, Jewish settlements in the occupied territories and the fate of more than 3.5 million Palestinian refugees from the 1948 and 1967 wars. Subsequently, Israel withdrew from a

	small area given to Palestinian sovereignty; a larger area was given to Palestinian civil control, while a third area of the West Bank and Gaza Strip remained under total Israeli control. Israel, however did not dismantle any settlements. Terrorist bombings by Hamas increased significantly in the 1990s.
13 September 1993	Israel and the PLO agreed to mutual recognition in the Oslo Declaration of Principles. Yasser Arafat and the PLO were allowed to return to Gaza.
30 October 1991	Initiated by the US, the Madrid Peace Conference for peaceful resolution of the Middle East Conflict gathered Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians. The conference made little progress, but after the Yitzhak Rabin Israeli government came to power in 1992, Israelis and Palestinians opened an independent line of negotiations.
Mid-December 1988	The PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat accepted resolutions 242 and 338 , recognised Israel's right to exist and condemned terrorism. The US agreed to open dialogue with the PLO.
15 November 1988	The Palestine National Council (PNC) of the PLO declared a Palestinian state in absentia and adopted the Palestinian Declaration of Independence. The final communiqué of the PNC formally committed the PLO to a two-state solution, called for an international peace conference on the basis of UN resolutions 242 and 338 and for Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967.
July 1988	Jordan disengaged from the West Bank.
January 1988	The Hamas Islamic Brotherhood was founded, advocating the destruction of Israel.
December 1987-1993	A mass uprising—the first Intifada—against the Israeli occupation began in Gaza and quickly spread to the West Bank. It mainly took the form of civil disobedience and stone-throwing against the heavily-armed Israeli troops.
16-18 September 1982	After a ceasefire agreement, the departing PLO fighters re-established their headquarters in Tunis. The Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, Sabra and Shatila, were left defenseless. They were attacked by the Christian Phalange militia. Hundreds of refugee civilians were killed. The camps were encircled by Israeli troops.
6 October 1981	Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated by Islamic radicals.
1979-1980	The Security Council adopted several resolutions deploring Israel's failure to abide by previous resolutions with particularly strong language against Israel's policy of settlements in the occupied territories. Resolution 446 of 22 March 1979 established a commission composed of three Security Council members to "examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab Territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem." In response to Israel's enactment of a "basic law" in 1980 proclaiming a change in the status of Jerusalem, effectively annexing East Jerusalem, the Council adopted resolution 478 of 20 August 1980.
17 September 1978	Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, meeting in Camp David under the auspices of US President Carter, signed a framework agreement for peace. Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula in exchange

	for peace with Egypt. The peace treaty was signed on 26 March 1979. The return of the Sinai to Egypt was completed in 1982.
22 November 1974	The General Assembly recognised the Palestinians' right to sovereignty in <u>resolution 3236</u> and granted the PLO observer status in <u>resolution 3237</u> . The US rejected official contacts with the PLO until the PLO accepted <u>resolutions 242</u> and <u>338</u> .
29 October 1974	The Arab League meeting in Rabat declared that the PLO was the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
25 October 1973	UNEF II was established with the mandate to supervise the implementation of Security Council <u>resolution 340</u> (1973), which demanded that a ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces be observed and that the parties return to their previous positions. Following the ceasefire, Israel withdrew from parts of the Sinai in stages, and from a small part of the Golan Heights.
22 October 1973	Security Council <u>resolution 338</u> called for a ceasefire and for negotiations for peace.
6 October 1973	In a surprise attack, Egypt retook the Suez Canal and a narrow zone on the other side, and Syria retook the Golan Heights. Following massive US re-supply, Israeli forces pushed back the Syrian army on the Golan Heights and regained the Sinai, eventually making gains beyond the 1967 ceasefire lines. Saudi Arabia led a petroleum embargo against states that supported Israel.
6 September 1970	The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the second largest of the groups forming the PLO, hijacked Swissair, British Overseas Airways Corporation, PanAm and Trans World Airlines flights and diverted them to Jordan. Three hundred and ten passengers were held hostage and freed after governments agreed to release Palestinian prisoners.
September 1970	The PLO, largely based in Jordan, was increasingly seen as a threat to internal security. Military action was taken against the PLO by King Hussein. This resulted in the PLO re-establishing its headquarters in Lebanon and the spawning of other more radical terrorist groups.
3 February 1969	After Fatah gained control of the executive bodies of the PLO, Yasser Arafat was appointed PLO chairman. The organisation's ideology was also refined, particularly in the July 1968 revised National Charter.
1969-1970	Egyptian President Nasser declared that he was no longer bound by the terms of the 1949 armistice. Israel also began the policy of establishing settlements in occupied territories.
22 November 1967	The Council passed <u>resolution 242</u> calling for Israeli withdrawal and establishing the land for peace principle.
August-September 1967	In an Arab summit in Khartoum, Arab leaders resolved that there would be "no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel."
16 May 1967	Egypt instructed UNEF to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and amassed troops on the border, closed the Straits of Tiran to all ships flying Israeli flags, and called for unified Arab action against Israel.
1966	An escalating spiral of raids and retaliations contributed to heightened tensions in the region. Israel's border with Syria and with Jordan was the scene of many military exchanges. In

	November, Egypt entered in a mutual defense agreement with Syria. Israel invaded the West Bank, which was condemned by the Security Council in <u>resolution 228</u> of 25 November.
2 June 1964	Following the first Arab Summit in Cairo in January, attended by 13 Arab states, the PLO was founded with encouragement from Arab states, concerned about coordinating Palestinian guerilla groups and managing the risk of being drawn prematurely into another war with Israel. Ahmad Shuqeiri, the Palestine representative to the Arab League became its first leader and was mandated to come up with a plan for a Palestinian entity.
Around 1959	Yasser Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir and others founded the Palestine Liberation Movement, soon renamed "Fatah" (Conquest). The movement began to take shape at a meeting in Kuwait in October 1957 but apparently did not fully exist until 1962. Like many other small-scale guerilla movements that appeared around that time, Fatah was considered subversive by Arab governments, and had to operate clandestinely.
30 October 1956	Because of vetoes from France and the UK, the Security Council failed to act on the Suezcrisis. The matter was referred to the General Assembly which met in emergency special session from 1 to 10 November. The Assembly called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from occupied territories. It also established the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. Britain and France withdrew from Egypt within a week, replaced by UNEF peacekeepers, and the Israelis left the Sinai in March 1957.
29 October 1956	Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula while British and French forces attacked Egypt.
23 September 1956	France and the UK referred the Suez dispute to the Security Council.
26 July 1956	Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the UK-controlled Suez Canal Company despite British opposition. The UK and the US had previously withdrawn their pledge to support the construction of the Aswan Dam following to Egyptian overtures to the Soviet Union. The Egyptian president intended to finance the dam project using revenue from the Canal. He also closed this vital international waterway to all Israeli shipping.
8 December 1949	The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), was established by General Assembly <u>resolution 302 (IV)</u> .
3 April 1949	Israel and Arab states signed an armistice in separate agreements. Israel gained about 50 percent more territory than was originally allotted to it by the UN Partition Plan. The territory of the British Mandate of Palestine was divided between Israel, Jordan (which annexed East Jerusalem and the West Bank) and Egypt (which took control of the Gaza Strip). Jerusalem was divided.
11 December 1948	The UN General Assembly adopted <u>resolution A/RES/194 (III)</u> calling for the cessation of hostilities and establishing the right of return for the Palestinian refugees (650,000 to 750,000 at that time) and resolving that compensation should be paid to those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property.

17 September 1948	Count Folke Bernadotte was assassinated by members of the Zionist terrorist group the Stern Gang. He was replaced by the American mediator Ralph Bunche.
16 September 1948	Count Folke Bernadotte submitted a proposal peace plan for Palestine on the basis of the partition formula, redrawing the boundaries and attaching Arab Palestine to Transjordan. He stated that the creation of an independent Palestinian state was now unrealistic. The union of Transjordan and Palestine was opposed by the Arabs, in addition to continued Arab rejection of any recognition of the Jewish state, and the Zionists rejected the plan on the basis that it threatened the security of Israel. The plan was then rejected by the UN.
19 July 1948	The second truce in Palestine started and lasted until 15 October.
15 July 1948	The Council adopted <u>resolution 54</u> under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, declaring the situation to be a threat to international peace and security.
11 June 1948	The first truce began, lasting until 8 July.
June 1948	The first group of military observers, known as the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), arrived in the region.
20 May 1948	Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden was appointed UN mediator in Palestine.
15 May 1948	Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia declared war against Israel.
14 May 1948	The state of Israel declared its independence as the British Mandate expired.
23 April 1948	The Security Council established a truce commission in <u>resolution 48</u> , to supervise the cessation of hostilities between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.
1948	During the war, about 750,000 Palestinians, over half the indigenous population (UN estimates), fled or were expelled. This gave birth to the Palestine refugee problem.
29 November[-30 November 1947]	By <u>resolution 181 (II)</u> , the General Assembly adopted the plan to partition the British Mandate of Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish, with Jerusalem placed under a special international regime. Arab countries and the Palestinians rejected the plan. [War subsequently broke out in Palestine]
1 September 1947	UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) issued its report. The majority of the members recommended that Palestine be partitioned into an Arab state and a Jewish state, with a special international status for the city of Jerusalem under UN administrative authority. The three entities were to be linked in an economic union. The minority plan called for an independent federal structure comprising an Arab state and a Jewish state, with Jerusalem as the capital of the federation. No members endorsed the unitary Arab state recommended by the Arab Higher Committee. The Arab Higher Committee rejected the majority proposal; their counterparts in the Jewish Agency accepted it.

Methodology

Methodology: Internal Displacement/Forced Displacement in the OPT

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Relevant definitions in context of Israel and OPT

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center provides two profiles on internally displaced persons (IDPs): one for Israel and one for the Palestinian Territory. The reasons behind this decision are explained below taking note of the respective definitions and applications of refugees according to UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees), the definition of refugees in the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the IDP definition according to the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

Mandate of the UNRWA: A separate regime was created in December 1949 to provide assistance to the Palestinian refugees. The mandate of UNRWA was to assist all those who were residents in Palestine in 1946 and who lost their homes and livelihood in 1948 (UNRWA Overview). The definition of a Palestinian refugee included the people who lost their homes in 1948 but remained in what became the State of Israel. From 1950 to 1952, UNRWA assisted both the people who had fled or were driven from the State of Israel (1949 armistice line) and those who had lost their homes but stayed in what had become the State of Israel. In 1952, Israel took over the responsibility of the ones who had remained in Israel. Today, UNRWA provides basic services - education, health, relief and social services - to over 3.8 million registered Palestine refugees in the Middle East (as of June 2001).

"Refugee" according to UN 1951 Convention Article 1 of the UN 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as "a person who is outside his/her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country, or to return there for fear of persecution." (UN 1951 Refugee Convention).

"IDPs" according to the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: "internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border." (UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement).

How to apply the above definitions in the case of Israel and the Palestinian territories

Usually, the main way to distinguish between who is a refugee and who is internally displaced, is to look at whether the displaced have crossed an international border. According to UNHCR, "Refugees are people who have crossed an international border into a second country seeking sanctuary. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) may have fled for similar reasons, but remain within their own territory and thus are still subject to the laws of that state" (UNHCR 2002). This

principle is problematic with the Palestinian refugee situation, because of the absence of agreed borders between Israel and some of its neighbors, including the Palestinian territory. Also, the Palestinian refugees were explicitly excluded from the coverage under the 1951 Refugee Convention, because they were covered under UNRWA (UN 1951 Refugee Convention, Introductory Note). To determine who is a refugee or an internally displaced person in Israel or in the Palestinian territories, we have compared the IDP definition with the one of refugees from the UN 1951 Convention. Using these definitions, we define five classes of displaced Palestinians:

1. Palestinians, who fled or were driven from their homes in 1948 from Israel for Lebanon and other recognized states.

These Palestinians became refugees and not internally displaced since they went from their country of habitual residence, whether considered the British mandate of Palestine or Israel, to Lebanon, etc. Even though they may not have crossed an agreed upon border, as in the case of Lebanon, they are still clearly outside their country of origin and defined as refugees.

2. Palestinians, who fled or were driven from their homes from Israel in 1948 to Gaza and the West Bank.

These Palestinians are refugees and not IDPs. They were displaced from what came to be Israel in 1948 to what is currently defined as the Occupied Palestinian Territory consisting of Gaza, and West Bank (which includes East Jerusalem). The contested borders are defined as per the Armistice Line of 1948, otherwise known as the Green Line. Even though there is no agreed border between the Palestinian Territory and Israel, the international community has identified this Territory per the Armistice Line as under occupation and benefiting from humanitarian and human rights law regime, and has condemned Israeli de jure and de facto annexation of territory beyond the Armistice Line. Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and de facto annexation of territory does not change status of the territory affected nor the refugee status of Palestinian refugees.

3. Palestinians, who fled or were driven from their homes during the 1948 war, and after that date, but remained within what has become the State of Israel.

These Palestinians are not refugees, but are internally displaced persons. Palestinians who fled or were driven from their homes during 1948 still seek to return to their former homes, and do have outstanding claims against the State of Israel. They have Israeli citizenship. Most of them have joined forces under the National Committee for the Rights of the Internally Displaced in Israel to negotiate directly with the State of Israel. Palestinian Israelis have been displaced as result of discriminate policies entailing land appropriation, eviction orders and house demolitions causing displacement. Palestinian Israelis, including Bedouin communities in the Negev, who have been forcibly displaced since 1948 are identified as internally displaced persons.

4. Palestinians, who are forcibly displaced from their homes in OPT, but have not left the Territory, nor the locality in which they reside.

These Palestinians are not refugees, since they have not left their country. They are internally displaced persons, because their displacement was a result of violations of human rights and humanitarian law. According to the Oslo Accords, Gaza and West Bank are considered as a single territorial unit (see Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, September 13, 1993), so movement between the two areas does not confer refugee status.

The identification of internally displaced persons is also given to persons whose homes have been demolished or have been evicted from their residence, but do not necessarily leave the locality in which they reside (i.e. residing in makeshift shelter close to the debris of their homes). This definition endorsed by the Inter-agency displacement working group in March 2008 was made (1) in recognition of the specific context of occupation and a systematic and discriminatory pressures exerted on Palestinians in the occupied territory to relocate (2) recognition that humanitarian and protection needs of persons whose homes have been demolished is analogous

to that of more traditionally recognised IDPs and should not be limited to geographical criteria or scope of displacement.

5. Palestinian refugees who are forcibly displaced from their homes in OPT but have not left the Territory.

These Palestinians refugees residing in OPT are categorised as ‘secondary displaced refugees’. Though they are not IDPs as their place of origin lies within Israel, they are identified as persons of concern for IDMC, because they have suffered from displacement within the OPT which exacerbates their vulnerability and exhausts their coping mechanisms. The term forced displacement refers to both IDP and secondary displaced refugees displaced within the OPT.

Secondary displaced refugees are of concern to IDMC on several grounds: (1) recognised applicability of the Guiding Principles by analogy to the situation of secondary displaced refugees (2) a protection gap persists in the OPT noting that UNWRA’s protection mandate is confined to ‘passive protection’ (3) secondarily displaced refugees and IDPs as victims of displacement, or multiple displacement, show similar if not more protection and humanitarian needs; and (4) excluding secondary displaced refugees would fail to take note nature, scope and severity of displacement taking place.

The inclusion of ‘secondarily displaced refugees’ as a category of concern takes note that there are significant differences to bear in mind: (1) Palestinian refugees benefit from distinctive regime through a UN mandated agency, albeit providing ‘passive protection’, whereas there is no agency specifically mandated to address IDPs in the OPT. (2) Durable solutions, notably with regards to the question of return, are quite distinct for both categories of IDPs and ‘secondary displaced refugees’.

Conclusion:

IDMC advocates for recognition of internally displaced populations and secondary displaced refugees in OPT based on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and relevant body of law. This gives visibility to people whose specific plights are neglected by authorities, and international community. The definitions were elaborated in consultations with the Inter-agency displacement working group in March 2008, and take note of the specificity of the situation in the OPT.

For lack of monitoring, segregated data on numbers of ‘secondary displaced refugees’ and ‘internally displaced persons’ is not readily available for the OPT. Figures of displacement do not consistently segregate between secondary displaced refugees and non-refugees displaced, nor has there been until quite recently in 2009-2010 systematic compilation of figures of displacement by humanitarian community in the OPT. IDMC figures are general estimates based on various field sources available. Figures of displacement cited by IDMC include “secondary displaced refugees” until such time that segregated data is more readily available.

Causes

Principal Causes of displacement in the OPT

- The 1967 war, and subsequent Occupation, are the principle causes of displacement in the OPT since 1967. This includes the destruction of villages within Green line during and shortly after 1967 war including areas in East Jerusalem, and subsequent policies of Occupation

which have entailed displacement. There are general patterns of displacement associated with the Occupation since 1967, and to this date by Israel in the OPT.

- Such patterns of displacement in their severity and consistency attest to a policy of forced displacement for the purpose of acquiring land and divesting Palestinians of ownership guaranteed under international law. These take the form of direct displacement arising out of house demolitions, and land expropriation; settlement expansion and related infrastructure; construction of the Wall and associated regime; revocation of residency rights, demolitions and restrictive planning in East Jerusalem, and Israeli incursions. There is also clear evidence of indirect displacement through effects of 'closures', or establishment of enclaves wherein human rights are restricted and limited, in effect indirectly forcing displacement by establishing an untenable situation for residents within the OPT.(Al Haq, December 2007; CARE et al., 25 February 2008; Badil, 12 September 2007; B'Tselem, July 2005).
- Israeli military incursions in West Bank and particularly in Gaza Strip such as the creation of buffer zones in northern Gaza and along the Philadelphia Corridor, and Israeli incursions into Gaza most recently in December 2008 to January 2009 are predominant illustrations of forced displacement. Several indirect forms of displacement are attributed to the 'closure regime' as it applies in the West Bank, movement restrictions, loss of livelihoods, lack of access to basic services. Revocation of residency rights, denial of family reunification, and safety concerns as a result of settler violence and Israeli military actions and intimidation are other sources of displacement (Al Haq, December 2007; CARE et al., 25 February 2008; Badil, 12 September 2007; B'Tselem, July 2005).
- The primary instrument of humanitarian law pertaining to the protection of civilians in times of armed conflict and occupation is the Fourth Geneva Convention, ratified by Israel in 1951, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice(ICJ) It is established that the existence of occupation and consequent applicability of humanitarian law does not preclude the application of human rights law. Forcible transfers are explicitly illegal under international humanitarian law as stipulated in Article 49 of IV Geneva Conventions. Evacuation is permissible only in limited circumstances: Such measures remain provisional measures. The Occupying power has duty to facilitate the return of evacuees to their homes once hostilities have ended.
- According to the jurisprudence of the ICTY, the term 'forced' when used in context of forcible transfer is not to be interpreted in a restrictive manner but also factors other than force itself. As well as constituting a violation of international humanitarian law, forcible transfer can also amount to a "grave breach" of the Geneva Conventions. The concept of indirect forcible transfer is codified in international criminal law by Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which delineates the war crime of forcible transfer direct or indirect
- In 2009, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the human rights of IDPs reported that forced displacement in OPT had been caused by incursions and military clearing operations, evictions, land appropriations and house demolitions, the illegal expansion of settlements and related infrastructure, the construction of the Separation Wall, violence by settlers, discriminatory denial of building permits, and the revocation of residency rights in East Jerusalem (UN HRC, March 2009). Displacement has also been caused by restrictions on freedom of movement and a system of closures that makes life untenable for many residents in Palestinian enclaves (UN HRC, March 2009).
- Successive Rapporteurs have also highlighted the situation of displacement in the OPT. In 2006, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in OPT, referring to displacement arising from the construction of the Separation Wall, commented that the situation in OPT was analogous to what had been described as ethnic cleansing in other contexts (UN GA, October 2006). In 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur reported that Israeli policy of dispossession and expulsion of Palestinians from Jerusalem amounted to a "gradual, incremental, and yet cumulatively devastating policy designed to achieve ethnic cleansing of Palestinians". The Rapporteur underlined that the magnitude of the settlement warranted concern that the Israeli occupation is a form of colonialist annexation (UN HRC, January 2011).

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 10 January 2011

7. The Rapporteur believes that there are important issues of language that arise from the cumulative effects of Israeli violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law and criminal law. It becomes misleading to treat these violations as distinct behavioural instances disconnected from broader consequences that are either designed by intention or the natural outcome of accumulating circumstances (so-called “facts on the ground”). These concerns about language are accentuated because Israel is the stronger party in diplomatic settings and generally enjoys the unconditional support of the United States of America. Indeed, unlawful Israeli behaviour that starts out as “facts” have over time been transformed into “conditions”, or in the words of the American Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, “subsequent developments” that are treated as essentially irreversible. Such transformation is true of several aspects of the occupation, including at a minimum the settlement blocs and accompanying infrastructure of roads and security zones, as well as the separation wall. To call appropriate attention to the effects and implications of these unambiguously unlawful patterns, and their somewhat perverse ex post facto attempted “legalization” and “normalization” requires stronger expository language to better understand the unbridled assault upon Palestinian rights and prospects for meaningful self-determination. It is against this background that this report has decided to employ such terms as “annexation”, “ethnic cleansing”, “apartheid”, “colonialist” and “criminality” as more adequately expressing the actual nature of the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories. Such labels can be perceived as emotive, and admittedly require a finding by a court of law to be legally conclusive. However, such language, in the Special Rapporteur’s view, more accurately describes the realities of the occupation as of the end of 2010 than the more neutral-seeming description of factual developments that disguises the structures of this occupation which has undermined the rights under international law of the Palestinian people for 43 years.

8. Against this background, the Rapporteur deems it appropriate at this time to renew the call of the former Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories, John Dugard, for a referral of the situation to the International Court of Justice for an authoritative decision as to whether, “elements of the [Israeli] occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid”.⁶ It should be emphasized that the crime of apartheid is no longer attached to the racist policies of the South African regime that generated the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. It is now a crime associated with an “institutionalized regime of systematic oppression ... by one racial group over any other racial group ... committed with the intention of maintaining that regime”.⁷ The crime of apartheid is also treated as “a grave breach” of article 85, paragraph 4 (c), of the First Geneva Protocol, an international treaty with 169 parties, and widely regarded as universally binding because it is declaratory of customary international law. As will be illustrated in the present report, the dual discriminatory structure of settler administration, security, mobility, and law as compared to the Palestinian subjugation seems to qualify the long Israeli occupation of the West Bank as an instance of apartheid. The referral to the International Court of Justice should also seek clarification as to whether the pattern of continuing unlawful settlement, manipulation of residence credentials, expulsions in East Jerusalem qualify as “ethnic cleansing” and, if so, how this behaviour should be viewed from the perspective of the international law of belligerent occupation.

9. It is also important to underscore what should be self-evident, namely, that Israel has State responsibility for all violations of international humanitarian law in the territories under occupation, above all, for the settlements. State responsibility cannot be evaded by delegation or failure to deal with violations of Palestinian rights in the occupied territories arising from the behaviour of municipal or private sector actors, as in connection especially with claims of unlawful settlement building and ethnic cleansing allegations in East Jerusalem.

Save the Children, Briefing Paper, October 2009, p.5:

"While forced displacement is far from a new concept for Palestinians, it has often been discussed as a historical and predominantly refugee issue. At the same time, Palestinians, both refugee and non-refugee, continue to be displaced as a result of Israeli actions and policies. In Gaza, displacement results mainly from Israeli military operations, which tend to be large in scale and has often displaced hundreds or thousands of people at a time. In the West Bank, the scale of displacement is different, though the rate appears to be increasing. Palestinians living in the West Bank – including Jerusalem - are displaced by house demolitions; forced evictions; land confiscation; lack of access to essential services; the Separation Wall and its associated regime; revocation of civil documentation and family reunification policies. Despite the fact that forced displacement has continued unabated throughout Israel's occupation, the needs of IDPs in the occupied territory have only in recent years been addressed in the operations and programming of the international community, which has a key role to play in their protection."

UN HRC, May 29, 2009

80. The occupation policies and practices that Israel has pursued since the 1967 war have infringed on the human rights of Palestinians and resulted in large-scale forced displacement of Palestinians within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, even before the Israeli military incursion into Gaza that began on 27 December 2008. Displacement is often caused by incursions and military clearing operations, evictions and land appropriation, the illegal expansion of settlements on occupied territory and related infrastructure, the illegal construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, violence and harassment by settlers, the revocation of residency rights in East Jerusalem, discriminatory denial of building permits and house demolitions. Forced displacement is also caused by a system of closures and restrictions on the right to freedom of movement through an elaborate regime of permits and checkpoints that make life untenable for many residents in Palestinian enclaves and force them to leave.

81. The Israeli military incursion into Gaza resulted in further massive forced displacement of Palestinians inside Gaza. On 14 January 2009, at the height of the crisis, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator estimated that up to 100,000 Palestinians could be displaced. The preliminary report of a shelter/Internally Displaced Persons joint rapid needs assessment, conducted in 45 localities in Gaza several days after the ceasefire of 18 January 2008, indicated that 71,657 displaced persons were staying with host families

82. As border crossings into Egypt and Israel were closed, large numbers of civilians tried to find refuge in other parts or sites of Gaza. At the height of the conflict, more than 50,000 displaced persons sought refuge in UNRWA schools. Many were also displaced because their homes had been destroyed or become uninhabitable, especially in rural areas. On a number of occasions, the Israel Defense Forces also warned or ordered the civilian population to flee areas or sites, which were often attacked shortly thereafter.

CARE International, NRC, DIAKONIA, Doctors Without Borders, Premiere Urgence, ICAHD, MA'AN Development Centre, and CISP, 25 February 2008:

"Forcible displacement is both a consequence and root cause of the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict. The international community needs to address forced displacement in OPT as a matter of urgency. While restrictions on freedom of movement and closure continue to have grave consequences in both Gaza and the West Bank and many Palestinians are thus unable to leave their habitual places of residence, many of those same Palestinians have been previously displaced, and still more continue to be forcibly displaced daily.

The deteriorating security situation and policies of occupation – military incursions, settler expansion, demolishing of homes, and land appropriation, revocation of residency permits, construction of the Separation Wall and its associated regime which includes fences, barriers, security systems, land and property confiscations, permits systems and regulations, and considerable environmental degradation – continues to cause displacement changing the demographic boundaries of the OPT within the confinements of a territory increasingly subject to restrictions on people's movement tantamount to a state of siege.

If the international community is committed to the establishment of a Palestinian State then displacement must be systematically and comprehensively addressed as a matter of urgency. The changes to facts-on-the-ground by means of forcible displacement, and the international community's modest response is rendering a political solution to the Palestinian right of self determination increasingly bleak and unforbearing."

Al-Haq, December 2007:

"Unfortunately, the destruction of the property of the Latroun villages which was set in motion before the Six-Day War had ended was not an exceptional incident never to be repeated by the Israeli army in the OPT, but, rather, the start of a trend. This trend forged ahead with the destruction of the entire Mughrabi Quarter in the Old City of occupied East Jerusalem on the night of 11 June 1967, with 135 Palestinian families roused from their sleep to look on helplessly as Israeli bulldozers mowed down their homes and the area's two mosques. The trend has continued through the 40 years of Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory since the Six-Day War, resulting in the destruction of over 18,000 Palestinian homes and reaching its nadir during the second intifada, with destruction of property being carried out extensively and with impunity, from Jenin in the northern West Bank to Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, in persistent violation of international humanitarian law. "

BADIL, March 2009:

"The Israeli policy of limiting and eliminating Palestinian access to water, combined with the resulting sharp increase in the price of water resulting from Israeli policies, has been one of the main reasons for displacement of Palestinians in the Jordan Valley since 1967. Palestinians are still banned from building any water-related infrastructure connecting Area C communities to the water grid in Areas A and B in the Jordan Valley, and attempts at expanding the water networks of A and B areas have resulted in swift Israeli demolition of the pipes and pumps. Palestinians who have remained steadfast on their land outside of Areas A and B are forced to purchase their water by the tank at the cost of 33 Israeli Shekels (approximately US \$9) per cubic meter; often the only vendors are the nearby illegal Israeli settlers! The result is that Palestinian families in "Area C" communities in the Jordan Valley pay anywhere from 30-80 percent of their gross monthly income on water. A very clear example of the workings of Israeli policy regarding water in the Jordan Valley over the past year have been the villages of Humsa and al-Hadidiya, both of which attempted to establish water reservoirs and a water network, both of which faced a brutal Israeli response involving the confiscation of all the equipment used in creating these reservoirs, including the water tanks and trucks, and both of which experienced the displacement of approximately half of their residents as a result."

Al-Haq, November 2006, p.35:

"The hardships imposed on the population of al-Nu'man are indicative of a concerted and deliberate policy on the part of Israel to force the villagers to leave. The Occupying Power's systematic property destruction, land appropriation and *de facto* annexation, physical and psychological harassment and restrictions on movement all combine to create living conditions so unbearable as to bring about the gradual indirect forcible transfer of residents out of the village."

Diakonia, 15 August 2008

"According to article 42 of the Hague Regulations, a territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of a hostile army. In 1967, the Israeli army invaded the Palestinian territory and gained effective control over it. Since then, the West bank - including East Jerusalem - and the Gaza Strip constitute occupied territory. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has stated that the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) is a territory under occupation. In its Advisory Opinion from July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) reaffirmed that the oPt is a territory under occupation. The laws applicable to the oPt are the laws

of belligerent (hostile) occupation, which are part of international humanitarian law (IHL). These laws are binding on Israel according to the international community.

The implementation of the Disengagement Plan in September 2005 raised questions regarding the continued status of Gaza as occupied territory, especially in light of the withdrawal of the Israeli army (IDF) land forces from the Gaza Strip. According to IHL, occupation ends when the occupying power no longer exercises effective military control over the occupied territory and does not apply government authorities there.

Israel refers to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) as disputed territory. Its main argument is that the Egyptian and Jordanian seizures of the territory were never recognized as legal acquirement of sovereignty according to the international community. Since, according to Israel, neither part of the territory had prior legitimate sovereign, the area cannot be considered as occupied by it under international law. The most accurate description would instead be "disputed territory". However, UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions such as Resolution 242 and Resolution 338 do not follow Israel's legal interpretation and consider the oPt to be under belligerent (hostile) occupation. In August 2004, a team of jurists that were appointed by the Israeli Attorney-General recommended to thoroughly examine the possibility of formally applying the Fourth Geneva Convention to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As of June 2007, this recommendation has not been implemented."

International Court of Justice (ICJ), 9 July 2004

"101. In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable in any occupied territory in the event of an armed conflict arising between two or more High Contracting Parties. Israel and Jordan were parties to that Convention when the 1967 armed conflict broke out. The Court accordingly finds that that Convention is applicable in the Palestinian territories which before the conflict lay to the east of the Green Line and which, during that conflict, were occupied by Israel, there being no need for any enquiry into the precise prior status of those territories.....

106. More generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, Save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as *lex specialis*, international humanitarian law.....

111. In conclusion, the Court considers that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory."

Al-Haq, November 2006

"The residents of al-Nu'man are protected persons under Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which covers "those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals." International humanitarian law prohibits deportations and forcible transfers of such protected persons. Both deportation and forcible transfer relate to the imposed evacuation of individuals from the territory in which they reside, by the Occupying Power. Deportation presumes displacement beyond State borders, whereas forcible transfer relates to displacements within a State or occupied territory. Article 49(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides, 'Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as

deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.’ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has confirmed that the prohibition of forcible transfer is enshrined in customary international law.

In essence, it is the absence of genuine choice by the individuals displaced that makes displacement unlawful. The authoritative commentary of the ICRC on the Fourth Geneva Convention confirms that Article 49(1) applies to transfers which are contrary to the free will of the protected persons. Whether a transferred person exercised genuine choice depends on the prevailing situation, atmosphere, and all relevant circumstances, including the victim’s vulnerability. According to the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the term “forced”, when used in the context of forcible transfer, is not to be interpreted in a restrictive manner. The Appeals Chamber has held that it is “not to be limited to physical force” but that “factors other than force itself may render an act involuntary, such as taking advantage of coercive circumstances.” The ICTY’s recent *Krajišnik* judgement provides a precedent that is relevant for al- Nu’mān: Serb municipal authorities and Serb forces created severe living conditions for Muslims and Croats which aimed, and succeeded, in making it practically impossible for most of them to remain. The Tribunal concluded that by creating such conditions through house searches, arrests and physical harassment, as well as cutting off water, electricity and telephone services, the Serb authorities succeeded in causing many Muslims and Croats to abandon their homes. This was held to constitute, with regard to those who departed to other areas within the same territory, forcible transfer. This concept of indirect forcible transfer is codified in international criminal law by virtue of Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which delineates the war crime of forcible transfer, stating that the transfer can occur “directly or indirectly.” Article 49(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention does allow for two exceptions to the otherwise “absolute” prohibition on forcible transfer of protected persons, namely when it is demanded by the security of the occupied population, or by imperative military reasons. However, the forcible transfer of this tiny village’s residents can in no conceivable way be demanded by the security of the Palestinian population or the imperative military necessity of Israel. The severity of forcible transfer is highlighted by its inclusion as a “grave breach” of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Grave breaches are the most heinous of violations of the Convention. Article 147 brands as a grave breach the “unlawful deportation or transfer” of protected persons by an Occupying Power. Article 147 must be read in conjunction with Article 49, and, as such, encompasses within its ambit indirect forcible transfer, such as that which is occurring in al-Nu’mān. Article 146 requires High Contracting Parties establish universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Convention. A person commits the war crime of forcible transfer if he or she carries out an act amounting to such transfer (material element or *actus reus*), and does so “wilfully and knowingly” (mental element or *mens rea*),⁴¹ in the context of an armed conflict. The severe living conditions imposed on the residents of al-Nu’mān by the Occupying Power are gradually compelling these protected persons to move elsewhere. The comments of Davier Kahana in 2003 show that these conditions were constructed deliberately. Finally, the policy of indirect forcible transfer is carried out in connection with the Israeli occupation of the OPT and associated armed conflict. The actions examined in the present study therefore qualify as war crimes and imply the criminal liability of their authors. The criminalisation of deportations and forcible transfers has been codified in the Statute of the International Criminal Court.⁴² The grave breach and war crime of unlawful forcible transfer of the population of al- Nu’mān is the direct result of the combination of numerous other contraventions of international humanitarian and human rights law, namely property destruction, land appropriation, and violations of the rights of the villagers to freedom of movement, to education, to supplies and services, and to family life.

As the Occupying Power, Israel has an obligation to provide for the welfare of the population of the OPT. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention has been described as “the basis on which

the Convention rests”⁴³ and indeed “the leitmotiv of the four Geneva Conventions.”⁴⁴ It articulates the fundamental principles, pertaining to protected persons, of respect (“for their persons, their honour, their family rights...”), protection (“against all acts of violence or threats thereof...”), and humane treatment. The acute failure of the Israeli authorities to respect their legal duties as they pertain to the occupied civilian population serves to further Israel’s goal of transforming al- Nu’mān into an “open and uninhabited space”. Israel’s violations of both international humanitarian and human rights law are contributing to the indirect forcible transfer of the residents of al-Nu’mān,”

United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), 17 January 2006

"8... The withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Gaza has led some to claim that the occupation of Gaza has come to an end. In deciding on this matter regard must be had to whether Israel retains effective control over the territory as this is the test for occupation recognized by international humanitarian law.² While the Special Rapporteur concedes that the absence of a military occupying power in Gaza has removed many of the features of occupation, it is wrong to suggest that the occupation has ended. In the first place, it must be stressed that technological advances since 1949 have changed the whole nature of control. It is no longer necessary for a foreign military power to maintain a permanent physical presence in a territory to exercise control, as Israel has demonstrated since its withdrawal from Gaza. Sonic booms, which terrorize and traumatize the population (and constitute a form of collective punishment) and the targeted assassination of militants (and innocent bystanders) by rockets fired from the skies, serve as a constant reminder to the people of Gaza that they remain occupied. In the three months following Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, 15 Palestinians have been targeted and assassinated, 18 civilians killed and 81 injured in response to Qassam rockets fired by militants from Gaza. Such actions of the Israel Defense Forces must be viewed in conjunction with the fact that Israel retains control over airspace, territorial waters (fishing is allowed only within 10 nautical miles of the coastline) and external borders. While it is true that the Rafah crossing is now open to Palestinian ID cardholders, Israel reserves the right to complain about who crosses at Gaza and has already done so (the crossing is administered by the Palestinian Authority and Egypt, but supervised by European Union inspectors and followed by Israeli officials on TV monitor screens). Karni crossing was largely dysfunctional at the time of writing and allowed passage of only 35 to 40 trucks compared with the 150 trucks promised by the 15 November agreement. This is a serious problem for greenhouse agricultural products harvested in December/January and exported to Israel and the West Bank. The passage of persons between Gaza and the West Bank by bus convoys, scheduled to start on 15 December, has been stopped by Israel, as a result of a suicide bombing in Netanya and Israel’s dissatisfaction with the Rafah crossing.³ (One fears that even if such convoys do commence, they will be frequently suspended for security reasons.) Control is also maintained by means of the Gaza population register, which Israel still administers, thereby allowing it to control the issue of identity documents to Gazans - a precondition for control in and out of the territory. Other facts confirm Israel’s control of Gaza: first, Israel still holds some 650 Gazan prisoners, despite article 77 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides for the release of prisoners “at the close of occupation”; secondly, Israel maintains military control over a buffer zone ranging between 150 and 300 metres within Gaza along its eastern and northern borders from which all Palestinians are excluded (farmers are thus denied access to their lands in this zone); thirdly, Israel may, and has already threatened, to cut off electricity supplies to Gaza. Finally, Palestine constitutes a single self-determination unit, comprising the West Bank and Gaza. To suggest that Gaza should enjoy a status different from that of the West Bank would violate the territorial integrity of Palestine and the substantive law of self-determination.

9. Undoubtedly, the nature of Israel’s occupation has changed. Many of the provisions relating to the treatment of protected persons in the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (the Fourth Geneva Convention) are premised upon the physical presence of the occupying Power - but not all. For instance, article 27, requiring

protected persons to “be humanely treated” and to “be protected especially against all acts of violence” and article 33, prohibiting collective penalties and “all measures of intimidation or of terrorism”, continue to apply and appear to have been violated by sonic booms and targeted assassinations that routinely cause collateral loss of life and injury. The silence of the principal protector of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the International Committee of the Red Cross, on the continuation of the occupation tends to confirm that it does indeed continue.

10. Israel’s occupation of both Gaza and the West Bank is unusual. The occupation of a territory for 38 years and the physical withdrawal of the occupying Power from a separate part of the occupied territory were clearly outside the contemplation of the drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention. But despite the unusual features of the Gaza occupation, it remains occupation as Israel continues to maintain effective control over the territory. It is not a fully liberated part of an occupied territory. Certainly the mood of the people of Gaza confirms this. They perceive themselves to be still subject to occupation as was repeatedly stressed to the Special Rapporteur on his visit to Gaza.”

See Also:

[Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Arab Occupied Territories A/HRC/7/17](#), **UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967**, 21 January 2008

[18,000 Houses Destroyed](#), **Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions**, December 2006

[Nablus From Economic Metropolis to Shrinking City](#), **Ma'an Development Centre**, 21 February 2008

[Israel Maintains its Programme of Population Transfer as More Palestinians are Forcibly Displaced from their Homes and Lands](#), **BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights**, 22 January 2008

[Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2006-2007](#), **BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights**, 12 September 2007

[18,000 Houses Destroyed](#), **Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions**, December 2006

[Palestinian Towns and Villages: Between Isolation and Expulsion](#), **Ma'an Development Centre**, 2007

See Links:

[To ICRC's website and Article 42 of the Hague Regulations](#)

[Read more about the Hague Regulations](#)

[Read more about the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice](#)

[Read more about occupation](#)

[To the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Disengagement Plan](#)

[Read more about the end of occupation](#)

[Read more about the Gaza Strip and the Disengagement Plan](#)

[To the UN Security Council website and Resolution 242](#)

[To the UN Security Council website and Resolution 338](#)

[To the Israeli Government's legal analysis](#)

[Read more about the Fourth Geneva Convention](#)

POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE

Global Figures & Profile

Global Figures (2011)

- Monitoring and documentation of internal displacement has been largely ad hoc and numbers of IDPs and demolitions have not been systematically monitored until quite recently. Lack of agency specifically mandated to address internal displacement within the OPT, and limited monitoring renders it difficult to provide global figure on current displaced in the OPT. The Inter-Agency Protection Sub Working Group on Forced Displacement (DWG), established in late 2007, has sought to address this gap in monitoring situations of displacement in recent years.
- There are no confirmed statistics on the number of IDPs in the OPT. IDMC estimates that at least 160,000 Palestinians have been displaced based on estimates provided by BADIL, ICAHD, OCHA, and other members of the DWG. This figure includes IDPs and "secondary displaced refugees" (Note Methodology section) and successive generations since 1967. There has been no profiling of the displaced population in the OPT, nor are there means to verify these figures short of such a profiling, or to assess as to whether those displaced several decades ago remain displaced or have sought alternative durable solutions other than return.
- BADIL suggests that more than 128,700 persons have been displaced since 1967 to 2009 (excluding displacement as result of Israeli incursion in January 2009 in Gaza, see below) (BADIL, December 2009). ICAHD estimates that 24,813 Palestinian homes have been demolished in the Occupied Territories since 1967 to mid 2010 (ICAHD, July 2010). The estimated figure of 160,000 is extrapolated from these sources and the estimated more than 20,000 Palestinians still displaced as result of Israeli operation in 2008/2009 in Gaza Strip. Israeli incursion in 2008/2009 led to the most significant displacement since 1967 leading to over 100,000 displaced. (League of Arab States, 30 April 2009, para.100-1006).
- From January 2010 to June 2011, more than 1,100 Palestinians were displaced as a result of house demolitions across the West Bank and East Jerusalem since January 2010 to June 2011 (HRW, June 2011; UNWRA June 2011; DWG, May 2011, IRIN April 2011). The DWG recorded a 60 per cent increase in demolitions in 2010 (mainly livelihood structures) since preceding year displacing 600 Palestinians half of them children, and affecting the livelihoods of almost 14,300 (DWG, January 2011). In 2009, DWG recorded a total of 225 Palestinian homes and livelihood structures destroyed, displacing 515 Palestinians (DWG, January 2010) In June 2011, the Inter-agency Shelter Cluster for Gaza Strip identified close to 20,000 IDPs still living in inadequate shelters owing to the Israeli blockade in force since 2007.
- Risks of displacement continue due to be pervasive across the West Bank due to the continued construction of Wall and associated regime, military incursions, revocation of residency rights, settlement expansion and settler violence, effects of closure regime including restrictive permit regime. In Gaza Strip, Palestinians whose property is in or in close proximity to the extended buffer zone continue to be at risk of displacement. There are no clear figures of numbers at risk of displacement though UN and NGOs have suggested close to 60,000-90,000 at risk across the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 2011, the UN Emergency Coordinator highlighted an estimated 85,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem alone were at risk of displacement due to illegal construction and risk of demolition by the Israeli authorities (UN May 2011; OCHA, March 2011).

Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, July 2010:

ICAHD estimates that some **24,813** Palestinian structures have been demolished in the Occupied Territories since 1967, based on information gleaned from the Israeli Ministry of Interior, the Jerusalem Municipality, the Civil Administration, PCHR, OCHA and other UN sources, Palestinian & Israeli human rights groups, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, our field work and other sources. Last updated on 28 July 2010.

Year	Punitive	Administrative	Military	Undefined	Total
1967	-	-	2,187	5,367	7,554
1968	-	-	-		
1969	-	-	-		
1970	-	-	-	191ii	191
1971	-	-	2,000iii	231	2,231
1972	-	-	-	35	35
1973	-	-	100 iv	34	134
1974	-	-	-	61	61
1975	-	-	-	77	77
1976	-	-	-	24	24
1977	-	-	-	1	1
1978	-	-	-	2	2
1979	-	-	-	18	18
1980	-	-	-	30	30
1981	-	-	-	24	24
1982	-	-	-	35	35
1983	12v	-	-	-	12
1984	2	-	-	-	2
1985	44	-	-	-	44
1986	49	-	-	-	49
1987	1vi	103vii	-	-	104
1988	164	423	-	-	587
1989	220	347	-	-	567
1990	204	102	-	-	306
1991	80	227	-	-	307
1992	33	160	-	-	193
1993	19	111	-	-	130
1994	4	149viii	-	-	153
1995	1	68	-	-	69
1996	11	157	-	-	168
1997	8	249	-	-	257
1998	-	180	-	-	180
1999	-	142	-	-	142
2000	-	59	2,781ix	-	4,747
2001	10	227		-	
2002	251	319		-	
2003	227	405		-	
2004	177	291		-	
2005	4	211	75	-	290
2006	-	146	256	-	402
2007	-	286	73	-	359
2008	-	291	79	-	377
2009	2x	271	4455xi	-	5,388

2010	-	232xii	-	-xiii	232
Total	1,523	5154	12,006	6,130	24,813

OCHA, 30 November 2009, p. 25:

“Continued displacement

In Gaza, the ban on the import of building materials has prevented the reconstruction of the homes destroyed and severely damaged during the last military offensive. More than 20,000 people displaced during the “Cast Lead” offensive are forced to continue living in rented apartments, in the houses of relatives and in tents next to their damaged houses. A small number of families continue to live in tented camps. In the West Bank, in 2009, OCHA field teams recorded the Israeli authorities’ demolition of a total of 225 Palestinian-owned structures - including 92 homes - in Area C and East Jerusalem, resulting in the displacement of 515 Palestinians, over half of whom are children. Though not displaced, a further 504, including 303 children, were otherwise affected (e.g. source of livelihood destroyed, etc.). Furthermore, an estimated 60,000 Palestinians in Jerusalem alone are at risk of displacement, due to the possible of demolition of their homes by the Israeli authorities; in Area C, there are over 3,000 outstanding demolition orders that can be executed at any time. In addition, East Jerusalem residents increasingly face the risk of displacement as a result of eviction due to Israeli settler activity.”

Badil, 30 September 2009, p.13:

"The demolition of Palestinian-owned homes and displacement have been a regular feature of Israel's occupation of the OPT. Between 1967 and the beginning of 2009, Israel has demolished over 24,100 Palestinian-owned homes and other structures in occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, resulting in the internal displacement of more than 128,700 Palestinians within the OPT since 1967. More than 3,000 Palestinian-owned structures in the West Bank have pending demolition orders, which can be immediately executed without forewarning resulting in new waves of displacement."

Badil, 8 September 2009:

1948 Palestinian refugees 5.7 million (80.5% of all displaced Palestinians); persons displaced in 1948 (the *Nakba*) and their descendants, including:

- UNRWA-registered refugees 4.7 million
- Refugees not registered with UNRWA 1.0 million

1967 Palestinian refugees 940,000 (13.5%)

Persons displaced for the first time from their homes and country in the context of the 1967 war.

IDPs in Israel since 1948 335,000 (4.7%)

Persons displaced in the 1948 *Nakba*, as well as those displaced subsequently. No reliable data available for the total number of persons displaced in 2007-2008.

IDPs in the OPT since 1967 129,000 (1.3%)

Persons displaced in the OPT during the 1967 war and subsequently. This number includes displaced refugees (approximately 37,000).

"[...] There is no single authoritative source for the global Palestinian refugee and IDP population. Available data on the size of the Palestinian refugee and IDP populations is uneven and shifting, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive registration system, frequent forced displacement, and the lack of a uniform definition of a Palestinian refugee. Internal displacement is also difficult to track because ceasefire lines have changed frequently and there is no internationally recognized border between Israel and the 1967 OPT. BADIL estimates of the

Palestinian refugee and IDP populations are calculated based on UNRWA data combined with data from the 2007 PCBS population census in the OPT and population growth projections."

BADIL, 12 September 2007:

Internal displacement is difficult to track in the context of the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict, as ceasefire lines have changed frequently and there is no internationally recognized border between Israel and the 1967-occupied Palestinian territory. UNRWA records cover about 75% of the 1948 Palestinian refugee population and possibly covers up to 55% of the total population of Palestinian refugees and IDPs. UNRWA registration data is not statistically valid, as reporting is voluntary. UNRWA has never carried out a comprehensive census of all Palestinian refugees under its mandate. In general, UNRWA registration records do not include:... IDPs.

Table 2.1: Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Palestinians (IDPs)

Year	UNRWA registered 1948 Refugees	Estimated non-registered 1948 Refugees	Estimated 1967 Refugees	Estimated 1948 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)	Estimated 1967 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
1950	*914,221	304,740	–	47,610	–
1955	905,986	301,995	–	56,546	–
1960	1,120,889	373,630	–	67,159	–
1965	1,280,823	426,941	–	79,763	–
1970	1,425,219	475,073	266,092	94,734	15,235
1975	1,632,707	544,236	316,034	112,514	22,501
1980	1,844,318	614,773	375,349	133,631	30,158
1985	2,093,545	697,848	445,797	158,712	38,278
1990	2,422,514	840,838	529,467	188,500	46,949
1995	3,172,641	1,057,547	628,841	223,879	56,275
2000	3,737,494	1,245,831	746,866	265,898	66,377
2001	3,874,738	1,291,579	773,006	275,205	68,504
2002	3,973,360	1,324,453	800,062	284,837	70,668
2003	4,082,300	1,360,767	828,064	294,806	72,872
2004	4,186,711	1,395,570	857,046	305,124	101,700
2005	4,283,892	1,427,964	887,043	315,804	107,918
2006	4,396,209	1,465,403	918,089	326,857	115,349
2007	4,510,510	1,503,503	950,222	338,297	115,349

The estimate includes persons internally displaced from destroyed Palestinian villages in the OPT during the 1967 war (10,000 persons). This figure is increased by the average annual growth rate of the refugee population (3.5%). The figure is also increased to include the average number of Palestinians displaced by house demolition (1,037) each year between 1967 and 2006. The number of Palestinians affected by house demolition is not increased according to the average annual population growth, as it is not known how many IDPs return to their home of origin.

The increase in the number of internally displaced persons in the 1967-occupied Palestinian territory for 2004 is due to Wall-induced forced displacement in the occupied West Bank, as well as the vast scope of demolitions undertaken in the occupied Gaza Strip, which left 2,224 families homeless (approximately 15,123 persons based on a household size of 6.8 persons). This number also includes 11,461 persons who were displaced by the Wall as of July 2004 [further] 103 persons were displaced as a result of the construction of the Wall between July 2004 and June 2005. This figure also includes the demolition of 198 house in 2005, leaving approximately

1,208 persons homeless, based on an average rate of 6.1 persons per household in both the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip. [There was] also 5,100 persons displaced as a result of Israel's military action in the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2006.

Finally, this number does not include those refugees in the Gaza Strip who remained homeless and displaced as of June 2005 as a result of the demolition of their shelters since the beginning of the intifada, a group that UNRWA estimates at 16,000. The number of IDPs include those displaced as a result of ID confiscations in Jerusalem; the total number of IDs confiscated since 1967 amounts to 8,269. This number does not include persons under the age of 16 years, which means that thousands more were affected by the revocation of Jerusalem IDs. There is no data on how many IDs were returned to their owners, if any."

See Also :

No Safe Place: Report of the Independent Fact Finding Committee On Gaza, **League of Arab States**, 30 April 2009, para.100-1006

Thomas Aboud (2000) "The Moroccan Quarter: A History of the Present." Jerusalem: *Jerusalem Quarterly*.

Discrimination in the Heart of the Holy City, **Meir Margalit**, 2006

House Demolitions as Punishment, **B'Tselem**, February 2005

Statistics on demolition of houses as punishment 1987-2005, **B'Tselem**, February 2005

Ronny Talmor (1989). *Demolition and Sealing of Houses As a punitive measure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the Intifada*. Jerusalem: B'tselem.

Razing Rafah: Mass House Demolitions in the Gaza Strip, **Human Rights Watch** (HRW), October 2004,

Jeff Halper (2005) *Obstacles to Peace* (Third Edition).

Profile of Persons Displaced & Geographical Distribution

- Profile of Persons Displaced & Geographical Distribution
- The living conditions of Palestinians in the OPT, displaced and not alike, in the OPT , despite macro economic indicators reveal high rates of vulnerability amongst number of communities. The UN has highlighted that the situation in OPT at the end of 2010, was characterized by continuing political stalemate, regular exposure to violence, continuing restrictions on access and movement, and persistent human rights violations, all of which leading to a protracted humanitarian situation. There has been notable recent macro-economic improvements (unemployment stands at 23 per cent and 25 per cent were below poverty line in OPT, including 38 per cent in Gaza) , however needs remain immense, especially in areas where the Palestinian Authority has limited control in Area C, East Jerusalem and Gaza - all of which are areas in which displacement has been reported.
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- Palestinian community in OPT comprises various statuses including host, refugee and IDP. Palestinian population census in 2007 identified 2,345,000 and approximately 754,000 Palestinian UNWRA refugees in West Bank – with estimated population of Area C is of 120,000, and of East Jerusalem 250,000. In Gaza Strip, in 2010 approximately 1,6 million reside in Gaza including almost 1 million UNWRA refugees. More than a third of population is below the age of 15 and more than 50 per cent are children. The number of IDPs is estimated at more than 160,000 since 1967 however this figure is based on extrapolated data and lack of monitoring or profiling of displaced communities provides limited information as to protection and humanitarian profile of IDPs.
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- The nature of displacement in the OPT contributes to a quite varied profile. Internal displacement in the OPT is both rural and urban, slow onsetting and sudden. It has affected vulnerable herding and bedouin communities in Jordan Valley, and farmers in South Hebron Hills, in Area C, as well neighbourhoods of Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem, and swaths of urban and rural areas affected by Israeli shelling and bombardments along the Gaza Strip. The impact is likely to vary considerably from one incident to another indicating a varied profile with diverse protection and humanitarian needs. Families displaced commonly have heightened sense of vulnerability, may suffer indebtedness due to litigation costs, rent, or reconstruction of damaged or destroyed homes, may suffer from lack of livelihoods for lack of grazing or agricultural land, children and adults may suffer from trauma related illness due to exposure to violence or may be injured or killed.
-
- For lack of monitoring it remains difficult to identify geographical distribution of IDPs due to lack of registration system and frequent displacement over four decades of occupation. IDPs are forced to relocate away from Israeli settlements, related infrastructure, military zones, and construction of the Wall and associated regime, and likely towards Areas A and B of the West Bank, and in Gaza away from buffer areas (though urban areas are also affected during incursions). In certain cases of displacement the village unit has tended to remain to some degree despite displacement. This is case for displacement as result of 1967 war however this is not systematically observed, and families have often been displaced repeatedly. In the West Bank, families experienced longer periods of displacement (more than one year) and move further away from their communities compared with families in Gaza. In Gaza, although military incursions cause displacement on a large scale, families
- frequently move back to their communities once calm prevails (Save the Children, October 2009). Yet continued sanctions has meant that reconstruction has not been possible for the vast majority since 2005 (OCHA, 28 November 2007; Inter-Agency Shetler Cluster, June 2011).
-
- Several communities are particularly at risk of displacement: Palestinians in East Jerusalem; predominantly rural Area C communities in the West Bank including Bedouin and herder communities in Jordan Valley, communities in proximity to the Separation Wall, or located near Israeli settlements and near other Israeli infrastructure , and Palestinians residing in or near the Gaza buffer zone are especially vulnerable to displacement. (Save the Children, Briefing paper, October 2009, p.7; See also section Issues of Self Reliance: Coping Strategies).
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- IDMC scattered images of families at risk of displacement and displaced across the OPT. For more accounts see also photo stories in "House Demolitions" and "Jerusalem Dispossed" in Activestills and "Community voices" in Stop the Wall - sources cited below the page.
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- Khirbet Yarza, Jordan Valley, OPT, November 2010
- <http://www.flickr.com/photos/idmc-nrc/sets/72157626967950311/>
- Al Nu'man, West Bank, OPT, December 2010
- <http://www.flickr.com/photos/idmc-nrc/sets/72157627092414458/>
- East Jerusalem, OPT, December 2010
- <http://www.flickr.com/photos/idmc-nrc/sets/72157627092231192/>
- Gaza Buffer Zone, OPT, December 2010
- <http://www.flickr.com/photos/idmc-nrc/sets/72157626967667603/>
- Rafah, Gaza Strip, OPT, December 2010
- <http://www.flickr.com/photos/idmc-nrc/sets/72157627092605376/>

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UN OCHA, 11 March 2011

"Displaced families generally face significant financial difficulties, particularly in East Jerusalem, where some 67 percent of families live in poverty. While some persons who are victims of home demolitions receive assistance from the Palestinian Authority and the humanitarian community, they receive no financial or material support from the Government of Israel. In addition to economic losses resulting from fines, legal fees and the lost investment in homes, the contents of the house are often destroyed during demolitions. Families often continue to pay instalments on fines long after the structure is demolished. An additional economic burden following the demolition is the payment of rent, which places considerable stress on already limited financial resources. Combined with psychological distress and debt, displaced families have few alternatives to relocate, since the land they build on is generally the main family asset. A 2007 survey of Palestinians whose homes were demolished in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for various reasons, including lack of permit, found that house demolitions are followed by long periods of instability; over 71 percent of surveyed families reported that they moved at least twice following the demolition of their home and over half took at least two years to find a permanent residence.⁸⁰ Given their vulnerability, children, who represent over 50 percent of the Palestinian population, are frequently disproportionately impacted by displacement. According to the survey, in the immediate aftermath of a demolition children face interrupted education, a reduced standard of living and limited access to basic services, such as water and health. The survey also found that emotional and behavioural problems persist even after the six month period following the demolition."

Save the Children, April 2009, p.38, 39

"The majority of house demolitions studied resulted in the displacement of the inhabitants. The subsequent period of migration is determined by the family's financial resources, the assistance they receive and the possibility of returning to the same land after the house demolition. Generally, migration leads to significant change, mainly distance from the extended family. It also leads to tension in the relationship between the nuclear family and extended family members due to fundamental changes in the lifestyles of both.These families are not only traumatized at the time of the demolition or afterwards, but also preceding the destruction of their home. Direct threat of demolition, on one hand, and daily cases of demolition in targeted areas, on the other, led participants in the study to panic in anticipation. One family in Rafah even reported feeling a sense of stability and reassurance following the demolition, explaining that daily anticipation of the demolition of their house was far worse than their feelings following the demolition. If a family seeks to reconstruct their demolished house, there is often the risk that the home will be demolished once again."

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 12 September 2007

"The distribution of Palestinians displaced from and within the OPT since 1967, and who are neither 1948 nor 1967 refugees, is difficult to determine given the lack of a registration system and frequent displacement over four decades of military occupation.In the OPT, IDPs are frequently forced to relocate away from Israeli colonies, related infrastructure (such as bypass roads), and military zones. More recently, the Wall and its associated regime has forced fresh relocations....

Despite almost 60 years in exile, the village unit has tended to remain to some degree intact even after mass displacement. In other words, the majority of the residents of a particular village tended to be displaced to the same host country, and often to the same area within the host country. The same phenomenon is also evident in those Palestinian villages inside Israel that provided refuge for internally displaced Palestinians in 1948. In many villages, neighbourhoods are named for the origin of the displaced persons who reside in them....

Approximately 39% of the total refugee population in the OPT lives in camps. These refugees reside in and around cities and towns in the host countries, often in areas adjacent to refugee camps.²⁸ Many West Bank villages and towns, for example, host a significant refugee population. There are approximately 100 localities in the occupied West Bank in which 1948 refugees comprise more than 50% of the total population.

Between 1997 and 2006, the proportion of refugees living in West Bank communities showed a significant change. For instance, the percentage of refugees decreased in Salfit(-63%) and in Tulkarem (-5%) ,showing important internal displacement and/or migration. Meanwhile, the proportion of refugees has significantly increased in Jericho (+20%), Qalqilya (+20%) and Jenin (+4%). Colonization, the Wall and its associated regime, and closure may explain why refugees are displaced to or “stuck” in some West Bank communities. In the Gaza Strip, the proportion of refugees has increased in Rafah (+15%), Khan Younis (+7%) and Gaza (+5%). This may be the result of home demolitions and Israeli military operations in their previous place of residence."

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 12 June 2006

"The Palestinian refugee and IDP population is young. More than one-third of all registered refugees are below the age of fifteen... There are no statistics for internally displaced Palestinians.... However, as differences between refugee and non-refugee populations in major Arab host states are negligibleThe age structure of IDPs is likely to follow that of Palestinians inside Israel and in the OPT. Palestinian refugees have a lower fertility rate than the non-refugee population. The fertility rate among internally displaced Palestinians inside Israel and in the OPT is likely to be similar to the non-refugee Palestinian population....

The mortality rate of the Palestinian population in the OPT is relatively low; similar to that in Western countries in the early 1960s.... Infant and child mortality rates of the refugee population have declined over the past six decades. Infant mortality rates among refugees, for example, declined from around 200 per 1,000 births in 1950, to around 24 per 1,000 births in the 1967-occupied Palestinian territory in 2006, and eight per 1,000 births inside Israel in 2003.... However, there are indications that child mortality has actually been increasing in the Gaza Strip since 2000. The Palestinian refugee and IDP population also has a high growth rate. This is similar to the Palestinian population as a whole, which has roughly doubled every twenty years.

Unemployment rates range from 11% to 34%, with rates in the OPT substantially higher as a result of the Israeli occupation and military activity since the second intifada, and more recently, the international sanctions against the democratically elected Palestinian Authority.... Annual per capita... in the OPT ranges from US \$450 to US \$600. Since 1999, per capita income has declined by 40% in the OPT. The crisis engendered by sanctions has hit refugees in the OPT harder than the general population with respect to employment and poverty. A study undertaken by UNRWA in the OPT in 2005 found that there were 623,200 refugees officially recognized as poor(living on less than US\$2.4per day) and 406,000 refugees in deep poverty (living on less than US \$2 daily)....While refugees accounted for 42% of the population of the OPT, they accounted for about half of those in deep poverty....

.....The primary infrastructural problem facing all refugee households is access to safe and secure supplies of drinking water.....Palestinian households in Israel, including IDP households, suffer from a shortage of land designated for development. Around 23% of Palestinians households have suffered from land confiscation between 1947 and 2004, while 8.7% of households have had their homes demolished or confiscated by the Israeli government during the same period..... Around 44% of Palestinian households have reported that their inability to build a needed housing unit is due to the scarcity of available building land. In the southern part of the country (i.e., Naqab), 24.1% of the Palestinians live in tents and shacks..."

Ma'an Development Centre, 2007

"We turned out to be the 21st century refugees with peoples life at stake. The issue is not security but rather the creation of an atmosphere of silent transfer, to create a situation where we ourselves reach the conclusion that our lives are unliveable.We will not live the Nakba twice... We are staying here, we are not leaving." **Jamal Der'awi, Nu'uman village.**

"We shall remain steadfast. When they demolish our homes we will rebuild them with determination." **Haj Ibrahim Jadallah, Khibet Zakaria village.**

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 December 2007

"I had to build a high fence around my house to protect my children. Before, my children were stoned by settlers when they were playing outside. They stone us for the simple reason that we continue to live on our land and do not want to leave." **Anwar, Hebron**

"First, they took land for the road, then more land for the security zone along the road, and then they destroyed my house because it was too close to the security zone. Now they have levelled the land again. I have nothing left." **Abdul, Gaza**

"Even after the disengagement, they did not leave us alone, they return every now and then, levelling our land, uprooting our trees and destroying our houses. In addition, you only know that you are inside the buffer zone when they shoot at you." **Saleh, farmer, Gaza**

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children in armed conflicts, October 2007

"We live in a *huge prison*, deprived of the least simple rights that any individual should have." **Young woman, 17, Occupied Palestinian Territory**

"I hate nights because they scare me. I ask my mother to let me sleep in her room during the attacks." **Boy, 10, Occupied Palestinian Territory**

B'Tselem and Hamoked, 31 January 2004

"In 1995, I married Ishak Taha. He was a resident of Qatana, a village located northwest of Jerusalem. Since we got married, we have lived in rented apartments in the Shu'afat refugee camp, which is in Jerusalem. Two years ago, we started building a house in the refugee camp, but the municipality demolished it. My husband and I have three children: Amal, 5, 'Omar, 4, and Muhammad, 3.

After we got married, I submitted a request – at the East Jerusalem office of the Interior Ministry – for family unification on behalf of my husband. Since 2000, I have been going to the Interior Ministry to check the status of the request. About two years ago, we received a notice of rejection. Now, HaMoked: Center for the Defence of the Individual is handling my request.

In the past, my husband worked at a restaurant in Jerusalem and was able to support us with dignity. Two years ago, it became much harder for residents of the West Bank to enter Israel, and he stopped working in Israel. The children and I can leave the refugee camp and go to Jerusalem or wherever else we want to go, but my husband can't come with us. He cannot work outside the camp, and inside the camp, he is unable to find work. He is imprisoned inside the camp and can't come with us anywhere." **Testimony of Jada, married with three children, Shu'afat refugee camp, Jerusalem**

"I was born in Jabal Mukaber, which is in [East] Jerusalem. On 5 June 1994, I married Jalal Rabi'a, from al-'Obediyya, Bethlehem District. We have six children. The three older children were born in the hospital in Bethlehem, and are not recorded on my identity card. The three younger children were born in Jerusalem and are listed on my card. I never lived in the Occupied Territories. I gave birth in Bethlehem because it was less expensive there. At the time, I did not have health insurance or the money to pay the hospital. After we got married in 1999, we lived with my parents.

... When I was pregnant with our first child, I submitted an application for family unification.... I went, and the clerk told me that my request had been rejected, and that I could file an appeal. I filed the appeal.... In 2000, I went to the Interior Ministry to register my children. I submitted all the documents they requested, such as receipts for municipal taxes, electricity, and water, and confirmation from their school.... 26 June 2001,... [t]he clerk told me that my request to register the children had been rejected... In January 2002, I did [a new request]....

We do not visit my husband's family in Bethlehem because I am afraid that it will affect the requests that are pending with the Interior Ministry." **Testimony of N. R., married with six children, Jabal Mukaber, Jerusalem**

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

House Demolitions & Displacement

Demolitions of Palestinian houses and properties

- General House Demolitions & Evictions (2011)
- Demolition of houses and other properties is a regular feature of Israel's occupation of the OPT. Different justifications are advanced including military necessity, administrative sanction for illegal building, as well as instances of punitive demolitions. (UNSR on HR, 2008) Evictions and demolitions are linked to Israel continual expansion of Jewish colonies and related infrastructure, and construction of the Wall and its associated regime, as well as military clearing operations. For human rights organisations Israeli demolitions for lack of building licence on administrative grounds, lack of Palestinian planning areas, denial of construction permits, are a means of compelling Palestinians to leave areas of land that are wanted for Israeli settlements, bypass roads, or to prevent Palestinians from establishing claims to land that Israel wants to keep in final status negotiations. (Al Haq, Nabulous 2006)
- Reasons for demolitions have varied from lack of permit for construction, to issues associated with the construction of the wall, to security concerns, and in most instances as result of Israeli military incursions which account for most homes demolished. (Ma'an January 2008; ICAHD, April 2010) Military demolitions account for approximately 65% of all demolitions while administrative demonstrations amount to 26 % of demolitions, the remaining that of punitive policy (ICAHD, April 2010)
- ICHAD estimates that more than 24,800 Palestinian homes had been destroyed between 1967 and 2010 as a result of military incursions, and punitive and administrative demolitions. From January 2010 to June 2011 more than 1,180 Palestinians were displaced as a result of administrative house demolitions across the West Bank and East Jerusalem, while more than 20,000 IDPs in the Gaza Strip were still living in inadequate shelters, as the Israeli blockade in force since 2007 continued (HRW June 2011; Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster June 2011; DWG January 2011). Demolitions in West Bank have not been confined to house but equally livelihood properties which have place communities in greater vulnerability. In 2010, demolitions displaced 600 people and affected the livelihoods of over 14,300 (DWG, January 2011).
- In 2009 in the West Bank, a total 225 Palestinian-owned structures were demolished, resulting in the displacement of 515 Palestinians. However the highest number of demolitions resulted from Israeli incursion. in Gaza 4,000 houses were demolished, close to 3,000 were seriously damaged and nearly 53,000 suffered minor damage leading at the time to displacement of 120,000, and affected the livelihoods and humanitarian situations of hundreds of thousands. In 2008 a total number of 377 house demolitions leading to hundreds displaced.
- The eviction and demolition of Palestinian homes by the Israeli authorities has been raised by a number of UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies, including the Committee Against Torture, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and highlighted multiple times in the reports of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967. EU and the United States among other key states have repeatedly condemned house demolitions particularly in Area C and East Jerusalem.
- (1) Military Incursions and Clearing Operations & House Demolitions:
- Land clearing operations and military incursions by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have been among the leading sources of displacement. Clearing operations are part of Israel's

defense strategy witnessed in West Bank though particularly in Gaza Strip, and consists of the destruction of homes deemed close to Israeli security infrastructure, Jewish roads, or provide cover for Palestinian military operations. Unlike in 1948, population displacement and property destruction after the 1967 war was concentrated mostly in border areas: along the boundary that had separated the West Bank from Israel (known as the Green Line) and near the external borders of the West Bank.

- Clearing operations in Gaza strip would consist of house demolitions, uprooting of orchards, and destruction of farm lands. This policy has been used mostly in areas surrounding the settlements, on both sides of the bypass roads along which the settlers drive, and around army posts, and mostly along the border of Gaza, particularly in the Philadelphi Corridor and Erez crossing point in the creation of 'security strips' or buffer zones. Clearing Operations have continued to be conducted in all areas of the West Bank and Gaza, although to a lesser extent in Area 'A', and in Gaza since the 2005 withdrawal.
- The frequency of incursions in response to Palestinian militancy increased during the second intifada. Between September 2000 and October 2004, more than 24,500 people were displaced by demolitions in Gaza, particularly along the border with Egypt (OCHA, 1 October 2004; ARIJ, 8 April 2006). In successive incursions in Gaza in 2006, over 5,000 people were displaced, 1,000 homes damaged and scores demolished (UNRWA, 19 November 2006; OCHA, 31 July 2006). In 2007, hundreds of people were displaced by demolitions in Nablus (UN HRC, 21 January 2008).
- The period around the 2008-2009 Gaza offensive saw the highest rate of internal displacement due to demolitions since 1967. Over 4,000 houses were demolished, close to 3,000 were seriously damaged and nearly 53,000 suffered minor damage, most of them by IDF in the course of the offensive (ICAHN, 7 April 2009; OCHA, July and September 2009).
- (2) Punitive House demolitions
- Israel implemented a policy of demolishing and sealing houses in West Bank and Gaza Strip as a punitive measure against the Palestinian population since 1967. The scope of the punitive house demolitions has varied. The declared objective was deterrence through harming of relatives of Palestinians carried out, or were suspected of carrying attacks against Israeli citizens. Main victims of demolitions were family members among them women, elderly and children.
- In many cases in the Al Aqsa intifada, the IDF has also damaged nearby homes. Almost half of homes demolished during the Al Aqsa intifada were adjacent to homes. The policy of punitive house demolitions was stopped in February 2005. Punitive house demolitions have been widely condemned for violating basic principles and rights of international human rights and humanitarian law. From 1987 to 2005, 1,115 houses were completely demolished, 64 partially demolished, 299 residences were sealed, and 118 were partially sealed. (B'Tselem 2005)
- There have however been reported number of cases of punitive house demolitions however following 2005 through to 2008. The punitive destruction of Palestinian homes was evidenced during Israel's 22 day military assault on the Gaza Strip (CAT, 23 June 2009). In the Gaza Strip, according to COHRE punitive demolitions accounted for nearly ten per cent of all demolitions during the 2008-2009 offensive (COHRE, May 2009). The Goldstone report concludes that the wide-spread and devastating effect in terms of deaths, injuries and destruction to property the military campaign had on the civilian population demonstrates collective punishment.
- (3) Demolitions of homes and other properties based on Administrative Regulations
- Last 40 years, Israel has employed in the West Bank a policy of planning, development, and building that severely restricts construction by Palestinians. Israel has created a situation in which thousands of Palestinians are unable to obtain permits to build on their land, and are compelled to build without a permit because they have no other way to provide shelter for their families. Israeli authorities have also continued to demolish Palestinian homes, other buildings or livelihood structures, on administrative or judicial grounds, citing their failure to

prove ownership or hold a building permit, or the building's location in a "closed military zone" or Israeli-designated nature reserve (OCHA, 27 May 2008; AI, June 2010). Since the Oslo Accords, administrative demolitions have mainly taken place in East Jerusalem and Area C of the West Bank. In East Jerusalem, the violation of building regulations is classified as a criminal offence, meaning Palestinian owners can be prosecuted

- under Israeli criminal law.
- The existing planning schemes, which have been frozen for past 30 years, serve as the basis for approval - more often rejection - of applications for building permits. Land registration has been frozen for thirty years, making it easy to deny applications for permits on the grounds of failure to prove ownership of the land. Palestinian construction is prohibited in 70 per cent of Area C, and a range of restrictions in the rest of the area make it virtually impossible to get a building permit (OCHA, December 2009). In practice, the Israeli authorities allow Palestinian construction in only one per cent of Area C, much of which is already built-up. Only 13 per cent of land in East Jerusalem is approved for construction, compared with the 35 per cent expropriated for Israeli settlements (OCHA, March 2011).
- Israel administers the building authorities, which have no Palestinian representation. A Palestinian wanting to obtain a building permit to build on his land in Area C [that part of the West Bank which remains under complete Israeli control] must undergo a prolonged, complicated, and expensive procedure which generally results in denial of the application. Over 94 per cent of Palestinian applications for building permits in Area C submitted between January 2000 and September 2007 were denied, leaving little choice for Palestinians but to build "illegally" and so risk the demolition of their buildings and displacement. There are no clear estimates of the number of homes or properties built "illegally", however UN has recently estimated that over 85,000 Palestinians may be at risk of displacement for having been compelled to build illegally in East Jerusalem (UN May 2011) From 1997 to 2009, more than 5,600 demolition orders were issued for Area C, and more than 2,500 buildings
- demolished on average of 200 a year (OCHA, May 2008 and December 2009). In East Jerusalem there were in early 2011 1,500 pending orders, putting 9,000 Palestinians at risk of displacement (IRIN, January 2011; OCHA, January 2011).
- In 2010, more than 430 buildings were demolished in East Jerusalem and Area C, 45 per cent more than in the previous year (DWG, January 2011; AI, July 2010). Nearly 600 Palestinians, almost half of whom were children, were displaced, and the livelihoods of more than 14,300 people affected placing these communities at risk of displacement (OCHA, January, November, and December 2010; DWG, January 2009 and January 2010). Demolitions whether of houses or livelihood structures often affects entire communities. Demolitions include and are often accompanied by the seizure of livestock, equipment and other livelihood assets which heightens the vulnerability of those displaced, and the communities affected. From January to May 2011, the Israeli authorities demolished nearly 230 buildings, displacing more than 430 people (IRIN, April 2011; UNWRA June 2011).

ICHAD, July 2010

ICAHD estimates that some **24,813** Palestinian structures have been demolished in the Occupied Territories since 1967, based on information gleaned from the Israeli Ministry of Interior, the Jerusalem Municipality, the Civil Administration, PCHR, OCHA and other UN sources, Palestinian & Israeli human rights groups, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, our field work and other sources. Last updated on 28 July 2010.

Types of demolitions

1. Punitive demolitions: Houses demolished as punishment for the actions of people associated with the houses. The actions in questions have been everything from political organizing to attacks on Israeli civilians. This policy was suspended by the IDF in February, 2005 after it reached the conclusion that rather than deterring attacks, punitive demolitions only enflame the people and lead to more attacks. The practice was resumed on 19 January 2009. Although this is

thought of by most people as the main reason why houses are demolished, in fact punitive demolitions account for only 8.5% of all defined demolitions. Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states, "Art. 33. No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited." Punitive demolitions, by definition, violate this statute.

2. Administrative demolitions: Houses demolished for lack of a building permit. This happens in Area C and in East Jerusalem, under exclusive Israeli authority, though prior to the existence of Areas A, B & C it occurred in other areas as well. It is important to point out that in almost all cases, Palestinians have no choice but to build "illegally" as permits are almost impossible to obtain. It is also the case that in Area B, if a house is in close proximity to a military base or a road used by the military or settlers, it may also face administrative demolition. Israeli officials explain this type of demolition by stating that Palestinians are violating the zoning and planning laws and that the demolitions are merely law enforcement. This type of demolition accounts for approximately 26% of defined demolitions. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention declares that the destruction of property "is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations." With these demolitions there is no pretense of military action, and are as such clear violations of international law.

3. Land-clearing operations/Military demolitions: Houses demolished by the IDF in the course of military operations for the purposes of clearing off a piece of land (for whatever reason), achieve a military goal or to kill wanted persons as part of Israel's policy of extrajudicial executions. Military demolition account for about 65.5% of defined demolitions. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention applies and the Israeli Defence Force itself found, referring to Operation Cast Lead, the massive destruction of homes "is very difficult to justify from a legal perspective, particularly if such justifications are called for in legal proceedings with international organizations."

OCHA, Protection of civilians, December 2009

"According to information released by the Israeli State Attorney's Office in early December 2009, approximately 2,450 Palestinian-owned structures in Area C have been demolished due to lack of building permit over the course of the past 12 years, or an average of some 200 per year. During the same period, the Israeli authorities demolished 1,230 "illegal" buildings belonging to Israelis. These figures were released as part of the State Attorney's Office's response to claims by an Israeli settler organization, "Regavim", that the Office acts immediately when it comes to demolishing "illegally" constructed buildings belonging to Israelis in the West Bank, but fails to do the same in Palestinian communities. "Regavim" has previously launched appeals to the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) calling on it to intervene in order to force the State to carryout outstanding demolition orders against "illegal" Palestinian-owned structures in Area C. Thus far, in 2009, OCHA has recorded the Israeli authorities' demolition of 180 Palestinian-owned structures in Area C, displacing 319 Palestinians, including 167 children. There have been no demolitions in Area C since mid-July. During the reporting period, no demolitions of Palestinian-owned structures in either Area C or East Jerusalem were recorded by OCHA."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), May 2008, p.1

"To date, more than 3,000 Palestinian-owned structures in the West Bank have pending demolition orders, which can be immediately executed without prior warning. At least ten small communities throughout the West Bank at risk of being almost entirely displaced due to the large number of pending demolitions orders. During the first quarter of 2008, Israeli authorities demolished 124 structures due to a lack of permits. In 2007, 208 Palestinian-owned structures have been demolished under the same circumstances. Sixty-one of the demolished structures were residential and led to the displacement of 435 Palestinians, including at least 135 children. Most of these demolitions occurred in the Jordan Valley and South Hebron areas. This trend, however, was discontinued in the following two months (as of 20 May), when only one structure was demolished. Children are frequently disproportionately affected by the demolition of their homes and the subsequent displacement of their families. According to a recent study, children

are separated from their parents and face gaps in access to education, health facilities and clean water in the immediate aftermath of a house demolition.

Since the beginning of the occupation in 1967 Palestinian-owned structures lacking building permits have been demolished by Israeli authorities. However, following the division of the oPt into different jurisdictional areas in the framework of the Oslo agreements, such demolitions have been restricted to areas classified as C, which cover approximately 61% of the West Bank territory. Demolitions are being carried out by the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) also during military operations, including arrest operations, and due to proximity to the Barrier route.

Over 400 Palestinian villages and towns (excluding East Jerusalem) have at least part of their built-up area in Area C. The number of Palestinians living in those areas is estimated at over 228,000. Among them, about 44,000 reside in 130 communities, whose built-up area lies *entirely (greater than 99%)* in Area C.

Over 94% of applications for building permits in Area C, submitted to the Israeli authorities by Palestinians between January 2000 and September 2007, were denied. During this period 5,000 demolition orders were issued, and over 1,600 Palestinian buildings were demolished. Given the inability to obtain building permits, many Palestinians no longer apply and instead build without them in order to meet their needs, despite the ever-present risk of demolition. [Footnote 6] In contrast, during the same period, 2,900 demolition orders were issued for structures in Israeli settlements, but only 200 demolitions (7% of total orders) were carried out. "

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 21 January 2008

"The demolition of houses has been a regular feature of Israel's occupation of the OPT. Different reasons or justifications are advanced for such demolitions: military necessity, punishment and failure to obtain a building permit. Although the IDF claims to have discontinued punitive home demolitions, instances of such demolitions still occur. On 29 August 2007, the IDF demolished seven housing units in the Naqar neighbourhood of Qalqiliya, which were home to 48 persons (including 17 children) on the ground that they housed members of the military wing of Hamas. Houses are frequently demolished for "administrative" reasons, on the grounds that no permit has been obtained to build - which Israel defends as a normal feature of town planning. Both law and fact show, however, that houses are not demolished in the course of "normal" town planning operations, but are instead demolished in a discriminatory manner to demonstrate the power of the occupier over the occupied.

In both East Jerusalem and that part of the West Bank categorized as Area C (60 per cent of the West Bank, comprising villages and rural districts), houses and structures may not be built without permits. The bureaucratic procedures for obtaining permits are cumbersome and in practice permits are rarely granted. As a result, Palestinians are frequently compelled to build homes without permits. In East Jerusalem house demolitions are implemented in a discriminatory manner: Arab homes are destroyed but not Jewish houses. In Area C the IDF has demolished or designated for demolition homes, schools, clinics and mosques on the ground that permits have not been obtained. Between May 2005 and May 2007, 354 Palestinian structures were destroyed by the IDF in Area C.

Many Bedouin communities have had their structures demolished. In September 2007 the Special Rapporteur visited Al Hadidiya in the Jordan Valley where the structures of a Bedouin community of some 200 families, comprising 6,000 people, living near to the Jewish settlement of Roi, were demolished by the IDF. This brought back memories of the practice in apartheid South Africa of destroying black villages (termed "black spots") that were too close to white residents. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the destruction of personal property "except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations". According to

B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, the destruction of homes in the Naqar neighbourhood of Qalqiliya failed to meet this test. The demolition of homes for administrative reasons can likewise not be justified. Both East Jerusalem and Area C are occupied territory, in respect of which the prohibition contained in Article 53 applies."

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 22 January 2008

"As Israel continues to expand Jewish-only colonies and related infrastructure and construct the Wall and implement its associated regime, Palestinians are left with nowhere to go. Since January 1st 2008, the Israeli army demolished the homes of and evicted from their lands 208 persons in the occupied West Bank. Over half of those who have been forcibly displaced are registered refugees with UNRWA. Bedouin communities in the Jordan Valley (Area C), many of whom have already been displaced a number of times since the Nakba (1948), have been especially targetted. The home demolitions and evictions have affected the communities of Al Baqaa (55 persons lost their homes on 2 January), Furush Beit Dajan (39 persons on 3 January), Fasayil (83 persons on 3 January), Jiftlik (one person on 3 January) and Jahalin Bedouin (30 persons on 16 January). Livestock and personal belongings were damaged because some families were not given time to remove them. While many families were able to seek temporary shelter with family and friends, some slept outside during some of the coldest winter nights in years. More families (Al Baqaa and Jahalin Bedouin) are at risk of imminent displacement as further demolition and eviction orders are pending."

United Nations Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, 10 November 2006

"Since 25 June 2006, the most recent Israeli incursion into the Gaza Strip, I continue to receive alarming reports about deliberate attacks by Israeli forces resulting in the destruction of homes, civilian property and infrastructures in the Gaza Strip. Such acts have a devastating impact on civilians particularly, women and children, and create insecurity and psychological trauma. Thus, these forced evictions and unjustifiable destruction constitute breaches of international laws of human rights, war and humanitarian norms. International law strictly prohibits the destruction of private or public property when not absolutely necessary by military operations."

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 11 August 2004

"During the last month, Israel had continued demolishing Palestinian houses, despite repeated calls by the international community to halt the practice, he [Kieran Prendergast] said. The Israeli Government had continued the practice of demolishing the homes of the families of persons connected to suicide bombing attacks. Such punitive demolitions affecting persons not charged with a crime were a form of collective punishment."

United Nations Secretary General (UN SG), 26 June 1997

"23. A number of further activities deemed to be in violation of international law continued to raise tensions and to jeopardize both the peace process and the rights of Palestinians in the occupied territories. ... Israeli demolitions of Palestinian homes in Jerusalem and other parts of the occupied territories continued.

24. ... Further evidence of the deteriorating political and security situation included punitive house demolitions, curfews, transfer of Bedouin population and unlicensed house demolitions."

United Nations Secretary General (UN SG), 15 June 1982

"38. From information provided by Governments of Arab States and the PLO, it seems that the official housing policy in the West Bank and, to a lesser extent, in the Gaza Strip, is not merely one of "benign neglect" but, in many instances, one of positive obstruction of efforts of individuals to build houses. Building permits are difficult to obtain and, in some cases, applications have been pending for as long as two years. It is stated that Palestinians, in desperation, have resorted to building houses without the required permit and that these houses are demolished by the authorities as unauthorized. Such demolition, which does nothing to alleviate the acute housing

shortage, has been carried out in addition to the punitive demolition of 1,259 houses carried out by the end of 1980.”

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 7 December 2004

“10. In the past year the IDF has carried out regular military incursions into the Gaza Strip. ... The reasons advanced by Israel for these incursions are, in the case of Rafah, the destruction of tunnels used for smuggling arms and in the case of Beit Hanoun and Jabaliya, the destruction of the capacity to launch Qassam rockets into Israel. However, these incursions must be seen in a broader political perspective. Israel has announced that it is planning to withdraw its settlements and military presence from Gaza. It clearly does not wish to be seen to be withdrawing in weakness, with the result that it has chosen to demonstrate its power in Gaza before it withdraws. Also, in order to maintain control over the border between Gaza and Egypt, Israel has decided to create a buffer zone of about 400 metres along the "Philadelphi" route, which requires the destruction of homes in Rafah presently in the buffer zone.

11. In pursuance of the above policies, Israel has engaged in a massive destruction of property in Gaza. Sometimes property, the homes of suspected militants, has been destroyed for punitive reasons. Sometimes homes have been destroyed for strategic purposes, as in the case of homes along the Philadelphi route. Often, however, the destruction is wanton. Homes have been destroyed in a purely purposeless manner. Caterpillar bulldozers have savagely dug up roads with a "ripper" attachment, which has enabled them to destroy electricity, sewage and water lines in a brutal display of power. Moreover, there has been a total lack of concern for the people affected. On 12 July 2004, in the course of a raid into Khan Yunis, the IDF destroyed a house in which 75-year-old Mahmoud Halfalla, confined to a wheelchair, was present. Despite appeals to allow him to leave, the house was destroyed above him and he was killed.

17. The actions of the IDF in Gaza in the past year must be examined and judged in the context of the rules of humanitarian law held to be applicable to Israel's actions in the OPT in the ICJ advisory opinion on the construction of the Wall. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that any destruction by the occupying Power of personal property is prohibited except when such destruction is rendered "absolutely necessary by military operations". Failure to comply with this prohibition constitutes a grave breach in terms of article 147 of the Convention requiring prosecution of the offenders. As shown in this report, the IDF has frequently destroyed houses, roads and agricultural land in order to expand the buffer zone at the Rafah border zone or to inflict damage for punitive reasons unconnected with military combat. Moreover, these operations have been conducted without regard for two of the most fundamental principles of international humanitarian law - the principle of distinguishing at all times between civilian objects and military objectives (article 48 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions) and the principle of proportionality.

20. The demolition of houses - homes - is a central feature of Israel's policy towards Palestinians. "The human suffering entailed in the process of destroying a family's home is incalculable. One's home is much more than simply a physical structure. It is one's symbolic center, the site of one's most intimate personal life and an expression of one's status. It is a refuge, it is the physical representation of the family, it is home". The demolition of a home destroys the family unit, causes a decline in standard of living and has a severe psychological impact on the family, particularly children.

21. The second intifada has witnessed the intensification of house demolitions, resulting in the destruction of 4,170 Palestinian homes. Some 60 per cent of the houses demolished have been destroyed as part of "clearing operations" to meet Israel's military needs. ... Since September 2000, the IDF has demolished 2,540 housing units in which 23,900 Palestinians lived in the

course of clearing operations. Some 25 per cent of the houses demolished have been destroyed for having been built without the required permit from the Israeli authorities, which still retain building authorization rights in Area C of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Israel demolished 768 structures in the West Bank between 2001 and 2003 and 161 structures in East Jerusalem between 2001 and 2004 for having been built without a permit.

22. A third kind of house demolition, accounting for 15 per cent of the houses destroyed, is that of punishment of the family and neighbours of Palestinians who have carried out or are suspected of having carried out attacks against Israelis. Such punitive action is not confined to the family of suicide bombers: indeed, in 40 per cent of the cases involving demolition of houses, no Israelis had been killed in the incidents giving rise to such demolitions. Punitive home destruction is the subject of a recent disturbing publication by Israel's premier human rights NGO, B'Tselem (Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories). This study shows that since October 2001, the IDF has demolished 628 housing units, home to 3,983 persons. 47 per cent (295) of the homes demolished were never home to any one suspected of involvement in attacks upon Israelis. As a result, 1,286 persons unconnected with any acts against Israelis have been punished. Figures do not bear out Israeli claims that advance notice is given to owners of houses to be demolished; only in 3 per cent of the cases had proper warning of demolition been given. This disquieting study strongly suggests that house demolitions are carried out in an arbitrary and indiscriminate manner.

23. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that punitive house demolitions constitute serious war crimes. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the occupying State from destroying the property of civilians "except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations". "Military operation", according to the official commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross, means "the movements, manoeuvres, and actions of any sort, carried out by the armed forces with a view to combat". House demolitions are not carried out in the context of hostilities "with a view to combat" but as a punishment. They cannot be described as part of a "military operation" and they certainly cannot be considered "absolutely necessary" for action not constituting a military operation. Moreover such demolitions violate the prohibition imposed on collective punishment by article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which reads:

"No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited."

49. *This report has drawn attention to the serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law flowing from the actions of the Government of Israel in the OPT. Israel is both legally and morally obliged to bring its practices and policies into line with the law. That Israel has legitimate security concerns cannot be denied. However, these concerns must be addressed within the parameters of the law for, as the High Court of Justice of Israel has rightly declared, "There is no security without law" (Beit Sourik case, para. 86)."*

United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), 12 June 2002

"23. Israel's demolition policies have been a subject of discussion at the meetings of the United Nations treaty bodies each time a report of the State party is examined. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has been seized with the issue since its review of Israel's implementation of the Covenant in 1998, deploring the "continuing practices...of home demolitions, land confiscations and restrictions on family reunification and residency rights, and its adoption of policies [which] result in substandard housing and living conditions, including extreme overcrowding and lack of services..." [E/C.12/1/Add.27 of 4 December 1998, para. 22. See also paras. 11,12,22,28 and 41, in which CESCR addressed the practice of demolishing Palestinian homes and policies leading to declining living conditions on both sides of the Green Line (Israel's 1948 border).] Most recently, the Committee against Torture (CAT) expressed concern that "Israeli policies on house demolitions...may, in certain instances, amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"."

UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, 5 October 1984

“27. There is at the same time an overall annual decline in residential construction in towns and villages of the occupied territories (see A/39/233-E/1984/79, paras. 12-14). New construction of housing barely covers the need resulting from the natural increase in population. For many years, no low-income housing has been publicly subsidized. In addition, punitive demolition of houses continues at an accelerated rate; this is made worse by a new measure of sealing houses or rooms with concrete. Absence of construction to replace dilapidated and substandard housing, together with restrictive policies of the occupying authorities concerning building permits and transfer of funds from abroad, is expected to worsen the serious housing condition.”

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 19 May 2004

“1. Calls on Israel to respect its obligations under international humanitarian law, and insists, in particular, on its obligation not to undertake demolition of homes contrary to that law;
2. Expresses grave concern regarding the humanitarian situation of Palestinians made homeless in the Rafah area and calls for the provision of emergency assistance to them...”

United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 23 May 2003

“26. The Committee reiterates its grave concern about the continuing practices by the State party of home demolitions, land confiscations and restrictions on residency rights, and its adoption of policies resulting in substandard housing and living conditions, including extreme overcrowding and lack of services, of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, in particular in the old city.

42. ...the Committee urges the State party to cease the practices of facilitating the building of Israeli settlements, expropriating land, water and resources, demolishing houses and carrying out arbitrary evictions.”

United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 9 October 2002

“50. The Committee is deeply concerned at the large-scale demolition of houses and infrastructure in the occupied Palestinian territories, which constitutes a serious violation of the right to an adequate standard of living for children in those territories.

51. The Committee recommends...that the State party...refrain from the demolition of civilian infrastructure, including homes, water supplies and other utilities. It further recommends that the State party provide the victims of such demolitions with support for the rebuilding of their homes and with adequate compensation.”

United Nations Committee Against Torture (CAT), 23 November 2001

“6. The Committee expresses concern about ...(j) Israeli policies of house demolitions, which may, in certain instances, amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 16 of the Convention).

7(g) The State party should desist from the policies of closure and house demolition where they offend article 16 of the Convention.” [According to art 16 of the UN Convention against Torture “each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in art. 1....”]

B'Tselem, 11 August 2008

“Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada, Israel has employed a policy of house demolition, uprooting of orchards, and destruction of farmland in the Gaza Strip. This policy has been used mostly in areas surrounding the settlements, on both sides of the bypass roads along which the settlers drive, and around army posts, mostly along the Egyptian border. This policy is part of Israel's defense strategy in the Gaza Strip.... As a safeguard against Palestinian attacks, Israel is creating “security strips” around places where Israeli civilians or armed forces are located.

..... The scope of house demolitions and destruction of farmland is especially extensive along the border between Rafah and Egypt. This strip of land, along which Israel has set up army posts, covers 16.5 square kilometers. Part of the strip lies at the edge of the extremely densely-populated Rafah refugee camp. Israel's policy of destruction in the camp has been systematic and continuous since the beginning of the intifada. In implementing this policy, the IDF has conducted a number of special operations in which it destroyed large numbers of houses in a short period of time. "

Human Rights Watch (HRW), October 2004

"While Israel's punitive and administrative house demolition policies have targeted individual homes, Israel has also in the past undertaken widespread destruction of neighborhoods, camps, and villages for putative security or military purposes. The apparent rationales for much of the destruction in Rafah since 2000 – namely, the need for "clear" borders and, to a lesser extent, to facilitate maneuverability of forces in densely populated areas – are not new. Such demolitions have also been linked to demographic changes.

Unlike in 1948, population displacement and property destruction after the 1967 war was concentrated mostly in border areas: along the boundary that had separated the West Bank from Israel (known as the Green Line) and near the external borders of the West Bank. The IDF razed the villages of Beit Nuba, 'Imwas, and Yalu, located near the strategic Latrun salient northwest of Jerusalem, in June 1967; later, a recreational area called "Canada Park" was built in their place. The same month, the IDF demolished the Green Line villages of Beit 'Awa and Beit Marsam near Hebron. From June 9-18, the IDF destroyed 850 of the 2,000 dwellings in the town of Qalqiliya, located near the Green Line; only the intervention of a group of Israeli intellectuals saved the rest. Equally important to Israel was the Jordan Valley, on the external border of the West Bank. While up to a quarter of the population of the West Bank left after the war, the Jordan Valley's population fell by eighty-eight percent, to 10,778. In subsequent years, the population grew to some twenty thousand. The bulk of those who fled across the river to Jordan were fifty thousand refugees living in three large camps in the valley – Ein al-Sultan, Nu'aymah, and 'Aqbat Jabir. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the IDF bulldozed the Jordan Valley communities of Jiftlik, Ajarish, and Nuseirat in late 1967. Israel's first settlements in the OPT were also in the Jordan Valley, underlining the importance given by Israel to control over the external borders of occupied territories.

The Gaza Strip has been the major site of mass demolitions for the stated purpose of enhancing the mobility of military vehicles in urban areas; such security considerations also dovetailed with demographic ones. General Ariel Sharon, head of the IDF Southern Command after the 1967 war, believed the Palestinian refugee "problem" could be solved by reducing or eliminating the refugee camps. In November 1969, the IDF described to UNRWA plans "to improve the water and electricity supply and to widen roads in refugee camps, noting that some houses would have to be removed." UNRWA demurred, citing the need for permission from the U.N. General Assembly. The IDF eventually went ahead without UNRWA's cooperation. In the summer of 1971, the IDF destroyed approximately two thousand houses in the refugee camps of the Gaza Strip, including Rafah. Bulldozers plowed through dense urban areas to create wide patrol roads to facilitate the general mobility of Israeli forces; they were not connected to combat activities. The demolitions displaced nearly sixteen thousand people, a quarter of them in Rafah. At least two thousand of the displaced were moved to al-Arish, in the Sinai peninsula (then also under Israeli control), and several hundred were sent to the West Bank. Israeli officials reportedly argued that demolitions would serve both developmental and demographic aims:

The Israelis say that their program of demolishing houses and putting in patrol roads and lighting will begin by restoring security to the camps' inhabitants. In the long run, they say, by reducing congestion and building new housing and other facilities, they will provide the beginnings of a

decent life. Israeli officials are not yet prepared to discuss the long-range aspects. They say they are legally justified in moving refugees from Gaza into occupied Egyptian territory in the Sinai Peninsula. Some of those displaced in 1971 again lost their homes in May 2004.

During the current uprising, property destruction in the Gaza Strip for the security of the IDF and settlers has far surpassed punitive demolitions. Most people inside the Gaza Strip who have lost their homes were not alleged to have any connection with those who participated in armed attacks. Rather, the IDF has seized property, razed land, and destroyed homes in the context of creating "buffer zones" for military bases, Israeli settlements, and the roads that serve them."

United Nations Committee Against Torture (CAT), 23 June 2009

"House demolitions

33. While recognizing the authority of the State party to demolish structures that may be considered legitimate military targets according to international humanitarian law, the Committee regrets the resumption by the State party of its policy of purely "punitive" house demolitions in East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip despite its decision of 2005 to cease this practice."

UN HRC, 15 September 2009

"73. The Mission also concludes that in the destruction by Israeli armed forces of private residential houses, water wells, water tanks, agricultural land and greenhouses there was a specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance to the population of the Gaza Strip. The Mission finds that Israel violated its duty to respect the right of the Gaza population to an adequate standard of living, including access to adequate food, water and housing. The Mission moreover finds violations of specific human rights provisions protecting the rights of children, particularly those who are victims of armed conflict, women and the disabled.

74. The conditions of life in Gaza, resulting from deliberate actions of the Israeli forces and the declared policies of the Government of Israel – as they were presented by its authorized and legitimate representatives - with regard to the Gaza Strip before, during and after the military operation, cumulatively indicate the intention to inflict collective punishment on the people of the Gaza Strip in violation of international humanitarian law."

B'Tselem, February 2005

"On 17 February 2005, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz adopted an IDF committee's recommendation to stop demolishing the homes of Palestinians suspected of carrying out attacks against Israelis. The committee found that house demolitions are not an efficient deterrent.

Since 1967, Israel has implemented a policy of demolishing and sealing houses in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a punitive measure against the Palestinian population. The scope of punitive house demolitions has varied over the years (in the four-year period 1998-2001, it was not used), in part because most Palestinians were living in areas in which governing powers had been transferred to the Palestinian Authority, and the IDF did not enter those areas. In October 2001, during IDF actions in Area A in the West Bank, Israel renewed its policy of punitive house demolitions.

The declared objective of house demolitions was deterrence, achieved by harming the relatives of Palestinians who carried out, or were suspected of involvement in carrying out, attacks against Israeli citizens and soldiers. Indeed, the main victims of the demolitions were family members, among them women, the elderly, and children, who bore no responsibility for the acts of their relative and were not suspected of involvement in any offense. In the vast majority of house demolitions, the person because of whom the house was demolished no longer lived in the house, either because he was "wanted" by Israel and was in hiding, or because he was being held by Israel and was awaiting a long prison sentence, or because he had been killed by security forces or in the attack he carried out.

Furthermore, unlike house demolition in the past, in which the IDF was careful to damage only the house of the nuclear family of the person because of whom the house was being demolished, in many cases during the al-Aqsa intifada, the IDF has also damaged nearby homes. In some instances, the damage to neighboring homes apparently resulted from the force of the explosion, and was not deliberate. However, B'Tselem's research clearly shows that in some cases, soldiers intentionally damaged adjacent homes. Destruction of nearby homes is especially common when the residents of the nearby homes belong to the suspect's extended family. Almost half of the homes demolished by the IDF as punishment during the current intifada were adjacent homes. Israel tried to give the impression that it destroys only homes of Palestinians who were directly involved in attacks that caused many Israeli civilian casualties. In practice, the IDF also demolished homes of Palestinians who were involved in any kind of violent actions against Israelis, from suicide attacks that caused many casualties, to failed attempts against soldiers' lives. Also, not only did Israel demolish houses of persons suspected of carrying out attacks or of attempting to carry out attacks, it also demolished the house of Palestinians suspected of planning, dispatching, or assisting in the commission of attacks. ...It should be mentioned that the deterrent effect of house demolitions has never been proven."

B'Tselem, 6 December 2005

"From October 2001 to the end of January 2005, Israel demolished 667 Palestinian houses in the Occupied Territories as a means of punishment, which left more than 4,200 persons homeless. Half of the demolished houses were situated adjacent to houses of the family of the person because of whom the demolition took place. In February of this year, the committee appointed by Chief-of-Staff Ya'alon recommended that the policy be stopped. The committee found that the demolition of houses is not an efficiency means of deterrence. In 17 February, Defense Minister Mofaz adopted the recommendation. "

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 7 December 2004

"22. A third kind of house demolition, accounting for 15 per cent of the houses destroyed, is that of punishment of the family and neighbours of Palestinians who have carried out or are suspected of having carried out attacks against Israelis. Such punitive action is not confined to the family of suicide bombers: indeed, in 40 per cent of the cases involving demolition of houses, no Israelis had been killed in the incidents giving rise to such demolitions. Punitive home destruction is the subject of a recent disturbing publication by Israel's premier human rights NGO, B'Tselem (Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories). This study shows that since October 2001, the IDF has demolished 628 housing units, home to 3,983 persons. 47 per cent (295) of the homes demolished were never home to any one suspected of involvement in attacks upon Israelis. As a result, 1,286 persons unconnected with any acts against Israelis have been punished. Figures do not bear out Israeli claims that advance notice is given to owners of houses to be demolished; only in 3 per cent of the cases had proper warning of demolition been given. This disquieting study strongly suggests that house demolitions are carried out in an arbitrary and indiscriminate manner.

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United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), 21 August 2003

"16. ...In the Committee's opinion the demolition of property and houses of families some of whose members were or are suspected of involvement in terrorist activities or suicide bombings contravenes the obligation of the State party to ensure without discrimination the right not to be subjected to arbitrary interference with one's home (art. 17), freedom to choose one's residence (art. 12), equality of all persons before the law and equal protection of the law (art. 26), and to be subject to torture or cruel and inhuman treatment (art. 7). The State party should cease forthwith the above practice."

United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), 12 June 2002

"22. Israel's administrative housing destruction as a punitive action does not comply with the norms of the rule of law with a view to ensuring human rights. The demolitions ordered either for lack of permit or another pretext have a military dimension and a gratuitously cruel nature. Orders are often issued without specifying the affected home(s), without indicating the date of the order or demolition, and without sufficient warning to inhabitants. Some administrative demolitions are carried out with no orders at all. In most cases of demolition for lack of permit, authorities wait until construction is complete before coming to destroy the home, inflicting the heaviest possible material loss to the victim. With regard to the arbitrary, disproportionate and discriminatory nature of this form of Israeli punishment, housing rights defenders note that even the Israeli assassination of former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was not subjected to the demolition of his family's home, the common collective punishment for Palestinians merely suspected of a real or potential act of resistance. "

B'Tselem, 11 August 2008

"Over the past three decades of occupation, Israel has employed in the West Bank a policy of planning, development, and building that severely restricts construction by Palestinians while allocating broad expanses of land to establish and expand Jewish settlements. In this way, Israel has created a situation in which thousands of Palestinians are unable to obtain permits to build on their land, and are compelled to build without a permit because they have no other way to provide shelter for their families.

Israel froze planning in Palestinian towns and villages. The existing planning schemes, which date back fifty years and more, serve as the basis for approval - more often rejection - of applications for building permits. Land registration has been frozen for thirty years, making it easy to deny applications for permits on the grounds of failure to prove ownership of the land. Israel administers the building authorities, which have no Palestinian representation. A Palestinian wanting to obtain a building permit to build on his land in Area C [that part of the West Bank which remains under complete Israeli control] must undergo a prolonged, complicated, and expensive procedure which generally results in denial of the application.

In this situation, and with no option, many Palestinians are compelled to build without a permit. The construction is not a political act or an act of protest. Rather, the construction is the only way left to them to provide housing for themselves and their families. Rather than change this situation, Israel has adopted a policy of mass demolition of Palestinian houses. In the past ten years, the authorities have demolished more than 2,200 residences, leaving more than 13,000 Palestinians homeless. This policy continues today in Area C.

At the same time, at least 155 Israeli settlements, containing more than 170,000 Jewish Israeli citizens, have been established. These settlements benefit from an efficient system of planning and supervision of construction, and establishment of comprehensive planning schemes for all the settlements. Despite this, thousands of houses were built in these settlements without permits. Israel refrained from demolishing these houses, and instead issued retroactive building

permits for thousand of houses constructed without permits. This building-permit policy blatantly discriminates between settlers and Palestinians.

Planning and building is a purely civilian matter. The military authorities have the right to intervene in planning and building only where patently military matters are involved. Conversely, individuals have a basic right to be involved in determining the future of their surroundings, including the right to elect and direct the planning and building authorities, and occupation cannot justify denial of this right. "

B'Tselem, July 2005, p.36

Refusal to permit building and development

"The entire closed area is classified Area C. According to the Oslo agreements signed between Israel and the PLO, Israel continues to have sole authority over planning and building in Area C of the West Bank. These powers are exercised by the Civil Administration. Planning in Area C continues to be based on two regional outline plans prepared by the British Mandate in the 1940s: one for the southern section of the West Bank and the other for the northern section. The southern section outline plan classifies the entire closed area as farmland, on which construction is forbidden. Because the Civil Administration has refrained from amending the Mandatory outline plans, as a rule, it is impossible to obtain building permits in Area C. The rule does not apply to lands held by the settlements. To enforce the outline plans, the Civil Administration operates a Building Inspection Unit and issues demolition orders when a new structure is detected. It is not surprising, therefore, that the closed area looks as if time has stood still. Israel uses the planning system to deny the residents their right to live in the area as a community. This system blocks all construction intended to meet the residents' basic needs, including residential dwellings, structures to supply services to the residents (education and basic medical care, for example), pens for their sheep and goats, and water reservoirs."

See Also:

[Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank](#), **B'Tselem**, May 2002

[The legality of house demolitions under International Humanitarian Law](#), **Harvard University**, 31 May 2004

[Ruling Palestine: A History of the Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land and Housing in Palestine](#), **Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights**, 11 May 2005

[The legality of house demolitions under International Humanitarian Law](#), **Harvard University**, 31 May 2004

[Demolishing Peace: Israel's policy of mass demolitions of Palestinian houses in the West Bank](#), **B'Tselem**, 25 December 1997

[Israel demolishes homes of 30 Palestinian Bedouins near Jerusalem](#), **Ma'an News Agency**, 28 January 2008

[Ruling Palestine: A History of the Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land and Housing in Palestine](#), **Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights**, 11 May 2005

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[Humanitarian Monitor January 2008](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 28 February 2008

[Discrimination in the Heart of the Holy City](#), **Meir Margalit**, 2006

[Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Israel. CRC/C/15/Add.195](#), **United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child**, 9 October 2002

[Statistics on demolition of houses as punishment 1987-2005](#), **B'Tselem**, February 2005
[Jewish Voice for Peace welcomes end of punitive home demolitions, calls for end to all home demolitions](#), **Jewish Voice for Peace**, 23 February 2005
[Jewish Peace News Commentary: The announced change applies only to punitive demolitions](#), **Jewish Voice for Peace**, 17 February 2005
[Israel Should Reject Proposal for Additional Home Demolitions](#), **Human Rights Watch (HRW)**, 14 January 2005
[B'Tselem to Mofaz: Prevent the renewal of house demolitions](#), **B'Tselem**, 6 December 2005
 al-Haq, *Israel's Punitive House Demolition Policy: Collective Punishment in Violation of International Law*, 2003;
 al-Haq, *A Thousand and One Homes: Israel's Demolition and Sealing of Houses in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*, 1993;
 B'tselem, *Demolition and sealing of homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a Punitive Measure During the Intifada*, 1989.

Separation Wall

Separation Wall and Displacement

- Separation Wall & Displacement
- In mid 2002, Israel approved the construction of the Wall with the intended purpose to thwart suicide attacks and appeals by Israeli citizens to address the security concerns. The path of the Wall designed by the Israeli government in entering West Bank violates international law and has been a source of forced displacement, amongst other violations. The Wall is planned to extend 723 kilometers with 85% located inside the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) at times entering 14km into the West Bank. According to UN figures, more than 61 per cent of the barrier had been completed by 2010, with an additional eight per cent under construction and 30 per cent planned but not yet built. When completed, 85 per cent of the barrier will run inside the West Bank, incorporating over nine per cent of the West Bank area, mainly where Israeli settlements have been built (OCHA / WHO, July 2010). Construction of the Wall has led to multiple forms of displacement and significant consequences on
 - Palestinian communities on both sides of the wall. In 2006, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in OPT referred to a "new generation of internally displaced persons" (UN CHR, 17 January 2006, para.20).
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 - There are several ways in which Palestinian communities are affected by the Wall and its associated regime: villages and suburbs that are walled from three sides by the Wall and where movement through the fourth is tightly monitored; and villages and population centres located between the Wall and the Green Line (Seam zone). According to 2008 study, the Wall when completed entail the following:
 - An estimated 35,000 to 60,000 Palestinians will be residing in the closed zone between the Wall and the Green Line, also known as "seam zone" in addition to the majority of the approximately 250,000 residents of East Jerusalem. The area will constitute 9,8 to 10,2% of Palestinian Territory. (CHR, 21 January 2008; OCHA and UNWRA, July 2008)
 - Approximately 125,000 Palestinians in 28 communities will be surrounded on three sides by the Wall.
 - Approximately, 26,000 Palestinians in 8 communities will be surrounded on four sides by the Wall, with a tunnel or road connection to the rest of the West Bank. (OCHA and UNWRA, July 2008)

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- Modifications of the route of the Wall have taken place however 85 per cent of the Wall remains still within West Bank including East Jerusalem. Israeli High Court of Justice has ruled on several occasions requesting the Government of Israel to re-route the Wall, for the effects it has on Palestinian lives. The most notable cases are the Beit Surik Ruling in June 2004, the Alfei Menashe ruling in September 2005, and the Bi'lin ruling in September 2007 in which the Wall had to be re-routed and certain parts dismantled parts of which implemented in 2011. (Diakonia, March 2011) Such rulings by the Israeli High Court have been far and in between and have modestly impacted on the continued construction of the Wall. Tens of petitions are still pending in front of the Israeli High Court of Justice.
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- The Wall has serious humanitarian consequences for Palestinians living within the "closed zone" or "seam zone" the area between the Wall and the Green Line designated by Israeli authorities as "closed military zone" as well as communities in East Jerusalem affected by the Wall (OCHA June 2010). Palestinians are cut off from places of employment, schools, universities and specialized medical care, and community life is seriously fragmented. In 2010, an estimated 7,000 Palestinians outside of East Jerusalem lived between the Wall and the Green Line (OCHA, June 2010). Since October 2003 Palestinian residents or Palestinians accessing land as well as visitors face restrictive permit regime - "green permits" - in order to reside in these areas or access their land which is only accessible through specific "gates" which do not operate regularly or effectively (OCHA, October 2009: June 2010). Construction of the Wall has involved land confiscations and has severely curtailed the access of
 - people living alongside it to livelihoods and services (OCHA, 15 July 2009).
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 - In East Jerusalem the construction of the Wall is re effectively re-drawing the geographical realities: all of the 'municipal' and the majority of the 'metropolitan' Israeli settlements are included on the 'Jerusalem' side of the Barrier (OCHA, March 2011). The Barrier is also compounding the separation of East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank (OCHA, March 2011). The Wall in East Jerusalem is having significant impact on number of communities
 - Estimated 55,000 Jerusalem ID card holders now located on the West Bank side of the Wall affecting their access to services, livelihoods, policing, as well as family unity issues
 - Estimated 2,500 majority West Bank ID holders in the Jerusalem side of the Wall creating concerns as to their residency status, impeding freedom of movement to services and livelihoods
 - Estimated 150,000 inhabitants in East Jerusalem suburbs and West Bank severed from ties to Jerusalem entailing economic decline and decrease of real estate, and movement of Jerusalem ID card holders into East Jerusalem.
 - Bedu and West bank communities restricted from access to agricultural land in Jerusalem governorate, and now governed by restrictive permit regime.
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 - The Wall has already displaced a significant number of people and threatens to provoke further displacement however there are no clear estimates available, and monitoring of movements of Jerusalemites or West Bank residents along the construction of the Wall has not been undertaken. In 2003 it was estimated that the completed Wall would leave some 90,000 people at risk of displacement (RI, 25 September 2003); the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) estimated in May 2005 that over 14,000 people had already been displaced in the 145 localities through which the Wall passed (PCBS, September 2005). Sample household survey undertaken in mid 2006 in Jerusalem indicates that 17,3% of Palestinians who had changed previous residence did so because of the Wall and associated regime. (BADIL and PCBS 2006) These figures are very likely underestimates and fail to

identify the extent of displacement which has taken place - such as suburbs like Al Ram which the construction of the Wall

- has caused significant decline and left a ghost suburb as Jerusalemites have relocated into Jerusalem - and still entail.
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- There is no doubt that the construction of the Wall within OPT has been internationally condemned as illegal. In 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its Advisory Opinion ruled that the construction of the Wall in the OPT as well as Israeli settlements were in breach of international humanitarian law, and that it should cease and that the constructed areas of the Wall in the West Bank be dismantled. The ICJ also underlined that that the construction of the Wall in the West Bank is entailing displacement and altering the demographic composition of the OPT. Following the ICJ ruling, on 20 August 2004, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/ES-10/15, which demanded that Israel comply with the legal obligations identified in the ICJ advisory opinion. It also requested the UN Secretary-General to establish a register of damages caused to the Palestinian population by the Wall's construction (See section on Property).
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UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 21 January 2008

"36. ...The wall that Israel is at present building, largely in Palestinian territory, is clearly illegal. The International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the construction of the wall found that it is contrary to international law and that Israel is under an obligation to discontinue construction of the wall and to dismantle forthwith those sections that have already been built. Israel has abandoned its claim that the wall is a security measure only and now concedes that one of the purposes of the wall is to include settlements within Israel. The fact that 83 per cent of the West Bank settler population and 69 settlements are enclosed within the wall bears this out.

37. The wall is planned to extend for 721 kilometres. At present 59 per cent of the wall has been completed and 200 kilometres have been constructed since the International Court of Justice handed down its Advisory Opinion declaring the wall to be illegal. When the wall is finished, an estimated 60,000 West Bank Palestinians living in 42 villages and towns will reside in the closed zone between the wall and the Green Line. This area will constitute 10.2 per cent of Palestinian land in the West Bank. There are, however, suggestions that the route of the wall will be revised to include additional Palestinian lands in the south-eastern West Bank near to the Dead Sea. If this plan is implemented some 13 per cent of Palestinian land will be seized by the wall. The closed zone includes many of the West Bank's valuable water resources and its richest agricultural lands.

38. The wall has serious humanitarian consequences for Palestinians living within the closed zone. They are cut off from places of employment, schools, universities and specialized medical care, and community life is seriously fragmented. Moreover, they do not have 24-hour access to emergency health services. Over 100 persons residing in the closed zone have not received permits to leave the area. Palestinians who live on the eastern side of the wall but whose land lies in the closed zone face serious economic hardship, as they are not able to reach their land to harvest crops or to graze their animals without permits. Permits are not easily granted and the bureaucratic procedures for obtaining them are humiliating and obstructive. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has estimated that only about 18 per cent of those who used to work land in the closed zone before the construction of the wall receive permits to visit the closed zone today. The opening and closing of the gates leading to the closed zone are regulated in a highly restrictive manner: in 2007 OCHA carried out a survey in 67 communities located close to the wall which showed that only 19 of the 67 gates in the wall were open to

Palestinians for use all the year round on a daily basis. To aggravate matters Palestinians coming into and out of the closed zone are frequently subjected to abuse and humiliation at the gates by the IDF. Hardships experienced by Palestinians living within the closed zone and in the precincts of the wall have already resulted in the displacement of some 15,000 persons.

39. The plight of the village of Jayyus, visited by the Special Rapporteur on 30 September 2007, illustrates the hardships faced by communities living near to the wall, but in the West Bank. The 3,200 residents of Jayyus are separated by the wall from their farmland; 68 per cent of the village's agricultural land and its six agricultural wells lie in the closed zone between the wall and the Green Line and are off limits to those without a visitor's permit. Scores of greenhouses are situated in the closed zone, producing tomatoes, cucumbers and sweet peppers, which require daily irrigation. Only about 40 per cent of the residents of Jayyus are granted permits to access farms, and gate opening times are both limited and arbitrary. By August 2004, one year after the construction of the wall, local production had fallen from 7 to 4 million kilograms of fruit and vegetables. The situation has further deteriorated over the past three years.

40. The section of the wall within the Jerusalem Governorate measures 168 kilometres in length. Only 5 kilometres of its completed length runs along the Green Line. The route of the wall runs deep into the West Bank to encircle the settlements of Maale Adumim. In contrast, many Palestinian villages which are currently in the Jerusalem municipality are placed outside the wall and thus separated from Jerusalem. In some places, such as Abu Dis, the wall runs through Palestinian communities, separating neighbours and families. About 25 per cent of the 253,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem have been cut off from the city by the wall. This means they can only enter Jerusalem through checkpoints, which makes it difficult to access hospitals, schools, universities, work and holy sites - particularly the Al Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre."

UNWRA & UNOCHA, July 2008, p.1 to 8.

"Various routes of the Barrier have been approved by the Israeli cabinet since construction began. The map of the current route was published on the website of the Ministry of Defense in April 2006. The Barrier compounds the fragmentation of the West Bank by creating non-contiguous enclaves of Palestinian communities and territory, which are isolated from each other and from the remainder of the West Bank. Movement and access for Palestinians is controlled by permits and gates, or channelled through 'Fabric of Life' routes – secondary roads, tunnels and underpasses created or upgraded by the Israeli authorities to restore transportation contiguity between disconnected Palestinian localities. These physical and bureaucratic measures add to the closure regime of checkpoints and roadblocks, preventing and delaying Palestinians from accessing essential services and workplaces. The constructed parts of the Barrier in the northern West Bank are already creating geographical and bureaucratic hardships for hundreds of thousands of Palestinians.

In October 2003, the area between the Barrier and the Green Line was declared closed by military order, and a permit and gate regime was introduced. Approximately 10,000 Palestinian residents reside in these areas and have become physically separated from the rest of the West Bank. The majority require 'permanent resident' permits from the Israeli military to continue to live in their own homes. As documented in previous UNOCHA-UNRWA reports, health and education services are generally located on the east, or 'Palestinian' side, of the Barrier, so children, patients and workers have to pass through gates to reach schools, medical facilities and workplaces and to maintain family and social relations. When complete, approximately 35,000 West Bank Palestinians will be located between the Barrier and the Green Line.

A far greater number of Palestinians who reside to the east of the Barrier have been isolated from farms, grazing lands and water resources located on the west side. In the northern West

Bank, these Palestinians need 'visitor' permits to cross the Barrier to reach their farms and wells located in the closed area. According to a UNOCHA-UNRWA Barrier Monitoring survey, less than 20 percent of those who used to farm their lands in these areas before completion of the Barrier are now granted permits. Even if granted, permits are not always issued to the most appropriate person, leaving older family members unable to effectively carry out the work, while the more able-bodied remain idle at home.

For the minority granted permits, access is through a limited number of designated gates. Along the total length of the Barrier, there are 66 gates currently open on a daily, weekly and/or seasonal basis The irregular placement of the gates and the restrictive opening times severely curtail the time available for farming with negative impact on rural livelihoods. Projected Barrier construction will also affect some of the most productive lands and water resources in the West Bank. In the north, the Qedumim and Ariel 'Fingers' will fragment the Qalqiliya district, adding to the deteriorating economic situation in Qalqiliya City, and compounding the problems faced by agricultural communities such as Jayyus. The 'Fingers' will also gravely impact the Salfit governorate, disrupting the geographical contiguity and dissecting the territory into three disconnected pockets, north, south and west, with communities surrounded on three sides (the Biddya Area) or four sides (Az Zawiya enclave) by the Barrier.

In the central West Bank, the completed Barrier isolates neighbouring West Bank communities -- such as the villages in the Deir Ballut enclave -- that were once closely connected to East Jerusalem. Densely-populated Palestinian localities inside the Jerusalem boundary are also physically separated from the city, with residents now needing to cross a checkpoint to access the services to which they are entitled. Completion of the Barrier around the Ma'ale Adummim settlement bloc will physically separate East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, and as documented in a previous UNOCHA Barrier report, will further restrict Palestinians' access to workplaces, health, education, and other services, and to places of worship.

Further south, the Barrier already separates Bethlehem from Jerusalem, with which it shares historic religious, social, and economic ties. Construction of the Barrier around the Gush 'Etzion settlement bloc will sever the territorial contiguity of Bethlehem and curtail its potential for natural growth. It will also separate the city from its agricultural hinterland, which comprises 9 Palestinian communities of approximately 22,000 residents, who will face restricted access to services in Bethlehem, including markets, health services, and higher education.

.... When complete: This route will run to 723 kilometres, more than double the length of the 1949 Armistice (Green Line), with 87% located inside the West Bank (including East Jerusalem). The Barrier will isolate approximately 9.8% of West Bank territory, including East Jerusalem and No-Man's Land. Approximately 385,000 settlers in 80 settlements will be located between the Barrier and the Green Line. Approximately 35,000 West Bank Palestinians will be located between the Barrier and the Green Line, in addition to the majority of the approximately 250,000 residents of East Jerusalem. Approximately 125,000 Palestinians in 28 communities will be surrounded on three sides by the Barrier. Approximately 26,000 Palestinians in 8 communities will be surrounded on four sides by the Barrier, with a tunnel or road connection to the rest of the West Bank."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), November 2007

"Of the 67 communities surveyed in the northern West Bank, 52 are located to the east of the Barrier and 15 in the closed area between the Barrier and the Green Line.

The total population is 218,556, including 77,403 refugees. Of these, 208,627 (including 75,534 refugees) reside to the east of the Barrier and 9,929 (including 1,969 refugees) live in the closed area.

67 Barrier gates have been recorded by the UN in the Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqiliya and north Salfit districts in the northern West Bank. Of these, 19 are currently open to Palestinians on a daily basis with appropriate permits. A further 19 are open to Palestinians on a seasonal/ weekly basis. 29 are never open to Palestinians to access land in the closed area.

Only about 18% of those who used to work land in the closed area before completion of the Barrier receive 'visitor' permits today.

Approximately 3,000 people have stopped applying for permits, discouraged because of repeated refusal. Approximately 1,800 families do not have an able bodied member with a permit.

26 men, 81 women, and 4 children residing in the closed area have not received 'permanent resident' permits, restricting their freedom of movement outside of the closed area.

7 communities in the closed area have no access to local primary health care and only 1 community has access to 24-hour-emergency healthcare. 9 communities in the closed area report that expectant mothers leave the closed area weeks before delivery to ensure access to proper care.

29 out of 67 communities reported that households have left because of the Barrier, representing about 1,200 households – just over 3 percent of the population surveyed.

36 communities reported that heads of households have left to find work elsewhere, representing about 1,100 additional individuals.

42 of the communities complained of regular harassment or verbal abuse, 17 reported incidents of physical violence and 13 complained of seizure, confiscation or destruction of produce.

....All 67 communities surveyed have land under the Barrier and/or isolated in the closed area between the Barrier and the Green Line in the northern West Bank. The communities included one city (Qalqiliya), towns, villages, *khirbehs* (hamlets) and Bedouin communities. Of the 67 communities, 52 are located to the east of the Barrier and 15 are in the closed area between the Barrier and the Green Line. The majority of communities are rural and highly dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods. The area affected includes some of the most agriculturally productive land and richest water resources in the West Bank. The total population, as reported by community officials, is 218,556, including 77,403 registered refugees. Of these, 208,627 (including 75,534 refugees) reside to the east of the Barrier and 9,929 (including 1,969 refugees) live in the closed area.

Those granted visitor permits can only enter and access the closed areas through designated gates. In the 200-kilometre length of the Barrier surveyed, the total number of gates is 67. Gates may have multiple functions: and OCHA/UNRWA have divided them into seven categories. Of the 67 gates recorded, only 19 are open on a daily basis, a further 19 are open seasonally or seasonal/ weekly, and 29 are never open for Palestinians to access the closed area.

The survey also attempted to address the issue of displacement as a result of the negative impact of the Barrier on movement and livelihoods. Some 29 communities reported that households have left because of the Barrier, representing about 1,200 households, or three percent of the population surveyed. As reported by respondents in 36 communities, heads of households have also left to seek employment elsewhere in the West Bank, representing about 1,100 additional individuals."

Ma'an Development Centre, 2007

"The Palestinian ghettos that exist today have been built gradually since 1948. As described by successive Israeli Ministers since that time, they serve a dual purpose: to exert severe economic and social pressure on the Palestinian population in order to force them to leave; and to allow complete control of the Palestinian population who remain in order to facilitate the expansion of the Jewish settlements onto their confiscated land.

In 2007, the policy of ghettoization is almost complete. Six ghettos have been shaped:

- The Northern Ghetto - Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Nablus.
- The Central Ghetto - Salfit and Ramallah.
- The Southern Ghetto - Hebron and Bethlehem
- The Jordan Valley
- The Gaza Strip
- Jerusalem

The ghettos contain 27 enclaves surrounded by barbed wire, walls and control towers, with 266,442 Palestinian residents. The physical restrictions, coupled with the Occupation's control of the planning system mean that there is no possibility that these centers can expand to meet the needs of the Palestinian population. Between the ghettos are walls, military outposts and roadblocks. Movement between the ghettos is extremely difficult for Palestinians and in many cases actually impossible, with deleterious effects on social relations, education and commercial activity. The restrictions are imposed in defiance of international conventions and human rights.

In spite of the ever-tightening restrictions, Palestinians have been steadfast in their resistance and their determination not to relinquish their rights and land. Palestinian national identity and struggle have endured decades of Israeli policies of fragmentation, culminating today in the Bantustanization of the West Bank and Gaza. Among Palestinians in the ghettos, across the Green Line and in the Diaspora the spirit of defiance remains undimmed: 'We will not live the Nakba twice' is our message to the Occupation and the world."

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 4 July 2006

"Within the framework of the PCBS surveillance system on impact of the Israeli measures on the wellbeing of the Palestinian people, PCBS conducted in cooperation with BADIL, the Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, a household survey on the impact of wall on forced displacement in Jerusalem. The sample size of the survey is 1,008 households; interviews were completed with 981 households comprising 5,148 persons. The main objective of this survey is to quantify the impact of the wall on the forced displacement of the Palestinian people in Jerusalem and on their social and economic conditions. Data collection took place between 15 May and 10 June 2006. The following summarizes the main findings of the survey.

Changing Place of Residence

The results of the survey show that 32.9% of the Jerusalemite people have changed their last place of residence. This percentage reached 29.7% for those living in localities inside the wall, against 83.3% from localities outside the wall. The percentage of persons who changed their place of residence for the first time after the beginning of constructing the wall in 2002 amounted to 53.9% of the total persons who have involuntarily changed their previous place of residence (54.9% inside the wall and 51.7% outside the wall). The wall and its associated regime was the main cause for changing the place of residence for 17.3% of all persons who have changed their previous place of residence.

At the household level, the results reveal that 18.9% of the Jerusalemite households have changed their previous place of residence (11.7% of those inside the wall and 32.2% outside the wall). The wall and its associated regime was the cause of 34.8% of these changes. The percentage of persons (16 years and over) who thought in the past to change their current place of residence due to the wall and its associated regime is 52.2% (51.4% inside the wall and 52.8% outside the wall). The percentage of those currently thinking to change their place of residence due to the wall and its associated regime is 63.8% (78.9% inside the wall and 58.0% outside the wall).

Requirement to Stay in the Current Place of Residence

The results show that 86.7% of persons (16 years and over) in Jerusalem governorate require adequate services in order to be encouraged to stay in their place of residence (91.8% inside the

wall and 63.6% outside the wall). Availability of adequate infrastructure was the requirement of 84.8% (88.6% inside the wall and 77.9% outside the wall). In addition, 76.9% (89.6% inside the wall and 53.7% outside the wall) of the household required social security, and 72.9% asked for suitable jobs (77.9% inside the wall and 63.6% outside the wall).

Land Confiscation

The results reveal that the percentage of households in Jerusalem governorate who had all or part of their land confiscated is 19.2% (5.3% inside of the wall and 31.4% outside of the wall).

Impact of the Wall on Education

The results of the survey show that 80.0% of the households with students in higher education used alternative roads to reach university/college. About 75.2% of the households with students enrolled in basic/secondary education reported use of alternative roads to reach schools. In addition, 72.1% of the households with students in higher education were forced to be sometimes absent from university, compared with 69.4% for households with students enrolled in basic/secondary education.

Separation from Relatives due to the Wall

About 21.4% of Palestinian households reported to have at least one member who was separated from relatives (15.5% inside of the wall and 32.6% outside of the wall). In addition, 18.0% of the Palestinian households in Jerusalem governorate are separated from the father (14.3% inside of the wall and 26.2% outside of the wall), whereas 12.7% of the households are separated from the mother (12.9% inside of the wall and 12.3% outside of the wall).

Access to Health Services

The results of the survey show that access to health centers in the center of town was a difficulty for 34.5% of the households in Jerusalem governorate (5.8% inside of the wall and 88.3% outside of the wall). The inability of medical staff to reach health centers is an obstacle for 31.3% of the households (4.4% inside of the wall and 81.8% outside of the wall).

Population Mobility

The results show that the time spent to pass checkpoints was an obstacle for 94.7% of the households (94.5% inside of the wall and 95.0% outside of the wall), whereas timing of passage was considered an obstacle for 92.7% of the households (93.4% inside of the wall and 91.2% outside of the wall).

Impact of the Wall on Social Networking

The results reveal that the ability of 84.6% of the households in Jerusalem to visit family and relatives has been affected by the wall (84.3% inside of the wall and 85.2% outside of the wall). About 56.3% of the households were affected in their ability to practice cultural and social activities and entertainment (48.5% inside of the wall and 70.5% outside of the wall). The wall has also affected the ability of 40.0% of the households to visit religious and holy sites. The survey results indicate also that the percentage of households who faced obstacles to marrying a partner living on the other side of the wall has increased from 31.6% before the construction of the wall to 69.4% after construction of the wall."

International Court of Justice (ICJ), 9 July 2004

"122. The Court recalls moreover that, according to the report of the Secretary-General, the planned route would incorporate in the area between the Green Line and the wall more than 16 per cent of the territory of the West Bank. Around 80 per cent of the settlers living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, that is 320,000 individuals, would reside in that area, as well as 237,000 Palestinians. Moreover, as a result of the construction of the wall, around 160,000 other Palestinians would reside in almost completely encircled communities (see paragraphs 84, 85 and 119 above). In other terms, the route chosen for the wall gives expression in *loco* to the

illegal measures taken by Israel with regard to Jerusalem and the settlements, as deplored by the Security Council (see paragraphs 75 and 120 above). There is also a risk of further alterations to the demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory resulting from the construction of the wall inasmuch as it is contributing, as will be further explained in paragraph 133 below, to the departure of Palestinian populations from certain areas. That construction, along with measures taken previously, thus severely impedes the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination, and is therefore a breach of Israel's obligation to respect that right....

133. That construction, the establishment of a closed area between the Green Line and the wall itself and the creation of enclaves have moreover imposed substantial restrictions on the freedom of movement of the inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (with the exception of Israeli citizens and those assimilated thereto). Such restrictions are most marked in urban areas, such as the Qalqiliya enclave or the City of Jerusalem and its suburbs. They are aggravated by the fact that the access gates are few in number in certain sectors and opening hours appear to be restricted and unpredictably applied. For example, according to the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, "Qalqiliya, a city with a population of 40,000, is completely surrounded by the Wall and residents can only enter and leave through a single military checkpoint open from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m.".... There have also been serious repercussions for agricultural production, as is attested by a number of sources. According to the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories "an estimated 100,000 dunums [approximately 10,000 hectares] of the West Bank's most fertile agricultural land, confiscated by the Israeli Occupation Forces, have been destroyed during the first phase of the wall construction.... The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights states that construction of the wall "cuts off Palestinians from their agricultural lands, wells and means of subsistence" It has further led to increasing difficulties for the population concerned regarding access to health services, educational establishments and primary sources of water. The Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967 states that "Palestinians between the Wall and Green Line will effectively be cut off from their land and workplaces, schools, health clinics and other social services." (E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 8 September 2003, para. 9.) In relation specifically to water resources, the Special Rapporteur on the right to Food of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights observes that "By constructing the fence Israel will also effectively annex most of the western aquifer system (which provides 51 per cent of the West Bank's water resources)." (E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31 October 2003, para. 51.)

Similarly, in regard to access to health services, it has been stated that, as a result of the enclosure of Qalqiliya, a United Nations hospital in that town has recorded a 40 per cent decrease in its caseload (report of the Secretary-General, para. 24). At Qalqiliya, according to reports furnished to the United Nations, some 600 shops or businesses have shut down, and 6,000 to 8,000 people have already left the region (E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 8 September 2003, para. 10; E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31 October 2003, para. 51). The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has also observed that "With the fence / wall cutting communities off from their land and water without other means of subsistence, many of the Palestinians living in these areas will be forced to leave." (E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31 October 2003, para. 51.) In this respect also the construction of the wall would effectively deprive a significant number of Palestinians of the "freedom to choose [their] residence". In addition, however, in the view of the Court, since a significant number of Palestinians have already been compelled by the construction of the wall and its associated régime to depart from certain areas, a process that will continue as more of the wall is built, that construction, coupled with the establishment of the Israeli settlements mentioned in paragraph 120 above, is tending to alter the demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

132. From the information submitted to the Court, particularly the report of the Secretary-General, it appears that the construction of the wall has led to the destruction or requisition of properties under conditions which contravene the requirements of Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 133. That construction, the establishment of a closed area between the Green Line and the wall itself and the creation of enclaves have moreover imposed substantial restrictions on the freedom of movement of the inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (with the exception of Israeli citizens and those assimilated thereto). Such restrictions are most marked in urban areas, such as the Qalqiliya enclave or the City of Jerusalem and its suburbs....

134. To sum up, the Court is of the opinion that the construction of the wall and its associated régime impede the liberty of movement of the inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (with the exception of Israeli citizens and those assimilated thereto) as guaranteed under Article 12, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They also impede the exercise by the persons concerned of the right to work, to health, to education and to an adequate standard of living as proclaimed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Lastly, the construction of the wall and its associated régime, by contributing to the demographic changes referred to in paragraphs 122 and 133 above, contravene Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Security Council resolutions cited in paragraph 120 above....

163. For these reasons, the Court finds... The construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated régime, are contrary to international law; ...Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto, in accordance with paragraph 151 of this Opinion.... Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem;...."

United Nations (UN), 20 July 2004

"The General Assembly GA/10248, 20 July 2004 today voted overwhelmingly to demand that Israel heed last month's advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to halt construction on its security barrier in the West Bank, tear down the portions built on Palestinian land, and provide reparations to Palestinians whose lives have been harmed by the wall. By a vote of 150 in favour to 6 against (Australia, Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, United States), with 10 abstentions, the Assembly's tenth resumed emergency special session adopted a resolution which also calls on both the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority to immediately implement their obligations under the Road Map peace plan, which calls for a series of parallel and reciprocal steps by each party leading to two States living side by side in peace by 2005.

On 9 July, the 15-judge Court issued its opinion, saying that the 450-mile-long system of walls and fences in the occupied Palestinian territory "gravely" infringed on the rights of Palestinians, could not be justified by military needs or national security, and violated international law. Though the decision was non-binding, 14 of the 15 judges called on the Assembly and the Security Council to "consider what further action is required to end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall".

The measure adopted today called on all United Nations Member States to comply with their obligations as contained in the finding by the ICJ -- the United Nations highest legal body -- which include a duty "not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in

the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem" and "not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction". The text also requests the Secretary-General to set up a register of all damage caused to "all the natural or legal persons" in connection with Israel's construction of the barrier. It also invites Switzerland, as the depositary of the Geneva Conventions, to conduct consultations and report to the Assembly on the matter, including the possibility of resuming the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention."

B'Tselem, February 2005

"On 26 February 2004, residents of several villages northwest of Jerusalem, among them Beit Sourik, petitioned the High Court of Justice in opposition to the route of the Separation Barrier planned for their area. The High Court gave its decision on 30 June 2004. The three justices - President Aharon Barak, Eliahu Matza, and Mishel Heshin - held that thirty of the forty kilometers of the barrier's route involved in the petition (the area between Givat Ze'ev and Maccabim) was illegal and that the state must change the route. The judgment discussed at length two questions: whether the military commander had the power to seize private land to build the Separation Barrier, and whether the barrier's route in the relevant section was lawfully set.

In examining these questions, the justices discussed reasons that could provide the legal basis for actions to be taken by the defense establishment in building the barrier. The Court assumed that the West Bank is occupied territory, subject to international humanitarian law: the Hague Regulations, of 1907, and the humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention (as defined by Israel). On this point, the justices held: We accept that the military commander cannot order the construction of the separation fence if his reasons are political. The separation fence cannot be motivated by a desire to "annex" territories to the State of Israel.. Indeed, the military commander of territory held in belligerent occupation must balance between the needs of the army on one hand, and the needs of the local inhabitants on the other. In the framework of this delicate balance, there is no room for an additional system of considerations, whether they be political considerations, the annexation of territory, or the establishment of the permanent borders of the state. (Par. 27)

Based on this determination, the justices found that "construction of the fence comes within this framework," in that the decision was made in light of legitimate military needs. However, as it has done for many years, the justices ignored the case law on the question of the illegality, in international law, of the settlements that Israel established in the West Bank. Thus, the High Court did not examine the effect of this illegal action on the legitimacy of the considerations underlying construction of the barrier. According to the judgment, the fact that the barrier is motivated by legitimate security concerns does not release the military commander from his duty to choose a "proportionate" route that balances between security and the inhabitants' needs. The judgment states that most of the route in the area under review is disproportionate because it severely impairs the residents' fabric of life:

The injury caused by the separation fence is not restricted to the lands of the inhabitants and to their access to these lands. The injury is of far wider a scope. It strikes across the fabric of life of the entire population. In many locations, the separation fence passes right by their homes. In certain places (like Beit Sourik), the separation fence surrounds the village from the west, the south, and the east. (Part. 94) After the High Court gave its decision, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon directed the defense establishment to review the entire route of the Separation Barrier and to conform it to the spirit of the Court's judgment. The new route, which was proposed by the defense establishment in September 2004, was approved by the Cabinet on 20 February 2005."

OCHA, November 2009

"In September, the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) ordered the state to relocate the Barrier on three sections between Tulkarm and Qalqiliya cities, after ruling that the current route causes a

disproportionate harm to Palestinians. While, once implemented, the new route approved by the Court will improve access of farmers to some areas, it runs entirely within the West Bank keeping thousands of dunums of agricultural land behind the Barrier. The relocation of another section of the Barrier, around the Alfe Menashe settlement enclave, following a previous HCJ ruling, was carried out during this period and is almost complete. The new route will reconnect three communities behind the Barrier with the rest of the West Bank, while cutting them off from large tracts of their agricultural land."

Reuters, 26 October 2006

"Israel's Supreme Court on Thursday rejected Palestinian petitions against the route of an Israeli barrier that cuts deep into the occupied West Bank to take in a Jewish settlement bloc. In its ruling, the court cited security considerations and said the three settlements at the centre of the case -- Emanuel, Maale Shomron and Karnei Shomron -- had been "targets of harsh terror attacks over recent years". Residents of nearby Palestinian villages argued in their petitions the 6-km (3.5 mile)-long stretch of steel-and-concrete construction would cut them off from their fields. The court said they could appeal again if arrangements for farmers to reach their crops through passages controlled by the Israeli military proved unsatisfactory.

About a third of the network of razor wire-tipped fences and towering concrete walls has been completed and Israeli officials say the project has already stopped several suicide attacks. Palestinians say it is a move to seize land that Israel has occupied since the 1967 Middle East war and will deny them the viable state they want in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The International Court of Justice, in a non-binding advisory opinion in 2004, ruled the construction of the barrier on occupied land was illegal and should be stopped immediately. The segment of the barrier discussed by the Supreme Court is one of two thin "fingers" reaching into the West Bank near the Palestinian city of Nablus to enclose two clusters of settlements. Emanuel is located 18 km (11 miles) inside the West Bank. Maale Shomron and Karnei Shomron are slightly closer to Israel."

See Also:

[Five Years after the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, Summary of the Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier](#), **OCHA**, July 2009

[Saving Lives – Israel's Security Fence](#), **Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)**, November 2003

[The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, July 2007

[A village cut in two: the goal is displacement, looting and land confiscation](#), **Palestinian News Network (PNN)**, 15 November 2006

[Israel-OPT: Palestinian shepherds forced to move on](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 19 December 2007

[OCHA Special Focus](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 8 November 2006

[Three Years Later: The Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier Since the International Court of Justice Opinion](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 9 July 2007

[Under the Guise of Security: Routing the Separation Barrier to Enable Israeli Settlement Expansion in the West Bank](#), **B'Tselem**, December 2005

[General Assembly Emergency Session overwhelmingly demands Israel's compliance with International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion](#), **United Nations (UN)**, 20 July 2004

[Profile of Jayous - The West Bank Barrier update Feb 2006](#), **United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)**, 28 February 2006

[Profile of Al-Jab'a Village - The West Bank Barrier update Feb 2006](#), **United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)**, 28 February 2006

[Profile of Nahalin Village - The West Bank Barrier update Feb 2006](#), **United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)**, 28 February 2006

[Preliminary Analysis: The Humanitarian Implications of the February 2005 Projected West Bank Barrier Route](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, March 2005

[The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, September 2004

[General Assembly Emergency Session overwhelmingly demands Israel's compliance with International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion](#), **United Nations**, 20 July 2004

[Cabinet approves Disengagement Plan and Security Fence route](#), **Government of Israel**, 20 February 2005

[Al Nu'man village: A case study of indirect forcible transfer](#), **al-Haq**, November 2006, p.35

[Separation Barrier: Opinion of the International Court of Justice](#), **B'Tselem**, July 2004

[Israel court urges barrier review](#), **BBC News**, 15 September 2005

[High Court errs in denying petition against separation barrier around Ariel](#), **B'Tselem**, 24 July 2006

[Israeli High Court judgement on the Barrier around Zufin](#), **B'Tselem**, 15 June 2006

[Village's battle against Israel's fence](#), **International Herald Tribune**, 16 May 2008

Settlements & Displacement

Settlements and Displacement

- Establishment of settlements and outposts has entailed the expropriation of Palestinian land, undermined the safety of Palestinian civilians, and entailed policies discriminatory against Palestinians, and lead to displacement. The figures on displacement cannot provide detailed information as to which of the many factors is a predominant cause of displacement – whether it be settlements and settler violence, the Wall, and so forth. In many instances it is a combination of several factors leading to displacement bearing in mind the an underlying policy of dispossession proceeding ahead in Area C of the West Bank including East Jerusalem. While Israeli settlements in West Bank including East Jerusalem under international law it is worth to note that at least 40% of land appropriated by settlements are privately owned Palestinian registered land the appropriation of which is also illegal under Israeli law. (Peace Now, October 2006)
-
- Israel's settlements and outposts are illegal under international humanitarian law, as per Article 49(6) of IV Geneva Convention and reiterated in ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004, and by Security Council.(ICJ, July 2004) There are currently 149 settlements, over 100 outposts, in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The numbers of settlers have reached about 297,000 in the West Bank and around 190,000 in East Jerusalem (B'tselem, January 2011) Since the beginning of the Oslo Accords period in 1993, which left the issue of settlements to final status negotiations, the total settler population has increased by 63%. By 2005, the number of settlements had grown to 149 but the amount of land they covered had increased by nearly 400% to 16,375 hectares. (OCHA, 2007) In 2005, Israel had evacuated around 600 settlers in 4 settlements in West Bank and estimated 7,000 settlers in Gaza (B'tselem, January 2011)
-
- Settlement expansion violates the Oslo Accords which stipulates that no party can take unilateral steps to change the situation in the territories until final-status negotiations status are completed. (Peace Now, July 2007) According to the Road Map agreement, and

underlying principle of reciprocity, Israel is under commitment to dismantle 'outposts' and freeze settlement construction subject to PNA commitments. (Ha'aretz, 25 October 2007) Despite Israeli authorities commitments to remove illegal outposts, this has not seriously been undertaken. Of the more than 100 outposts occupied by more 2,000 settlers, less than 2% were removed by 2008. (Ha'aretz, January 2008) Settlements are organised communities of Israeli civilians established on land in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, with the approval and direct or indirect support of the Israeli government. (OCHA, 2007) An outpost is a settlement which has been set up without the proper authorisation. Outposts are

- illegal under Israeli law because they have not been authorized or planned by the Israeli government (OCHA, 2007; Sasson, May 2005)
-
- Settlements, as mentioned by former UN Secretary General, remains the single biggest impediment to realizing a viable Palestinian State with territorial contiguity. There have been repeated declared "freezes" in the settlement construction however, this is no more than a trend of a relative slowdown in constructions. This "slowdown" is still of few thousands of new housing units every year. In November 2009 under pressure from the US, the Israel declared a ten-month moratorium on new settlement housing in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, but settlement construction continued, and was not renewed (OCHA, November 2009; Peace Now, August 2010; Al Haq, September 2010). Settlers have since September 2010 managed to "catch up" with the construction freeze, "slow down", and erase its effect, starting construction of some 2,000 housing units in 75 different settlements and outposts, (this number is higher than the yearly average for the last few years) while the Israel has approved
- the planning of at least 800 new units (Peace Now, June 2011).
-
- The impact of the settlements on daily Palestinian life is significant, resulting in a matrix of bypass roads, movement restrictions and closed areas which severely limits the free movement of Palestinians, and serves to substantially appropriate Palestinian land and natural resources, particularly water, and had directly or indirectly led to forcible displacement. Human Rights Watch in December 2010 highlighted Israel's two-tier system for Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank, the only discernable purposes of which is promoting life in the Israeli settlements while in many instances stifling growth in Palestinian communities and forcibly displacing Palestinian residents (HRW, December 2010).
-
- Settler violence and harassment particularly in Area C under Israeli Civil Administration in number of instances colluded with policies of the IDF and Civil Administration causing directly or indirectly displacement. Harassment and attack by settlers has grown more prevalent after the second intifada. The IDF and the police have shown to be more often than not, absent, helpless or apathetic though IDF, Civil Administration and the police are bound by Israeli Court rulings in 2006 to protect Palestinians property rights. (Ha'aretz, 10 October 2006; B'Tselem, May 2007) Settler violence often revolves around control of natural resources. Incidents include the destruction, vandalism and theft of land and property, crops and livestock. In the centre of Hebron, where up to 800 settlers live under the protection of the IDF, a combination of stringent movement restrictions and settler intimidation and violence has led over 1,800 Palestinian businesses to shut down and over 1,000 Palestinian
- homes to be vacated (B'Tselem, May 2007; UN CEIRPP, 5 November 2007).
-
- There was a dramatic increase in settler violence from 2008 to 2010, with perpetrators rarely punished, and children often implicated in order to limit criminal culpability (UN HRC, March 2010 and March 2011; Yesh Din, October 2010 and August 2008). In 2009 OCHA identified 22 communities with a combined population of nearly 76,000 people as being highly vulnerable to settler violence and a further 173,000 people moderately vulnerable (OCHA,

November 2009). Meanwhile, in response to attempts by the Israeli authorities to dismantle unsanctioned outposts, groups of settlers have since 2008 perpetrated widespread and indiscriminate violence known as a "price tag" against Palestinians and their property (ACRI, December 2009; OCHA, November 2009). Incidents show a seasonal pattern, with increases in property and land damage observed during periods of intensive agricultural activity for Palestinians. The majority of these incidents are reported close to Israeli settlements and other parts

- of Area C. (OCHA 2007, B'Tselem, July 2005) Since 2008, some of the most extreme settlers have instituted a "price tag" policy: Whenever an illegal outpost is evacuated or the government initiates legal proceedings against settlements, they exact a price by attacking Palestinian residents or property.

Al Haq, September 2010

The 26 September 2010 brings a formal end to the ten-month Israeli moratorium on settlement construction in the West Bank. Israeli government officials have stated that once the moratorium comes to an end,

construction in the West Bank is expected to resume at its previous rate. However, in light of its terms and its application in practice, the moratorium itself amounts to nothing more than a hollow political gesture in the form of an alleged "freeze", whilst Israel's illegal settlement activity continues almost unabated. The built-up area of these settlements consists of less than 3 percent of the area of the West Bank, but the area under their municipal jurisdiction, constitutes 9,28 percent of the West Bank. In September 2009, the number of settlers reached about 500,000 in the West Bank, about 200,000 of whom live in East Jerusalem. The annual growth rate of the settler population in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) is 3.7 percent, which is significantly higher than the population growth inside Israel. Many settlements exceed their jurisdictional area and gradually gain control over more parts of the West Bank. The total area controlled by settlements is about 42 percent of the West Bank.

ACRI, December 2009

"Incidents of violence perpetrated by Israeli civilians have severely affected the personal security of many Palestinian residents of the West Bank, threatening their basic right to life, personal security, livelihood, and property. These incidents include violent assault, harassment, trespassing, taking over Palestinian-owned land, and destroying property. During this past year [2009], some of the most extreme settlers have instituted a "price tag" policy: Whenever an illegal outpost is evacuated or the government initiates legal proceedings against settlements, they exact a price by attacking Palestinian residents or property. This turns the Palestinians into double victims, first when the outposts are established and then when they are dismantled."

OCHA, October 2009

...Palestinians attempt to harvest olives amidst settler violence

"There were a number of serious incidents involving damage to property during the month, most of which occurred in the context of the olive harvest, which officially began on 11 October. According to IDF reports, ahead of the olive harvest, the Israeli authorities adopted several measures to protect Palestinian farmers from settlers' attacks,... Despite ... measures, OCHA recorded numerous attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinians harvesting their olives and on olive groves. Israeli settlers picked olives belonging to Palestinians, uprooted or damaged a number of olive trees, and harassed olive pickers on the way back from the harvest..."

Diakonia, 13 May 2008

"During the Israeli occupation Israeli settlers have built Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) with the political, military, and financial support of the Israeli government. These lands were seized from Palestinians by military orders. According to B'Tselem, the Israeli information center for human rights in the occupied territories, Israel has,

since 1967, established 152 settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The settlements were recognized by the Israeli Ministry of Interior even though they are illegal under international humanitarian law.

In September 2005, 23 settlements in the Gaza Strip were evacuated by Israel as part of the Disengagement Plan. Prior to the evacuation, the 7,595 settlers have controlled 38 percent of the Gaza Strip. Currently settlements in the West Bank comprise over 42 percent of the entire area (excluding Jerusalem, no-man's land, and the Dead Sea waters). According United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) there are currently 149 settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The numbers of settlers have reached about 260,000 in the West Bank and around 200,000 in East Jerusalem.

The annual growth rate of the number of Israeli citizens living in settlements in the West Bank is 5.5 % compared to a population growth rate of less than 2% inside Israel. In concrete terms, the settlement population increases with one and half bus loads each day - this despite the clear reference in the Quartet 2002 "Road Map for Peace" that the Israeli government must halt the expansion of settlements.

New Settlements (Outposts)

In addition to the above, settlers have established dozens of small settlements of varying size, commonly referred to as outposts. The term "outpost" refers to a relatively small settlement (generally on a hilltop) occupied with a number of residential structures. The distance between an outpost and a permanent settlement can be a few hundred meters; however, a majority of the outposts tend to span a number of kilometres. These outposts wish to become de facto settlements in their own right. Each outpost collects its own taxes, has its own secretariat and committees that are established to maintain civilian life in the settlement. Commonly the Israeli Ministry of Interior does not granted them formal recognition and municipal status. According to Peace Now, in 1996 the government of Israel articulated for the first time a commitment not to establish any new outposts. As of that date, this commitment remains officially binding; however, this has not prevented the establishment of over 100 new outposts on the West Bank. The purpose of these new settlements is to minimize the existing open space between permanent settlements by creating large settlement blocs encompassing more land. The majority of these outposts are inhabited and around 60 percent of them were established since Ariel Sharon became Prime Minister in February 2001.

Illegal structures also in the settlements

According to Israeli law, outposts are illegal - no building permits are given for their construction - and the Israeli government has promised to dismantle them. While international law does not distinguish between outposts and settlements - both are considered illegal, Israel maintains its differentiation, claiming that the settlements are lawful. A recent report by Peace Now, however, shows that thousands of illegal structures (lacking permits) can be found inside the settlements - not only in outposts. Among the construction offenders are commercial and cellular companies, public figures and the IDF itself. Some demolition orders have been issued for the illegal structures both in the settlements and the outposts, but the implementation of those orders is close to non-existent."

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 21 January 2008

"There are 149 settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Despite promises by Israel to freeze settlement growth, the number of settlers has increased by 63 per cent since 1993 to its present population of 460,000. At present new construction is under way in 88 settlements and the average growth rate in the settlements is 4.5 per cent compared with the average growth rate of 1.5 per cent in Israel itself. In addition there are 105 "outposts" - that is, informal structures, which serve as a prelude to a new settlement, and are unauthorized but still funded by

Government ministries. Despite Israel's undertaking in the road map to dismantle all outposts built after 2001, no such action has been taken in respect of the 51 such outposts. More than 38 per cent of the West Bank consists of settlements, outposts, military areas and Israeli nature reserves that are off limits to Palestinians. Settler roads link settlements to each other and to Israel. These roads are largely closed to Palestinian vehicles. (Israel has therefore introduced a system of "road apartheid", which was unknown in apartheid South Africa.)

Settlements are illegal under international law as they violate article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This illegality has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the construction of the wall, by the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention in a declaration published in 2001, and by both the Security Council and the General Assembly. Furthermore settlements constitute a form of colonialism which is contrary to international law


33. Israel's contempt for international law and opinion is illustrated by recent Government decisions. First, in December shortly after the Annapolis meeting, the Israeli Government announced plans to build 307 new apartments in the settlement of Har Homa. Secondly, in October it announced that it would proceed with plans for the development of E1, a planned new settlement which will have 3,500 apartments, 10 hotels and an industrial park, to accommodate 14,500 settlers, situated adjacent to Maale Adumim. At present Israel has built a police station on E1 (visited by the Special Rapporteur on 25 September) but is prevented from proceeding with its plans to start construction on E1 by the presence of the main road from East Jerusalem to Jericho, which is used by Palestinians. Israel has now confiscated Palestinian land in Abu Dis, Sawareh, Nabi Moussa and al-Khan al-Ahmar to enable it to build an alternate road for Palestinians to Jericho which will free the area for E1. The road is part of Israel's broader plan to replace territorial contiguity with "transportational contiguity" by artificially connecting Palestinian population centres through an elaborate network of alternate roads and tunnels and creating segregated road networks, one for Palestinians and another for Israeli settlers, in the West Bank."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), July 2007

"In 2007, approximately 57% of the total settler population in the West Bank lived within a 10 kilometre radius of the Old City of Jerusalem, many of them inside the Israeli declared Jerusalem municipal boundary. The encircling settlements have increasingly isolated East Jerusalem, home to approximately 250,000 Palestinians, from the rest of the West Bank.... Eighty per cent of the settler population lives within a 25 kilometre radius of Jerusalem in the Ramallah and Bethlehem governorates. Most of the settlements deeper into the central West Bank are located on hilltops affording them a commanding presence over surrounding Palestinian communities. Other settlements, such as those in the Jordan Valley, have large areas of agricultural land under their control

Establishments of new settlements was particularly prolific in the decade between 1977 and 1987.

While fewer settlements were established after 1987, overall the settler population increased by nearly 150% between 1987 and 2004 – an average annual growth rate of 5.5% per year. Since the beginning of the Oslo Accords period in 1993, which left the issue of settlements to final status negotiations, the total settler population has increased by 63% (an absolute increase of more than 163,000 settlers between 1993 and 2004). By 2005, the number of settlements had grown to 149 but the amount of land they covered had increased by nearly 400% to 16,375 hectares.



Source: OCHA *Israeli presence in the West Bank geo-database*. For more details see Annex 2.

Construction is ongoing in approximately 75 settlements in the West Bank, in particular around East Jerusalem, according to Peace Now, an Israeli movement which monitors settlement activity. Peace Now also notes that in 2006 a total of 952 tenders were published for construction contracts in the West Bank while 1,272 new construction “starts” were noted in the first three-quarters of 2006.... Over the years, much of the attraction of residing in settlements has come from the range of financial incentives such as housing subsidies, preferential loans and lower taxes that settlers typically enjoy.

...In 2006, there were more than 100 outposts in the West Bank with a population of approximately 2,000 settlers according to Peace Now. The establishment of outposts started in 1995 and has continued for more than a decade since Gol, responding to international pressure, largely stopped approving new settlements. Creating outposts has enabled the settler movement to circumvent the freeze on the establishment of new settlements. The majority of outposts were established in the years before and immediately after the start of the second Intifada, between 1998 and 2002.

In 2005, Talia Sasson, the former head of the State Prosecution Criminal Department, conducted an inquiry at the request of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Bureau into the establishment of “unauthorized outposts” and the involvement of state and public authorities. Her investigations revealed that many public authorities had illegally supported outposts through funding, allotting land and issuing permits for connection to water and electricity networks....

Approximately 90% of all outposts are located within three kilometres of an established settlement and some of these are situated inside its outer limits. Their close proximity to settlements provides not only the benefit of settlement services, infrastructure and security but also enables residents to claim that the outpost is not a new settlement develop their infrastructure and in some cases eventually merge.... The remaining outposts located further away (between 3–6 km) are linked to their nearest settlement(s) by a road. The physical features

that connect settlements to outposts such as roads and fences and other infrastructure divide Palestinian areas, restricting Palestinian movement and access to agricultural land."

Peace Now, March 2008

"In 101 settlements construction took place. Over 500 buildings are currently being built in the settlements, in each of them several housing units (East Jerusalem excluded)... 20% of the construction is taking place in settlements east of the Separation Fence. ... Mobile Structures (Caravans) - in some of the settlements, particularly east of the fence, new caravan neighborhoods have been established, using the "Lego System" so that construction is faster and cheaper, without a construction permits or approved planning. At least 184 new caravans were brought and installed in the settlements, some 150 of them (82%) in settlements located east of the fence... Approval of new construction plans – the Minister of Defense has approved several plans for construction. A total of (at least) 946 housing units.


Construction in East Jerusalem

Since the Annapolis summit there was a leap in the number of tenders and construction plans in East Jerusalem. Tenders for the construction of at least 750 housing units in East Jerusalem were issued between December 2007 and March 2008, while throughout all 2007 until the summit, only two tenders for 46 housing units were issued. In 1967, the State of Israel annexed some 70,000 dunams of land east of the Green Line to Jerusalem, and constructed tens of thousands of housing units for Israelis on that land. One of the largest construction projects in Israel is the one in Har Homa, East Jerusalem, which began at the end of the 1990's and is still continuing today at an accelerated pace. Another neighborhood, "Nof Zion", is located in the heart of a Palestinian neighborhood in East Jerusalem, and the construction of some 100 housing units at the place continued in the last few months and is just about completed. The goal of such construction is to make it much harder to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on a two states solution. Such a solution would have to include a compromise in Jerusalem based on a separation between the Palestinian and the Israeli neighborhoods.


Construction in "illegal outposts"

In 58 outposts there was construction or development. At least 16 new permanent structures have been constructed in seven different outposts, and construction on eight more structure continued. At least 38 new mobile structures have been added in outposts. 53 structures in the outposts were expanded. No outposts were evacuated – the Government's declaration on evacuation of two outposts in 17/3/08 seems to be a little misleading. One of the "outposts" was a single broken caravan, and the other was never evacuated. outpost with the adjacent settlement of El'azar. By so doing the Israeli government indicated that not only does it not prevent the construction, but it encourages it by confirming the de-facto annexation of the illegal outpost to the existing settlement by building a new neighborhood connection them.

Date	Settlement	Status	Number of Housing Units	Plan No.
02/12/2007	Har Homa	Building tender	307	7509
31/12/2007	East Talpiyot	Building tender	440	7984
28/01/2008	Ramot ⁶	Deposited for objections	105	6885
28/01/2008	Givat Hamatos	Deposited for objections	2337	5834A
29/01/2008	Gilo	Building tender	Hotel or altered for housing units	3062
20/02/2008	Neve Yaakov	Deposited for objections	393	6513A



Throughout the Oslo process Israel continued to build in the Occupied Territories. Under all Israeli governments the construction continued, and reached its peak under Barak's government in 1999-2000. The settlers' complaint regarding a "freeze" in the settlements, is no more than an ongoing trend of a relative slowdown in construction which began following the eruption of the second Intifada in the end of 2000. However, this "slowdown" is still of few thousands of new housing units every year."



Diakonia, 24 October 2006

"Transfer: The common legal interpretation by the international community maintains that [article 49](#) of the Fourth Geneva Convention does not allow any kind of transfer of the occupier's population to the occupied territory and therefore settlements are illegal

Settlements illegal according to international humanitarian law: There is no difference under international humanitarian law (IHL) between settlements and unauthorized outposts. All types of settlements are illegal according to IHL. Many UN resolutions reaffirm that Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), including East Jerusalem, are illegal and pose an obstacle to peace and to economic and social development of that area. Several resolutions also demand the complete halt of settlement activities. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Advisory Opinion from July 2004 concludes "that the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of international law" (section 120).

Israeli Stand: Israel's stand is that article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention forbids only intentional, and mass transfer that is conducted by the government. Israel contends that since the settlements in the oPt were established by individuals, without a directing government policy, the establishment of the settlements is not illegal.

Destruction of Private Property: The building of settlements has entailed the expropriation of private Palestinian lands contrary to [articles 53](#) of the Fourth Geneva Convention and [articles 52](#) and [23\(g\)](#) of the Hague Regulations.

Violation of the Obligation to Ensure Public Order: The construction of settlements is also a violation of [article 43](#) of the Hague Regulations which obliges the occupying power to take all measures within his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. Settlements have undermined the public order and safety of Palestinian civilians in the oPt, and introduced a major change to the laws in force in Palestine at the time of their construction.

Violation of the prohibition against Discrimination: Settlements have also violated the prohibition against discrimination based on [article 3 \(1\)](#), [article 13](#) and [article 27](#) of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In many issues related to civilian life, settlers are under the jurisdiction of the Israeli law, either directly or indirectly through military orders, while Palestinians are under the jurisdiction of military law.

Laws differ depending on nationality : In many issues related to civilian life, settlers abide by the Israeli law, either directly or indirectly, through military orders that apply Israeli law to them. Palestinians, on the other hand, fall under the Israeli military law, in addition to relevant parts of ancient laws that applied to the oPt before the Israeli occupation like the Ottoman, British, Jordanian and Egyptian laws. Palestinians go to military courts and to local Palestinian civil courts, while Israeli settlers cannot be brought before neither of those - this according to Israeli law and the Oslo Agreements.

The transportation network is also affected: Separation and discrimination also take place in the transportation network, when some roads are exclusive to Israeli settlers, and some for Palestinians. There is also discrimination in services like planning, water, electricity, etc. Israeli and Palestinian workers get different benefits, and salaries although both may work in the same workplace in the oPt. In any case, the legal protection and services provided to Palestinians by the Civil Administration are systematically inferior to the comparable Israeli ones."

International Court of Justice (ICJ), 9 July 2004

"120.... the information provided to the Court shows that, since 1977, Israel has conducted a policy and developed practices involving the establishment of Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, contrary to the terms of Article 49, paragraph 6, just cited. The Security Council has thus taken the view that such policy and practices "have no legal validity". It has also called upon "Israel, as the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously" by the Fourth Geneva Convention and: "to rescind its previous measures and to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories" (resolution 446 (1979) of 22 March 1979)j. The Council reaffirmed its position in resolutions 452 (1979) of 20 July 1979 and 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980. Indeed, in the latter case it described "Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in [the occupied] territories" as a "flagrant violation" of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Court concludes that the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, (including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of international law.

121. Whilst the Court notes the assurance given by Israel that the construction of the wall does not amount to annexation and that the wall is of a temporary nature (see paragraph 116 above), it nevertheless cannot remain indifferent to, certain fears expressed to it that the route of the wall will prejudice the future frontier between Israel and Palestine, and the fear that Israel may integrate the settlements and their means of access. The Court considers that the construction of the wall and its associated régime create a "fait accompli" on the ground that could well become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to *&,facto* annexatio-i.

122. The Court recalls moreover that, according to the report of the Secretary-General, the planned route would incorporate in the area between the Green line and the wall more than 16 per cent of the territory of the West Bank. Around 80 per cent of the settlers living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, that is 320,000 individuals, would reside in that area, as well as 237,000 Palestinians. Moreover, as a result of the construction of the wall, around 160,000 other

Palestinians would reside in almost completely encircled communities (see paragraphs 84, 85 and 119 above).

123.In other terms, the route chosen for the wall gives expression in *loco* to the illegal measures taken by Israel with regard to Jerusalem and the settlements, as deplored by the Security Council (see paragraphs 75 and 120 above). There is also a risk of further alterations to the demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory resulting from the construction of the wall inasmuch as it is contributing, as will be further explained in paragraph 133 below, to the departure of Palestinian populations from certain areas. That construction, along with measures taken previously, thus severely impedes the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination, and is therefore a breach of Israel's obligation to respect that right... The Court concludes that the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of international law."

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 11 December 2006

"19. In the period that I have served as Secretary-General, the number of Israeli settlers living in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) has grown from 140,000 to 240,000. The settler population of East Jerusalem grew during this period from approximately 160,000 to 190,000. The area formally controlled by the settlements, according to Israeli law, now encompasses some 40 per cent of the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem). In a welcome development, the Government of Israel withdrew all settlements from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the West Bank in August 2005. However, during the year following this disengagement, West Bank settlements grew by 3,000 more people than had moved out of Gaza. Indeed, according to official Israeli figures, more than 1,000 settlers a month took up residence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory during 2005, a rate that appears to be continuing. In total, in the decade and a half after the Oslo Accords, Israel more than doubled its physical presence in the West Bank through settlements — a policy that was implemented under Labour, Likud and Kadima Governments. This remains the single biggest impediment to realizing a viable Palestinian State with territorial contiguity. Just as Israelis are dismayed that terrorism continued after Oslo and the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, Palestinians are dismayed when they see prospects for a viable Palestinian State disappearing and the entrenchment of the occupation."

United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 4 December 1998

"21. The Committee is deeply concerned about the adverse impact of the growing exclusion faced by Palestinians in East Jerusalem from the enjoyment of their economic, social and cultural rights. The Committee is also concerned over the continued Israeli policies of building settlements to expand the boundaries of East Jerusalem and of transferring Jewish residents into East Jerusalem with the result that they now outnumber the Palestinian residents.

22. The Committee deplores the continuing practices of the Government of Israel of home demolitions, land confiscations and restrictions on family reunification and residency rights, and its adoption of policies which result in substandard housing and living conditions, including extreme overcrowding and lack of services, of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, in particular in the old city...."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), July 2007

"Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank has taken place under every government since the beginning of Israel's occupation following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. In 2007, there are more than 450,000 settlers living in 149 settlements in the West Bank including East Jerusalem.... The conflict over resources in the West Bank has led to violence between settlers and Palestinians. Settler violence often revolves around control of natural resources. Incidents include the destruction, vandalism and theft of land and property, crops and livestock. Incidents show a

seasonal pattern, with increases in property and land damage observed during periods of intensive agricultural activity for Palestinians, e.g., preparing land or harvesting olives. The majority of these incidents are reported close to Israeli settlements and other parts of Area C. During the olive harvest season (October - November), the IDF has facilitated safe access for some Palestinians. They arrange for seasonal gates in the Barrier to be opened, allowing access to olive groves in the closed areas. They also accompany harvesters to land near settlements where settler harassment is most common.

Despite its obligations under international humanitarian law to protect the life, property and rights of Palestinians under occupation, the Israeli authorities frequently do not investigate incidents of reported settler violence nor take a proactive approach to protecting local Palestinian populations near Israeli settlements and outposts. In her 2005 report into unauthorized settler outposts, Talia Sasson, former head of the State Prosecution Criminal Department of Israel, concluded that: "IDF soldiers have the enforcement powers like those given to the police officers, by virtue of the procedure for enforcing the law in the territories, which is included in the IDF command. In practice, however, IDF soldiers do not enforce the law, are not aware of the law enforcement procedure, and are not at all interested in functioning like police officers...."

Settler numbers continue to grow at a rate of 5.5% a year – equivalent to adding one and a half busloads of new settlers each day to the 450,000 living in the West Bank in 2007. This rate of growth is three times that of Israel itself. The majority of new arrivals settle in the large settlement blocs west of the Barrier where over 80% of all settlers currently reside. Based on the current growth rate, the settler population will double to nearly 900,000 in just 12 years. Meanwhile, the Palestinian population is growing at a rate of around 2.5% a year – which means the Palestinian population will double in less than 30 years to around four million. The problem is obvious: the West Bank's resources are finite. As both settler and Palestinian populations expand, it is inevitable that the pressure on natural resources – namely land and water – will increase. It is equally inevitable, based on trends of the last 40 years, that the growth of settlements, roads and other infrastructure will come at the expense of Palestinian development and freedom of movement around the West Bank."

Ha'aretz, 11 October 2006

"Harassment and attacks by settlers, who tried to terrify the villagers, existed even before 2000, but they grew more prevalent after the second intifada began. The army and the police turned out to be either absent, helpless or apathetic. The military commanders found an easy way out: They closed vast areas of farmland to their owners, the Palestinians, as a means of "protecting them" against the settlers. But in July 2006, the court handed down a ruling that obliged the security forces to protect Palestinians' property rights and their right to cultivate their land. The IDF, the Civil Administration and the police are now bound by the court's ruling. That is why they now sound more resolute than ever before in their warnings to the settlers."

B'Tselem, May 2002

"The transfer of certain powers to the Palestinian Authority in the context of the Oslo Accords changed matters only slightly. Most Palestinians are still exposed to the bureaucratic controls of the Israeli occupation, and the IDF is still able to impose, for example, broad restrictions on movement, to restrict entry and exit from the Occupied Territories, and to detain Palestinians. The settlers, on the other hand, remain subject to total civilian control, just like Israeli citizens living within the Green Lines, and are not subject to the Palestinian Authority in any matter. This situation, in which an individual's rights are determined according to his or her national identity, constitutes a flagrant breach of the right to equality."

See Also:

["And Thou Shalt Spread ..." Construction and development of settlements beyond the official limits of jurisdiction](#), **Peace Now**, July 2007

[West Bank Jewish settler population rises by 5.1 percent](#), Agence France-Presse (AFP), 21 January 2008

[Security forces evacuate two small outposts in West Bank](#), Ha'aretz, 16 January 2008

[Human rights organization appeals to Israeli government to stop settlement expansion](#), Al-Jazeera, 17 October 2006

[After war in Lebanon, Israeli settlements growing again](#), Christian Science Monitor (CSM), 5 October 2006

[Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories](#), Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP), April 2008

[Shooting Back](#), B'Tselem, 2007

[Means of Expulsion: Violence, Harassment and Lawlessness Toward Palestinians in the Southern Hebron Hills](#), B'Tselem, July 2005

[Resolution 2/4: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan](#), United Nations Human Rights Council (UN HRC), 9 January 2007

[Means of Expulsion : Violence, Harrassment and Lawlessness against Palestinians in the Southern Hebron Hills](#), B'Tselem, July 2005

[Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts](#), Talia Sasson, Government of Israel, May 2005

[Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts](#), Talia Sasson, Government of Israel, May 2005

Settlements, 'Closed Military Areas', and Settler & IDF violence and intimidation in South Hebron Hills and Hebron

- In South Hebron Hills, Israeli authorities having declared the area a 'closed military area' in 1970s leading to many forced evictions. Israeli authorities for the past 7 years been trying to expel some one thousand Palestinians from the area. Settler intimidation and the gradual encroachment onto Palestinian land began when settlements were established in southern Hebron in 1982. Between 1998 and 2002, 75 families (837 people) from 11 hamlets were forced to leave the area of Masafer Yatta in southern Hebron.
- In addition to the threat of expulsion, residents are victims of violence and property damage from settlers of nearby settlements. In a survey conducted by B'Tselem, some 88% of the Palestinians in the closed military area were victims of settler violence or witnessed such violence against a member of their immediate family...Due the intensity of this violence, the residents of two villages to abandon their villages in 2000. (B'Tselem, July 2005) Israel contends that expulsion of the cave residents is justified because they are not permanent residents of the area, and that the expulsion is an "imperative military need." B'Tselem's report demonstrates that these contentions are baseless, and shows that Israel has continually sought to annex the area and expand the nearby settlements. (B'Tselem, July 2005)
- In 1997, the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron was signed, dividing Hebron into two sections: H1, about 80 percent of the city, fell under the control of the Palestinian Authority, while Israel maintained control over H2, which contained significant parts of the commercial centre as well as the Israeli settlements. In Hebron, the security of 400-800 settlers protected by around 1500 Israeli soldiers and police, has led the Israeli military to impose harsh restrictions on the 35,000 Palestinians living in H2. An additional 115,000 Palestinian live in H1. Israeli policy in Hebron city centre, combined with settler violence and harassment, has led 1,014 Palestinians homes vacated and some 1,829 businesses have been shut down since 1994. (B'Tselem, May 2007) Israeli soldiers and police seldom intervene to stop violence against Palestinians, and violent settlers are rarely brought to justice. (B'Tselem, May 2007)


HPG, July 2009, p.21-23

"People living in the H2 area of Hebron

Residents spoke of threats to their physical safety as a consequence of violence by settlers as well as the Israeli military. The threat posed by settlers was considered more dangerous. Two main types of threat were reported. The first is random violence. This occurs routinely, on a weekly, if not daily, basis. Often, it involves young Israelis under 18 (and hence below the age of criminal responsibility), frequently accompanied by an older woman. The violence takes the form of harassment, obstruction of movement, physical attacks or stone-throwing. The second, less frequent but more serious form of violence involves planned attacks, often organised or led by a rabbi or other adults. Interviewees spoke of attacks by groups of between 20 and 200 settlers, resulting in serious casualties, property damage and the uprooting of trees. Men, women and children are all at risk, although those living closest to Israeli settlements are most affected. It was said that the aim of the violence was to remove Palestinians from their land. Inducements are also used to the same end, including offers of money, foreign nationalities/passports and other incentives to leave. Often, settlers were accompanied by IDF troops, who at best did little to shield Palestinians from attacks, and at times supported the violence. This testimony is supported by studies on settler violence which show that, in most cases, the IDF does not intervene to protect Palestinians. Police efforts to enforce the rule of law are little better: research has shown that 90% of police investigations end without indictment (Yesh Din, no date: 91)."

Ma'an Developemnt Center, September 2008

"Hebron has been a major target of Israel's colonisation policies in the West Bank and outside of Jerusalem, is the only Palestinian city to have settlements in its centre. 25 settlements litter the governorate and outposts continue to be established with both the acquiescence and open support of the Israeli authorities. Between 1979 and 1983, Israel established Avraham Avino, Beit Romano, Beit Hadassah and Tel Rumeida which house 500 to 600 religious settlers whose behaviour is characterized by continued acts of violence towards Palestinians.



The vast majority of Hebron's displacement has been from H2 and most of the IDPs have resettled in the H1 area of the city. However as more IDPs from the south of the governorate are forced to move to escape settler violence, house demolitions and forced evictions, the city faces dual displacement and resettlement pressures."

B'Tselem, May 2007

"Hebron is the second largest city in the West Bank and the largest in the southern West Bank. It is the only Palestinian city with an Israeli settlement in the middle of it.¹ The Israeli settlement in Hebron is concentrated in and around the Old City, which traditionally served as the commercial center for the entire southern West Bank. For years, Israel has severely oppressed Palestinians living in the center of the city. The authorities have created a long strip of land that partitions the city into southern and northern sections and is forbidden to Palestinian vehicles. Parts of the strip are also closed to Palestinian pedestrians.

The settlers, on the other hand, are allowed to move about freely in these areas. In the areas open to Palestinian movement, passersby are subject to repeated detention and humiliating inspections every step of the way. ... To aggravate matters, the Israeli defense establishment has knowingly and routinely protected countless acts of settler violence against Palestinians in the city.

These restrictions, prohibitions, and omissions have expropriated the City Center from its Palestinian residents and destroyed it economically.... Having no option, many families have left their homes in the City Center. What was once the vibrant heart of Hebron has become a ghost town.... Palestinians have left the area primarily as a deplorable result of the "separation policy" Israel has implemented there. Oppression of the Palestinians in the City Center is part of this policy, which is openly aimed at protecting Israeli settlers in Hebron by separating them, by physical and legal means, from the Palestinian residents.....

The survey's findings show that at least 1,014 Palestinian housing units had been vacated by their occupants. This number represents 41.9 percent of the housing units in the relevant area. Sixty-five percent (659) of the empty apartments became vacant during the course of the second intifada. Regarding Palestinian businesses, 1,829 were not open for business. This number represents 76.6 percent of all the business establishments in the surveyed area. Of the closed businesses, 62.4 percent (1,141) were closed during the second intifada. At least 440 of them closed pursuant to military orders....

... The constant and grave harm to Palestinians living in the center of Hebron is one of the most extreme manifestations of human rights violations committed by the State of Israel. Israel's policy of protecting the Hebron settlement and encouraging it is based on "the principle of separation" and includes physical and legal segregation between Palestinians and Israeli settlers based on national ethnic criteria.

This policy involves the use of harsh oppressive measures against the Palestinians in the city. Residents of the City Center are subjected to extremely severe restrictions on their movement, whether by car or on foot, to repeated assaults by violent settlers who attack them and their property, and to the arbitrary treatment of soldiers and their commanders during searches of the homes, to delays, and harassment, even to violent acts committed by the security forces. Using these measures, Israel has brought about over the years the expulsion of thousands of Palestinian residents and merchants from the center of the city....

The "separation policy" constitutes, therefore, a policy of expulsion of Palestinians. This is the result of that policy, and as we have seen, the authorities had to expect it. The authorities' refraining from protecting Palestinians from settler violence also contributes to the harsh results of this policy, and, as the testimonies have shown, is a significant cause, whether deliberate or not, in Palestinians leaving the City Center. The army acts according to similar principles throughout the West Bank, but in Hebron, the only Palestinian city in the West Bank with an Israeli settlement in the heart of it, this regime of separation-discrimination is implemented in a small area. As a result, the concentration, magnitude, and severity of human rights violations in the city are especially great."

IRIN, 9 September 2007

"The limitations on movement and commerce in the city of Hebron are the 'necessary minimum' needed to provide protection to Israeli Defence Force soldiers and residents of the Jewish community in Hebron," the Israeli military said in response to Ghost Town. According to Ghost Town, Israeli soldiers and police seldom intervene to stop violence against Palestinians, and violent settlers are rarely brought to justice..... The Israeli police denied claims that it closes the majority of cases of violence without a proper investigation. It said many times the alleged victims do not file complaints making it difficult to follow through on those cases."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), July 2007

"In the early 1970s, the IDF designated part of Masafer Yatta a closed military area, leading to many forced evictions of Palestinian residents. Settler intimidation and the gradual encroachment onto Palestinian land began when settlements were established in southern Hebron in 1982. Between 1998 and 2002, 75 families (837 people) from 11 hamlets were forced to leave the area of Masafer Yatta. The settlements and outposts built along the southern ridge of the Hebron hills are today connected to Israel and other settlements by a network of roads catering for settlers and which cut off Palestinians living in Masafer Yatta from the rest of the West Bank. Most residents who have been displaced report either being victims of, or witnesses to, attacks by settlers. Half of the families interviewed reported filing complaints with the IDF or with the Israeli Police. None, however, had resulted in punitive action against settlers. Families forced to move away from southern Hebron lose their traditional lifestyle and means of support. Many have exhausted their savings, fallen deeper into debt and rely increasingly on humanitarian aid. Of the 122 persons who considered themselves employed before their displacement, only 28 have jobs today."

B'Tselem, July 2005

"In the southernmost West Bank, some one thousand Palestinians have maintained the way of life of their ancestors: living in caves and earning a living from farming and livestock. In the 1970s, the Israeli military commander declared the area a "closed military area," and for the past five years, Israel has been trying to expel them from the area. In November 1999, soldiers and Civil Administration officials expelled the cave residents and confiscated their meager belongings. The army sealed caves, destroyed wells and outhouses, and prohibited the residents from returning to the area. The cave residents petitioned the High Court of Justice, and in March 2000, the Court issued a temporary injunction, returning the residents to the area and preventing the state from expelling them until the court reaches a final decision in the matter. Since then, the residents live with the threat of expulsion hovering over their heads. Israel contends that expulsion of the cave residents is justified because they are not permanent residents of the area, and that the expulsion is an "imperative military need." B'Tselem's report demonstrates that these contentions are baseless, and shows that Israel has continually sought to annex the area and expand the nearby settlements.

In addition to the threat of expulsion, the cave residents are victims of violence and property damage from the residents of nearby settlements. Due to the intensity of this violence, the residents of two villages abandoned their villages in 2000. In a survey conducted by B'Tselem, some 88% of the Palestinians in the closed military area were victims of settler violence or witnessed such violence against a member of their immediate family. The abuse reported in the survey can be divided into four patterns: blocking of roads and preventing access to fields (51 percent of the cases), property damage, including destruction of crops and theft of sheep and goats in particular (21 percent), intimidation (17 percent), and physical violence (11 percent).

The police do little to enforce the law against the settlers, and the army does even less. In some cases, soldiers have even assisted settlers in carrying out their violent acts. On a few occasions, the army at its own initiative destroyed the residents' farmland by driving tanks and other armored

vehicles onto the fields. In addition, the Civil Administration prohibits the residents from building in their villages, contending that the area is designated for agricultural use. The prohibition also covers construction to ensure proper water supply and to meet other basic needs. The report documents Israel's attempts over the past five years to expel the cave residents through legal proceedings, and describes the lives of the residents under the intimidation of settlers, the military, and the Civil Administration.

Since the occupation began, in 1967, every Israeli government has been active in developing and strengthening the settlement enterprise. Every governmental plan for settling the West Bank has indicated a clear intention to annex parts of the southern Hebron hills near the Green Line, including the closed area. Their proximity to the Green Line, and the sparse Palestinian population living there make the southern Hebron hills a "natural" candidate for annexation, as well as an attractive site for settlement that will create a contiguous Jewish presence on both sides of the Green Line. Israel's declared policy and statements over the years suggest that the real motive for turning the area into a closed military area and attempting to expel the cave residents is expansion of settlements and annexation of the area."

See Also:

[Settler violence against Palestinians on the rise](#), IRIN, 31 August 2008 [Hebron turned into 'ghost town'](#), BBC News, 14 May 2007
[Shooting Back](#), B'Tselem, 2007
[Honey makes Hebron life a bit sweeter](#), Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 10 August 2008

East Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

- East Jerusalem
- In 1967, Israel annexed East Jerusalem in addition to 64 square kilometers in West Bank, unilaterally defining this as expanded Jerusalem municipality, and would in 1980 pass legislation reinforcing position of Israel since 1967. This decree was declared illegal in flagrant violation of international law by the UN Security Council. (UN Security Council resolution 252, 1968; HRC resolution 2/4, January 9 2007). Since the annexation, Israel has implemented policies aimed at reducing the number of Palestinians in the city. These take the form of legislation, measures limiting services granted by law, and discriminatory law enforcement in such areas as discriminatory application of municipal planning regulations, access to services, family reunification, and revocation of residency rights (B'tselem, July 2006, ICAHD, 2007)
- The ideological motive is rooted in a policy decision establishing that a demographic balance must be maintained in all Jerusalem at a ratio of 70% Jews to 30% Palestinians. (ICAHD, 2007) In 1967, a census revealed 70,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and no Israelis (UNSC, September 1967); in 2011 an estimated 200,000 Israeli settlers reside in East Jerusalem alongside 270,000 Palestinians (OCHA, March 2011) - Palestinians represent close to 30% of all residents of Jerusalem. The UN, Israeli and Palestinian organizations have criticized Israeli policies that have sought to Judaize East Jerusalem and maintain a Jewish majority in Jerusalem at the expense of the Palestinian community, in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law.(ICAHD, March 2007; B'tselem, July 2006; OCHA March 2011).

- For lack of adequate monitoring, there are no available figures of the numbers of Palestinians displaced from East Jerusalem though UN and NGOs reveal clear instances of displacement and communities at risk of displacement short of tens of thousands whose livelihoods are affected by Israeli policies in East Jerusalem:
- Since 1967 more than 2,000 Palestinian homes are reported to have been demolished, displacing thousands though figures are only available for the last few years (OCHA, March 2011). In 2011, it is estimated that some 86,000 Palestinians are at risk of displacement for having built illegally (UN, May 2011; OCHA, March 2011)
- Restrictions in planning in East Jerusalem also to have contributed to relocation/displacement of 50,000-60,000 outside the city (FMR, 2 September 2006), while the Wall and onerous restrictions is now leading to relocation/displacement of Jerusalemites ID holders on West Bank side of the Wall into East Jerusalem (OCHA March 2011) though estimates vary as to how many from 55,000 Jerusalemites (JCESR, December 2001; ICAHD, March 2007; EU, November 2005) while estimated 2,300 West Bank Palestinians on East Jerusalem side of the Wall are also at risk of displacement (OCHA, March 2011).
- Revocation of residency rights has also led to displacement, as well as restrictions in family unity. Approximately 14,000 East Jerusalem Palestinians have had their residency revoked since 1967, of which over 4,500 were revoked in 2008 though it is unclear how many were then internally displaced or became refugees (B'tselem, 2009). This is not including Palestinians who fled or refused registration in 1967 census, or estimated 20,000-30,000 living immediately adjacent to but not in the municipal boundaries in 1967 (OCHA, 2007). There are no clear figures on number of displacement due to Israeli restrictions in family unity though thousands are affected.
- Municipal Planning & Building Permit in East Jerusalem
- Rather than addressing the welfare of its residents, urban planning in Jerusalem is first and foremost aimed at maintaining the Jewish majority in the city. (B'Tselem, July 2006). It is premised on the development of Jerusalem including East Jerusalem as capital of Israel. This is achieved by massive investment in Jewish neighborhoods/settlements in East Jerusalem, coupled with the prevention of the expansion of Palestinian neighborhoods (B'Tselem, July 2006; ICAHD, March 2007)
- Urban development plans discriminately affect Palestinian community, with municipal budgets allocating proportionally far less funds to Palestinian community in comparison to the Jewish community. Only 7-13 per cent of land in East Jerusalem is approved for Palestinian construction most of which is in already built-up areas, compared with the 35 per cent expropriated for Israeli settlements (ICAHD, March 2007, B'Tselem, July 2006; OCHA, March 2011).
- Restrictions in building permits and associated costs, discriminately affect Palestinian community and underline the basis for illegal construction in East Jerusalem. Such factors as discriminatory building permits, and regime are noted to have contributed to relocation or displacement of 50,000-60,000 Palestinians outside the municipal boundaries of the city (FMR, 2 September 2006). Given the extreme difficulty in obtaining a building permit, it is estimated that some 86,000 Palestinians have built in violation of Israeli regulations, and so risk having their homes demolished (UN, May 2011; OCHA, March 2011; HRW December 2010). Since 1967, the Israeli authorities have demolished some 2,000 houses (OCHA, March 2011). The same authorities have failed in many cases to implement court orders to seal or demolish Israeli settlers' illegal buildings (HRW, December 2010).
- Settlements in East Jerusalem
- Since 1968, the Government of Israel has constructed settlements within the extended municipal boundary of East Jerusalem and in the wider metropolitan area beyond creating a new demographic boundary within East Jerusalem, despite the prohibition, under international law, on the transfer of civilians to occupied territory. Over one third of the area within the extended boundary of East Jerusalem has been expropriated for the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements. (OCHA, March 2011)

- In addition, settler organizations are targeting land and property to create an 'inner' layer of settlements within Palestinian residential areas, in the so-called 'Holy Basin' area. The impact of this settlement activity in Palestinian areas includes restrictions on public space, residential growth and freedom of movement. In the most severe cases – in the Old City, Silwan, and Sheikh Jarrah – settler expropriation has resulted in the loss of property and the eviction of Palestinian residents. (OCHA, March 2011) Archaeological activity in these areas is augmenting the public space which the settlers control. A government-sponsored 'Open Spaces' project will expand this domain and further constrain Palestinian construction and space in East Jerusalem.
- Between 1987 and 2004 settler population expanded by 65% from 111,300 to 184,034 while the area covered by settlements increased by 143% from 890 hectares to more than 2,170 hectares. As of end 2010, over 200,000 Israeli settlers live in settlements in East Jerusalem (OCHA, April 2009; OCHA March 2011). Following the 1967 occupation and subsequent annexation of East Jerusalem and its hinterland, an area of approximately 70 Km², the Government of Israel has confiscated approximately 35 percent of the territory, primarily from private Palestinian owners. (OCHA, March 2011)
- An estimated eighty per cent of the settler population in the West Bank now lives within a 25 kilometre radius of Jerusalem. All of these settlements have been incorporated onto the 'Jerusalem' side of the Wall. In addition to the settlements located within the Israeli-defined municipal boundary, another layer has been constructed in the wider metropolitan area of Jerusalem, encompassing, among others, the Ma'ale Adummim, Giv'at Ze'ev and Gush Etzion blocs. (OCHA, March 2011)
- East Jerusalem & House Demolitions
- House demolitions remain a reoccurring source of internal displacement in East Jerusalem discriminately affecting Palestinian communities residing in East Jerusalem. This has been aggravated in recent years as result of the construction of the Separation Wall and continuing discriminatory policies affecting Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem. 2003–2005 were among the worst known to East Jerusalem for house demolitions; not only did the number of demolitions reach a peak of 350 buildings, but there was also an unprecedented severity in punitive enforcement measures. (ICAHD, 2007) Punitive enforcement measures have included reopening of legal proceedings for cases which had remained dormant, doubling of penalties, confiscation of building equipment and incarceration. (ICAHD, 2007)
- The Ministry of the Interior and the Municipality assert that between 15,000-20,000 buildings in East Jerusalem have been built without permits, which is to say, about 40% of the total number of buildings. (ICAHD, 2007) The UN has estimated that some 86,000 Palestinians havng built in violation of Israeli regulations are at risk of having their homes demolished (UN, May 2011; OCHA, March 2011). Since 1967 more than 2,000 Palestinian homes are reported to have been demolished. Thousands remain at risk of being demolished. In Bustan in East Jerusalem, 1,000 Palestinians are at risk of displacement due to pending demolition orders. (OCHA, March 2011) Though families at risk have sought legal avenues against demolition or eviction orders, such measures remain costly, can last years and while can in succesful instances provide temporary Court injunctions, yet contrary to the impression the Israeli authorities have created, since 2003 there have been many cases in which homes have been
 - demolished in violation of Israseli court orders. (ICAHD, 2007)
- East Jerusalem & Separation Wall
- Wall isolate East Jerusalem, an occupied territory since 1967, from the rest of the West Bank, and de facto incorporate it to Israel, but it also divides Palestinian neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem, with serious consequences for their residents. Approximately 25% of the 253,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem have been cut off from the city by the Separation Wall finding themselves on the West Bank side of the Wall. They can now only reach Jerusalem by crossing a checkpoint to access the services to which they are entitled, and are at risk of losing their permanent residency status. (OCHA, March 2011)

- Conversely, certain West Bank localities are 'dislocated' to the 'Jerusalem' side of the Barrier, with the result that approximately 2,500 Palestinians in 16 communities face also uncertain residency status, impeded access to basic services and potential displacement (OCHA, March 2011) Construction of the Wall in the greater Jerusalem area is effectively re-drawing the geographical boundaries, in addition to compounding the separation of East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. (OCHA, March 2011) It is already responsible for the economic and social decline of entire communities as they are in practice cut off from Jerusalem and essential services they previously had access to (Al Haq, October 2005, pp.8-11; EU, 25 November 2005, para. 22). (UNGA, A/60/380, 26 September 2005, para.53).
- Many of these people do not have access to alternative services or jobs, notably because of the economic decline in their areas of residence – which used to live mainly on the commercial exchanges between Ramallah and Jerusalem before the construction of the wall – and the difficulty of travel from Jerusalem to other West Bank cities. They risk being forced sooner or later to move eastward (Al Haq, October 2005; UNGA, A/60/380, 26 September 2005; CHR, March 2005, para.17-19). The construction of the Wall around Jerusalem along with the reactivation of the "centre of life" policy has prompted a wave of return of Israeli ID card-holders to Jerusalem and exacerbated the housing crisis with important consequences for property prices and rents (Al Haq, October 2005; EU, 25 November 2005, para.20; OCHA, March 2011).
- Revocation of Jerusalem Residency & Family Reunification
- The origin of the 'Jerusalem residency' originates from 1967 when, following a census of Palestinian residents in the Israeli created municipality of East Jerusalem. Jerusalem residents who left temporarily during the 1967 war missed the census and were denied permanent residency, in addition, to around 30,000 Palestinians who were living immediately adjacent to, but not within, the Israeli-declared new municipal boundaries. (OCHA, July 2007) Palestinians who hold Jerusalem ID cards are permanent residents of Israel. Approximately 253,000 Palestinians hold Jerusalem ID cards. They can live and enter Jerusalem without a permit, buy property and work in Israel, and receive Israeli taxpayer benefits. (OCHA, July 2007; OCHA, 2005)
- Palestinians residing outside of Jerusalem for seven or more years lose their Jerusalem residency status. In order to maintain their card, under Israeli law, the onus lies on Palestinians to provide proof that Jerusalem is their 'centre of life' and that they are living inside the Jerusalem municipal boundaries. (OCHA, July 2007) Approximately 14,000 East Jerusalem Palestinians have had their residency revoked since 1967, of which over 4,500 were revoked in 2008. (B'Tselem, August 2008; OCHA March 2011) At the same time, Israel's centre of life policy would according to some analysts lead to return of 20,000 to 30,000 Palestinians Jerusalemites residing outside municipal borders of East Jerusalem – aggravated by the construction of the Wall which would lead to second wave. (JCESR, December 2001; ICAHD, March 2007; EU, November 2005).
- The center of life policy is additionally contributing to, or leading casue of displacement as families face increasing difficulties in exercising the rights to family reunification and child registration in Jerusalem. Palestinians may have to choose between living separately on different sides of the Wall or losing their residency rights in Jerusalem (CHR, January 2006; Al Haq, October 2005). The application process for family reunification has become virtually impossible since 2003, when Israel introduced the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order). Permanent residency status is also not passed on to the holder's children 'by right', resulting in difficulties in registering children of such 'mixed residency' status marriages (OCHA March 2011)


OCHA, March 2011

In the years since 1967, Israel has undertaken measures – in particular land confiscation, settlement building and construction of the Barrier – which serve to alter the status of East Jerusalem, contrary to international law. Government and municipal policies have also negatively impacted the estimated 270,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem.¹ As this report

demonstrates, these policies affect their residency status, their access to education and health services, and their ability to plan and develop their communities....Combined, these policies significantly increase the humanitarian vulnerability of the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem. Although Palestinians are remaining in the city, in the long term, failure to address these 'push factors' risks undermining the Palestinian presence in East Jerusalem. Palestinians from the remainder of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been prevented from residing within the Israeli-defined municipal boundary, other than through the increasingly restrictive process of 'family unification.' Since the early 1990s, non-Jerusalem Palestinians have been compelled by the Israeli authorities to obtain permits just to access the city, including to places of worship during Ramadan and Easter. The number of such permits granted is limited, and access of permit holders into East Jerusalem is restricted to four checkpoints. The majority of checkpoints leading into the Jerusalem area have been incorporated into the Barrier, which is itself compounding the separation of East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. In addition to this administrative and physical separation, the Palestinian Authority is not allowed, under the Oslo Accords, to operate in East Jerusalem and the closure of Palestinian institutions, such as Orient House, is continually renewed, notwithstanding Israel's commitments under the Roadmap. This has led to a political and institutional vacuum which, in addition to restrictive residency and access policies, is resulting in East Jerusalem becoming increasingly separated from the remainder of the occupied Palestinian territory – physically, politically, socially and culturally.

OCHA, October 2009

"In 2009, the Israeli authorities have demolished ...including 57 in East Jerusalem and 180 in Area C. ...While Israel has expropriated approximately 35 percent of occupied East Jerusalem for Israeli settlements, only an estimated 13 percent is available Palestinian construction in East Jerusalem, and much of this is built-up already. In those areas where construction is possible, Israeli restrictions on Palestinian planning and development, including bureaucratic requirements and high fees, make it extremely difficult for Palestinian residents to obtain building permits, leaving many families with no choice to meet their housing needs but to build "illegally" and risk demolition of their home. Conservative estimates indicate that as many as 60,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem may be at risk of having their homes demolished. During the month, the Israeli daily, Yedioth Yerushalayim, reported of a document produced by the Jerusalem Municipality, indicating its intention to implement in the near future 42 pending demolition orders issued against Palestinian-owned buildings and structures in East Jerusalem, as well as 17 demolition orders against Israeli-owned structures."



OCHA, The Planning Crisis in EJ, April 2009

"...Of particular concern are areas in East Jerusalem that face the prospect of mass demolitions. For example, the execution of pending demolition orders in the Tel al Foul area in Beit Hanina, Khalet el 'Ein in At Tur, Al Abbasiya in Ath Thuri, and Wadi Yasul between Jabal al Mukabbir and

Ath Thuri, affect a combined total of more than 3,600 persons. In the Bustan area of the Silwan neighbourhood, which has received considerable media attention, some 90 houses are threatened with demolition, potentially displacing a further 1,000 Palestinians. In addition, some 500 residents of the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood potentially face eviction as their homes are located on land whose ownership is contested

B'Tselem, July 2006

"During the 1967 war, Israel took control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While the West Bank remained under military occupation, Israel annexed East Jerusalem and applied Israeli law there. The annexed area included, however, not only the 6 square kilometers of East Jerusalem prior to 1967, but an additional 64 square kilometers that were part of the West Bank. In its re-drawing of the Jerusalem borders, one of the factors Israel took into account was demographic: ensuring a large Jewish majority in the city. This was accomplished by including sparsely populated Palestinian areas in the territory annexed, while attempting to exclude the more populated areas. As a result, several villages and neighborhoods were divided in two. In other cases, farmlands belonging to a village were annexed to Jerusalem, while the village itself remained in the West Bank. Immediately following the occupation of the West Bank, Israel's Parliament passed the "Jerusalem Law", annexing the area within the newly determined municipal boundary, and proclaiming Israeli sovereignty over it. Israel conducted a population census, and Palestinians residing inside what was now under municipal jurisdiction, were granted the status of "permanent resident" and the option of becoming Israeli citizens. East Jerusalemites found themselves in an awkward situation. In order to become citizens they were obliged to pledge allegiance to Israel. Thus, most declined citizenship, opting to be permanent residents instead. This status resembles the one granted to non-Jewish immigrants: it allows Palestinian Jerusalemites to work in Israel, and enjoy health insurance and social welfare benefits provided to all Israeli residents. However, residents lack political clout and are subject to a variety of measures intended to ensure a Jewish majority in the city. The result is an inequality between Jewish and Palestinian Jerusalemites that is present in all aspects of daily life in the city."

Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, March 2007

"The ideological motive is rooted in a policy decision establishing that a demographic balance must be maintained in the city at a ratio of 70% Jews to 30% Palestinians. The ministerial committee known as the Gafni Commission laid down this policy in 1973. Underlying the policy was concern at the rate of increase of the Palestinian population in Jerusalem and the fear that within a few years, they would succeed in changing the Jewish character of the city and would even choose the mayor! A municipal paper prepared by the Planning Policy Division in 1977 states, "One of the cornerstones of Jerusalem's planning process is...the preservation of the demographic balance between the ethnic groups [in accordance with] the resolution of the Government of Israel."

The new outline scheme currently being prepared reiterates the same trend of preserving "demographic balance in accordance with Government resolutions," even though the planners recognize the fact that, according to the forecasts, the increase in the population toward 2020 will be in a ratio of 40-60. Amir Cheshin, who observed the planning process in East Jerusalem in the Teddy Kollek era, attests that in Jerusalem: Israel has transformed urban planning into a tool in the hands of the Government whose object is to prevent the spread of the non-Jewish population of the city. This was a cruel policy, if only by reason of the fact that it disregarded the needs (not to mention the rights) of the Palestinian residents. Israel regarded the institution of a stringent urban planning policy as a way to restrict the number of new houses being constructed in Palestinian neighbourhoods, and thus ensure that the percentage of Palestinian residents in the city's population – 28.8% in 1967 – would not increase. If we permit 'too many' new homes to be built in Palestinian neighbourhoods, that will mean 'too many' Palestinian residents in the city. The idea is to move as many Jewish residents as possible to East Jerusalem and to move as many Palestinians as possible out of the city altogether. Housing policy in East Jerusalem has

focused on this numbers game. The same fear of demographic increase underlies the Ministry of Interior's three moves aiming to reduce the city's Palestinian population, all of which are still in force today: confiscation of identity cards from residents moving outside the city's municipal boundary, obstacles placed before the registration of infants in the Population Register, and difficulties created for those trying to bring spouses from the territories or Jordan within the municipal boundary."

by Israeli settlers."

Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, March 2007

"The years 2003–2005 were among the worst known to East Jerusalem for house demolitions; not only did the number of demolitions reach a peak of 350 buildings, but there was also an unprecedented severity in punitive enforcement measures. Residents of East Jerusalem found themselves: in a far more severe situation: enforcement measures were stepped up and there was an increase in red tape; those wishing to build legally found themselves frustrated at almost every turn. This report shows that from 2003 until 2005 the authorities took increasing steps to tighten the noose around the necks of East Jerusalem residents; faced with the incessant proliferation of bureaucratic, planning, legal, and economic hurdles, making it hopeless to obtain a building permit, they had to resort to unlicensed construction. Thus, fewer than 100 buildings were built under licence in East Jerusalem each year. Yet in the same period demand for housing in East Jerusalem rose steeply, due to the Wall construction around Jerusalem. As a result, thousands were forced inside Jerusalem's municipal boundaries, enormously boosting illegal construction, which peaked in 2004 at 1,189 houses. Various red lines were crossed during that period. Shamelessly eager to demolish houses at all costs, municipal and Ministry of Interior inspectors resorted to underhand tactics of evasion or deception, disregarding court-issued decisions. The inspectors were prepared to trample the rule of law underfoot, so that the bulldozer did not, heaven forbid, return to base without having destroyed a home.

Demolitions in East Jerusalem during recent years²

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Municipality	7	15	6	9	12	17	11	32	36	66	128	76	73
MOI	22	10	11	7	18	14	7	9	7	33	24	18	10
Total	29	25	17	16	30	31	18	41	43	99 ³	152	94	83

[The decline in recent years since 2004]... disguises the fact that the total area of demolished structures increased dramatically from 9,000 square metres in 2004 to 12,000 square metres in 2005, as the demolitions concentrated on large buildings, including four, five and even seven-storey structures... [Nor does] [t]he above table include homes demolished by owners themselves when offered a plea bargain whereby they could destroy their own home in return for being awarded only a small monetary fine. We do not have figures for houses demolished in this category, but estimate their number at only slightly less than those destroyed by the authorities.

As the figures show, the years 2003–2005 were amongst the worst since the Occupation commenced, as to administrative demolitions.... [In addition, it] is characterized by harsher enforcement measures, in order to deter residents from building without a permit. These measures include, apart from the actual demolitions, a significant increase in financial fines, confiscation of building equipment and imposition of prison sentences for building offences. The

increased stringency of municipal policy may be explained as a response to pressures exerted on the mayor by the public that voted him into office, and the policy of judaisation of the eastern part of the city, as envisioned by the right-wing circles he represents.....

[Scope of Illegal Building]

The Ministry of the Interior and the Municipality assert that between 15,000-20,000 buildings in East Jerusalem have been built without permits, which is to say, about 40% of the total number of buildings. According to the Municipal Tax Collection Department, 5,300 residential units were constructed in East Jerusalem in the years 2000 – 2004. In the period covered here, building permits were issued for only 481 buildings (of which a certain number would, in normal circumstances, contain more than one residential apartment), which is to say that for every building erected under permit, ten were built without permit. In the year 2004, the Municipality and the Ministry of the Interior destroyed 152 of 1,435 “illegal” buildings, or 11% of the total unlicensed construction started that year.... [This] must take into account the tremendous demand for housing arising in recent years as a result of two policy decisions of the Government of Israel: annulment of residency of those living outside the municipal boundaries, and construction of the Wall around Jerusalem. Since the government instituted these two moves, housing demand in East Jerusalem has increased, giving illegal construction a tremendous boost.

[Discrimination]

The proportion of cases that either result in or end in a demolition order being awarded against structures, out of all the building infractions taken to court, is far higher in the case of East Jerusalem. In West Jerusalem, far fewer structures receive demolition orders; in fact, in West Jerusalem no entire residential buildings have ever received demolition orders or been demolished. One notes that in 2005 there was a 65% rate of demolition in West Jerusalem, whereas in East Jerusalem the rate was 95%. There is a certain screening process at work by which infractions in East Jerusalem are dealt with faster, while in West Jerusalem there is a system at work that delays such legal procedures.


[Illegality of Demolish orders within Israeli Law]

Contrary to the impression the authorities have created, since 2003 there have been many cases in which homes have been demolished in violation of court orders. All too many cases provide proof that the inspectors of both the Municipality and the Ministry of Interior have no qualms about bypassing the law as long as the bulldozer is fed its pound of flesh."

B'Tselem, July 2006

"Severe overcrowding and no hope of obtaining a building permit – even to build a house on land they own - lead many Palestinians to build without permits. They do so knowing they will forever live in fear that, after investing their life savings to build, their home may be demolished. In fact, both Jews and Palestinians build illegally. Yet the response of the authorities is not equal. Palestinians account for about 20% of illegal construction, yet more than 75% of the demolitions are carried out on Palestinian homes. While demolitions carried out in Jewish neighborhoods target either commercial buildings or additions to a house, in Palestinian neighborhoods such demolitions leave entire Palestinian families homeless. The rate of house demolition has increased dramatically since Israel began constructing the Barrier. The lack of housing solutions drove many East Jerusalem Palestinians to the suburbs, even at the risk of losing social security benefits. Following the construction of the Barrier, which cuts off the suburbs, many of these same people are moving back into the city. Thus, the Barrier is only exacerbating the housing shortage for Palestinians in Jerusalem."

Who Builds Illegally? Whose Houses Are Demolished?





*Data provided by the head of the department of construction administration in Jerusalem Municipality.

B'Tselem, July 2006, p.18-21.

"Municipal budgets exacerbate social inequalities. Although Palestinians are required to pay taxes like all other residents of Jerusalem, the city invests meagre sums in services and infrastructure in Palestinian neighborhoods. In contrast to the claim that Jerusalem is the united capital of Israel, ethnic divisions in the city have remained largely unresolved. Israel has invested vast resources to build new Jewish settlements in areas of East Jerusalem expropriated from Palestinians. At the same time, Palestinian villages and neighborhoods incorporated into the city have turned into its new slums. Palestinians and Jews may now live side-by-side, yet inequality keeps them completely alienated from one another..... A walk through Jewish and Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem reveals striking inequalities. Jewish neighborhoods enjoy all the amenities of a modern western city. Most Palestinian neighborhoods lack even the most basic infrastructure, such as sidewalks and street lamps. Many are not connected to a sewage system. An examination of the municipal budget reveals that the disparities are not an accident; they are clearly the result of official policy. In each section of the municipal budget, the Jewish population receives the lion's share of investment, while the Palestinian population is allocated much less than its fair share. Palestinians constitute a third of the city's population, yet in no budget item do they receive a third of the allocations. The discrimination is even more severe when you consider that in some spheres, Palestinians should receive more than a third of city investment: 42% of Jerusalem's children under the age of 10 are Palestinian; 67% of Palestinian families in Jerusalem live below the poverty line (compared with 29% of Jewish families)."

Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, March 2007

year	Municipal Budget	East Jerusalem's Share	Percentage
2003	3,547,261,000	300,978,132	8.48%



Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, March 2007

"In a discussion on the question of house demolitions in East Jerusalem that took place in February 2005 in the office of Minister of the Interior Ophir Pines-Paz, she summarized the reasons why it is so difficult for residents of East Jerusalem to obtain a construction permit. Among them she pointed to the low plot ratios in the Palestinian sector that do not cover the needs of the population, problems of parcellation of different areas, and problems with proof of land ownership. She added that the existing Urban Development Outline Plans do not give satisfactory answers to these problems and that the Ministry of the Interior had not yet come up with any alternative active urban development plans because of budgetary constraints. The importance of the District Commissioner's testimony rests on the fact that she stressed overall planning problems for which the state is responsible, and that she also took professional responsibility for the longstanding ministerial planning failure....

The total area of East Jerusalem, meaning the Palestinian neighbourhoods east of the Green Line, exclusive of the Jewish settlements built there, amounts to some 46,000 dunams (11,500 acres). Just over half the area, 24,655 dunam (6,163 acres), is covered by 25 approved zoning plans; another seven proposed zoning plans are as yet unapproved. The size of the area zoned for construction appears, on the face of it, reasonable. Under the approved plans, however, only

37% [of 6,163 acres] is allocated for residential purposes. Construction is prohibited on the rest of the land: some 40% has been defined as open land or green areas where a sweeping ban is imposed on construction, and 20% of the area is designated for public institutions and roads.

Just as the area zoned for construction is restricted, so are plot ratios within that area. In most of the area permitted for construction in East Jerusalem, the plot ratio is in the range of 35%-75%, whereas in West Jerusalem it is in the range of 75%-120%. This is made on the pretext of preserving the "rural character" of the area, and because this is seen as compatible with residential patterns in Palestinian society. In West Jerusalem, up to six housing units per dunam may be constructed in three or four-storey buildings, while in the East, only two land-attached housing units may be built per dunam. The most blatant examples of plot ratio discrimination are found in the Jewish precincts located in the heart of Palestinian villages....

The following requirements are notable among these newly-added difficulties:

Requirement to prove ownership of the land by means of registration.


Personal particulars and signatures of all landowners.

Confirmation from the Ministry of Justice that there are no additional claims to the lands appearing in the Jordanian Table of Claims.

Confirmation from the Custodian of Absentee Property that the land is not under its management.

Confirmation from the Israel Mapping Centre that the land is plotted and that it has no competing claims.

It must be noted once more that *the ownership of about half the land in East Jerusalem cannot be proved*. Moreover, even if residents of East Jerusalem wish to register their land today at the Lands Registry, they would be unable to do so, since the Israeli government has frozen land registration as far back as 1967....



The cost of obtaining a permit

Beyond the statutory difficulties, anyone seeking to build legally discovers the cost of obtaining a permit is well beyond his ability..... Jews and Palestinians seeking to obtain a building permit pay in accordance with the same parameters; there are, however, two obvious differences between Palestinian residents wishing to buy a self-contained house and their Jewish neighbours living in high-rise apartment buildings: (a) the expenses payable in Jewish neighbourhoods are distributed among a large number of occupants, whereas in the Palestinian sector the costs fall on a single family, and (b) the socio-economic level in East Jerusalem is far lower than in West Jerusalem, and most East Jerusalem residents cannot meet such expenses. According to data from the Municipal Welfare Division, 67% of East Jerusalem residents live below the poverty line. The burden of fees and levies is far more than they can bear."

COHRE, November 2009

"Significant expansion of existing illegal settlements and establishment of new ones are planned in five neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem [2009]. In total, 377 new housing units are under construction, while plans for a further 444 units are awaiting approval.

- Mount of Olives: 280 housing units under construction in two locations, 104 housing units awaiting approval;
- Silwan: 20 housing units awaiting approval;
- Sheikh Jarrah: 31 housing units approved, 290 housing units awaiting approval;
- South East Jerusalem: 66 housing units under construction;
- Old City: 30 housing units awaiting approval."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), July 2005

"Construction of settlements in and around Jerusalem dates back to the period immediately after [1967]. In 1968, settlements were established surrounding the Old City in areas such as French Hill, Ramat Eshkol and Ma'alot Dafna as well as in the Old City itself. Further settlements were established within the expanded Jerusalem municipal boundary such as Ramot Allon (1973) in the northwest, Neve Ya'akov (1971) and Pisgat Ze'ev (1985) to the north, and Gilo (1971) and Har Homa (1998) in the south. In addition, an outer ring of settlements (including Givat Ze'ev, Ma'ale Adumim and Betar Illit) were established around Jerusalem as is visible on the maps opposite. The construction of settler housing and infrastructure within East Jerusalem and surrounding areas created a new demographic reality on the ground. In 1980, the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, passed legislation declaring that "Jerusalem complete and united, is the capital of Israel", reinforcing the position that the Gol had held since the 1967 War. This decree was declared to have "no legal validity and constitute a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention" by the UN Security Council in 1980.... [T]he settler population inside East Jerusalem expanded by 65% from 111,300 to 184,034 between 1987 and 2004 while the area covered by settlements increased by 143% from 890 hectares to more than 2,170 hectares. Pisgat Ze'ev was the fastest-growing settlement in East Jerusalem between 1987 and 2004. Created in 1985, its population grew to 40,911 by 2004 and, the population increased annually on average by 11%, due in large part to the arrival of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, many of whom moved there in the early 1990s."

B'Tselem, July 2006

"One third of the area annexed in 1967 was expropriated, mostly from individual Palestinian land-owners, and was used exclusively to build Jewish neighborhoods. Today there are 12 Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, populated by some 192,000 people. According to international law, the status of these neighborhoods is identical to the settlements throughout the West Bank. At the same time, virtually all construction is prohibited in Palestinian neighborhoods. There are

various means to implement this policy. Over a third of East Jerusalem lacks outline plans, making construction impossible. Plans for the remaining areas define vast tracts of land as Green Areas, where building is forbidden, allegedly for ecological reasons. Jabal Abu Ghaneim, a hilltop amongst neighboring Palestinian villages, was defined as a "Green Area" until 1999, when it was turned into the Jewish settlement of Har Homa, inhabited today by over 2,000 people. As a matter of fact, Palestinian building is only allowed in 7% of East Jerusalem, mostly in existing Palestinian neighborhoods. Even within these neighborhoods, Palestinians will generally not get permits to expand their houses."

Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, March 2007

"Any attempt to explain the reasons for illegal construction in East Jerusalem must take into account the tremendous demand for housing arising in recent years as a result of two policy decisions of the Government of Israel: annulment of residency of those living outside the municipal boundaries, and construction of the Wall around Jerusalem. Since the government instituted these two moves, housing demand in East Jerusalem has increased, giving illegal construction a tremendous boost.

The policy of annulling resident status of those residing outside the city's municipal boundaries has been in force for more than ten years. The former Minister of the Interior, Eli Suissa, instituted the policy. Until that time, young couples had preferred to live on the city's outskirts, due to a shortage of rental apartments and the high rents collected within the city. Many communities of Jerusalemites arose in the peripheral villages, from Beit Jala in the south to Ar-Ram in the north, and in eastern villages such as Hizma, Anata, Abu Dis and Al Azariah. In 1993, the Ministry of Interior published regulations revoking the residency of those living outside the city's boundary, also removing social rights ranging from health care services to the various National Insurance allowances. Confiscation of blue identity cards (Jerusalem IDs) even deprived such individuals of freedom of movement within the city, access to places of work, and prevented them from visiting family. As a result, tens of thousands of Jerusalemites started migrating back inside the city causing a tremendous demand for apartments and a steep increase in rent.

This phenomenon was stepped up again in 2002, when construction of the "Separation Barrier" or "Jerusalem Envelope" started to be discussed, and yet again in 2003, when people realised the implications of living behind the Wall. We have since witnessed waves of families relocating to the 'right side' of the Wall, locking their houses and leaving everything behind, moving to any vacant spot within the city. The area north of the Qalandia Wall, where over 20,000 Jerusalemite families live, is losing its inhabitants. Entire families are relocating, even if only by a few hundred metres, in order not to lose their place of work, not to be cut off from schools, hospitals or family members, and especially in order to save themselves the daily humiliations involved in crossing the checkpoints. Rent in Kufr Aqab village plummeted by 50% in 2003, while at the same time, rent on the other side of the Wall rose by more than 100%. This massive return to within the municipal boundaries has caused a demographic explosion followed by a wave of illegal construction. From that time, the Municipality has lost all control of construction in East Jerusalem, since the need for shelter is stronger than any of the 'deterrent measures' imposed by the Municipality. Faced by urgent necessity, no penalty can deter. Indeed, as Jewish scholars taught, no edict should be imposed upon the public that is more than the public can endure. He who thought to battle the 'demographic demon' through the use of administrative measures created a far worse 'urban demon.' The late Faisal Hussein, one of the leading Palestinian leaders, once said that the day the Palestinian state awarded "Freedom of Al-Quds" honours, he would recommend awarding them to Minister Eli Suissa for his contribution in reinforcing East Jerusalem."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), June 2007

"Approximately 253,000 Palestinians hold Jerusalem ID cards. They are permanent residents of Israel who can live and enter Jerusalem without a permit.Jerusalem ID holders can buy property and work in Israel and receive Israeli taxpayer benefits such as health insurance, social security, and public schooling. Permanent resident status is not the same as Israeli citizenship. In the early 1990s, Israel offered Jerusalem ID card holders the possibility of obtaining Israeli citizenship and some Palestinians chose to become Israeli citizens during this limited period. The origin of the 'Jerusalem residency' originates from 1967 when, following a census of Palestinian residents in the Israeli created municipality of East Jerusalem, 66,000 people were granted 'permanent residency' status. Jerusalem residents who left the city temporarily during the 1967 war missed the census and were denied an opportunity to gain permanent residency¹⁵. They can no longer return to live in Jerusalem. In addition, around 30,000 Palestinian residents of Jerusalem who were living immediately adjacent to, but not within, the Israeli-declared new municipal boundaries at the time of the census were also excluded. They hold West Bank IDs, and require a permit to enter Jerusalem, despite the municipal boundary sometimes being only a few metres away from their homes.

Palestinians residing outside of Jerusalem for seven or more years lose their Jerusalem residency status. In order to maintain their card, under Israeli law, the onus lies on Palestinians to provide proof that Jerusalem is their 'centre of life' and that they are living inside the Jerusalem municipal boundaries. In 2006 over 1360 Palestinians had their ID card revoked. This was five times more than in 2005, and more than in any previous year since 1967. The law continues to force Palestinian residents of Jerusalem to make hard choices about where to establish their lives. If two people marry and one spouse does not hold a Jerusalem ID card he or she faces extreme difficulty in obtaining permission to live with their spouse in East Jerusalem. As a result, thousands of married couples are forced to live apart from one another to ensure that at least one of the partners retains his or her Jerusalem status. Since 1982 the Israeli Interior Ministry has not permitted the registration of Palestinian children as Jerusalem residents if the child's father does not hold a Jerusalem ID card, even if the mother is a Jerusalem ID card holder."

B'Tselem and Hamoked, 31 January 2004

"Since 1967, Israel has made great effort to preserve the "demographic balance" in Jerusalem by reducing the number of Palestinians living in the city and by maintaining a seventy-percent Jewish majority. To accomplish this goal, Israel imposes broad restrictions on Palestinian building in East Jerusalem, does not invest in infrastructure there, and allocates significantly smaller sums than it does for West Jerusalem.

The Interior Ministry – which is responsible for implementation of the Entry into Israel Law – plays a major role in implementing this policy of discrimination. The Ministry sets rigid rules for the approval of family unification and registration of children in the Population Registry. In almost every request for family unification or child registration, the residents must submit numerous documents. If they fail to do so, their requests are rejected. It was the Interior Ministry that implemented the policy of "quiet deportation" from 1996-1999, in which the Ministry permanently revoked the residency of hundreds of Palestinians on the grounds that they lived for a prolonged period outside of Israel, including the Occupied Territories.⁴ People going to the East Jerusalem office of the Interior Ministry face physical conditions far worse than at other Ministry branches.

On 31 July 2003, the Knesset passed the bill into law. The Nationality and Entry into Israel (Temporary Order) Law, 5763-2003, prohibits Israelis who are married to, or marry in the future, residents of the Occupied Territories to live in Israel with their spouses. Children born in the Occupied Territories to one parent who is a resident of East Jerusalem and a parent who is a resident of the Occupied Territories are forbidden under this law to live in Jerusalem with their family.⁵ The law does not establish a new immigration policy for residents of the Occupied Territories. International law recognizes the right of every state to determine who is entitled to

enter its territory – aliens have no intrinsic right to enter the state. Some countries set immigration quotas, based on varying criteria. However, when the foreigners are married to nationals or residents of the state, different rules apply, and there are limitations to the discretion that the government may exercise. As in every case where a state authority exercises discretion, the rules must be reasonable, based on substantive grounds, and applied without discrimination. The question involved here is not whether the alien has a right to enter the state. We are dealing with the right of citizens and residents of the state to live with their spouses in their (the citizens and residents) own country."

Jerusalem Center for Economic and Social Rights (JCESR), August 2001

"Centre of life' policy – In 1995, the Interior Ministry introduced the 'centre of life' policy. Palestinians with Jerusalem IDs were required to prove continuous residency in Jerusalem by submitting documents to demonstrate that they actually resided in the city for the previous seven years. The burden of having to prove the individual's 'centre of life' in Jerusalem is placed on the Palestinian. The requirements to prove the 'centre of life' are so detailed that even persons who never left the city have difficulties meeting them. The following elements are part of the 'centre of life' policy:

Revocation of residency status by confiscating ID Cards from persons who cannot prove that their 'centre of life' is in Jerusalem.

Refusal and complicated procedures to show one's 'centre of life' for family unification.

Refusal to register children born to parents of whom only one is an East Jerusalem resident in the Population registry.

Incidents of ID Card confiscation increased by over 600 percent after the implementation of the 'centre of life' policy. This policy greatly strengthened the ability of the Interior Ministry to confiscate ID cards and re-established the burden of proof to renew residency rights on the Palestinians themselves. In 1993, the Interior Ministry began examining who was a resident of Jerusalem and who had moved out of the city. It was decided that the Jerusalem suburbs would be considered to be outside the city borders. It was estimated that between 50,000 and 80,000 of East Jerusalem's 180,000 Palestinian inhabitants had moved to the suburbs outside the Jerusalem city. With this decision their status was being invalidated. The period, in which these actions took place, became known as the 'quiet transfer'.

No public notice was given of the change of policy and procedures. Many people lost their residency, including health and social benefits. Decisions could be given verbally without any justification or explanation. People were not allowed to appeal against the decisions. This policy was applied solely to Palestinian Jerusalemites, not to any other ethnic group in the city. In contrast to this policy towards Palestinians, all Jews, also those who are not Israeli citizens, are entitled to move to the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories without the move affecting their status. Also their return is guaranteed contrary to Palestinians.

The policy of ID Card confiscation accomplished the contrary as between 20,000 and 30,000 residents of the suburbs returned to live in Jerusalem. Others returned to fictitious addresses. The result was that at the end of 1997, the Ministry decided to slow down implementation. In 1999, it announced that it would no longer revoke the residency rights of East Jerusalem residents who had transferred their 'centre of life' outside the city boundaries on condition that the validity of their exit card had not expired. However, the demands for documentation verifying a person's 'centre of life' by the Interior Ministry and the National Insurance Institute continuous despite announcements to stop this policy. As a result of these requirements, many residents of East Jerusalem are still unable to benefit from many of their rights and have their residency status threatened.

2. *Family unification* – Jerusalem residents married to persons who are not Israeli residents or citizens must apply for family unification in order to live legally in the city. The application is being checked on 'centre of life', security and criminal record. It can take years before the applicant receives a decision to his or her application. When the applicant receives approval, a process of five years starts. Every year both the applicant as well as the one for whom the applicant applies have to show all the requested documents and the application is checked on the above three issues. During the first two years the person receives a so-called B1 permit, which means that the person can stay, but has no residency rights. After two years the person receives a temporary residency permit. After five years one receives a permanent residency permit.

This policy severely affects family life, the right of a couple to live together, and the right of children to live with their parents. Many families are divided because of this policy. Family unification for Jewish families is an automatic right.

3. *Child Registration* – A child born to parents of whom only one is a resident of East Jerusalem does not receive an identity number. After birth, the parents receive only a form titled 'notification of live birth'. To receive an identity number, the parents must submit a 'request to register a birth' and submit to this request proof that the 'centre of life' is in Jerusalem. It is estimated that there are currently at least 10,000 children residing in East Jerusalem who are not registered. Without a Jerusalem ID number, Palestinian children are denied some basic rights. A child must have his/her birth registered in order to be recognised by the state. By denying or restricting registration, the state can effectively disclaim their rights to any benefit or service, including access to and provision of education, health care and others. It is estimated that up to 23.6 percent of children are unable to register at government schools in East Jerusalem.

United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), 17 January 2006

"30. East Jerusalem is not part of Israel. On the contrary, it is occupied territory, subject to the Fourth Geneva Convention. Unfortunately, Israel's illegal attempt at annexation of East Jerusalem has obscured this truth. As a consequence, world public opinion tends, incorrectly, to treat Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem as different from that of the West Bank and Gaza.

31. Israel has embarked upon major changes to the character of Jerusalem. In essence, these changes are designed to reduce the number of Palestinians in the city and to increase the Jewish population of the city, thereby undermining Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as the capital of an independent Palestinian State. That this is the purpose of the wall in Jerusalem was acknowledged by the Israeli Minister for Jerusalem Affairs, Mr. Haim Ramon, on 10 July 2005 when he stated that the route of the wall would make Jerusalem "more Jewish". He added "The Government is bringing security to the city and will also make Jerusalem the capital of a Jewish and democratic State of Israel."

32. There are already some 190,000 Jewish settlers in Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem. Plans are, however, under way to increase the number of settlers and to extend settlements both to encircle Jerusalem and to cut the West Bank in half. Within the Old City of Jerusalem there are some 80 Jewish settler buildings and institutions. Moreover, there is a plan to build a large new Jewish settlement in the Muslim Quarter near Herod's Gate. Settlement expansion is also evident in neighbourhoods surrounding the Old City such as Silwan. Beyond this lie the more established settlements such as Ramot, French Hill, Har Homa and Gilo. The inner circle of settlements will be circled by the settlement blocs of Givat Ze'ev to the north, Ma'aleh Adumim to the east, and Gush Etzion to the south. Particularly threatening to a future Palestinian State is Ma'aleh Adumim, which is to be expanded by "E1" ("East 1"), a 53-square-mile area larger than Tel Aviv designated to have 3,500 housing units to accommodate 15,000 to 20,000 new settlers. The expanded Ma'aleh Adumim will effectively cut the West bank in half, separating Ramallah from Bethlehem, with serious economic and political consequences.

33. Conversely, the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem, presently numbering some 230,000, is to be reduced by a number of stratagems. First, by house demolitions. There was a sharp increase in house demolitions in 2004, when 152 homes were destroyed in East Jerusalem. Plans to destroy 88 homes in the Silwan district are presently on hold. Secondly, this population is to be reduced by routing the wall to the west of neighbourhoods previously part of East Jerusalem. Thus areas such as the Shu'afat camp, with a population of some 55,000, and West Anata are excluded from the East Jerusalem municipality and transferred to the West Bank. Thirdly, this will be done by transferring neighbourhoods previously integrated into East Jerusalem into the West Bank by means of the wall. Neighbourhoods such as Abu Dis, Anata and Al-Eizariya fall into this category.

34. The exclusion of large neighbourhoods from East Jerusalem and their transfer to the West Bank will cause great suffering to thousands of Palestinians and personal tragedies to many. A sharp distinction is made between Palestinians with blue Jerusalem ID cards and those with green West Bank ID cards living in East Jerusalem neighbourhoods. West Bank ID cardholders, and in due course Jerusalem ID cardholders living to the east of the wall, will no longer be able to access hospitals and schools in Jerusalem or to work in Jerusalem without special permits to enter Jerusalem. The differences in ID cards will also have a profound effect on family life, as many spouses hold different ID cards. They will be forced to live separately on different sides of the wall under Israeli law, which prohibits family unification. If one spouse elects to move east of the wall, he or she will lose his or her rights (such as medical insurance and social security) attached to the Jerusalem ID. In this way Israel hopes to further reduce the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem by compelling spouses to move to the West Bank side of the wall. The Special Rapporteur visited two of the neighbourhoods most affected by the wall - Abu Dis and Al-Eizariya. There he met husbands separated from their wives and persons separated from their livelihoods, schools and hospitals in Jerusalem. Words cannot convey the hardships to which Palestinians are subjected in the interests of the Judaization of Jerusalem. 35. In November 2005 the heads of 25 European Union missions stationed in East Jerusalem prepared a report on Israel's plans to change the character of East Jerusalem. The report condemned the construction of the wall and settlements, the demolition of Palestinian homes, the separation of Palestinian residents and families, and the discriminatory practices employed by Israel. It concluded: Jerusalem is already one of the trickiest issues on the road to reaching a final status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. But several interlinked Israeli policies are reducing the possibility of reaching a final status agreement on Jerusalem that any Palestinian could accept. We judge that this is a deliberate Israeli policy - the completion of the annexation of East Jerusalem. Israeli measures also risk radicalizing the hitherto relatively quiescent Palestinian population of East Jerusalem."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), June 2007

"East Jerusalem is part of the West Bank. However, since 1993, the GOI has erected checkpoints on roads leading to the city and required West Bank Palestinians to obtain permits to enter East Jerusalem. Palestinian access to East Jerusalem was tightened in September 2000, with the outbreak of the second intifada. A series of additional military checkpoints and obstacles were set up to further restrict Palestinian movement into Jerusalem and Israel. In 2001, the GOI announced its intention to build a barrier to physically separate Israel from the West Bank to prevent suicide bombers from the West Bank entering Israel¹¹. By May 2007, 408 km of the total 721km Barrier route has been completed (56.5%) while a further 10% is under construction. The Barrier in East Jerusalem solidifies the various Israeli mechanisms that have been put in place to restrict Palestinian movement between the West Bank and East Jerusalem, namely identity cards, permits and checkpoints. In effect, the Barrier is the physical culmination of these access restrictions which have weakened the connections between East Jerusalem and the West Bank....

The section of the Barrier within Jerusalem governorate measures 168 kilometres (km)²¹ in length. Only five kilometers of its completed length runs along the Green Line. The remainder lies inside the West Bank. Construction of the Barrier progressed rapidly throughout 2006 and 2007 and is now near completion, physically separating East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. In conjunction with the complex system of permits, checkpoints and gates, the Barrier has become a de facto border. The Barrier's route winds around the Israeli settlements that surround Jerusalem ensuring that the majority lie on the western side of the Barrier with easy access into Jerusalem and Israel. The route runs deep into the West Bank to encircle the large settlements of Giv'at Zeev (pop. 11,000) and Ma'ale Adummim (pop. 28,000) which are currently outside the municipal boundary. By contrast, densely populated Palestinian areas – Shu'fat Camp, Kafr 'Aqab, and Samiramees with a total population of over 30,000 – which are currently inside the municipal boundary, are separated from Jerusalem by the Barrier. Other villages to the north and east of the city, with populations of more than 84,000 are also excluded. In addition, the Barrier runs through the middle of Palestinian communities separating neighbours and families from one another – this occurs in Abu Dis, for example. To the north of the city over 15,200 Palestinian residents of four villages in the Bir Nabala enclave are completely surrounded by the Barrier on three sides, with an Israeli security road on the fourth, closed to Bir Nabala residents. As a result, these residents are in a totally enclosed enclave isolated from the Jerusalem. The only way in and out is by means of an underpass to Ramallah, which passes under a motorway restricted for Israeli vehicles only.

Approximately 25% of the 253,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem have been cut off from the city by the Barrier. They can now only reach Jerusalem by crossing a checkpoint to access the services to which they are entitled (see next section), and are at risk of losing their permanent residency status. The Barrier route is largely determined by the location of settlements: it winds around the settlements, ensuring that they are physically connected to Jerusalem and Israel. As a result, over 80% of all Israeli settlers living in the West Bank now reside to the west of the Barrier. The population of the settlements and the area they cover have both expanded rapidly in East Jerusalem. In 2004, the Israeli settler population in East Jerusalem was approximately 190,000 compared to 110,000 in 1987. The area covered by the settlements has more than doubled – from 890 to 2,170 hectares in 2005. In addition to the settlements within the city, Israeli settlements have been built within the West Bank to form a ring around Jerusalem. The large Israeli settlements of Givat Ze'ev, Ma'ale Adummim and the Gush Etzion bloc located respectively to the north, east and south of Jerusalem are physically connected to Jerusalem by roads that pass through the Barrier and which Palestinians are prohibited or restricted from using. These large Israeli civilian populations in the West Bank and their associated infrastructure further isolate East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. In 2004, 79% of the total settler population was located in Jerusalem and the surrounding Ramallah and Bethlehem governorates. The overall route of the Barrier in the West Bank incorporates 73 Israeli settlements between the Green Line and Barrier; approximately 10.2% of the West Bank lies between the Green Line and the Barrier."

See Also:

[al-Haq, October 2005, Building Walls, Breaking Communities: The Impact of the Annexation Wall on Jerusalem Palestinians](#)

['Quiet transfer' in East Jerusalem nears completion](#), Forced Migration Review (FMR), 4 September 2006

[European Union \(EU\), November 2005, Jerusalem and Ramallah Heads of Mission Report on East Jerusalem \(Unofficial document\)](#)

[United Nations General Assembly \(UN GA\), 26 September 2005, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories](#)

[Strike paralyzes West Bank](#), Al Jazeera, 28 February 2009

[Married but without rights](#), Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 3 August 2008

[Revocation of Residency in East Jerusalem: Statistics on Revocation of Residency Rights](#), B'Tselem, 14 August 2008

[Humanitarian Update: Special Focus the Barrier and Access Points to Jerusalem](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), July 2005

['Quiet transfer' in East Jerusalem nears completion](#), Forced Migration Review (FMR), 4 September 2006

[Jerusalem Center for Economic and Social Rights \(JCESR\), August 2001, Occupied East Jerusalem, A New Soweto?](#)

[European Union \(EU\), November 2005, Jerusalem and Ramallah Heads of Mission Report on East Jerusalem \(Unofficial document\)](#)

[Married but without rights](#), Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 3 August 2008

[Housing plan for Jerusalem neighborhood spurs criticism](#), Washington Post , November 18, 2009

[Jewish group begins new construction in East Jerusalem](#), Ha'aretz, 31 January 2008

['Quiet transfer' in East Jerusalem nears completion](#), Forced Migration Review (FMR), 4 September 2006

B'tselem, *A Policy of Discrimination: Land Expropriation, Planning and Building in East Jerusalem*, 1995.

[Civil Administration demolishes hut of al-Moher family on grounds that it was built without a permit, near Zububa Village, Jenin District](#), B'Tselem, 16 May 2005

[Jerusalem Center for Economic and Social Rights \(JCESR\), August 2001, Occupied East Jerusalem, A New Soweto?](#)

[Jerusalem Center for Economic and Social Rights \(JCESR\), August 2001, Occupied East Jerusalem, A New Soweto?](#)

Military Incursions & Strategy

Israeli Incursions & Clearing strategy in West Bank & Gaza

- Israeli incursions in the West Bank and Gaza remain a source of displacement both direct and indirect in entailing temporary or long lasting displacement, destruction of public and private property, and creating an insecure environment for civilians. Several such operations have caused massive temporary displacement causing the temporary displacement of thousands, while other incursions have had incremental impact. Israeli incursions as these entail displacement can be categorised in terms of clearing operations which form part of Israel's defense strategy witnessed in West Bank though particularly in Gaza Strip, and consists of the destruction of homes deemed close to Israeli security infrastructure, Jewish roads, or provide cover for Palestinian military operations; According to ICAHD demolitions of homes by Israel Defense Force during such operations accounts for more than 65% of all demolitions in OPT (ICAHD, April 2010).
- Israeli incursions can also be defined more strictly in terms of military operations in which displacement is induced by actions aimed at Palestinian militancy causing temporary displacement of civilian populations, or destruction of housing and private, and public property, contributing to displacement. The frequency of military incursions/raids has increased during the second intifada with thousands being undertaken annually with varying degrees of intensity – over 5,000 military searches and arrest would take place in 2007 (OCHA, 6 July 2008; UNSR on HR, 21 January 2008).
- The international community, while acknowledging Israel's right to self-defence has repeatedly stressed that Israel's right to self-defence must be carried out in accordance with international law, and condemned Israel's excessive use of force, and violations of humanitarian and human rights law. (UN SG, 11 December 2006; UN HRC, 23 January 2008; UN HRC, 6 June, 2008)

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- Israeli clearing operations
- Clearing operations are part of Israel's defense strategy witnessed in West Bank though particularly in Gaza Strip, and consists of the destruction of homes deemed close to Israeli security infrastructure, Jewish roads, or provide cover for Palestinian military operations. (B'Tselem, 2007) Unlike in 1948, population displacement and property destruction after the 1967 war was concentrated mostly in border areas: along the boundary that had separated the West Bank from Israel (known as the Green Line) and near the external borders of the West Bank. (B'Tselem, 2007; Human Rights Watch, October 2004; Al Haq, December 2007)
- Clearing operations in Gaza strip was used mostly in areas surrounding the settlements, on both sides of the bypass roads along which the settlers drive, and around army posts, and mostly along the border of Gaza, particularly in the Philadelphi Corridor and Erez crossing point in the creation of 'security strips' or buffer zones. Clearing Operations have continued to be conducted in all areas of the West Bank and Gaza, although to a lesser extent in Area 'A', and in Gaza Strip since the 2005 preceding which in 2004-2005 had witnessed massive demolitions along the Rafah border with Egypt causing the demolition of hundreds of homes.
- Communities living in or near the Israeli-imposed 'buffer zone' (no-go area) along the boundary with Israel in the occupied Gaza Strip and northern Gaza Strip are at risk of displacement. Hundreds of families prior to Israel's offensive in 2008/2009 have already been forcibly displaced as a result of home and property demolitions, incursions and fear of attacks, such as in al-Shoka, while those remaining live in fear of displacement. (OCHA, January 2008; ICRC, 12 December 2007) Israeli attacks and demolitions have either temporarily or permanently displaced 70 per cent of households living in or near the buffer zone since 2000 (Save the Children, June 2010).
- The "buffer zone" has ranged from 50 meters wide to more than 1.5 kilometers in some northern areas. In May 2009, Israeli authorities officially announced the current boundaries of the buffer zone to be 300 meters, within which anyone walking on the land would be subject to Israeli fire. In some areas, the buffer zone encroaches up to 1.5 kilometres into Palestinian territory, affecting an estimated 30 per cent of the cultivable land available (OCHA, January 2011) In 2010, 24 civilians in the buffer zone were killed and scores injured (Electronic intifada, March 2011).
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- Israeli military incursions:
- Impact of incursions have varied in displacement that these entail since 1967. In 1967, the IDF razed the villages of Beit Nuba, 'Imwas, and Yalu, located near the strategic Latrun salient northwest of Jerusalem; demolished the Green Line villages of Beit 'Awa and Beit Marsam near Hebron; and destroyed 850 homes in Qalqiliya near the Green Line; and in late 1967 bulldozed the Jordan Valley communities of Jiftlik, Ajarish, and Nuseirat. The number of displaced who remained within the OPT from hostilities and destruction of homes and entire communities is unclear. Up to a quarter of the West Bank left after the war, including close to 88 per cent of the population of the Jordan Valley. In 1971, Israel destroyed approximately 2,000 houses in various refugee camps in Gaza Strip (HRW, October 2004).
- In subsequent years there have been various Israeli incursions causing displacement particularly in the Gaza Strip linked both to establishing "security areas" affecting highly dense urban areas as well as due to Israeli Defense Forces military incursions. The situation in Gaza Strip has consistently far more violent and leading to far more displacement than in West Bank. Since 2000, during the intifada roughly three times as many Palestinians have been killed as Israelis in total; within Gaza Strip, however, the ratio was closer to ten to one (HRW, October 2004). With the Israeli incursion of 2008/2009 in Gaza, that ratio would increase to nearly one hundred to one. Between September 2000 and October 2004, more than 24,500 people were displaced by demolitions in Gaza, particularly along the border with Egypt (OCHA, 1 October 2004; ARIJ, 8 April 2006). In successive incursions in Gaza in 2006,

over 5,000 people were displaced, 1,000 homes damaged and scores demolished (UNRWA, 19

- November 2006; OCHA, 31 July 2006).
- Since Gaza disengagement in 2005 large scale incursions in Gaza Strip have occurred causing the displacement of thousands. 'Operation Summer Rain' in June 2006 during which 5,100 Palestinians would be displaced as a result of IDF operations. In 'Operation Autumn Clouds' in November 2006 homes of over 1,000 Palestinians in Gaza were damaged and scores destroyed; (UNRWA, November 2006) 'Operation Hot Winter' in February/March 2008 during which several thousand were temporarily displaced in Gaza and homes of close to 800 persons were severely damaged, and scores destroyed. (OCHA, 2008) Between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, Israel launched a military operation codenamed "Operation Cast Lead" on the Gaza Strip leading to the highest level of displacement since 1967 of nearly 120,000 Palestinians and demolishing or damaging more than 6,300 houses, and nearly 53,000 suffered minor damage, most of them by IDF in the course of the offensive (ICAHD, 7 April 2009; OCHA, July and
- September 2009). Israeli incursions since the offensive have resulted in the damage of over 600 homes, affecting more than 3,000 people (UN, January 2011; Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster, June 2011).
- In 2011, the Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster/Sector for Gaza highlighted that due to Israeli incursions preceding the offensive and subsequent interventions 7,900 houses were demolished or seriously damaged and nearly 59,000 suffered minor damage. (Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster, June 2011). By mid-2011 most of the minor damage to housing had been repaired, but only about 200 of the demolished houses and 1,500 of those seriously damaged had been rebuilt (Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster, June 2011). At least 20,000 people are still displaced due to the destruction of or damage to their housing (Shelter Cluster, June 2011) and continued blockade which has denied Palestinians access to construction materials. These are thought of as conservative and may not reflect the extent of displacement in Gaza.
- In early 2011, the flow of construction material into the Gaza Strip was still only 11 per cent of the rate before the blockade (Oxfam et al., November 2010; OCHA, March 2011). In January 2011, the UN estimated that total housing needs in the Gaza Strip had reached 91,500, approximately 80,000 to meet unmet natural growth rates and derelict and unsanitary housing units, and close to 11,000 to address housing of those displaced in successive Israeli interventions (Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster June, 2011). The scope of housing needs unaddressed reflects on the scope of the external closure/restrictions imposed on the Gaza Strip, and the basic human rights needs that are unmet. In June 2011, Israel approved the delivery of construction material for UN construction projects of 1,500 homes and 18 new schools— a fraction of what is needed (Haartz, June, 2011).

UN HRC, 15 September 2009

"29. Israel deployed its navy, air force and army in the operation it codenamed "Operation Cast Lead". The military operations in the Gaza Strip included two main phases, the air phase and the air-land phase, and lasted from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009. The Israeli offensive began with a week-long air attack, from 27 December until 3 January 2009. The air force continued to play an important role in assisting and covering the ground forces from 3 January to 18 January 2009. The army was responsible for the ground invasion, which began on 3 January 2009 when ground troops entered Gaza from the north and from the east. The available information indicates that the Golani, Givati and Paratrooper Brigades and five Armoured Corps Brigades were involved. The navy was used in part to shell the Gaza coast during the operations....

30. Statistics about Palestinians who lost their life during the military operations vary. Based on extensive field research, non-governmental organizations place the overall number of persons killed between 1,387 and 1,417....1239.... At the height of the military operations UNRWA was providing shelter to 50,896 displaced persons in 50 shelters. This number was estimated to be a

fraction of those who had become homeless, most of whom found temporary shelter with relatives."

The Electronic Intifada, 30 June 2009

"For almost a decade, Israel has unilaterally imposed an off-limits area solely on the Palestinian side of the boundary between Israel and Gaza. This "buffer zone" has ranged from 50 meters wide to more than two kilometers in some northern areas. On 25 May [2009], Israeli authorities officially announced the current boundaries of the buffer zone to be 300 meters, within which anyone walking on the land would be subject to Israeli fire. Prior to and following the declaration, Israeli soldiers have continued to shell and shoot well beyond 300 meters, targeting unarmed Palestinian civilians and farmers in the vicinity."

The Christian Science Monitor, 1 June 2009

"...Once a lush scene of rolling olive, citrus, and pomegranate groves, much of the border region is now just a barren landscape, marked only by the presence of IDF tanks, military watchtowers, and the occasional pop of gunfire. Farmers and their families have been displaced, too afraid to return to their fields, while international humanitarian organizations are unable to make an assessment of the needs and damages of the area in the aftermath of the assault.... But what was previously just a sliver of fortified land on the strip's northern and eastern perimeters now, in the aftermath of Israel's January offensive in the territory, swallows roughly 30 percent of Gaza's arable farmland, according to the FAO. It stretches as deep as 1.25 miles inside Gaza's territory in the north and half a mile in the east, despite the 300-meter figure declared on the leaflets, the organization says. Gaza is just 25 miles long and slightly more than six miles wide."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 17 April 2008

"The first two days of March saw the intensification of ongoing Israeli army air and ground operations throughout the Gaza Strip. The Israeli code-named 'Hot Winter' operation which took place in northern and eastern Gaza between 28 February and 2 March resulted in a total of 107 killed and 250 injured. This was one of the most violent incursions in Gaza since the granting of limited autonomy to Gaza in 1994. The Gaza Strip remains closed to the outside world, with the exception of limited humanitarian imports and the movement of a small number of international visitors, patients and Israeli-approved Palestinians. Fuel shortages have begun to have a more profound effect on all aspects of life in Gaza, as private reserves have been depleted and the needs of the harvest and fishing season have increased demand. In March, the supply of diesel and gasoline by Israel was 57% and 80% less, respectively, compared to one year ago. The limited supply led to diesel and gasoline selling for 48% and 70% more on the black market compared to the regular market..... During the 'Hot Winter' incursion, 34 children lost a parent. Twenty-one homes were completely destroyed, leaving 147 people homeless. Eighty-eight homes were severely or partially damaged, affecting an additional 616 people."

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 26 September 2007

"[In mid September 2007] Residents of the Ein Beit Alma refugee camp began to pick up the pieces after an intense [3 day] Israeli military incursion last week left dozens homeless, and many very frightened, especially children. The fighting with Palestinian militants also caused damage to sewer systems, residents said. Israeli military said the purpose of the three-day operation was to "prevent the execution of terror attacks into the Israeli home front", and that information obtained from arrested alleged militants, 49 in all, had led them to an explosive belt which had been smuggled into Tel Aviv. "The effects of these military operations at such close quarters have an incalculable impact on the well-being of the young," said Christopher Gunness from UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees.

According to the residents in other homes ... a tactic, known as "through walls", was used. Soldiers go through neighbours' homes, destroying joint walls, to reach targets without being exposed in the narrow streets.... [a] building, four stories high, was totally demolished by Israeli

bulldozers, leaving dozens homeless. Personal belongings like furniture, video tapes and clothes stick out of the rubble. The soldiers, searching for and fighting militants, did not give the residents time to get their possessions out, residents said. Several people said the soldiers used three locals as human shields, a practice deemed illegal by Israel's High Court. The Israeli military said it was "not aware of any such incident". In other areas, people were cordoned off while soldiers used their homes as observation points, residents said. "

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 19 November 2006

"On 1 November, approximately 70 Israeli armoured vehicles entered Beit Hanoun in north eastern Gaza marking the start of an operation codenamed Autumn Clouds, the stated aim of which was to counter the firing of home-made rockets into southern Israel. Between the 1st and 8th November, the Israeli army killed 82 Palestinians and injured more than 260 in northern Gaza. At least 39 of these fatalities were civilians, including 18 children and ten women. During the operation, one Israeli soldier was killed in Beit Hanoun and one wounded. Israeli troops pulled back from the town on 7th November leaving a trail of devastation in their wake.

Description of damage	Number of houses visited	Number of families impacted	Estimated Cost of Reconstruction and Repair (US\$)
Total demolition	48	48	766,000
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The staggering decline of the economy and of the physical, humanitarian and social conditions in Gaza are, alas, not a recent phenomenon. The downturn started in 2000, when over a hundred thousand Palestinians lost their livelihoods because of the impossibility to work in Israel. It continued with major military operations in many of the cities of the Gaza Strip, the large-scale destruction of houses, agricultural land, and infrastructure. It worsened dramatically with the sanctions regime imposed upon the Palestinian Authority following the results of the Palestinian Legislative Council elections earlier this year, when both foreign economic aid and Palestinian public income were summarily withheld. And finally, it culminates today with the humanitarian disaster brought about by Israeli military assault on the town of Beit Hanoun, leaving 82 Palestinians dead, including 39 women and children, 260 wounded and more wanton destruction. I fully recognize the right and responsibility of Israel to protect its citizens, and its legitimate concern about the home-made rockets fired from Gaza, but for humanitarian agencies such as UNRWA it is becoming increasingly difficult to deal with the aftermath of such military operations without questioning their justification, their proportionality and their effects. The tragic events in Beit Hanoun have provided the clearest proof yet that the vicious circle of violence must be brought to an end....."

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 7 September 2006

"The current Israeli military operation in Gaza began after an Israeli soldier was captured by Palestinian militants on 25 June. Israeli incursions since then, which have taken place on three occasions, have displaced more than 2,000 Palestinians, according to the UN's agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA). "Shouka has been the location of repeated Israeli Defense Force

(IDF) incursions since June. Most of the people there have been evacuated on each of the three occasions that the IDF has gone in," said John Ging, UNRWA's Director of Operations in Gaza. "We have provided them with shelter in our schools in Rafah. We had more than 2,000 in and we have had to open the schools three times. They may stay for a week or so and then they go back," he said.

The Shouka residents, most of whom are Bedouins [nomadic Arab tribes people], are grateful to UNRWA - but they want to return home. "They provided us with covers, and put each family in a classroom. They promised us other assistance, but all we want now is to return to our homes. We cannot stay in this school forever," said Rashida, who added that she had left her eight goats and a camel behind. Shlomo Dror, Israeli spokesperson for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories, told IRIN, "We do not know that people have not been able to go back to their homes. We don't even know that people were forced to leave in the first place. We deny this information."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 July 2006

"... On the morning of 24 June, the IDF entered the Gaza Strip in a special operation and took two Palestinian prisoners, for the first time since the disengagement last year. Since 28 June and the beginning of the IDF operation in the Gaza Strip, the IDF fired on average between 200 – 250 artillery shells each day and the IAF conducted more than 220 air strikes including the bombing of the Gaza power plant on 28 June. The destruction of the plant's transformers left Gazans with electricity for an average of between six to eight hours per day. This also led to a water shortage across the Gaza Strip with Palestinians in urban areas receiving as little as two to three hours of water supply per day as the water distribution has not been synchronised with electrical supply. The IDF operation has caused 5,100 Palestinians to flee from their homes at different times and seek shelter in UNRWA schools. Thousands of other Palestinians are estimated to have been displaced and sought shelter elsewhere. The operation led to the destruction of 34 Palestinian structures and 3,666 dunums (367 hectares) of agricultural land."

B'Tselem, August 2008

"Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada, Israel has employed a policy of house demolition, uprooting of orchards, and destruction of farmland in the Gaza Strip. This policy has been used mostly in areas surrounding the settlements, on both sides of the bypass roads along which the settlers drive, and around army posts, mostly along the Egyptian border. This policy is part of Israel's defense strategy in the Gaza Strip.... As a safeguard against Palestinian attacks, Israel is creating "security strips" around places where Israeli civilians or armed forces are located.

The houses are usually demolished at night, without giving the residents any warning. In certain cases, where there were exchanges of gunfire between Palestinians and Israeli forces, some residents left their homes and moved to safer dwellings. However, in most instances, some members of the family remained in their house to protect their property. Dozens of testimonies given to B'Tselem indicate that these residents were given no warning and were forced to flee after hearing the noise of tanks and bulldozers at their door. Their personal possessions were buried under the ruins.

Israel calls this policy "clearing," a name that conceals the destructive and long-term consequences for the Palestinian residents in the Gaza Strip. Thousands of people have been made homeless and thousands have lost their sole source of income for many years to come. Israel caused this damage to people although it did not contend that they themselves were involved in attacks, or attempted attacks, against Israeli civilians or security forces.

The scope of house demolitions and destruction of farmland is especially extensive along the border between Rafah and Egypt. This strip of land, along which Israel has set up army posts, covers 16.5 square kilometers. Part of the strip lies at the edge of the extremely densely-populated Rafah refugee camp. Israel's policy of destruction in the camp has been systematic

and continuous since the beginning of the intifada. In implementing this policy, the IDF has conducted a number of special operations in which it destroyed large numbers of houses in a short period of time. "

al-Haq, December 2007

"Seeking to demonstrate the link between the policies initiated by the Israeli occupying authorities in 1967 and continuing in 2007, this study examines some of the defining attributes of Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territory through the lens of the Latroun villages. Drawing on field documentation and historical research conducted by Al-Haq, the study first intends to provide a comprehensive factual account of what has happened in 'Imwas, Yalo and Beit Nouba since June 1967.

The purpose of the legal analysis component of the study is to assess the legality, under international law, of the practices adopted by Israel in the Latroun villages, in particular property destruction and population transfer, and the subsequent appropriation of the land of those villages in order to pursue its own settlement construction and territorial annexation agendas.

Israel's premeditated design to destroy the three villages of Latroun was implemented during and following the Six-Day War. And so when the armed conflict broke out in June 1967, the Israeli army did not hesitate to seize the opportunity created by the war to cleanse the Latroun region of its Palestinian inhabitants, to eradicate their villages from the face of the earth and to assert Israeli control over the area."

United Nations Secretary General (UN SG), 15 September 1967

"58. In the Latrun area are located the border-line villages of Emwas, Yalu and Beit Nuba, together containing a population of some 4,000 according to Israel information, and 10,000 according to information from the refugees. In the same area are located the villages of Beit Likquia, Beit Sira and Beni Hareth, with an estimated total population of 3,300. The first three villages mentioned have been destroyed.

59. An Israel liaison officer stated that the destruction had taken place mostly during the fighting, that the Jordanian Army in the area had been assisted by one battalion of Egyptian commandos, that the area had been heavily shelled, that fighting had gone on all through the night and that tanks had gone through the villages because these are located on the way from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

60. The Israel Minister of Defence, in his meeting with the Special Representative, stated that he had ordered the destruction of these damaged villages for strategic and security reasons since they dominated an important strategic area.... the State of Israel had informed the representatives of these three villages that it would help their population "to develop other areas".

...

62. According to accounts from displaced persons, the Israel forces entered the three villages of Emwas, Yalu and Beit Nuba at 4.30 a.m. on 6 June and called the inhabitants to assemble, after which they were ordered under threat to leave in the direction of Ramallah. They were joined on the road by people from the "second line" villages of Beit Likquia, Beit Sira and Beni Hareth. After three days they were told that they could go back but they were allowed to reach the "second line" villages only. Those who wanted to go on to Emwas, Yalu and Beit Nuba were turned. They then returned to Ramallah and some of them went to the East Bank...."

Human Rights Watch (HRW), October 2004

"IDF's justifications for the destruction, including smugglers' tunnels and threats to its forces on the border, in serious doubt. The pattern of destruction, it concludes, is consistent with the goal of having a wide and empty border area to facilitate long-term control over the Gaza Strip. Such a goal would entail the wholesale destruction of neighborhoods, regardless of whether the homes in them pose a specific threat to the IDF, and would greatly exceed the IDF's security needs. Under the plan, the IDF will maintain its fortifications and patrols on the Rafah border indefinitely. The plan explicitly envisions the possibility of further demolitions to widen the buffer zone on the basis of vague "security considerations" that, as this report demonstrates, should not require a buffer zone of the kind that currently exists, let alone further mass demolitions.

The Israeli military argues that house demolitions in Rafah are necessary primarily for two reasons: to deal with smuggling tunnels from Egypt that run underneath the IDF-controlled border and to protect IDF forces on the border from attack. Rafah is the "gateway to terror," officials say – the entrance point for weapons used by Palestinian armed groups against the Israeli military and civilians. In the case of Rafah, it is difficult to reconcile the IDF's stated rationales with the widespread destruction that has taken place. On the contrary, the manner and pattern of destruction appears to be consistent with the plan to clear Palestinians from the border area, irrespective of specific threats.

The border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt is 12.5 kilometers long, of which four kilometers run alongside Rafah. The IDF refers to this border area as the "Philadelphi" corridor or zone, but it is better understood as two distinct areas: a shielded *patrol corridor* (between the border and IDF fortifications) and a *buffer zone* (the space between IDF fortifications and the houses of Rafah). Before the uprising, the IDF maintained a patrol corridor along the border some twenty to forty meters wide, separated from the camp in most places by a concrete wall, approximately three meters high, topped with barbed wire. In some areas, especially the densely populated Block O section of the camp, houses were situated within several meters of the patrol corridor.

While Israel's punitive and administrative house demolition policies have targeted individual homes, Israel has also in the past undertaken widespread destruction of neighborhoods, camps, and villages for putative security or military purposes. The apparent rationales for much of the destruction in Rafah since 2000 – namely, the need for "clear" borders and, to a lesser extent, to facilitate maneuverability of forces in densely populated areas – are not new. Such demolitions have also been linked to demographic changes.

Unlike in 1948, population displacement and property destruction after the 1967 war was concentrated mostly in border areas: along the boundary that had separated the West Bank from Israel (known as the Green Line) and near the external borders of the West Bank. The IDF razed the villages of Beit Nuba, 'Imwas, and Yalu, located near the strategic Latrun salient northwest of Jerusalem, in June 1967; later, a recreational area called "Canada Park" was built in their place. The same month, the IDF demolished the Green Line villages of Beit 'Awa and Beit Marsam near Hebron. From June 9-18, the IDF destroyed 850 of the 2,000 dwellings in the town of Qalqiliya, located near the Green Line; only the intervention of a group of Israeli intellectuals saved the rest. Equally important to Israel was the Jordan Valley, on the external border of the West Bank. While up to a quarter of the population of the West Bank left after the war, the Jordan Valley's population fell by eighty-eight percent, to 10,778. In subsequent years, the population grew to some twenty thousand. The bulk of those who fled across the river to Jordan were fifty thousand refugees living in three large camps in the valley – 'Ein al-Sultan, Nu'aymah, and 'Aqbat Jabir. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the IDF bulldozed the Jordan Valley communities of Jiftlik, Ajarish, and Nuseirat in late 1967. Israel's first settlements in the OPT were also in the Jordan Valley, underlining the importance given by Israel to control over the external borders of occupied territories.

The Gaza Strip has been the major site of mass demolitions for the stated purpose of enhancing the mobility of military vehicles in urban areas; such security considerations also dovetailed with demographic ones. General Ariel Sharon, head of the IDF Southern Command after the 1967 war, believed the Palestinian refugee "problem" could be solved by reducing or eliminating the refugee camps. In November 1969, the IDF described to UNRWA plans "to improve the water and electricity supply and to widen roads in refugee camps, noting that some houses would have to be removed." UNRWA demurred, citing the need for permission from the U.N. General Assembly. The IDF eventually went ahead without UNRWA's cooperation. In the summer of 1971, the IDF destroyed approximately two thousand houses in the refugee camps of the Gaza Strip, including Rafah. Bulldozers plowed through dense urban areas to create wide patrol roads to facilitate the general mobility of Israeli forces; they were not connected to combat activities. The demolitions displaced nearly sixteen thousand people, a quarter of them in Rafah. At least two thousand of the displaced were moved to al-Arish, in the Sinai peninsula (then also under Israeli control), and several hundred were sent to the West Bank. Israeli officials reportedly argued that demolitions would serve both developmental and demographic aims:

The Israelis say that their program of demolishing houses and putting in patrol roads and lighting will begin by restoring security to the camps' inhabitants. In the long run, they say, by reducing congestion and building new housing and other facilities, they will provide the beginnings of a decent life. Israeli officials are not yet prepared to discuss the long-range aspects. They say they are legally justified in moving refugees from Gaza into occupied Egyptian territory in the Sinai Peninsula. Some of those displaced in 1971 again lost their homes in May 2004.

During the current uprising, property destruction in the Gaza Strip for the security of the IDF and settlers has far surpassed punitive demolitions. Most people inside the Gaza Strip who have lost their homes were not alleged to have any connection with those who participated in armed attacks. Rather, the IDF has seized property, razed land, and destroyed homes in the context of creating "buffer zones" for military bases, Israeli settlements, and the roads that serve them."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 22 January 2008

"Communities in the 'buffer zone' at risk of displacement - Gaza Strip Communities living in the Israeli-imposed 'buffer zone' (no-go area) along the boundary with Israel in the occupied Gaza Strip are at risk of displacement. Hundreds of families have already been forcibly displaced as a result of home and property demolitions, incursions and fear of attacks, such as in al-Shoka, while those remaining live in fear. Men and boys often sleep in mosques and other buildings outside their homes for fear of detention and interrogation during night incursions by the IDF, leaving women and girls alone in the house.

This situation severely affects the right to family life and the well-being of children. There is no clear delimitation of the 'buffer zone'; this is left to the discretion of soldiers, but it varies between 150 and 1,000 meters. This situation also prevents farmers from accessing their land and has seriously aggravated the economic situation of these communities. The Israeli army imposed this 'buffer zone' through home and property demolitions, land leveling, and exposure to direct fire, all of which are factors contributing to the forcible displacement of Palestinian communities."

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 December 2007

"Since its unilateral disengagement in 2005, Israel has gradually established a buffer zone along the fence that surrounds Gaza, extending into the Strip's already cramped and overpopulated territory, with heavy consequences for the population. More and more agricultural land is being lost through the ill-defined extension of this buffer zone, and this is endangering anyone who gets too close. Indeed, Gazans are often killed, wounded or arrested when they approach the fence."

The Electronic Intifada, 30 June 2009

"For almost a decade, Israel has unilaterally imposed an off-limits area solely on the Palestinian side of the boundary between Israel and Gaza. This "buffer zone" has ranged from 50 meters wide to more than two kilometers in some northern areas. On 25 May [2009], Israeli authorities officially announced the current boundaries of the buffer zone to be 300 meters, within which anyone walking on the land would be subject to Israeli fire.

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See Also:

[Tensions across Palestinian territory as locals flee Israeli attacks, fire rockets – UN, United Nations News Service, 4 August 2006](#)

[The Humanitarian Monitor March 2008, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UN OCHA\), 18 April 2008](#)

[Israel hits Gaza as PM pledges rocket protection](#), **Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 17 February 2008

[WFP warns of deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza](#), **World Food Programme (WFP)**, 28 August 2006

[Schools shelter Palestinian families displaced by violence in Gaza](#), **United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 22 August 2006

[UN official paints grim picture of Palestinian situation; urges renewed international effort](#), **UN News Service**, 22 August 2006

[In the shadow of war: Wave of violence by security forces against Palestinians in the West Bank](#), **B'Tselem**, 21 August 2006

[Report on Israeli Occupation Forces \(IOF\) violations against Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip for the period from the Palestinian paramilitary operation on 25 June 2006 till 31 July 2006](#), **Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR)**, 7 August 2006

[UN Human Rights Council denounces recent Israeli military actions in northern Gaza](#), **United Nations News Service**, 15 November 2006

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Closures and Displacement

Closure Regime, Restrictions in Freedom of Movement & Israeli Infrastructure

- Closures is a policy of physical barriers in the form of checkpoints, and other road obstacles, and permit requirements, including the development of two tier road infrastructure is used to separate and control Palestinian movement in the OPT – the closure policy may refer to elaborate system restricting internal movement, as well as external movement between West Bank, Gaza, and Israel. The closure policy consists of elaborate restrictions including checkpoints, and various unmanned road obstacles, restrictive permit system and two tier road infrastructure and bypasses have fragmented the West Bank and until the Disengagement Plan of 2005, the Gaza Strip as well. This regime is allegedly intended to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinian militant attacks Yet its scope and severity restricts the access of Palestinians communities to health and education services, markets, employment opportunities and social and religious networks, and subjects them to humiliation and abuse and
- have been a contributing factor to displacement. The closure regime has also affected the provision of assistances to communities displaced, and as in the case of Gaza Strip to reconstruction efforts for tens of thousands of houses destroyed.
-
- For the West Bank, in 2007, there was monthly average of 552/561 such obstacles (including monthly average of 113 flying or random checkpoints), a rise from 518 in 2006, an increase of

49.2% since 2005. (OCHA, January 2008). In 2009, there were a total of 578 closure obstacles inside the West Bank territory (i.e. excluding Green Line crossings) (OCHA, November 2009). In 2010, there were an estimated average of 520 permanent checkpoints, road obstacles and other restrictions during 2010, plus an estimated monthly average of 420 mobile checkpoints. Settlements are at the centre of movement and access restrictions. Together with the settlements and other Israeli infrastructure, the West Bank is fragmented into a multitude of enclaves for Palestinians. Many of these enclaves are connected to adjacent towns only via checkpoints or tunnels built under settler roads. Israel has established roads primarily for settler use which connect the settlements with Israel, while Palestinian

- access to the majority of these roads is prevented or restricted by checkpoints, roadblocks, and restrictive permit system for vehicles wanting to travel on them.
-
- Israeli settlements, outposts, cultivated areas, military infrastructure, nature reserves and 'closed areas' west of the Barrier - have effectively placed 38.3% of the West Bank beyond the reach of Palestinians. Indirectly and directly these structures have caused internal displacement in various Palestinian enclaves and have had a negative impact on economic activity forcing internal displacement. In October 2009, the High Court of Justice announced its ruling on the first petition against the regime of separate roads in the West Bank based on national or ethnic origin. The Court ruled that the closure of the road to tens of thousands of Palestinian residents for the benefit of fewer than 200 residents of Israeli outposts was disproportionate. However restrictions in movements persist and continue to be developed, and in certain instances with the complicity of the international donor community (HRC, January 2011).
-
- In Gaza Strip, the closure policies in and around the Gaza Strip are far more hermetic than those in the much larger West Bank; they have also been more pervasive and overtly violent policies such as bombardment, and property destruction. (HRW October 2004) Controls on movement within the Gaza Strip were mostly for the security of the settlements and entailed IDF closing but a handful of main internal roads, leaving only one route between the northern and southern halves of the Gaza Strip with key checkpoints effectively cut the territory in two, severely restricting the movement of people and goods, as well as access to health care for Palestinians (HRW October 2004). With the Disengagement of 2005, internal closures were removed and gave way to the external closure of the Gaza Strip, which begun in the early 1990s but drastically tightened since 2000, and more so after the Disengagement of 2005 and particularly in 2007-2010. (See Freedom of Movement; Humanitarian Access)
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- Tightening control and displacement: Examples of village of Al Nu'uman and city of Nablus
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- Figures of displacement linked to the closures remain difficult to identify for lack of systematic study and for the fact that such restrictions have usually combined with, or preceded, other factors to cause displacement. The situation of the small village of Al-Nu'man, and of the city of Nablus typifies the extent to which closure regime amongst other factors contribute to forced displacement. Nablus plays a central role as a regional market, manufacturing hub and a provider of jobs and services in the West Bank. Effects of closure regime and Israeli settlements have had severe impact on Nablus.
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- Al-Nu'man is a small village consisting of one street and approximately 25 houses situated southeast of Jerusalem and northeast of Bethlehem. It typifies effects of closure regime, Israeli infrastructure, and settlement expansion in entailing internal displacement. Residents of al-Nu'man are prohibited from building under the pretext of a blanket ban on constructing new structures or adding to existing structures enforced since 1992, inhabitants have faced

steep fines and/or demolition of homes built in violation of blanket ban, obstruction of any incoming new residents to Al Nu'man. Should these policies be allowed to continue, the small village will become a ghost town (Al Haq, November 2006)

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 10 January 2011

"21. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has reported that Israeli authorities continue to implement measures to restrict Palestinian movement and access and, at the same time, to facilitate the movement of Israeli settlers.³⁵ These measures include, namely, the expansion of the alternative ("fabric of life") road network; checkpoints (including partial checkpoints); and the unstaffed obstacles, including roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers and trenches.³⁶ These measures exact a price from Palestinians. For example, the "fabric of life" roads, which often require the seizure of private Palestinian lands, reconnect a few of the Palestinian communities that were disconnected due to the restricted access of Palestinians to a main road or due to the obstruction of a road by the separation wall. They, however, continue to reinforce the exclusion of Palestinians from the primary road network and undermine the territorial contiguity between different areas.

22. Whether inadvertently or not, the role of the international donor community has led to a consolidation of Israeli control in the West Bank through the two-tiered system of roads. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has acknowledged that all its West Bank projects in Area C, including road construction, must be carried out through prior coordination with the Government of Israel.³⁸ In other words, USAID and American taxpayers are financing, and thereby further entrenching, the Israeli de facto annexation of the West Bank. In one specific example, USAID announced in June 2010 that United States taxpayers had paid for road construction in the West Bank, boasting that "after completion of a road project in the southern West Bank, trade between Dahriyeh and the neighboring city of Beer Sheva (approximately 100,000 residents total) increased dramatically". The West Bank area between Dahriyeh and Beer Sheva lies largely within Area C, thus aid funds designated for Palestinian residents is instead helping Israel finance the occupation. In another example in a nearby area, Nidal Hatim, a resident of Battir village near Bethlehem, described his inability to use Route 60, the main road from Bethlehem to his home village and the principal north-south traffic artery through the West Bank; "To go on the highway, we have to go through the checkpoint and turn around. I have a West Bank Palestinian ID, so I can't go through the checkpoint". Instead, he takes a side road that is currently being built by the Palestinian Authority with USAID support. The side road, still under construction, weaves around and under the four-lane Route 60, which is now used mostly by Israeli settlers. Upon completion, this "fabric of life" road is expected to be the sole access point connecting the villages in the western section of Bethlehem governorate with the urban area of Bethlehem.⁴² According to the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem, "the dual road system in the West Bank will in the long run cement Israeli control. The tunnel that connects with Battir can be controlled by one army jeep".⁴³ The Palestinian Authority grants approval for some of the roads. However, that does not change the legal consequence of an outside-Government funding infrastructure that consolidates the process of de facto annexation already under way in the occupied Palestinian territory. Such funding could arguably result in the outside Government supplying the funds being deemed complicit in the illegal occupation."

ACRI, December 2009

"In October 2009, more than three years after submission of the petition, the High Court of Justice announced its ruling on the first petition against the regime of separate roads in the West Bank based on national or ethnic origin. The petition was submitted by ACRI in the name of 22 Palestinian villages in the western Hebron Hills, after the area's main thoroughfare (connecting Beit Awa with Dura) was closed to Palestinian traffic and permitted only to Israelis. The Court ruled that the closure of the road to tens of thousands of Palestinian residents for the benefit of fewer than 200 residents of Israeli outposts was disproportionate. However, the Court did not

rule, as it should have, that the existence of separate roads for Israelis and Palestinians is itself illegitimate.

For the tens of thousands of Palestinians living in the area, the opening of this road – if it is opened - to free movement will represent a life-saving change:182 For the eight years in which they were prohibited from using the road, their lives were severely disrupted, their freedom of movement and dignity severely violated. The Court arrived at its decision through the test of proportionality only, and by using only this

test, the Court skirted all the other legal issues in the case, avoiding discussion and a legal decision on the larger principle of policies of segregation and discrimination in the West Bank. Avoidance of these issues is liable to give the impression that the Court implicitly accepts segregation and that it could uphold its use in another case, on another road...."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), July 2007

".... Israeli settlements, outposts, cultivated areas, military infrastructure, nature reserves and 'closed areas' west of the Barrier - have effectively placed 38.3% of the West Bank beyond the reach of Palestinians. As a result, the West Bank has been considerably narrowed for Palestinians, limiting their potential for growth and development.... This is true both vertically - east and west - and horizontally - see the narrowing in the Jerusalem area and the two large incursions of the Barrier in the northern West Bank. Moreover, in those areas remaining for Palestinians, a road system linking Israel with the settlements - and an accompanying system of closures - further fragments the West Bank and restricts Palestinian movement and activity. "

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 21 January 2008

"Checkpoints and roadblocks seriously obstruct the freedom of movement of Palestinians in the West Bank, with disastrous consequences for both personal life and the economy. There are 561 such obstacles to freedom of movement, comprising over 80 manned checkpoints and some 476 unmanned locked gates, earth mounds, concrete blocks and ditches. In addition, thousands of temporary checkpoints, known as flying checkpoints, are set up every year by Israeli army patrols on roads throughout the West Bank for limited periods, ranging from half an hour to several hours. In November 2007 there were 429 flying checkpoints.

Palestinians are subjected to numerous prohibitions on travel and to requirements for permits for travel within the West Bank and to East Jerusalem. Checkpoints ensure compliance with the permit regime. These restrictions violate article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which has been held to be binding on Israel in the OPT by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the construction of the wall.

Israel's argument that these restrictions are justified as security measures is difficult to accept. Many of the checkpoints and roadblocks are distant from the border of Israel, which is in any event protected by the wall. More likely explanations are to be found in the need to serve the convenience of settlers, to facilitate the travel of settlers through the West Bank and to impress upon the Palestinian people the power and presence of the occupier. According to a report in Yedioth Ahronoth, one quarter of all IDF soldiers who have served at roadblocks in the West Bank reported having witnessed or taken part in an act of abuse against a Palestinian civilian. Checkpoints serve to humiliate Palestinians and to create feelings of deep hostility towards Israel. In this respect they resemble the "pass laws" of apartheid South Africa, which required black South Africans to demonstrate permission to travel or reside anywhere in South Africa. These laws generated widespread humiliation and anger, and were the cause of regular protest action. Israel would do well to consider the South African experience. Restrictions on freedom of movement of the kind applied by Israel do more to create insecurity than to achieve security."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), July 2007

"Palestinian movement is inhibited by roads reserved primarily for Israeli use and the system of physical obstacles and permits that accompanies them. These roads have two major impacts. First, Palestinians are restricted from using roads between their key towns and communities. Second, the roads have become barriers for Palestinians wishing to cross them. One community has been separated from another by roads reserved for Israeli use. They have, therefore, further fragmented the West Bank, creating isolated Palestinian enclaves....Settlements depend on their connection to each other and to Israel; they cannot exist in isolation. A network of 1,661 kms of roads, on which Israeli vehicles must travel by IDF order, links settlements, military areas and other infrastructure in the West Bank with Israel. Via these roads Israelis move freely between the West Bank settlements and Israel. Palestinian access on to this network is restricted by a closure regime consisting of approximately 85 checkpoints, 460 roadblocks and a permit system for Palestinian vehicles....

The IDF states that the reason for the closure regime – which was mostly implemented in the course of the second Intifada – is to reduce attacks on Israelis by Palestinian militants by limiting their ability to move freely by vehicle. In practice, these measures have enforced the status of certain West Bank roads as almost exclusively for Israeli / settler use, thereby, creating a 'sterile' traffic flow for Israelis accessing settlements. The impact on Palestinian life has been profound. The key thoroughfares throughout the West Bank on which Palestinians have traditionally depended are closed or restricted, shutting routes traditionally used for trade, and normal movement to jobs, hospitals, schools, universities. The World Bank notes that "in economic terms, the restrictions arising from the closure have not only increased the transaction costs but have also led to a level of uncertainty and inefficiency which has made the conduct of business difficult and therefore has stymied the growth and investment which is necessary to fuel economic revival'....

.... In practice, Palestinians are compelled to use an alternative road network of secondary and more circuitous roads that run between the Israeli road network ... In effect a two-tier road system – Israeli and Palestinian – operates side-by-side. Limited Palestinian travel is still possible on the primary Israeli road system, but Palestinian drivers wanting to travel on these roads need permits. For those Palestinian drivers who succeed in obtaining permits, passage on the controlled road system is controlled by checkpoints. In addition to the 85 fixed and partially manned checkpoints, random – or flying checkpoints – are regularly set up by the IDF. In July 2007, approximately 100 – 120 flying checkpoints were observed each week.

The road system has fragmented the West Bank into a series of Palestinian enclaves. Each Palestinian enclave is geographically separated from the other by some form of Israeli infrastructure including settlements, outposts, military areas, nature reserves and the Barrier. However, the Israeli road network is the key delineator in marking the boundaries of the enclaves. The road network functions to provide corridors for travel from Israel, and between settlements in the West Bank, and barriers for Palestinian movement. In many places, the same checkpoints that regulate Palestinian traffic on the Israeli road network also check Palestinians moving between enclaves. A growing trend is to funnel Palestinian traffic under the Israeli road network via tunnels and underpasses. Palestinian vehicles, therefore, remain on their inferior secondary road network, but pass under roads primarily for Israeli use to Palestinian communities in nearby enclaves. In effect, Israelis and Palestinians use a parallel road system."

al-Haq, November 2006

"One of the most pervasive elements of Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territory, and the greatest single difficulty that al-Nu'man residents currently face, is the severe restrictions on movement imposed on Palestinians. Since the establishment of a checkpoint at the entrance of the village in May 2006, only al-Nu'man residents holding West Bank IDs have been permitted access to the village. Moreover, the residents face regular delays when passing through the checkpoint, which causes significant inconveniences to any travel..... There is also evidence of

Israeli Border Police refusing residents entry to the village on the basis that “there is no such thing as al-Nu’man,” as well as attempting to impose conditions that residents may only leave the village if they do not come back...

Non-residents of the village, including relatives of residents and service providers, are systematically prevented from entering. Even the villagers’ lawyer, Labib Habib, holder of an Israeli ID, is unable to enter the village.¹³ For villagers, the delays, intimidation, and humiliation involved in moving through the checkpoint complicate and discourage travel, especially after dark. Because of the small size of the village, which has no shops, school, mosque or health facilities, residents are particularly dependent on neighbouring villages for education, practice of religion, food and supplies, utility services, and healthcare. Moreover, many al-Nu’man residents have family in neighbouring villages. The restrictions on movement have grave implications for almost every aspect of the residents’ lives.... In addition to the severe restrictions on movement persistently imposed on al- Nu’man’s residents, they endure physical harassment and psychological humiliation at the checkpoint. Numerous villagers have testified that they have been ordered to remove their clothes under threat of being shot. Children have also been subjected to intimidating and degrading treatment.....

In addition to the pressures imposed on residents by restrictions on movement and harassment at the checkpoint, Israeli construction and land use plans in the area have a direct and grave effect on village life....The Israeli government considers the area of al-Nu’man village to be “white land.” Under this classification, building permits may not be issued, regardless of the status of the residents. However, the Jerusalem Municipality’s Master Plan 2000 shows a.... planned expansion of Har Homa settlement (“Har Homa D”) next to al-Nu’man village and indicates that it will consume 530 dunums of al-Nu’man land.¹⁷ It is expected to contain approximately 12,000 housing units. The site of the planned settlement has been confirmed by both the Israeli military, in discussions with al-Nu’man residents, and by Bimkom’s projection plans of the area.¹⁸ Meanwhile, residents of al-Nu’man are prohibited from building under the pretext of a blanket ban on constructing new structures or adding to existing structures. This has been enforced against the village since 1992. Those who have built houses have been unable to obtain licenses retroactively, and have faced steep fines and/or demolition of their houses. Furthermore, ... the conditions in al-Nu’man village have sharply deteriorated over the past three years and are now such that village residents face severe obstacles in continuing to live there. Although many residents are determined to remain on their lands against all odds, some are already beginning to leave.....The stunting of al-Nu’man’s natural growth, the gradual enforced departure of residents and the obstruction of any incoming residents can all be attributed to Israel’s systematic campaign to ultimately rid the area of its Palestinian inhabitants. Should these policies be allowed to continue, the small village will become a ghost town."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 22 January 2008

"Nablus city, the economic and service centre of the northern West Bank, has a population of more than 130,000 people and serves as a regional hub for an estimated 350,000 people in the governorate.¹⁰ Nablus is a market and manufacturing centre, a focus for services, an educational centre – home to the large An Najah University – and the location of important medical facilities. Nablus has 13 health centres and six hospitals including the major referral hospitals of Rafida and Al Watani. Access into and out of Nablus is, therefore, essential. Nablus is considered a centre of militant activity by the IDF and has been the focus of large scale military operations. The IDF conducts almost nightly search and arrest campaigns into Nablus and surrounding villages, in addition to its three refugee camps. Between June 2005 and April 2007, for example, the IDF conducted over 1,000 search and arrest campaigns in Nablus governorate – an average of more than 10 each week.¹¹ Nablus is encircled by 14 Israeli settlements and 26 outposts (see map opposite). The settlements are connected to each other by a series of roads used primarily by settlers that stretch around the city and across Nablus governorate. These roads are in turn linked to ten checkpoints, including seven encircling Nablus city. All Palestinians going in and out

of Nablus are required to cross these checkpoints. In April 2007, only 10% of Nablus buses (22 out of 220) and 7% of Nablus taxis (150 out of 2,250) had permits to access and use the checkpoints around Nablus city. Only 50 private Palestinian cars were permitted to use the checkpoints.¹² In addition, more than 70 obstacles installed by the IDF block the road junctions and physically prevent Palestinian traffic from reaching the roads used primarily by settlers. Palestinian vehicles also need a permit to travel on these roads. Palestinians caught without a permit can be fined or prosecuted. Under these conditions, it is impossible for the Nablus economy to function normally. Unemployment in Nablus governorate increased by 44.5 percent between 1999 and 2006 (18.2 to 26.3%).¹³ Many businesses, no longer accessible by customers and traders, have been forced to relocate to smaller towns and villages.¹⁴ These new centres, however, these new centres, however, cannot substitute for the large urban markets in terms of the volume of customers and levels of trade. There are also persistent difficulties for patients reaching hospitals and students reaching schools and universities."

Ma'an Development Centre, 21 February 2008

"While no definite numbers are available, anecdotal evidence suggests that these strains are taking their toll in the form of forced internal displacement out of Nablus city. Because jobs are no longer as available inside the town, workers are leaving to find jobs in other towns, particularly Ramallah, which was once a 40-minute drive south. Companies are either closing their doors or opening branches in Ramallah. These changes have been so dramatic as to reverse the Nablus governorate's standing as the main manufacturing center in the West Bank, with Ramallah governorate taking its place.Officials in both the Nablus municipality and the governorate express concern that their city is being emptied of people as a result of Israel's closure of the city and the resulting loss of markets, policies that are linked to Israel's settlement scheme for the Nablus area, the creation of infrastructure for the use of Jews and not Arabs, and Israel's collective punishment of Nablus residents.... UN OCHA's data on house demolitions is an important, albeit insufficient, indicator of forced displacement as a phenomenon. Over the past two years (since May 2005), OCHA has recorded the demolition of 15 structures in Nablus city and three of its refugee camps. Thirteen of these structures were residential and their demolition resulted in the displacement of 225 people (including 38 children). An informal survey carried out in the summer of 2007 by Save the Children UK found that Palestinians are moving away from their homes in response to home demolitions, settlement or infrastructure construction that blocks Palestinian building and movement, and direct evictions by Israeli forces, or to escape violence carried out by Israeli settlers. These triggers are almost prevalent in areas of Israeli settlement. The Nablus area was identified as one of three areas in the West Bank (alongside southern Hebron and the Jordan Valley) where internal displacement is underway. Many Nablus residents are moving further south, the study showed, to other urban areas."

See:

[Apartheid Roads, Promoting settlements, Punishing Civilians, Ma'an Development Center](#), December 2008

[West Bank Movement and Access Update](#), OCHA, November 2009

[The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, July 2007

[Increasing Need, Decreasing Access: Tightening Control On Economic Movement](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 22 January 2008

[Nablus From Economic Metropolis to Shrinking City](#), **Ma'an Development Centre**, 21 February 2008

[Palestinians Fear Two-Tier Road System](#), **NY Times**, 28 April 2008

[Movement restrictions limiting benefits of aid - World Bank](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 28 April 2008

[High Court closes off use of major highway to Palestinians](#), **Ha'aretz**, 20 March 2008

[Humanitarian Situation Update for the oPt](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 20 March 2008

[Court case reveals how settlers illegally grab West Bank lands](#), **Ha'aretz**, 19 March 2008

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Physical Security

Physical Security in OPT

- Physical Security in OPT
- In the OPT, the occupation has engendered directly and indirectly a very insecure environment affecting Palestinian civilian population both internally displaced, and none displaced alike. The OPT security environment is affected by ongoing Occupation, Israeli military operations in West Bank and specifically Gaza Strip, and settler violence, including harassment and intimidation by IDF, and settlers. This has also been aggravated by Palestinian factional violence. From September 2000 to December 2008, 5,439 Palestinians – including 577 in intra-Palestinian conflict – and 1,057 Israelis were killed, and over 40,000 injured (B'tselem, June 2008; UNOCHA, August 31 2007). In 2009 number of Palestinians killed was between 1,387 and 1,417, with 13 Israeli casualties in (UN HRC, 15 September 2009). In 2010, direct Israeli-Palestinian conflict related casualties led to over 1,500 Palestinian and 45 Israeli civilians injured, and 35 Palestinian and 4 Israeli civilians killed(OCHA, March 2011).
- Palestinians displaced or not face significant security concerns, yet for lack of adequate protection monitoring on the situation of IDPs information is not readily available though more emphasis has been placed on Palestinians at risk of displacement. It is assumed from anecdotal evidence that their security concerns are amplified due to their displacement.
- There are reports of intimidation and harassment, and in certain cases violence against Palestinian communities at risk of displacement by settlers and by Israeli authorities as per example in East Jerusalem, Namuan village or Old City of Hebron, Jordan Valley, and Southern Hebron Hills. In 2010, over 400 settler-related incidents led in over 300 cases to Palestinian casualties or damage to property (OCHA, March 2011).
- Palestinian communities also face protection risks in the context of house demolitions, land confiscation, and evictions. This is particularly the case when house demolitions are undertaken with limited forewarning, or/and result of military operations, or military or instances of Israeli police intimidation, harassment, arrest or use of force during process of evictions or house demolitions.
- Families evicted or whose homes have been demolished, face continued consequences including risks of prosecution and high fines for "illegal" building. In East Jerusalem, the violation of building regulations is classified as a criminal offence, meaning Palestinian owners can be prosecuted under Israeli criminal law. Families also have to pay fines and high costs incurred by Israeli authorities for demolishing their homes. In many instances, Palestinians destroy their own homes to avoid paying such costs.
- Israeli IDF Intimidation, Harassment & Military incursions
- Effects of intimidation and harassment affect host and displaced communities alike. There is no clear delineation. Intimidation and harassment, and risks to physical security is noted to take place such as in check points, process of house demolitions, or evictions, and process of arrests and during detention. (UN HRC, 21 January 2008; ICAHD, March 2007) Clearest testimony of risks to physical security has been during military incursions in which civilian and civilian private and public property are directly or indirectly affected by conflict between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces. Palestinians displaced or at risk of displacement in

areas in proximity to Israeli installations or security zones established by the IDF remain vulnerable to arrest, or physical harm. (ICRC, December 2007)

- Recently in December-January 2009, serious human rights and humanitarian law violations were committed by IDF during Operation Cast Lead against displaced and non-displaced Palestinians. Including indiscriminate targeting against civilian populated areas such as UNWRA emergency shelters housing displaced, incidents of white flag killings, use of human shields and white phosphorous attacks in densely civilian populated areas.(HRW, June and August 2009; UN HRC September 2009; UN OCHA, 30 November 2009)
- Violations of humanitarian law were also committed by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups that launched rockets from densely populated areas unlawfully putting Palestinian civilians at risk of counter strikes, and targeting indiscriminately civilian areas in Israel (HRW, August 2009). Landmines and unexploded munitions in civilian areas posed a threat to the population of Gaza. Sporadic air strikes by the Israeli military and rocket attacks by Hamas were reported in November 2009.
- Settler Violence & Lack of Law Enforcement
- Harassment and attack by settlers has grown more prevalent after the second intifada. The IDF and the police have shown to be more often than not, absent, helpless or apathetic though IDF, Civil Administration and the police are bound by Israeli Court rulings in 2006 to protect Palestinians property rights. (Ha'aretz, October 2006; B'Tselem, 2007) Number of assault on Palestinian civilians in the West Bank has grown steadily while investigations are rare and ineffective (ICRC, December 2007; OCHA March 2011) In 2009 OCHA identified 22 communities with a combined population of nearly 76,000 people as being highly vulnerable to settler violence and a further 173,000 people moderately vulnerable (OCHA, November 2009).
- Settler violence dramatically increased since 2008. A high proportion of attacks are undertaken by groups of Israeli settlers, with Israeli minors often implicated in order to limit criminal culpability. (HPG, July 2009; ACRI, December 2009) Settler violence and harassment has been marked in number of localities particularly in Area C under Israeli Civil Administration have in number of instances colluded with policies of the IDF and Civil Administration and have caused directly or indirectly displacement.
- Since 2008 in light of discussions on halting on growth of settlements, some of the most extreme settlers have instituted a "price tag" policy: Whenever an illegal outpost is evacuated or the government initiates legal proceedings against settlements, they exact a price by attacking Palestinian residents or property. (ACRI, December 2009; The price of law enforcement failure UN OCHA, November 2009)
- IDF soldiers have the enforcement powers like those given to a police officer, by virtue of the procedure for enforcing the law in the territories, which is included in the IDF Commands. In practice, however, IDF soldiers do not enforce the law, are not aware of the law enforcement procedure, and are not at all interested in functioning like police officers. (Sasson, May 2005) UN has reported that Hebron and Nablus governorates were most affected by settler violence, accounting for 42% and 21% of the total level of violence. In some areas (H2 area of Hebron and hamlets in Msaffir Yatta), the severe and systematic nature of the violence has directly contributed to the displacement of Palestinian residents.
- Intra-Palestinian clashes in West Bank and Gaza
- 2007 saw an increase in human rights violations committed by Palestinians against Palestinians, both in number and severity, as a result of the violent struggle waging between Fatah and Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The violence peaked in June 2007, when Hamas seized control of the security apparatus in the Gaza Strip. (B'Tselem, January 2008) The casualties occurred during violent clashes between members of the Palestinian Authority's security apparatus, most of whom belong to Fatah and are loyal to Palestinian Authority president Mahmud Abbas, and Hamas militias, headed by the Hamas Executive Force and the 'Iz a-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Violations included restrictions in freedom of association, arbitrary detention, extralegal executions. (B'Tselem, January 2008)

- There are reports of Palestinians displaced as a result of intra-Palestinian violence in mid 2007 when Hamas took control over Gaza Strip, and following violence in August 2008. Though there are no clear figures on Palestinians displaced, observers have commented that numbers of civilians displaced has been quite negligible. (IDMC, March 2008; Ha'aertz, 3 August 2008) In 2009-2010, members of the PNA in the West Bank, as well as officials of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, pursued a systematic policy of arbitrary arrest of members of the opposite political faction, typically subjecting detainees to torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Other violations based on political affiliation included harassment and home raids. In May 2011, the formation of government unity between Fateh and Hamas singled a new departure
- There have been few instances of displacement. (1) Intra-Palestinian violence has however not been a significant cause of displacement only leading to negligible number of displaced. (2) Another source of displacement is Palestinian militants launching rockets in Gaza Strip from densely populated areas unlawfully targeting Israeli civilian areas and putting Palestinian civilians at risk of counter strikes which may entail displacement ; (3) policies enacted by Palestinian authority adopted in mid 2010 to regularise housing in Gaza Strip and possibly West Bank though the rates of displacement are moderate and information remains limited.

UN HRC, 15 September 2009:

2. Overview of Israel's military operations in the Gaza Strip and casualties


[...]

"30. Statistics about Palestinians who lost their life during the military operations vary. Based on extensive field research, non-governmental organizations place the overall number of persons killed between 1,387 and 1,417. The Gaza authorities report 1,444 fatal casualties. The Government of Israel provides a figure of 1,166. The data provided by non-governmental sources with regard to the percentage of civilians among those killed are generally consistent and raise very serious concerns with regard to the way Israel conducted the military operations in Gaza.

31. According to the Government of Israel, during the military operations there were 4 Israeli fatal casualties in southern Israel, of whom 3 were civilians and one soldier, killed by rockets and mortars attacks by Palestinian armed groups. In addition, 9 Israeli soldiers were killed during the fighting inside the Gaza strip, 4 of whom as a result of friendly fire."

OCHA, November 2009

"From July through October, there had been a fourmonth upward trend in the number of Palestinians injured in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, by Israeli military and police forces..."



UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 22 January 2008:


"In 2007, direct conflict deaths were largely accounted for by targeted killings (32%), military operations (28%), border incidents (15%), and undercover operations (8%). By contrast, one-fourth (1/4) of Palestinians injured in direct conflict (456) were injured in demonstrations in the


West Bank, 14% in targeted killing operations by the IDF in the Gaza Strip, 12% in IDF operations in the Gaza Strip, and 10% in IDF operations in the West Bank.

The majority (85%) of Palestinians killed this year were in the Gaza Strip, due to both direct conflict and internal violence. Factional violence accounted for 78% of internal conflict deaths, 80% of internal injuries in the Gaza Strip, and 53% of internal conflict injuries in the West Bank. On the other hand, factional violence and family feuds constituted 8% and 47%, respectively, of internal violence deaths in the West Bank.

Out of the total number of Palestinians injured this year, 38% were injured in internal conflict in the Gaza Strip and 25% were injured in the conflict with Israel in the West Bank. A total of 13 Israelis were killed this year, including four IDF soldiers during military operations in the oPt and four Israeli settlers in the West Bank. In Israel, three Israelis were killed in suicide bombings and two by Qassam rockets.


Sixty-nine percent (or 175) of Israelis injured by Palestinians in direct conflict-related incidents this year were IDF soldiers. Of those injured, 47% were in the West Bank, 42% in Israel, and 11% in the Gaza Strip. A total of 78 Israelis were injured who were not IDF soldiers, 58% of whom were in the West Bank and 41% in Israel. Of the 103 Israelis injured by Qassam rockets and mortars in Israel, 71% were IDF soldiers. A total of 25 foreign citizens were injured in 2007, all in the West Bank and the majority (60%) during demonstrations against the Barrier in the Ramallah and Bethlehem governorates. Twenty-four percent were injured by Israeli settlers in the Hebron governorate; the rest, 76%, were injured by the IDF."





OCHA, November 2009:

"From July through October, there had been a fourmonth upward trend in the number of Palestinians injured in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, by Israeli military and police forces..."



HPG, July 2009:

"Incursions into residential areas by the IDF are a daily, or more often nightly, occurrence (B'Tselem, 2007: 61). Search and patrol operations are often associated with deaths or injuries to

Palestinians, the damage, loss or theft of property and harassment and disruption. Operations are particularly frequent in refugee camps. In the first quarter of 2009 alone, UNRWA recorded 118 search operations in West Bank camps. Operations are frequently accompanied by night time curfews (there were 3,855 curfew hours in the West Bank between 2005 and 2008 (OCHA, 2008)) and the use of stun grenades and tear gas. Civilian residences may be occupied by the IDF in order to serve as look-out points."

AFP, 21 November 2009:

"A Palestinian rocket was fired Saturday from the [Gaza Strip](#) into [Israel](#) without causing casualties or damage, the Israeli military said. The rocket exploded near the Israeli town of [Sderot](#), according to an army spokesman. Israel's military says more than 270 rockets and mortar shells have been fired into the Jewish state since the end in January its war on militants in the Palestinian territory controlled by the Islamist movement Hamas."

IRIN, 26 January 2009:

"On 20 January two Palestinian children were killed by unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the Shaaf area, near Jabalia, east of Gaza city, highlighting a new threat to people's lives in Gaza. "It is becoming clear that unexploded munitions in civilian areas represent another major new danger," said an ICRC assessment published on 21 January. "Most children stayed at home during the past three weeks because there was no let-up in hostilities. Now that the fighting is over they are venturing out onto the streets again, but they run the risk of being killed or maimed by these remnants of war," said ICRC staff member Imad Abou Hasirah. ... "The fact that Gaza is one of the most densely populated areas in the world makes the problem of unexploded munitions even more acute," said Antoine Grand, head of the ICRC office in Gaza. "The contamination represents a major threat for the population and for rescue teams now working in the field. It could hold back the pace of humanitarian work."

UN HRC, 11 February 2009

"(e) On the above basis, the contention that the use of force by Israel was "disproportionate" should not divert our attention from the prior question of the unlawfulness of recourse to force. If for the sake of argument, however, the claim of self-defence and defensive force is accepted, it would appear that the air, ground and sea attacks by Israel were grossly and intentionally disproportionate when measured against either the threat posed or harm done, as well as with respect to the disconnect between the high level of violence relied upon and the specific security goals being pursued. Israel did little to disguise its policy of disproportionate use of force, thereby acknowledging a refusal to comply with this fundamental requirement of international customary law. The Prime Minister of Israel was quoted by the press agency Reuters after the ceasefire as saying: "The Government's position was from the outset that if there is shooting at the residents of the south, there will be a harsh Israeli response that will be disproportionate." To the extent that the Prime Minister's comment reflects Israeli policy, it was a novel and blatant repudiation of one of the most fundamental aspects of international law governing the use of force."

ACRI, December 2009:

"When it comes to protecting the security of Palestinians from the attacks of Israelis, on the other hand, the system has consistently refrained from using many of the security measures and tools at its disposal. Moreover in many cases the only "response" to the threats posed by Israelis to Palestinian security and property, has been to limit and violate the freedom of the Palestinians - victim of the attacks – rather than bringing to justice those responsible for the violence. For years, security forces have preferred to take the easy route of imposing restrictions on Palestinian residents rather than taking the more appropriate (and far more difficult) action of enforcing the law against Israelis involved in breaking the law and attacking Palestinians. Incidents of violence perpetrated by Israeli civilians have severely affected the personal security of many Palestinian residents of the West Bank, threatening their basic right to life, personal security, livelihood, and

property. These incidents include violent assault, harassment, trespassing, taking over Palestinian-owned land, and destroying property. During this past year [2009], some of the most extreme settlers have instituted a "price tag" policy: Whenever an illegal outpost is evacuated or the government initiates legal proceedings against settlements, they exact a price by attacking Palestinian residents or property. This turns the Palestinians into double victims, first when the outposts are established and then when they are dismantled."

HPG, July 2009:

Settler violence: a direct assault on the lives and livelihoods of Palestinians

"Research on settler violence suggests a dramatic increase in 2008. A high proportion of attacks are undertaken by groups of Israeli settlers, with Israeli minors often implicated in order to limit criminal culpability. Incidents were recorded throughout the West Bank, but the Hebron and Nablus governorates were most affected, accounting for 42% and 21% of the total level of violence. In some areas (such as the H2 area of Hebron and hamlets in Msaffir Yatta), the severe and systematic nature of the violence has directly contributed to the displacement of Palestinian residents (OCHA, 2008). Many consider that settler violence has the twin aims of limiting the Palestinian presence in settled areas through displacement and furthering settlement by ensuring that the cost of evacuating even the smallest outpost is high in terms of violence against Palestinians and their property, as well attacks against and abuse of Israeli soldiers (Peace Now, 2009)."

UN HRC, 21 January 2008:

"13. IDF military incursions into Gaza have continued regularly over the past year; 290 Palestinians were killed in Gaza in 2007. Of this number at least a third were civilians. On 26 September, the day the Special Rapporteur visited Gaza, 12 Palestinian militants were killed by IDF missiles. Since the Annapolis meeting on 27 November 2007, over 70 Palestinians have been killed of whom 8 were killed in a major military operation in southern Gaza on the day before the first round of talks between Israelis and Palestinians following the Annapolis meeting. A further 13 Palestinians were killed in three separate airstrikes on 18 December. The frequency of targeted killings raises a question as to whether the IDF acts within the permissible parameters for such action laid down by the Israeli Supreme Court in its 2006 judgement on targeted killings. Or does the IDF act without regard to its own law as well as international law in carrying out targeted killings?"

14. In the past two years 668 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli security forces in Gaza. Over half - 359 people - were not involved in hostilities at the time they were killed. Of those killed 126 were minors; 361 were killed by missiles fired from helicopters; and 29 of those killed were targeted for assassination. During the same period, Palestinians fired some 2,800 Qassam rockets and mortar shells into Israel from the Gaza Strip. Four Israeli civilians were killed by Qassam rockets and hundreds were injured. Four members of the Israeli security forces were killed in attacks originating from Gaza....

29. Military incursions in the West Bank have intensified since June 2007. For instance, in November the IDF carried out 786 raids in the West Bank in the course of which one person was killed, 67 injured and 398 arrested; 12 public and private properties were damaged; curfews were imposed; and countless innocent civilians were terrorized by armed soldiers and dogs. Nablus has been particularly affected: on 17 October, the Israeli army raided the city of Nablus and fired tank shells, killing an elderly civilian and one armed individual, and injuring 14 civilians, including 2 children and a journalist. The IDF has frequently failed to distinguish clearly between military targets and civilians. As in the case of Gaza (see paragraph 25) these actions appear to violate rules of international humanitarian law (articles 48, 51 (4) and 52 (1) of Additional Protocol I).

35. According to a report in Yedioth Ahronoth, one quarter of all IDF soldiers who have served at roadblocks in the West Bank reported having witnessed or taken part in an act of abuse against

a Palestinian civilian. Checkpoints serve to humiliate Palestinians and to create feelings of deep hostility towards Israel. In this respect they resemble the "pass laws" of apartheid South Africa, which required black South Africans to demonstrate permission to travel or reside anywhere in South Africa. These laws generated widespread humiliation and anger, and were the cause of regular protest action. Israel would do well to consider the South African experience. Restrictions on freedom of movement of the kind applied by Israel do more to create insecurity than to achieve security."

Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, March 2007:

"When the dreaded day arrives, it does so without warning. Demolitions take place in some *ad hoc* manner, with no discernible pattern, and can happen anywhere and at any time. This, too, is part of the fear theme underlying the "deterrence" policy. The demolition crews, accompanied by hundreds of soldiers, police officers and officials, generally appear early in the morning, usually after the men have left for work. The family is sometimes given a mere few minutes in which to take out its belongings before the bulldozers get to work, and when family and neighbours evidence resistance – or at least a protest – they are generally removed by force from the home. The work crews then throw the furniture out of the house. In addition to the destruction of the house, the ruin of private property deals the family a severe economic blow – not to mention the emotional suffering undergone by people looking on as their most personal possessions are slung out into the rain, sun and dirt. The bulldozer then proceeds with its methodical work of demolition. Sometimes, resistance to demolition elicits a great deal of violence: people are beaten, arrested, killed – as happened in the case of Zaki Nur-A-Din Obeid when he attempted to prevent the destruction of a home in Issawiya on 18 January 2001. And always, people are humiliated. Family and neighbours look on with restrained fury, as the home becomes a pile of rubble. Needless to say, families whose homes have been destroyed are abandoned to their fate. No use looking for social workers coming to the aid of families in distress, as one finds in West Jerusalem for people in far less dire straits. The families must move in with relatives or put up tents (one family in Jabel Mukaber is living in a bus) or pay out more money to rent an apartment."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 22 January 2008:

"Violations were perpetrated during the arrest and interrogation period, during military court proceedings as well as during incarceration, and included: arbitrary detention, exposure to physical abuse and humiliating treatment during arrest and exposure to physical and psychological abuse during interrogation."

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 December 2007:

"Since its unilateral disengagement in 2005, Israel has gradually established a buffer zone along the fence that surrounds Gaza, extending into the Strip's already cramped and overpopulated territory, with heavy consequences for the population. More and more agricultural land is being lost through the ill-defined extension of this buffer zone, and this is endangering anyone who gets too close. Indeed, Gazans are often killed, wounded or arrested when they approach the fence."

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 December 2007

"Palestinians living close to Israeli settlements are not only dispossessed of their land, but are often harassed by settlers. The number of assaults on civilians in the West Bank has grown steadily. ICRC data collected in the field indicates that the number of offences more than tripled in the last five years, while complete police investigations are rare and most of the time reach the conclusion that "the culprits could not be identified."

Talia Sasson, Government of Israel, May 2005

"IDF soldiers have the enforcement powers like those given to a police officer, by virtue of the procedure for enforcing the law in the territories, which is included in the IDF Commands. In practice, however, IDF soldiers do not enforce the law, are not aware of the law enforcement


procedure, and are not at all interested in functioning like police officers. "The spirit conveyed by the commander," as described to me, is that IDF soldiers are not to examine in a legal framework the acts of the settlers, who are doing a Zionist act in building the outposts, even though it is illegal. Protecting the settlers is one of the army's principal missions. It carries out the mission in close cooperation with the settlers themselves. Settlers take an active part in guarding the settlements, and some of them serve as security coordinators, and are given powers and firearms by the IDF. Settlers have abused these powers and have misused the weapons given them to carry out attacks against Palestinians. A senior army official told *Ha'aretz* that, "in extremist settlements, security heads, their deputies and assistance, act outside the community's borders."

B'Tselem, July 2005

"[S]ettler violence against Palestinians is common all over the West Bank. However, throughout the history of the occupation, efforts to enforce the law against settlers have been limited and ineffective. In 1981, a committee headed by Deputy Attorney General Yehudit Karp was appointed to examine the police's handling of offenses by settlers. The committee was sharply critical of the efforts of the law enforcement authorities and stated that the police must find an urgent solution to the problem. In 1994, following the massacre committed by Baruch Goldstein in the Tomb of the Patriarchs, a state commission of inquiry, headed by former Supreme Court president Meir Shamgar, was appointed to investigate the massacre. The commission held that enforcement of the law against settlers had failed, and that for years no effort had been made to improve the situation. Following the commission's recommendations, the police created the SHAI [Samaria and Judea] District, which was given responsibility for enforcing the law on settlers in the West Bank..... Recently, the media reported that Attorney General Menachem Mazuz, and Police Inspector-General Moshe Karadi agreed among themselves that, "from now on, enforcement would be more efficient and swift, and that the arrest and rapid release of rioters would not suffice. It was also decided that there would be careful documentation of events, and if there is sufficient evidence, shortly after the events occur, the state would not hesitate to file indictments against the rioters." These comments strengthen the contention that enforcement of the law against settlers is limited and ineffective, and that the top law enforcement officials are well aware of the fact. The number of military troops in the West Bank is far greater than the number of police officers, and generally they are the first to reach the scene of an attack. This is especially true in the closed area, as the closest police station is in Qiryat Arba, and the terrain does not generally enable ready access to the police. Yet, in most cases, not only do soldiers turn a blind eye to settler attacks on Palestinians, they aid the attackers.....

B'Tselem asked the police how many complaints residents of the closed area [South Hebron Hills] had filed against settlers for violence in recent years, and how the police handled the complaints. The police supplied figures on all complaints of Palestinians in the entire Hebron District for the years 1999-2004 (until October)....The number of Palestinian complaints to the police does not reflect the magnitude of settler violence. Many Palestinians do not have confidence in the Israeli authorities, and the police in particular, and do not think that the police will properly handle their complaints and prosecute the settlers to the full extent of the law. In many cases, therefore, they do not file complaints. Testimonies given to B'Tselem indicate that few Palestinians filed complaints, and of those who did, some said that they did not believe it would help..... Most of the complaints filed in the past five years whose handling has been completed were closed. Some were closed in the preliminary investigation stage and were not transferred to the Police Prosecutor's Office or to the State Attorney's Office, and the others were closed after the Police Prosecutor's Office and the State Attorney's Office reviewed the file. Files are closed for four reasons: lack of evidence, lack of public interest, lack of wrongdoing, and offender unknown. According to police figures, the absolute majority of files were closed for lack of evidence. A substantial percentage of the cases referred to the State Attorney's Office or the Police Prosecutor's Office over the past five years (in particular the years 2003 and 2004) remain open. Based on past experience, most of them will ultimately be closed."

Graph No. 4: Number of Palestinian complaints compared with the number of Palestinian complaints that led to the conviction of an Israeli citizen, by year



Al-Haq, June 2009

"Members of the PNA in the West Bank, as well as officials of the Hamas de facto authority in the Gaza Strip, have pursued a systematic policy of arbitrary arrest of members of the opposite political faction, typically subjecting detainees to torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Other violations based on political affiliation, included **harassment** by the authorities of members of the opposition. In a typical example on 19 April, in the Nablus area, Hamed Khdeir, a member of Hamas' Change and Reform Bloc in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), was assaulted by a member of the PNA's Preventative Security. The perpetrator shot at Hamed but narrowly missed. As a result of the incident, Hamad's leg was injured. Prior to the incident, Preventative Security officers had been observing Hamed's office, and were examining the ID cards of all of his visitors (see Al-Haq Affidavit No. 4847/2009). Al-Haq fieldworkers documented new cases of **home raids**, most of which appeared to be purely gratuitous. On 5 May, for example, members of the PNA's Intelligence Agency raided the home of farmer Ibrahim Sa'abna, in Fahma, southwest of Jenin, confiscating a computer, a mobile telephone and various files, without revealing the purpose of the raid or the intended goal of the search (see Al-Haq Affidavit No. 4929/2009)"

Ha'aretz, 3 August 2008

"Over 150 members of the Fatah-linked Hilles clan fled the Gaza Strip on Saturday and entered Israel, after a day of clashes with the ruling Hamas faction had left at least nine people dead and more than 80 wounded. Hamas security forces and members of the Hilles clan exchanged mortar shell and machine gun fire all day Saturday in the most violent round yet of Hamas' weeklong crackdown on political rival Fatah."

B'Tselem, 2 January 2008

"2007 saw an increase in human rights violations committed by Palestinians against Palestinians, both in number and severity, as a result of the violent struggle waging between Fatah and Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The violence peaked in June, when Hamas seized control of the security apparatus in the Gaza Strip. From the beginning of the year to mid-November, at least 344 Palestinians were killed and thousands injured in the fighting between the factions. B'Tselem's figures indicate that at least 73 of the dead, 22 of them children, were not taking part in the hostilities and were killed during street fighting or from gunfire during demonstrations. Some three hundred of the dead were killed in the first six months of the year, the vast majority of them in the Gaza Strip. 160 persons were killed in June alone. The casualties occurred during violent clashes between members of the Palestinian Authority's security apparatus, most of whom

belong to Fatah and are loyal to Palestinian Authority president Mahmud Abbas, and Hamas militias, headed by the Hamas Executive Force and the 'Iz a-Din al-Qassam Brigades."

The Guardian, 18 June 2007

"Hundreds of Palestinians are trapped at Erez, one of the main crossing points out of the Gaza Strip, hoping to escape through Israel to the West Bank. Israel's justice minister said the crowd should be allowed out, but so far the Erez crossing has remained closed, except to around 100 senior Fatah officials, who have been allowed out since Hamas seized control of Gaza last Thursday. Others have fled to Egypt. The crowd of up to 300 people was made up mostly of young men, members of the Fatah-led security services who have been locked in fighting with Hamas gunmen for months. With them were dozens of women and children, some sleeping on the ground."

See Also:

[Nine killed, 95 hurt in Hamas-Fatah violence in Gaza](#), **Reuters**, 2 August 2008

[Palestinian hostilities flare in Gaza](#), **Christian Science Monitor (CSM)**, 28 July 2008

[Hundreds flee Gaza as Hamas tightens grip](#), **The Guardian**, 17 June 2007

[Two Fatah men killed in Gaza; Hamas threatens W. Bank battles](#), **Ha'aretz**, 16 June 2007

[Victims of insecurity increase in oPt](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 11 October 2006

[Palestinian PM vows to avoid civil war, urges calm](#), **Reuters**, 23 May 2006

[In the shadow of war: Wave of violence by security forces against Palestinians in the West Bank](#), **B'Tselem**, 21 August 2006

[Palestinian factions close national talks ahead of deadline](#), **Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 3 June 2006

[National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners](#), **Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli jails (representing FATEH, HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, and DFLP)**, 26 May 2006

[Abbas calls controversial referendum as Hamas breaks truce](#), **Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 10 June 2006

[Forbidden to settlers, not the state](#), **Ha'aretz**, 11 October 2006

[Honey makes Hebron life a bit sweeter](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 10 August 2008

[Israeli-Palestinian Fatalities Since 2000 - Key Trends](#), **UN OCHA**, 31 August 2007

[Statistics: Fatalities](#), **B'Tselem**, December 2008

[B'Tselem marks twentieth anniversary with a heavy heart: almost 8900 Israelis and Palestinians killed in the conflict](#), **B'Tselem**, 22 November 2009

[Press statement by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967](#), **UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967**, 18 January 2008

[Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories: Civilians on both sides pay price of escalation](#), **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**, 18 January 2008

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[Protection of civilians weekly report 02 – 08 January 2008](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 19 January 2008

[OCHA Humanitarian Update: Access and Protection](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, August 2006

[Palestinian Public Perceptions Report IX: Mobility and Security](#), **Graduate Institute of Development Studies - Palestine Research Unit (IUED-PRU)**, November 2005

[Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem](#), **United Nations General Assembly (UN GA)**, 18 August 2005

[Inside Story - Collateral damage?](#), **AlJazeera**, 30 June 2009,

[White Flag Deaths](#), **HRW**, 13 August 2009,

[Precisely Wrong](#), **HRW**, 30 June 2009,

[Rockets from Gaza](#), **HRW**, 6 August 2009,

[Rights group: Shin Bet denies vital treatment to Palestinians](#), **Ha'aretz**, 12 October 2006

[Italian probe: Israel used new weapon prototype in Gaza Strip](#), **Ha'aretz**, 11 October 2006

[Act of Vengeance: Israel's Bombing of the Gaza Power Plant and its Effects](#), **B'Tselem**, 30 September 2006

[Schools shelter Palestinian families displaced by violence in Gaza](#), **United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 22 August 2006

[Israeli army raids West Bank refugee camp](#), **Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 15 August 2006

[Report on Israeli Occupation Forces \(IOF\) violations against Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip for the period from the Palestinian paramilitary operation on 25 June 2006 till 31 July 2006](#), **Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR)**, 7 August 2006

[Almost half the fatalities in the Gaza Strip in July were civilians not taking part in the hostilities](#), **B'Tselem**, 3 August 2006

[Israeli army in for the long haul in Gaza Strip](#), **The Guardian**, 7 July 2006

[Israeli Human Rights Organizations: End Killing of Civilians](#), **B'Tselem**, 15 June 2006

[Israel: More Evidence on Beach Killings Implicates IDF](#), **Human Rights Watch (HRW)**, 15 June 2006

[Beit Hanoun Flash Appeal](#), **United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)**, 19 November 2006

[Gaza death toll from Israel blitz tops 50](#), **Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 7 November 2006

[Gaza: UN agency reports significant damage in Beit Hanoun after Israeli withdrawal](#), **UN News Service**, 7 November 2006

[Beit Hanoun under siege: Palestine refugees severely affected](#), **United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)**, 4 November 2006

[Israel bombards Gaza with deadly air strikes](#), **Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 3 November 2006

[U.N. AGENCIES WARN VIOLENCE IS PUSHING PALESTINIANS INTO DEEP CRISIS](#), **United Nations (UN)**, 6 October 2004

Freedom of Movement

Freedom of Movement in the OPT

- General Freedom of Movement
- Throughout the occupied Palestinian territory, in the Gaza Strip as well as in the West Bank, Palestinians continuously face hardship. Israeli policy of closures and the severe restrictions, including curfews and the permit regime, continue to be imposed on the movement of Palestinians. The primary Israeli method for dealing with the Palestinian uprising, intifada, has been the tightening of "closure" policies that date back to the early 1990s (HRW, October 2004). According to Israel, closure and movement restrictions for goods and people in the West Bank are necessary measures to protect Israeli citizens in Israel and in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. (OCHA, January 2008)
- These measures and movement restrictions through checkpoints and other physical impediments, have limited Palestinian freedom of movement and residency throughout the OPT. Israel administers permit regime which defines movements in the OPT according to

Palestinians status and residency, and also controls the Palestinian population registry thereby also defining Palestinian residency whether in Gaza, and West Bank. Extensive permit regime defines access and freedom of movement within the OPT through mosaic of A, B and C areas, and in between Gaza and West Bank separated by checkpoints, road obstacles and other restrictions and governed by the Israeli Civil Administration of the Israeli military governing the OPT.

- The severity of these closures, discriminating against Palestinians collectively and has often amounted to collective punishment. (AI, September 2003) The denial of passage or delays at checkpoints, including curfews, has significantly affected the access of civilians, particularly children, to medical care and services, causing serious threat to their physical health. (OCHA, January 2008; IRIN 2008) As a result internal and external closures are effectively combined into one elaborate system of control of movements severely restricting freedom of movement in the West Bank, and isolating the Gaza Strip.
- The movement of the Palestinians in the West Bank is restricted by a series of physical obstacles such as checkpoints, roadblocks, trenches, etc. that severely restrict Palestinians' freedom of movement In 2010, there were an estimated average of 520 permanent checkpoints, road obstacles and other restrictions during 2010, plus an estimated monthly average of 420 mobile checkpoints (OCHA, March 2011).
- Though both displaced and non-displaced faced difficulties in freedom of movement, there is however lack of information as to how specifically it affects IDPs, for lack of protection monitoring on displaced communities. Closures however have a considerable affect by hampering humanitarian access to persons displaced and in need of assistance. This clearly evident in the Gaza Strip were closures have restricted reconstruction efforts for housing of those displaced. There is more analysis on the difficulties faced by communities at risk such as communities affected by the wall, residing in seam zones, or combination of restrictions and Israeli infrastructure such as Al Nu'man (See Patterns of Displacement: Separation Wall and Closures).
- Internal Closures & External Closures in West Bank
- Internal closures in West bank impose multifaceted system of physical and bureaucratic control including checkpoints, road blocks amongst in addition to flying checkpoints, curfews, and age restrictions on Palestinian movements. Internal closures have had significant impact by fragmenting social and economic fabric of West Bank. External closures consists Israeli controlled crossings that permit movement into and out of West Bank. The Wall has progressively sealed the West Bank off from Israel. Crossing the Wall is necessary for all movements of goods and people between the West Bank and Israel and is defined by restrictive permit regime policy. Palestinian communities in "seam zones" face particular restrictions and impedments to freedom of movement.
- Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority have included discussions on improving access as an essential element for security in the occupied Palestinian Territory. There has been very limited 'cosmetic' easing of restrictions. The 'Agreement on Movement and Access', signed in November 2005, has led to very limited, improvements. In 2008 and 2009, the Israeli authorities implemented measures that increased the freedom of movement of Palestinians between most Palestinian urban centres in the West Bank. However, during the same period, there was no significant improvement when it comes to access to land and use of space by Palestinians. In 2010, there were still however an estimated average of 520 permanent checkpoints, road obstacles and other restrictions, plus an estimated monthly average of 420 mobile checkpoints.
- Existing regime of military legislation which already places extensive restrictions on Palestinians to ability to reside within and move around OPT. Since 1967, upwards of 150,000 Palestinians have had their residency status in the OPT revoked (AI Haq, June 2010; Al Haaertz, 2011). In 2010, new Israeli military orders, Orders Nos. 1649 and 1650, has also made it easier for the Israeli authorities to forcibly transfer or deport Palestinians from the West Bank to Gaza or outside the OPT. Both Palestinian and Israeli human rights organisations have expressed concerns that the military orders potentially place thousands of

Palestinians at risk of arrest, prosecution, and deportation, on the grounds of unclear criteria and without adequate judicial review (Al Haq, April, May and June 2010). In worrisome precedent such practices also targeted political figures in the Palestinian authority irrespective of their status, several of whom have since 2010-2011 sought refuge in ICRC offices in

- East Jerusalem.
- Disengagement, Blockade & Israeli incursions into Gaza
- The Gaza Strip – home to 1,5 million Palestinians - is especially vulnerable because it has suffered from years of economic restrictions imposed since the Israeli disengagement in 2005. The Disengagement plan entailed Israel's withdrawal of its military forces and settlers from the Gaza Strip in 2005, but it still controls Gaza's airspace, territorial waters, and land borders and remains an occupying power. (Human Rights Watch, 24 January 2008) Israeli restrictions constitute a grave violation of their basic human rights, and restrictions amount to collective punishment. (Human Rights Watch, 24 January 2008; Oxfam, 25 January 2008)
- Closure policies in and around the Gaza Strip date back to the 1990s and are far more hermetic than those in the much larger West Bank; they have also been more pervasive and overtly violent policies such as bombardment, and property destruction. The external closure of the Gaza Strip, begun in the early 1990s but drastically tightened since 2000. Controls on movement within the Gaza Strip, known as "internal closure," have also increased, mostly for the security of the settlements until their withdrawal in 2005 (HRW, October 2004). The IDF closed all but a handful of main internal roads, leaving only one route between the northern and southern halves of the Gaza Strip with key checkpoints effectively cutting the territory in two, severely restricting the movement of people and goods, as well as access to health care (HRW, October 2004).
- With the Disengagement Plan and removal of settlers internal freedom of movement, apart from buffer areas and no go zone in northern Gaza. However since the Disengagement Israel has continued to impose severe restrictions on external movement and access and frequently re-entered Gaza. Since Hamas control in 2006 following the elections Israel has imposed tight restrictions on movements of persons and goods significantly affecting the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Israel put in place more extensive restrictions on the movement of goods and people to and from Gaza after Hamas seized power in June 2007. (OCHA, 17 April 2008) In late 2007 Israel declared Gaza "enemy entity" in response to continued rocket attacks by militants holding Hamas responsible and subsequently increased restrictions which were upheld as legitimate by the Israeli Supreme Court (The Guardian, 31 January 2008)
- During the operation "Cast Lead", there was almost a total closure of the Gaza crossings. Israel refused to allow the entire civilian population to leave the war zone during the 22 days of attack. Refusal by Israel and Egypt to allow Palestinians to flee Gaza during the conflict amounted to violations of international law. (Human Rights Watch, 24 January 2008) The movement of people and goods to Gaza has been even more severely restricted after the operation "Cast Lead" and has led to worsening poverty, rising unemployment and deteriorating public services with very limited capacity for reconstruction of public infrastructure, schools, and thousands of homes demolished or severely damaged
- In late 2010, despite lessening of restrictions following the incident of the Gaza flotilla in mid 2010, the inflow of construction material was still only at 11 per cent of the rate before the blockade (Oxfam et al, November 2010; OCHA, March 2011). The continued restrictions have stalled reconstruction efforts as well as projects to build new housing for persons displaced as far back as 2004/2005. In June 2011, the UN estimated total housing needs in the Gaza Strip had reached over 91,000 units of which approximately 80,000 were needed to meet natural growth rates, and 11,000 to house those displaced in successive Israeli interventions (Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster, June 2011). In June 2011, Israel approved the delivery of construction material for UN projects to build 1,500 homes (Haaertz, June 2011) – a fraction of what is required.

Al Haq, June 2010

Four Jerusalemite Palestinians are facing impending forcible transfer from occupied East Jerusalem. Three are elected parliamentarians to the Palestinian Legislative Council, Mr. Muhammad Abu-Teir, Mr. Ahmad Attoun, and Mr. Muhammad Totah, and the fourth is the former Palestinian Authority Minister of Jerusalem Affairs, Mr. Khaled Abu Arafeh. These impending deportations are in keeping with Israel's policy of forcibly transferring Palestinians from East Jerusalem. In addition to the revocation of Jerusalem ID cards, which effectively rescinds the right of permanent residency to Palestinian citizens of Jerusalem and denies them access to their city, Israeli police have made living conditions for Palestinians in Jerusalem increasingly intolerable, causing many to leave. Long-standing Israeli policies of home demolitions, settlement construction, police brutality, denial of essential services, restrictions on access to holy sites as well as cultural and educational facilities, and construction of the Annexation Wall have resulted in the indirect forcible transfer of Palestinians out of the city. Recently introduced military orders further facilitate the forcible transfer and deportation of Palestinians from the remainder of the occupied West Bank. As analysed in Al-Haq's position paper on the issue, these military orders effectively legislate for the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

Al Haq, May 2010

On 13 April 2010, military orders 1649 'Order regarding Security provisions' and 1650 'Order regarding Prevention of Infiltration', issued by the General Officer Commander of the Israeli Occupation Force's Central Command, entered into force. These military orders dramatically broaden the existing definition of 'infiltration' in the occupied West Bank, criminalizing and subjecting to deportation every person present there. If implemented, these orders would facilitate the mass deportation or transfer of Palestinians and other protected persons from the West Bank, in clear violation of international law

UN HRC, 11 February 2009

"18. In unprecedented belligerent policy, Israel refused to allow the entire civilian population of Gaza, with the exception of 200 foreign wives, to leave the war zone during the 22 days of attack that commenced on 27 December. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated on 6 January 2009, Gaza is "the only conflict in the world in which people are not even allowed to flee". All crossings from Israel were kept closed during the attacks, except for rare and minor exceptions. By so doing, children, women, invalids and disabled persons were unable to avail themselves of the refugee option to flee from the locus of immediate harm resulting from the military operations. This condition was aggravated by the absence of places to hide from the ravages of war in Gaza, given its small size, dense population and absence of natural or man-made shelters.

19. International humanitarian law has not specifically and explicitly at this time anticipated such an abuse of civilians, but the policy as implemented would suggest the importance of an impartial investigation to determine whether such practices of "refugee denial" constitute a crime against humanity as understood in international criminal law. The initial definition of crimes against humanity, developed in relation to the war crimes trials after the Second World War, is "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts done against any civilian population". Refugee denial under these circumstances of confined occupation is an instance of "inhumane acts", during which the entire civilian population of Gaza was subjected to the extreme physical and psychological hazards of modern warfare within a very small overall territory. It should be kept in mind that this restriction on free movement, to escape from the war zone, was imposed on a population already severely weakened by the effects of the blockade.

20. The small size of Gaza and its geographic character also operated to deny most of the population remaining within its borders of an opportunity to internally remove itself from the combat zones. In this sense, the entire Gaza Strip became a war zone, although the actual combat area on the ground was more limited. In effect, leaving Gaza was the only way to remove oneself to a position of safety. In this respect, the option to become an internally displaced person was, as a practical matter, unavailable to the civilian population, although some civilians sought relative safety in shelters that were made available on an emergency basis for a tiny fraction of the population, mainly through the efforts of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other United Nations and non-governmental organization efforts. In some situations, the shelters were not always treated as sanctuaries by the Israeli armed forces. Six UNRWA emergency shelters were damaged during Operation Cast Lead."

Ma'an News Agency, 20 November 2009

"Despite being scheduled for opening, Gaza crossings were sealed on Thursday following a last-minute announcement by Israeli crossings authorities, Palestinian officials said. Raed Fattouh, a Palestinian border crossings official in Gaza, said the Israeli side informed him early Friday that the fuel, bulk goods and commercial goods transfer points would remain shut. The Gaza crossings continue to operate only five days a week. Crossings opened six days a week until the spring, when Israeli officials suddenly announced their closure and continued each Friday since. Operating fewer days a week means a general reduction in the amount of goods getting into Gaza, as there has been no marked daily increase in goods."

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 21 January 2008

"Checkpoints and roadblocks seriously obstruct the freedom of movement of Palestinians in the West Bank, with disastrous consequences for both personal life and the economy. There are 561 such obstacles to freedom of movement, comprising over 80 manned checkpoints and some 476 unmanned locked gates, earth mounds, concrete blocks and ditches. In addition, thousands of temporary checkpoints, known as flying checkpoints, are set up every year by Israeli army patrols on roads throughout the West Bank for limited periods, ranging from half an hour to several hours. In November 2007 there were 429 flying checkpoints.

Palestinians are subjected to numerous prohibitions on travel and to requirements for permits for travel within the West Bank and to East Jerusalem. Checkpoints ensure compliance with the permit regime. These restrictions violate article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which has been held to be binding on Israel in the OPT by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the construction of the wall.

Israel's argument that these restrictions are justified as security measures is difficult to accept. Many of the checkpoints and roadblocks are distant from the border of Israel, which is in any event protected by the wall. More likely explanations are to be found in the need to serve the convenience of settlers, to facilitate the travel of settlers through the West Bank and to impress

upon the Palestinian people the power and presence of the occupier. According to a report in Yedioth Ahronoth, one quarter of all IDF soldiers who have served at roadblocks in the West Bank reported having witnessed or taken part in an act of abuse against a Palestinian civilian. Checkpoints serve to humiliate Palestinians and to create feelings of deep hostility towards Israel. In this respect they resemble the "pass laws" of apartheid South Africa, which required black South Africans to demonstrate permission to travel or reside anywhere in South Africa. These laws generated widespread humiliation and anger, and were the cause of regular protest action. Israel would do well to consider the South African experience. Restrictions on freedom of movement of the kind applied by Israel do more to create insecurity than to achieve security."

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 December 2007

"Throughout the occupied Palestinian territories, in the Gaza Strip as well as in the West Bank, Palestinians continuously face hardship in simply going about their lives; they are prevented from doing what makes up the daily fabric of most people's existence. The Palestinian territories face a deep human crisis, where millions of people are denied their human dignity. Not once in a while, but every day. Nothing is predictable for Palestinians. Rules can change from one day to the next without notice or explanation. They live in an arbitrary environment, continuously adapting to circumstances they cannot influence and that increasingly reduce the range of their possibilities."

....

Many West Bank roads that used to connect Palestinian villages to nearby cities are now closed off by concrete blocks, ditches, earth mounds or iron gates. These obstacles separate Palestinians from their lands, their water sources and even their rubbish dumps. They divide one community from another, villages from cities, and districts from each other. People in the West Bank watch from their houses as Israelis use freshly paved roads, built on Palestinian land, connecting Israeli settlements to each other and linking them smoothly to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Palestinians have to use dirt tracks, taking long detours to reach their schools, work places, hospitals and places of worship, or simply to visit relatives and friends. In the once booming city of Nablus in the northern West Bank, the population of 177,000 is limited to two exit roads. They are not allowed to continue southward in their own cars but have to use taxis, putting a further strain on their already limited economic resources."

Amnesty International (AI), 8 September 2003

"This report analyses the impact of movement restrictions on the right to work of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It contends that the widespread and prolonged closures, curfews and other restrictions on movement currently imposed cannot be justified on security grounds, discriminate against Palestinians, and are often used as a form of collective punishment in reprisal for attacks committed by Palestinian armed groups. Amnesty International recommends that the Israeli government lift the restrictions on movement that constitute collective punishment and makes every effort to enable as normal a life as possible for the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories. It calls for the evacuation of Israeli settlers from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, on the grounds that their residence in the Occupied Territories violates international law and that measures purportedly taken to protect the security and freedom of movement of Israeli settlers inflict serious and discriminatory human rights abuses against Palestinians."

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 28 September 2006

"A report by the Palestinian Ministry of Health says that pregnant Palestinian women are often prevented by Israeli forces from reaching hospitals to receive appropriate medical attention, causing many miscarriages and the deaths of some women. Since the beginning of the second Intifada, a Palestinian uprising against Israeli military occupation, in September 2000, 68 pregnant Palestinian women gave birth at Israeli checkpoints, leading to 34 miscarriages and the deaths of four women, according to the Health Ministry's September report."

Thoraya Obaid, Executive Director of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), said these figures underline the need to put an end to the agony of pregnant Palestinian women held at Israeli checkpoints. According to the Health Ministry's report, there are currently 117,600 pregnant women in the Palestinian territories. This includes 17,640 women who are suffering difficult pregnancies due to a lack of prenatal and postnatal care. "Inadequate medical care during pregnancy is the third leading cause of death among Palestinian women of childbearing age," said Abu Shaaban. UNFPA has been helping pregnant women avoid suffering at checkpoints by training health personnel and equipping them with delivery kits to provide services within their communities. It has also formed local community support teams to assist health providers and raise awareness of the availability of delivery services."

West Bank Movement and Access Update, OCHA, November 2009:

"Over the course of the past six months (May- October 2009), the Israeli authorities continued to implement measures that increased the freedom of movement of Palestinians between most Palestinian urban centres in the West Bank. However, during the same period, there has been no significant improvement when it comes to access to land and use of space by Palestinians. In particular, Area C, which covers 60 percent of the West Bank has remained, to a large extent, off-limits for Palestinian use and development. Moreover, access of Palestinians to and from areas behind the Barrier, including East Jerusalem, and the Jordan Valley, as well as within the Israeli controlled area of Hebron City (H2), continued to be severely restricted.

The most significant measures improving the flow of Palestinian traffic between the main cities and towns throughout the West Bank, implemented mostly during June and September, were the following:

- the removal of two staffed checkpoints that controlled access into Qalqiliya and Nablus cities;
- the shifting of four staffed checkpoints that controlled access into Ramallah, Jericho, Qalailiya, and Salfit into "partial checkpoints", that are checkpoints staffed at an ad-hoc basis only;
- the relaxation of the crossing procedures at most checkpoints to the east of the Barrier, including the lifting of permit requirements, the extension of opening hours, and the performance of searches and documentation checking on a random basis only;
- The removal of 46 earthmounds and roadblocks that prevented vehicular access to main routes from various communities. The majority of these communities are located in the southern West Bank, particularly along roads 60 and 35....

The gradual relaxation in Palestinian movement between cities, which has been ongoing for the last year and half, has taken place alongside a process of entrenchment of some of the mechanisms used to control and restrict Palestinian movement. This process includes, among other elements, the expansion of the alternative ("fabric of life") road network and of key permanently staffed checkpoints. While some of these measures have contributed to the easing of movement, they exact a price from Palestinians in terms of land loss, disruption of traditional routes, and deepening fragmentation of West Bank territory....As of the end of October 2009, there were a total of 578 closure obstacles inside the West Bank territory (i.e. excluding Green Line crossings), including 69 permanently staffed checkpoints, 21 "partial checkpoints", and 488 unstaffed obstacles (roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road barriers, road gates and trenches)."

Ma'an News Agency, 20 November 2009

"Despite being scheduled for opening, Gaza crossings were sealed on Thursday following a last-minute announcement by Israeli crossings authorities, Palestinian officials said. Raed Fattouh, a Palestinian border crossings official in Gaza, said the Israeli side informed him early Friday that the fuel, bulk goods and commercial goods transfer points would remain shut. The Gaza crossings continue to operate only five days a week. Crossings opened six days a week until the spring, when Israeli officials suddenly announced their closure and continued each Friday since. Operating fewer days a week means a general reduction in the amount of goods getting into Gaza, as there has been no marked daily increase in goods."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), July 2007

"Settlements and other Israeli infrastructure, including the Barrier, have significantly narrowed the amount of land that Palestinians can live in, use or access. More than 38% of West Bank territory is effectively offlimits or restricted to Palestinians. There is an additional layer of restrictions placed on Palestinians. Palestinian movement is inhibited by roads reserved primarily for Israeli use and the system of physical obstacles and permits that accompanies them ...[which] regulates or prevents Palestinian vehicles from using those West Bank roads primarily reserved for Israeli use.

Checkpoint : A barrier manned by the IDF, Border Police and/or private security companies with observation towers and other physical blocks used to control pedestrian and vehicular access.

Partial Checkpoint: An established checkpoint structure operating periodically.

Road Barrier: A fence or other physical barrier of more than 100 metres in length, which runs alongside a road primarily reserved for Israelis. This obstructs the free passage of Palestinian people, vehicles and animals onto, off, or across the road.

Earth wall : A series of earthmounds alongside a road used to prevent vehicles from crossing.

Road Gate A metal gate used by the IDF to control movement along roads.

Earth mound. A mound of rubble, dirt and/or rocks to obstruct vehicle access.


Road block : A series of one meter concrete blocks to obstruct vehicle access.

Trench: A ditch dug across or alongside a road to prevent vehicles from crossing."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 22 January 2008

"Internal closures in West Bank are imposed by a multifaceted system of physical and bureaucratic obstacles, which control all movements inside the West Bank, and onto the roads that are used primarily by Israeli settlers. In January 2008, there were 563 obstacles, including checkpoints, road blocs, earth mounds, trenches, fences and gates on roads inside the West Bank.... The term 'External Closure' refers to the use of Israeli controlled crossings that permit movement into and out of West Bank. The West Bank Barrier has progressively sealed the West Bank off from Israel. Crossing the Barrier is necessary for all movements of goods and people between the West Bank and Israel.... In 2005, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that "Israeli security forces will transfer the bulk of their monitoring and control efforts from the checkpoints inside the West Bank... to crossing points along the revised route of the security fence." And although tighter restrictions on movements across the Barrier are progressively being introduced, there has been no corresponding reduction on movements inside of the West Bank. As the construction of the West Bank Barrier has progressed, the Barrier crossings are now regarded by Israel as Border Terminals.... The control of these terminals has increasingly been handed over from the IDF to the Israeli Customs Authorities, civil Police and civilian security companies, and the movement of goods and labour has become increasingly difficult. Palestinian export trade has been particularly affected by these developments. Goods must first pass the internal closures around urban West Bank centres before exiting the West Bank via one of five Barrier Terminals into Israel or across the King Hussein Bridge into Jordan. Labourers with the required permits, who have successfully crossed all the internal checkpoints and obstacles inside the West Bank, may only cross the Barrier at one of eleven designated Barrier Crossing Points.....As a result internal and external closures are effectively combined into one system of control of movements."

Negotiations between the Government of Israel (GoI) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) have included discussions on improving access as an essential element for security in the occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt). The 'Agreement on Movement and Access', which was signed in November 2005, has so far led to very limited, if any, improvements⁴. According to the GoI, closure and movement restrictions for goods and people in the West Bank are necessary measures to protect Israeli citizens in Israel and in Israeli settlements in the West Bank....."



UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), May 2008

"In April, the Government of Israel (GoI) announced that 61 (initially 50) closures or physical obstacles in the West Bank were removed in order to ease the lives of the Palestinians. Following the announcement, OCHA monitored the removal of the closures and identified that only 44 closures were actually removed, while six were still in place and 11 could not be found within a 400 metre-radius of the GPS (Global Positioning System) location provided by the IDF. Of the 44 closures: Only five closures were significant (i.e. facilitating access to services and land, or located between towns). Nine were of minimal significance; Seventeen were of no significance; Thirteen were 'questionable' regarding the circumstance of their original installation. Overall, the removal of 44 of the 61 obstacles announced has had little or no impact on movement and access and has not reduced the fragmentation within the West Bank."

UN HRC, 11 February 2009

18. In unprecedented belligerent policy, Israel refused to allow the entire civilian population of Gaza, with the exception of 200 foreign wives, to leave the war zone during the 22 days of attack that commenced on 27 December. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated on 6 January 2009, Gaza is "the only conflict in the world in which people are not even allowed to flee". All crossings from Israel were kept closed during the attacks, except for rare and minor exceptions. By so doing, children, women, invalids and disabled persons were unable to avail themselves of the refugee option to flee from the locus of immediate harm resulting from the military operations. This condition was aggravated by the absence of places to hide from the ravages of war in Gaza, given its small size, dense population and absence of natural or man-made shelters.

19. International humanitarian law has not specifically and explicitly at this time anticipated such an abuse of civilians, but the policy as implemented would suggest the importance of an impartial investigation to determine whether such practices of "refugee denial" constitute a crime against humanity as understood in international criminal law. The initial definition of crimes against humanity, developed in relation to the war crimes trials after the Second World War, is "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts done against any civilian population". Refugee denial under these circumstances of confined occupation is an instance of "inhumane acts", during which the entire civilian population of Gaza was subjected to the extreme physical and psychological hazards of modern warfare within a very small overall territory. It should be kept in mind that this restriction on free movement, to escape from the war zone, was imposed on a population already severely weakened by the effects of the blockade.

20. The small size of Gaza and its geographic character also operated to deny most of the population remaining within its borders of an opportunity to internally remove itself from the combat zones. In this sense, the entire Gaza Strip became a war zone, although the actual combat area on the ground was more limited. In effect, leaving Gaza was the only way to remove

oneself to a position of safety. In this respect, the option to become an internally displaced person was, as a practical matter, unavailable to the civilian population, although some civilians sought relative safety in shelters that were made available on an emergency basis for a tiny fraction of the population, mainly through the efforts of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other United Nations and non-governmental organization efforts. In some situations, the shelters were not always treated as sanctuaries by the Israeli armed forces. Six UNRWA emergency shelters were damaged during Operation Cast Lead."

UN OCHA, 17 April 2008

"The first two days of March saw the intensification of ongoing Israeli army air and ground operations throughout the Gaza Strip. The Israeli code-named 'Hot Winter' operation which took place in northern and eastern Gaza between 28 February and 2 March resulted in a total of 107 killed and 250 injured. This was one of the most violent incursions in Gaza since the granting of limited autonomy to Gaza in 1994.

The Gaza Strip remains closed to the outside world, with the exception of limited humanitarian imports and the movement of a small number of international visitors, patients and Israeli-approved Palestinians. Fuel shortages have begun to have a more profound effect on all aspects of life in Gaza, as private reserves have been depleted and the needs of the harvest and fishing season have increased demand. In March, the supply of diesel and gasoline by Israel was 57% and 80% less, respectively, compared to one year ago. The limited supply led to diesel and gasoline selling for 48% and 70% more on the black market compared to the regular market

During the 'Hot Winter' incursion, 34 children lost a parent. Twenty-one homes were completely destroyed, leaving 147 people homeless. Eighty-eight homes were severely or partially damaged, affecting an additional 616 people. The Gaza Strip is especially vulnerable because it has suffered from years of economic restrictions imposed since the Israeli disengagement in 2005 and increased after Hamas won the 2006 elections. Most recently, Israel put in place new restrictions on the movement of goods and people to and from Gaza after Hamas seized power in June 2007. These restrictions were further exacerbated at the end of October 2007. Israel holds Hamas responsible for rocket fire from Gaza into Israel."

ICRC, 12 December 2007

"Gazans are getting increasingly anxious as shelves in grocery shops begin to empty because of the closure. Prices have skyrocketed, and the little that comes in to Gaza is virtually unaffordable. The prices of many foodstuffs, such as chicken, have at least doubled in the past four months, as stocks dwindle without resupply. According to the World Food Programme, some 80,000 Gazans have lost their jobs since June 2007, increasing the already high rate of unemployment to the point where around 44% of the working population is jobless. Many local industries had to shut down and fire their personnel, as 95% of local production depends on imports of raw materials from Israel. Israel has restricted imports to what it deems "basic goods" – mostly staple food products – while other essential items needed to keep industry running or repair infrastructure cannot enter the Strip.

Gaza farmers remember how green and fertile their land was in the recent past. Rich harvests from their citrus and olive trees were exported to the West Bank and Israel. Today, a large part of their land has been levelled and their trees uprooted during the frequent military incursions. Some 5,000 farmers who rely on exporting tomatoes, strawberries and carnations to support their families are about to suffer a 100% drop in sales. The harvest season for these important crops started in June, but the embargo on exports has left them rotting in containers at the crossing points.

The infrastructure of the Gaza Strip is in a fragile state. Some eight months ago, a wastewater lagoon in northern Gaza containing hundreds of thousands of litres of raw sewage burst its embankments. Sewage flooded a Bedouin village, killing five people, injuring 16 others and destroying the homes of thousands. Since then, no substantial repairs could be carried out due to a lack of funding and Israel's restrictions on imports of spare parts.

Basic services such as hospitals, water and sewerage systems can only function if they are connected to the electrical grid. If the grid fails to provide the required power, all basic services will suffer. Since Israeli air strikes destroyed a large part of the Gaza Power Plant in June 2006, it has been working at roughly half of its original capacity. The electrical supply to the Gaza Strip is precarious, unreliable and dependent on external sources. In its current state, it cannot produce sufficient power to meet the needs of the population."

The Guardian, 31 January 2008

"The Israeli supreme court today upheld the government's blockade of fuel and electricity supplies to the Gaza Strip. Israeli human rights groups had challenged the sanctions, which the government claims are aimed at halting rocket attacks by Gaza militants. Palestinian officials say the cuts in fuel supplies harm Gaza's already impoverished residents by causing blackouts that cripple crucial utilities. The court ruled that the fuel and electricity provided to the Gaza Strip was "sufficient to answer the vital humanitarian needs of the strip for the time being".

In September last year, Israel declared Gaza - home to 1.5 million Palestinians - an "enemy entity" in response to continued rocket attacks by militants. The court said Gaza was ruled by "a murderous terror group", but found Israel still had an obligation under international law to avoid "deliberately" harming Palestinian civilians. Israel supplies all of Gaza's fuel and more than two-thirds of its electricity, and has reduced but not halted supplies. Israel tightened its blockade earlier this month, temporarily cutting off fuel to Gaza's main power plant after an increase in rocket attacks on southern Israeli towns."

HRW, 24 January 2008:

"This week's Gaza-Egypt border breach temporarily eased the humanitarian impact of Israel's blockade, but Israel as the occupying power remains responsible for the well-being of Gaza's 1.4 million residents, Human Rights Watch said today. Gazans remain almost completely dependent on Israel for fuel, electricity, medicine, food, and other essential commodities. Human Rights Watch also called upon Palestinian armed groups in Gaza to stop their indiscriminate rocket attacks into populated areas in Israel in violation of international humanitarian law. The attacks have wounded 82 Israeli civilians in the past six months.

"Israel's rightful self-defense against unlawful rocket attacks does not justify a blockade that denies civilians the food, fuel and medicine needed to survive, a policy amounting to collective punishment," said Joe Stork, acting director of Human Rights Watch's Middle East division. "Gazans can't turn on the lights, get tap water, buy enough food, or earn a living without Israel's consent."

Al-Jazeera, 2 July 2008

"As part of the truce, Hamas is supposed to stop cross-border rocket fire by Palestinian groups in Gaza. In exchange, Israel will allow fuel, medicine and other essential goods into the territory, and halt military raids. Since the six-month ceasefire went into effect on June 19, goods crossings into Gaza have been sporadically or partially opened, but none have been returned to the level of activity they saw over a year ago. Most recently, Israel halted the transit of goods into Gaza after two Qassam rockets were fired from the north of the strip into an open area in the western Negev on Monday, according to Israel's *Ynetnews*. Gaza's three main crossings are each used for specific goods transfers: Nahal Oz for fuel and gas, Sufa for products like fruits, vegetables and medicine - and Karni for raw construction materials such as cement. Limited goods came through Sufa and Nahal Oz last Sunday, nothing has come through Karni for a week. The Erez

passenger crossing - used mainly by diplomats and journalists - has continued to open regularly, but with the exception of a few special permit holders, it is inaccessible to ordinary Palestinians."

HRW, 24 January 2008:

"Israel withdrew its military forces and settlers from the Gaza Strip in 2005, but it still controls Gaza's airspace, territorial waters, and land borders – with the exception this week of the Rafah border area with Egypt. Israel is Gaza's primary supplier of electricity, which is essential for water availability and sewage treatment. In addition, Israel controls Gaza's telecommunications network, its population registry, and its customs and tax revenues. Israeli security forces have frequently re-entered Gaza at will."

UN OCHA, 7 August 2006:

"For the third time since 28 June, Palestinian families have fled the village of As Shoka seeking refuge in Rafah as a result of IDF artillery shelling and incursions. UNRWA provided emergency accommodation and assistance (medical care, food parcels and water) to over 3,400 people in three UNRWA schools. Following the withdrawal of the IDF on 6 August, families have gradually returned home. One UNRWA shelter remains open for 450 people (67 families) who had not returned to As Shoka or have fled the shelling of the Al Tanour Quarters in Rafah.

In the north, UNRWA has increased its emergency accommodation capacity to meet the increasing numbers of those fleeing the continued shelling east of Beit Hanoun and the area around the Al Nada housing estate in Beit Lahia, in the northern areas of the Gaza Strip. The number of Palestinians sheltered in four UNRWA schools in Jabalia has doubled to 1,405 people.... An additional six houses have been destroyed by IAF strikes after their occupants were informed over the telephone by the IDF of the impending attack (bringing the total number to 12). This practice is causing panic among entire Palestinian neighbourhoods who fear extensive collateral damage due to the high density of populated areas."

UNRWA, 9 March 2006:

"The situation for 1.5 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip is worse now than it has ever been since the start of the Israeli military occupation in 1967. The current situation in Gaza is man-made, completely avoidable and, with the necessary political will, can also be reversed. Gaza has suffered from a long-term pattern of economic stagnation and plummeting development indicators. The severity of the situation has increased exponentially since Israel imposed extreme restrictions on the movement of goods and people in response to the Hamas take over of Gaza and to indiscriminate rocket attacks against Israel."

See Also:

[Gaza Strip: Situation Report](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 5 June 2006

[Gaza miserable and dangerous: UN relief chief](#), Agence France-Presse (AFP), 6 September 2006

[UN warns of Gaza aid 'time bomb'](#), BBC News, September 2006

[Crisis in Gaza deepens](#), Church World Service (CWS), 31 August 2006

[B'Tselem to Defense Minister: Stop using Rafah Crossing to pressure Gaza civilians](#), B'Tselem, 30 August 2006

[Gaza siege causing major health crisis](#), Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 29 August 2006

[Israel presses deadly two-month offensive in Gaza](#), Agence France-Presse (AFP), 28 August 2006

[WFP warns of deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza](#), World Food Programme (WFP), 28 August 2006

[Gaza facts & figures since the beginning of the invasion on 28 Jun until 07 Aug 2006](#), The Palestine Monitor, 10 August 2006

[Gaza Strip Situation Report](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 7 August 2006

[Egypt starts building steel wall on Gaza Strip border](#), BBC, 9 December 2009

[Press Statement](#), OCHA, 9 November 2009

[Gaza Strip Crossings Monitoring report](#), Paltrade, 7 May 2009

[Gaza: reconstruction unlikely to succeed without the prospect of a lasting peace](#), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 26 February 2009

[Tense calm on Gaza frontier as truce enters third day](#), Agence France-Presse (AFP), 21 June 2008

[GAZA Humanitarian Situation Report: Escalation in Violence 27 FEB - 3 MARCH 2008](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 3 March 2008

[Israel's blockade poses immediate threat to the lives of Gaza's sick and elderly](#), Oxfam, 25 January 2008

[Gaza Strip Inter-Agency Humanitarian Fact Sheet: March 2008](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 17 April 2008

[Gaza Closure: Situation Report 18-24 January 2008](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 24 January 2008

[Gaza Strip Humanitarian Report Power Shortages 8 January 2008](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 8 January 2008

[OPT: Gaza strip humanitarian fact sheet, Dec 2007](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 21 January 2008

[The Road Out of Gaza](#), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2008

See Also:

[West Bank Movement and Access Update](#), OCHA, November 2009

[Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief concludes visit to Israel and the OPT](#), UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 28 January 2008

[Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access \(14-27 November 2007\)](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 11 January 2008

[The Humanitarian Monitor: December 2007](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 22 January 2008

[Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access \(28 November – 11 December 2007\)](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 23 January 2008

[Dignity Dignied in the Palestinian Territories](#), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 December 2007

[Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief concludes visit to Israel and the OPT](#), UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 28 January 2008

[Protection of Weekly Report 19 – 25 December 2007](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 4 January 2008

[Children and armed conflict](#), United Nations Secretary General (UN SG), 21 January 2008

[Humanitarian Update: Special Focus Closure Count and Analysis](#), , August 2005

[Palestinian Public Perceptions Report IX: Mobility and Security](#), Graduate Institute of Development Studies - Palestine Research Unit (IUED-PRU), November 2005

[Fourteenth Report on the Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access](#), United Nations (UN), 5 June 2006

[Between games and propaganda: the removal of checkpoints and roadblocks in the West Bank](#), The Palestine Monitor, 19 April 2008

[Israel general criticises West Bank roadblocks](#), Agence France-Presse (AFP), 13 February 2008

[Security Council Resolution 1405 \(2002\)](#), United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 19 April 2002

See Also:

[UN says number of West Bank checkpoints on the rise](#), Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 28 May 2008

[Pledge to remove 50 West Bank roadblocks](#), Guardian (UK), 31 March 2008

[OPT: West Bank under lockdown](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 28 October 2006

[Inside the maze: movement restrictions in the West Bank](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 21 November 2007

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[Movement restrictions limiting benefits of aid - World Bank](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 28 April 2008

[The issue of Palestinian pregnant women giving birth at Israeli checkpoints Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights](#), **UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)**, February 2008

Child Protection

Child Protection and Access to Education

- General Protection & Children
- The situation of Palestinian children, whether displaced or not, in OPT remains grave. Children face chronic vulnerability to violence resulting from Israeli incursions, settler violence, humiliation and intimidation by Israeli military and police, wherein children are systematically denied a safe environment (RSC, September 2010). Civilians, including children, are subject to wide restrictions in freedom of movement, random checkpoints, to the arbitrary closure of crossing points between Palestinian areas, and to the imposition of curfews that suspend public life entirely. (RSC, September 2010) Constraints upon movement constitute a source of risk in themselves but also limit the opportunities for children to gain access and knowledge to areas beyond their own immediate town or village while most immediate spaces of Palestinian life can become alienated, as vast areas are placed off-limits by Israeli military or civil administration (RSC, September 2010).
- The chronic violence to which children are exposed is manifested systematically in the West Bank, and particularly in Gaza Strip. Israelis incursions which can range in the thousands per year (nightly raids, arrests, and so forth) in the West Bank, and large military offensives particularly into Gaza Strip and its continued blockade severely impacts on child protection from the right to life to access to basic services including health, education, and so forth. Children have also been exposed to escalation in intra-Palestinian factional fighting in 2007-2008, and at risk of exploitation by parties to the conflict. Documenting the recruitment of children by Palestinian armed groups remains a challenge, and the extent of the phenomenon is not well known. Reports however suggest that Shabak, Israel's security agency, and Hamas continues to recruit Palestinian children as collaborators/informers, and that IDF have forced civilians, often minors, to enter potential zones of conflict
- before soldiers in order to clear the area or limit casualties (UN SG, 21 January 2008)
- Total number of Palestinian children killed since the beginning of the second intifada has risen to over 940 children. (Save the Children, October 2007). The most significant deterioration in protection occurred in the Gaza Strip, between 27 December 2008 and 31 August 2009, during which Israeli military activities resulted in the deaths of 358 children (UN OCHA, 30 November 2009). This is in a context of continued occupation in which children have exposure to systematic violence including Israeli incursions, settler violence, restrictions in movement, and forced displacement following house demolitions for instance. In 2010, an estimated 9 Palestinian children were killed and 330 injured due to conflict, while there was monthly average of close to 290 Palestinian children in Israeli prisons, while estimated 297 children were displaced as result of home demolitions only, while there were 24 incidents reported related to access to education (OCHA, May 2011).

- Restrictions in freedom of movement and access to services are significant in Gaza Strip with continued restrictions but equally inside Israeli controlled areas in the West Bank. In the West Bank, children continue to be humiliated and threatened at Israeli checkpoints and at risk of violence from Israeli settlers, while children particular amongst herding communities in Area C face acute food insecurity (ORS, September 2010; UNICEF, August 2010) The threat of physical violence from settlers, especially against students on their way to school presents a significant impediment on rights of children, their protection, and access to education (OCHA August 2010). In OPT, in 2007-2008, schools and hospitals were attacked or occupied by both IDF and Palestinian armed groups, in some instances resulting in the killing or injury of children. (Save the Children, October 2007; UN SG, 21 January 2008) As result of Israeli incursions in Gaza Strip in 2008/2009, close to 18 schools were
- destroyed and 280 damaged out of 640 schools – the reconstruction of which have been extremely difficult due to the continuing restrictions on construction (AI, January 2010).
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- Access to Education
- Education has been severely affected by the worsening situation since the second intifada. In the OPT, refugee children lost between 35% and 50% of class time during the first intifada. The second intifada has negatively affected access to education and the quality of education provided in the OPT. (Badil, September 2007) In West Bank, as many as 6,000 students and more than 650 teachers (of a total of 33,000 students and 2,000 teachers) in East Jerusalem face difficulties reaching their schools because of the Wall. (Save the Children, February 2007) Over three per cent of students in the localities affected by the Wall left school as a direct result of the Wall and its associated regime, while 26% of those who left school did so because of the worsening economic situation. (Badil, September 2007)
- In Area C of the West Bank, 26 schools have been assessed by humanitarian organizations as sub-standard and in need of humanitarian response including unsafe or unhygienic facilities, schools facing the threat of demolition, attacks on students, and restrictions on access to and from school. Assessments reveal a high drop-out rate, particularly among girls, and significant health and safety risks for the students that continue to attend the 26 schools (OCHA August 2010). The UN was appealing to Israeli Civil Administration to grant them authorisation to address these situations (OCHA, August 2010).
- UNRWA attributed lower academic scores and attendance in 2006-2007 to violence, overcrowding and poverty. From late 2006 through early 2007, 450 children (aged 12 -17) in the West Bank and Gaza identified increased violence in school and domestic violence as priority issues for child protection. Because of the frequent settlers' attacks in the Bedouin villages in the West Bank, Knesset has ordered military protection for Palestinian children on their way to and from school though such escort is not consistently available. (Sky News, 22 November 2009; OCHA August 2010)
- In Gaza access to education has been severely hampered by years of blockade and Israeli incursions. In January 2009, IDF offensive destroyed 18 schools, and damaged at least 260 schools and kindergartens (Al Mezan, September 2009) Prior to the offensive schools were overcrowded, understaffed and undersupplied as a result of the Israeli blockade and Palestinian infighting (Save the Children, 24 February 2009). Throughout the assault the Israeli military destroyed schools are civilian objects protected under international humanitarian law Many displaced children are likely to have lost their clothes, books, schoolbags and other materials that, due to the blockade, are hard to replace and affect their ability to participate at school.
- These problems are compounded by psychological distress in children and teachers, as well as the damage to schools and loss of materials, and some children still are not attending class because of displacement, poverty, fear or injury. In Gaza in 2009 child labour was also on the rise. Khan Younis residents and displaced cite 50% of children are not attending school (UNIFEM, 2009 and OCHA, October 2009). In 2010, schoolchildren were still suffering from trauma and anxiety more than a year after Israeli military operations in which

schools were shelled, 250 students and 15 teachers were killed, reflected in high absentism and failures in examinations (IRIN, February 2010). In September 2010, UNWRA highlighted the need to build 100 schools to meet growing needs in Gaza Strip – no schools have been allowed to be built by the Israeli authorities since 2007 – and in 2010 was compelled to turn away 40,000 eligible children due to lack of adequate schools (UNWRA, September 2010).

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- Children and displacement
- In 2010, close to 600 Palestinians were displaced in the West Bank, half of whom were children. In addition, over 4,000 homes were demolished between 27 December 2009 and 18 January 2009 in Gaza and at the peak of hostilities, 120,000-200,000 people were estimated to be displaced – close to half of them children (Save the Children, April 2009). In 2008, at least 419 children were displaced or affected by demolition of 156 residential structures in the OPT. Study on the effects of house demolitions on children in the West Bank undertaken by Save the Children revealed that children are more withdrawn, suffer from anxiety and depression, social problems, have hard time concentrating, tend more towards delinquency, exhibit violent behaviour, etc. (Save the Children, April 2009).
- IDF incursions in Gaza and continued blockade have underlined the protection crisis faced by Palestinian children in Gaza. The hardship caused by the extensive destruction of shelter and resulting displacement particularly affected children and women (UN HRC, 15 September 2009). Vulnerabilities were exacerbated as result of the conflict. Displaced people with disabilities were exposed to additional hardship, because shelters were not equipped for their special needs (UN HRC, September 2009). According to a UNIFEM survey, approximately 20% of households said that boys' needs are prioritized when there is a food shortage in the home. The least likely household members to get priority during a food shortage are elderly men and women.
- Survey undertaken by UNIFEM indicated the communities displaced perceived a heightened vulnerability particularly among displaced women. Half of the displaced respondents said their children had not returned to school after the war due to "lack of security". There were also increase in domestic violence against women and children particularly in displaced households and in southern Gaza Strip. (UNIFEM, 2009) Risk-taking behaviour (domestic violence against wives and children, drug abuse) was higher among those displaced during the war. There are also indications of high level of trauma amongst men women and children as result of the war. It is estimated that 36% of boys and 33% of girls suffer from trauma. (UNIFEM, 2009).
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UN Secretary-General, April 2011

120. Eleven Palestinian children were killed and 360 injured (342 boys and 18 girls) in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in incidents related to the armed conflict. Of the 360 children injured, 58 were under the age of 12; 83 per cent of the injuries occurred in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and 17 per cent in Gaza; 302 children were injured by the Israeli security forces, 40 by Israeli settlers, 11 by unexploded ordnance, and 2 by unidentified perpetrators. In addition, five children were injured by mishandling weapons and explosives, including one incident allegedly related to interfactional fighting by Palestinian armed groups. No Israeli children were killed in 2010 as a result of the conflict, but two were injured, including one as a result of a rocket from the Gaza Strip on 21 December launched by an unidentified Palestinian armed group.....121. There are serious concerns regarding the increasing number of civilians, including children, shot and injured in the so-called Gaza buffer zone imposed by Israel, which covers the area up to 300 metres from the Gaza fence. The exact boundaries of the zone are unclear, given that it is not physically delimited, but is known to be an area where there are clashes between militants and the Israeli security forces. In May 2009, the

Israeli Army made a statement indicating that any individual entering the zone would be endangering his or her life. However, Palestinians continue to collect gravel and scrap metal in abandoned settlements and industrial zones near the fence, which they later sell to support their families. In 2010, 40 boys and 4 girls were allegedly injured by Israeli fire in or near the buffer zone. Of those, 26 boys, some as young as 13, were shot while collecting gravel within 800 metres of the fence. In cases where sworn affidavits were taken, 19 children were shot in the leg, 2 in the arm and 1 child was shot in the head.....

126. There was an increase in the number of attacks on schools and education facilities by Israeli security forces and settlers in 2010 (20 cases), compared to 2009 (9 cases). These attacks resulted in damage to schools or interruption of education, placing the safety of the children in Gaza and the West Bank at risk. The majority of cases involved the presence of Israeli security forces within school compounds following raids, forceful entry, and search and arrest operations, including the use of tear gas on students. There were also three incidents involving air strikes and shelling by Israeli security forces that resulted in damage to four schools in Gaza, although schools did not appear to have been directly targeted in these incidents. There was also an increasing number of incidents in 2010 in which Palestinian students were prevented from accessing schools and had their safety compromised by Israeli security forces. Thirty-six such incidents were documented in the West Bank in 2010, purportedly involving security measures such as road closures searches, harassment or assaults at checkpoints by Israeli authorities and settlers. In other cases, children were exposed to settler violence as Israeli authorities did not provide military escorts to protect children who pass near historically violent settlements and outposts in the West Bank, particularly Hebron. In this regard, the Israeli authorities have not yet responded to the request of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict in February 2009 to investigate the 2008 attack by Israeli settlers of children on their way to the Al-Tuwani School outside Hebron. Furthermore, they have failed to address the broader issue of settler violence against Palestinian children. In addition, the blockade on the Gaza Strip impacts on the availability, accessibility and quality of education in Gaza. Though the situation has improved since the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) commenced building 20 new schools after certain restrictions were lifted, UNRWA was unable to deliver education to a number of Palestinian refugee children owing to a shortage of school space resulting from the restriction on the importation of construction materials to rebuild schools destroyed or damaged during "Operation Cast Lead". Those children are therefore attending Palestinian Authority schools.....

129. Forced displacement continues to affect the lives of hundreds of Palestinian families. More than 431 Palestinian structures were demolished in 2010 in the West Bank (including Area C and East Jerusalem), including 137 residential structures, leaving homeless at least 594 people, 299 of them children.

Refugee Studies Center, September 2010

Settler violence in al-Tuwani

In various locations across the West Bank isolation and lack of state presence have left children vulnerable to direct violence. The abuse of children living in the villages around al-Tuwani by neighbouring settlers is one example. Around 600–700 Palestinians live in al-Tuwani and the seven surrounding villages in the South Hebron Hills. This locale is within Area C of the West Bank and thus under full Israeli control. In the 1980s two settlements were constructed nearby – Ma'on and

Carmel. Adjacent to Ma'on an outpost – Havat Ma'on – was constructed in 1997 housing some of the most extremist settlers in the oPt. The Palestinians living in the vicinity of these settlements have been subjected to repeated acts of violence and measures that violate their basic human rights. These include direct assault, poisoning the land on which they graze their sheep, stealing and burning their crops. In addition, the settlers have striven to ensure that all efforts to develop the infrastructure of the villages – water supply, electricity, homes and public buildings – are quashed. The aim seems clear: to provoke the Palestinians into leaving the area entirely. While

the various acts of the settlers all impact negatively upon children as members of the Palestinian communities living in the area, the violence inflicted upon them directly in the course of their journey to and from school represents an explicit threat to them as children. The local school serving the area is located in al-Tuwani. The path along which children from two of the neighbouring villages walk to school passes between Ma'on and Havat Ma'on and a section has been fenced off by the settlers. While volunteers from the US-based Christian Peacemakers Team (CPT) and the Italian organisation Operation Dove (OD) accompany the children for most of the path, no adults are allowed to walk with the children along the section that has been fenced off. The children must, therefore, go alone and on numerous occasions they have been attacked.

Even the volunteers have been attacked on occasion yet they are less likely to be arrested than adult villagers who are frequently taken into custody by the Israeli authorities when they act to defend their families and property. In 2004 the Israeli Knesset mandated the IDF to provide an escort to the children for their passage through this fenced off area in order to protect them from the settlers. CPT and OD monitor the situation in the area on a daily basis and confirm that the army frequently fails to fulfil its obligations. When an army jeep does come to escort the children it is often late or the soldiers drive too fast through the fenced off area and the children must run behind them to keep up. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Ms Radhika Coomaraswamy, raised the situation of children in this area with the Israeli authorities following her visit in April 2007. In her report to the UN General Assembly in 2008 she noted that 'the Government of Israel was committed to investigating and taking appropriate action on the case of renewed attacks by settlers on schoolchildren in al-Tuwani village.' However, there is no evidence of change on the ground: in the 2007-8 school year there were 14 documented attacks on children by settlers. A local community leader offered us the following observation about the situation in al-Tuwani: 'So since '67 until now [the Israelis] are working on this strategy, this strategy of evacuation of the people. They have their plans just to make the Palestinian life in this area harder and harder: to be easier for them to evacuate us.' The CPT accompany [the children], watching everything. So it was helpful until now but really we need solutions. We have to take these settlers away from [the children].'

UNICEF, 2009

"Child labour is on the rise in Gaza and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. According to the 2004 Palestinian Child's Rights Law, children below the age of 15 are barred from working. Still, hunger and need drive families to allow their children to abandon schooling. Gaza's borders remain largely closed, and the entry and exit of goods is severely restricted. Six months after the end of Israel's 'Cast Lead' military operation here, restrictions on imports are making it virtually impossible for Gazans to rebuild their lives."

OCHA, Gaza Education Cluster Meeting, 27 October 2009

"Dr. Mazen Hamada gave an update on Al Azhar University, and although he said that he cannot speak for the other universities, he indicated that all the universities were suffering from similar problems including: After the destruction of the Faculty of Agriculture in Beit Hanon, all the students and staff had move to the main campus of the university. Since then, the university is overcrowded, and students and staff suffer from a lack of classrooms and laboratories. There are difficulties obtaining the necessary stationary for lectures. The labs are equipped with minimum instruments to run the practical courses. The university is not able to buy spare parts to repair the damaged or defective devices. Reconstruction of the buildings is still not possible. The university is in the process of finding glass to fix the broken windows but the only source is through the tunnels. Very little support is geared towards higher education. Most of the support goes to basic education. Al Azhar has appealed to various organizations and has received no or very little support.

The academic achievement of the students was drastically affected during the semester immediately following the war on Gaza. By conducting a survey and using available computer data, it was found that thousands (8,000 to 10,000) students had dropped academic hours. Dr.

Hamada explained that this is most likely due to the psychosocial impact of the war as students could not attend classes, or attend their exams, and therefore, preferred to withdraw. The numbers of dropouts and withdrawal from classes is much higher in the war-semester than in previous semesters."

UN HRC, 15 September 2009, para.69, 1277:

"69. The number of persons suffering from mental health problems is also bound to increase. The Mission investigated a number of incidents in which adults and children witnessed the killing of their loved ones. Doctors of the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme gave information to the Mission on psychosomatic disorders, on a widespread state of alienation in the population, and on "numbness" as a result of severe loss. They told the Mission that these conditions were likely to in turn increase the readiness to embrace violence and extremism. They also told the Mission that 20 percent of children in the Gaza Strip suffer Post Traumatic Stress Disorders.

1277. Adults and children showed signs of profound depression, while children suffered from insomnia and bed-wetting. Numerous testimonies received by the Mission highlight the presence of children in situations where houses were searched or occupied with force by Israeli soldiers, and when killings occurred.... Children were present in improvised shelters on United Nations premises, enduring the trauma of displacement as well as feelings of fear from the military attacks and of deep insecurity from having been attacked in their own homes or in a shelter that was expected to be safe. During its visits, the Mission saw many children living with their families in the ruins of their homes and in makeshift accommodation. The trauma for children having witnessed violence and often the killing of their own family members will no doubt be long-lasting."

Al Mezan, September 2009, p.63

"According to the Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA) in the OPT, throughout the assault the Israeli military destroyed 18 schools (eight government-run, two private, and eight kindergartens), and damaged at least 260 schools and kindergartens. Six of the eight government schools that were destroyed are in north Gaza; forcing almost 9,000 schoolchildren to relocate to other schools. Thirty-six out of 124 UNRWA school buildings sustained physical damage; five of these schools were operating as temporary emergency shelters. No UNRWA school operated as a school throughout the 23-day offensive. Additionally, there were reports that the Israeli army targeted and damaged the Ministry of Education, the Gaza Training College, the Gaza Music School, and university buildings. This extensive destruction of schools cannot be justified by military necessity and violates the *Fourth Geneva Convention* as well as customary international law."

Save the Children, 24 February 2009

"While most children have returned to schools, with attendance reported at 80 percent for UNRWA schools and 89 percent for Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) schools, some children still are not attending class because of displacement, poverty, fear or injury. Children and teaching staff continue to be emotionally affected by their experiences, and many of them have lost family, friends and homes. In addition, teachers and other education staff were in short supply even before the crisis as a result of a teacher strike.[...]

Serious damage to schools has a direct impact on education and child safety in Gaza. Currently, many students study in classrooms without doors and windows, or in buildings with entire school wings in rubble. This situation cannot easily be rectified as construction materials have not been permitted to enter the territory. [...]

Before the most recent crisis, Gaza's schools were overcrowded, understaffed and undersupplied as a result of the Israeli blockade and of the factional split between Fatah and Hamas. There were significant concerns about academic performance in all schools, as well as reports from children of high levels of violence. Now, these problems are compounded by psychological distress in children and teachers, as well as the damage to schools and loss of materials. [...]

Every child in Gaza has been affected by the recent Israeli offensive. Some children, however, are more vulnerable than others, and it will be especially important to ensure that these children are in school — notably children with disabilities, displaced children and girls (who are particularly vulnerable to drop-out and early marriage).

- A preliminary assessment indicated that, in 45 surveyed non-refugee localities in Gaza, 71,657 people, including around 40,128 children, were staying with host families (OCHA). Many displaced children are likely to have lost their clothes, books, schoolbags and other materials that, due to the blockade, are hard to replace and affect their ability to participate at school."

UNIFEM, 2009

"The displaced and residents of Khan Younis cite the greatest drop in school attendance with more than 50% saying that girls and boys have stopped attending school following the war. Overall 32% of respondents say there has been a decline in school attendance following the war. However, it is necessary to be careful with these responses given that they reflect general perceptions rather than statements that children from their own household have actually stopped attending. In terms of gender, the highest response that only girls stopped going to school was among female headed households (13%), among residents of Deir al Balah (12%) and Rafah (10%).

Table 28: War's affects on school attendance

	Men	Women	Female headed household	Displaced	North Gaza	Gaza	Deir al Balah	Khan Younis	Rafah
Boys and girls stopped going to school after war	34%	30%	33%	52%	8%	29%	30%	53%	41%
Only girls stopped	7%	8%	13%	6%	5%	7%	12%	5%	10%
Only boys stopped	4%	3%	5%	4%	2%	4%	5%	3%	4%

The main reason respondents gave for the decline in school attendance, was feelings of insecurity cited by more than 43% of respondents but higher among women (47%), the displaced and female headed households(44%), and highest among residents of Khan Younis (59%). In order to ensure that all girls and boys benefit equally from education it is essential to understand the social, security and gender dynamics that might place constraints on them, and specially for displaced girls and boys. "

Table 29: Main reason affecting school attendance after the war

	Men	Women	Female headed household	Displaced	North Gaza	Gaza	Deir al Balah	Khan Yunis	Rafah
Feeling of insecurity	40%	47%	44%	44%	39%	43%	43%	59%	25%

"Throughout the survey, the communities displaced perceived a heightened vulnerability among their women family members in relation to safety and security needs. In addition, displaced

women were more likely than other women to say they felt unsafe using a bathing or latrine facility and also cited a greater lack of access to reliable sanitary materials. Half of the displaced respondents said their children had not returned to school after the war due to “lack of security”. However, individuals from displaced households report higher knowledge of, access to and participation in the planning of relief and recovery assistance than those not displaced during the war. Given that providing housing to their families is men’s socially prescribed gender responsibility, it is significant that men in displaced households show greater uncertainty than women that they will be able to return to their homes in the future, signalling a heightened level of stress and anxiety amongst men regarding this fundamental issue.

...

Table 19: Percentage answering mental health as the primary health problem currently faced by either gender

	Men	Women	Female headed household	Displaced	North Gaza	Gaza	Deir al Balah	Khan Younis	Rafah
Mental health of boys and men	33%	25%	31%	36%	18%	46%	29%	43%	25%
Mental health of girls and women	28%	33%	26%	31%	14%	40%	28%	32%	30%

.....

Table 20: The main obstacles to access for psychosocial support

	Men	Women	Female headed household	Displaced	North Gaza	Gaza	Deir al Balah	Khan Younis	Rafah
Lack of information	24%	30%	30%	28%	27%	20%	27%	40%	26%
Distance	16%	16%	23%	20%	20%	11%	34%	16%	3%
Inability to pay	17%	11%	15%	14%	11%	14%	14%	15%	17%
Feelings of shame	10%	10%	5%	9%	15%	9%	7%	8%	12%

...

Sixty five percent of men and 52% of women cite an increase in risk-taking behaviours following the war. The highest rate of response is in Rafah (74%) and Khan Younis (72%) and the rate of response is also higher among those displaced during the war (67%). When asked what these were, three main responses were cited across the five governorates. In order of highest response these were: smoking at 38% to 52% (with the highest rate cited in Khan Younis and North Gaza); domestic violence against wives at 16% to 22%; and domestic violence against children at 10% to 19% (with the highest rate of response in Rafah (27%). An increase in drug abuse was also cited by approximately 8% of all respondents with women more likely to cite it than men (at 10% compared to 6%) and the highest level of reporting drug abuse is in Khan Younis (12%)."

...

Table 30: Has there been an increase or decrease in the following types of violence following the war?

	Change In extent	Men	Women	Female headed household	Displaced
Killings by Israel	increased	64%	60%	70%	67%
	decreased	16%	15%	9%	9%
Domestic violence against wife	increased	54%	52%	48%	57%
	decreased	16%	16%	15%	13%
Domestic violence against children	increased	51%	49%	57%	52%
	decreased	19%	20%	20%	19%
Killings due to internal conflict	increased	47%	45%	52%	48%
	decreased	29%	30%	27%	26%
Early marriage	increased	38%	37%	36%	39%
	decreased	29%	27%	30%	27%
Sexual harassment	increased	28%	24%	18%	22%
	decreased	32%	33%	42%	40%
Honor killing	increased	22%	18%	10%	15%
	decreased	32%	33%	44%	38%
Incest	increased	22%	20%	9%	18%
	decreased	31%	34%	47%	31%

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), May 2008, p.5

"Impact of House Demolitions on Children: Demolitions lead to the displacement of Palestinian families and have wide-ranging physical and psychological impacts. A recent survey conducted by the Palestinian Counseling Center and supported by Save the Children – UK and the Welfare Association found that in the immediate aftermath of a house demolition, children have been separated from their parents, and that there are gaps in children's access to education, health facilities and clean water. Moreover, even though demolition is a single event, its impact is similar to multiple and continuous traumas. The survey found that emotional and behavioral problems persist beyond the first six month period following a demolition. Long-term effects include lower academic achievement rates and early school drop-out. Symptoms of psychological distress found among children included: increased aggression; depression; difficulty concentrating and bedwetting, among others. The survey also found that only 12 % of surveyed families reported that they had the chance to empty the house of its contents prior to demolition and that over 65% of surveyed families reported that they moved more than one time following the demolition of their home."

Save the Children, 3 October 2007

"There are 4 million Palestinians in the OPT (2.5 million, or 63%, in the West Bank, and 1.5 million, about 37%, in Gaza). Children make up 52.2% of the OPT population. That is an estimated 2.1 million Palestinians under the age of 18. 42% of Palestinian children in the OPT are refugees; 69% of children in Gaza and 27% of children in the West Bank are refugees. Between January and September 2007, 38 children were killed and 209 children were injured as a result of direct Israeli military and settler violence. 29 children died as a result of Palestinian inter-factional fighting and 9 children died in incidents indirectly related to the conflict. By the end of September, 335 Palestinian children were being held in Israeli detention facilities. The majority of children detained in 2007 are from households with very low or no income, and the highest percentage has generally been from the northern West Bank.

More children living in rural areas are exposed to home violence (56%) than children in urban areas (50%) and children in refugee camps (47%). Between January and August 2007, 425 people were affected or displaced by house demolitions, 40% of whom were children. From late 2006 through early 2007, 450 children (aged 12 -17) in the West Bank and Gaza identified increased violence in school and domestic violence as priority issues for child protection.

Between October 2006 and September 2007, there were: At least 75 schools in Gaza which were disrupted or closed because of Palestinian inter-factional fighting. In 6 instances, militants stormed the schools and in 3 of those attacks, hand grenades were used. At least 11 incidents in which Israeli soldiers attacked PA and UNRWA-run schools. In 6 of these attacks, soldiers used either teargas, sound bombs or stun grenades inside the schools. At least 10 separate attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinian students from Cordoba elementary school in H2/Hebron City, causing injuries among at least 18 students. At least 6 separate incidents wherein the Israeli military used schools (3 PA-run and 3 UNRWA-run) as detention facilities."

Save the Children, June 2008

"The percentage of Palestinian refugee girls married by age 18 is 35.4% in Gaza and 34.7% in the West Bank.... Refugees remain highly vulnerable to ongoing displacement. For example, ... 2,521 refugee shelters were destroyed in the Gaza Strip between October 2000 and June 2005 displacing 24,000 persons.... A 2003 study found refugees in the OPT were the most vulnerable to the effects of conflict. Whereas 20% of the Palestinian population required psycho-social support, the corresponding figure for refugees was 44%, rising to 53% among camp populations. In the OPT refugee children are at risk of death and injury as a result of the conflict. 344 children in Gaza and 440 children in the West Bank were killed from September 2000 until end 2005, representing 19.9% of total fatalities. Among those killed, 159 were UNRWA school children, of whom four were killed by Israeli fire into UNRWA schools. In addition, a total of 1,548 children enrolled in UNRWA schools were injured, of whom 10 inside school premises. "

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 12 October 2006

"Youngsters are suffering increasing levels of stress from violence and fear in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, UNICEF said. "They are confronted with regular military operations, shelling, house demolitions and checkpoints on their way to schools," said Anne Grandjean, a UNICEF Child Protection Officer. "As a result we find high prevalence of signs of stress such as anxiety, eating and sleeping disorders, and difficulties concentrating in school. All of these signs need to be tackled as soon as possible to avoid a long-lasting impact on the child's development," she added. The bloodiest year for Palestinian children since the beginning of the second intifada was 2002, when 192 children met a violent death."

BADIL , 12 September 2007

"Education is highly valued in the face of the protracted nature of the Palestinian refugee crisis. It is seen both as offering an opportunity for a better life and as a means of reaffirming identity. A study commissioned by UNRWA on adolescents' knowledge of and attitudes towards family, reproductive health issues and lifestyle practices, showed that 76% of the respondents aspired to higher education. Most refugees benefit from the elementary and preparatory education provided by UNRWA schools. Few study in private schools.

Education-related problems... In the 1967-occupied Palestinian territory, refugee children lost between 35% and 50% of class time during the first intifada. The second intifada has negatively affected access to education and the quality of education provided in the OPT. Israeli military and Jewish settler activity in the OPT has had a negative effect on the capacity of students to concentrate, participate in class, and meet amongst themselves for study purposes. During 2006, a decline was observed in test scores in schools and school attendance in the OPT.

Enrolment rates among refugee children are high, but tend to drop off at the preparatory level owing to poverty, lack of motivation, and (among young women) marriage and social constraints. Nearly all refugee children are enrolled at the elementary stage. In all fields and at nearly all ages, more women than men are enrolled.

Table 2.11: Enrolment Levels (%) in West Bank & Gaza Strip

Age Group	West Bank & Gaza Strip
	MF
7-9	9898
10-14	7983
15-18	4855
19-24	1417

....In the OPT, however, over three per cent of students in the localities affected by the Wall left school as a direct result of the Wall and its associated regime, while 26% of those who left school did so because of the worsening economic situation.... In the 1967-occupied Palestinian territory, non-refugee Palestinians have a slightly lower enrolment rate than camp and non-camp refugees.... In the OPT, the enrolment rate for persons 6-24 years amounted to 80.6% of the total number of refugees (78.7% for males and 82.6% for females). Persons are defined as literate if they can read or write. In the OPT, female non-literacy is nearly three times that of males.... [In OPT] literacy is higher among camp refugees. In the former Palestinian territory, 93.6% of the refugees are literate (96.7% for males and 90.4% for females). There is little difference between refugee and non-refugee Palestinians in the 1967-occupied Palestinian territory. Among persons classified as special hard ship cases, 16.6% are illiterate, with the highest rates being in the West Bank (25%) and the lowest in the Gaza Strip (12%). "

Save the Children, 3 October 2007

"For the 2007-2008 school year, 1.1 million students were enrolled in schools, half of them females. 70% of those students attend PA-run schools, 23% attend UNRWA schools and 7% go to private schools. As many as 6,000 students and more than 650 teachers (of a total of 33,000 students and 2,000 teachers) in east Jerusalem face difficulties reaching their schools because of the Wall. More than two-thirds of Gaza's UNRWA school students in grades 4 through 9 failed math, and more than one-third did poorly in Arabic. UNRWA attributed this to violence, overcrowding and poverty. From late 2006 through early 2007, 450 children (aged 12 -17) in the West Bank and Gaza identified increased violence in school and domestic violence as priority issues for child protection."

See Also:

[Selected Statistics, United Nations Children's Fund \(UNICEF\)](#), 21 July 2006

[Children and Armed Conflict, United Nations Secretary General \(UN SG\)](#), 21 January 2008

[Renewed violence in Gaza raises serious concerns for children's safety, United Nations Children's Fund \(UNICEF\)](#), 6 November 2006

[Pregnant Palestinians give birth at Israeli checkpoints, Integrated Regional Information Networks \(IRIN\)](#), 28 September 2006

[Israel's blockade poses immediate threat to the lives of Gaza's sick and elderly](#), Oxfam, 25 January 2008

[Pregnant Palestinians give birth at Israeli checkpoints, Integrated Regional Information Networks \(IRIN\)](#), 28 September 2006

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS

Socio Economic Situation

Socio-Economic and Humanitarian Situation in OPT

- Socio-Economic and Humanitarian Situation in OPT
- Issues of self reliance and subsistence needs are faced by both displaced and non displaced in the OPT. The overall performance of the Palestinian economy remains poor, due Israel's persistent restrictions and obstacles to movement and access in the West Bank, and continual blockade on Gaza and results of high level of destruction of Gaza as result of 2009. The UN has reported economic progress in 2010 providing some measure of relief however macro-economic improvements conceal vast disparities on the ground, with increasing exposure to chronic poverty for many, and great concerns over longer-term prospects.
- In the West Bank, a reduction in obstacles between select urban areas has yielded tangible commercial benefits, as has an improvement in law and order within Area A.1 Restrictions on movement remain pervasive, however, notably in East Jerusalem, Area C and the seam zones, where access to social services and economic resources continues to be severely constrained. Unaltered restrictions on planning and development and unabated settler violence in particular constitute constant hardships for Palestinians. In Gaza, despite a partial easing of closure in June 2010, many of the fundamental parameters of the blockade remain in place.
- Lack of consistent monitoring means that there is limited information as to the humanitarian situation of Palestinians displaced in contrast to that of the overall Palestinian population in West Bank and Gaza Strip, yet their vulnerability is not doubt amplified by their displacement. Families that have been displaced according to the few surveys undertaken mainly with regards to West Bank do fare significantly worse in terms of living conditions due to erosion of coping mechanisms socioeconomic impacts and psychosocial well-being than they did before their displacement, regardless of the reason why they were displaced.
- In the West Bank, the displaced as well as the households hosting the displaced are among the most vulnerable when it comes to food security. While areas at high risk of displacement are significantly poorer, more marginalized and less protected than the general population. (Save the Children, 2009) Only 37% of respondents from areas at high risk of displacement said they have sufficient food, compared with 70% among the general population in the OPT. (Save the Children, October 2009)
- Socio-Economic impact of Closures in West Bank & Gaza Strip
- Israeli closure regime includes of physical measures including checkpoints, closed military areas, settlements amongst other obstacles, and number of administrative measures such as the permit regime and population registry which controls of movement of people and vehicles, and residency rights of individuals. Such regime is forcing many Palestinians, displaced and not, into reliance on aid and worsening the already deteriorating socioeconomic conditions A dependency, which according to the World Bank, is not temporary: "aid reliance dismantles existing economic structures and leads to a decline, which is difficult to reverse." There is need for a fundamental restoration of freedom of movement. (OCHA, January 2008) The closure regime has had significant impact on displaced and at risk of displacement by affecting access to basic services and livelihoods.
- There has been no systematic monitoring of the socio-economic impact on IDPs however anecdotal evidence reflects varied impact closures have had on communities at risk and displaced alike. In such examples as Hebron, impact of closures has been disastrous leading

to deterioration in livelihoods and contributing to displacement of Palestinian families. In Gaza, the continuous sanctions, repeated incursions and extended buffer zone has had disastrous socio-economic impact on IDPs and non IDPs alike, stalling reconstruction efforts for IDPs whose homes were demolished, and limiting access to livelihoods.

- Lack of contiguity between different Palestinian lands affects freedom of movement, access to employment, commerce and access to services and social networks, and restrictions on the land and property rights of Palestinians affect infrastructure development, urban growth and development. In Area C and East Jerusalem, Palestinians find it difficult to obtain building permits, and infrastructure projects are also frequently denied or rejected; illegal construction incurs fines, and is at risk of being demolished. Any economic activity within Area C of the West Bank is therefore limited to low intensity agriculture.
- Impact of closure regime for instance is seen in Hebron's Old City, where the presence of settlers has led to strict security measures imposed by the IDF. These have included closing markets and shops to create "buffer zones". This has left Palestinian property increasingly at risk of being taken over by settlers. These measures have made it virtually impossible for Palestinians to bring their goods to sell in the Old Suq. (OCHA, January 2008) Before September 2000 there were 1,610 shops licensed in and around the Old City. Around 650 shops are closed by military order and another 700 closed due to the drop in trade. Of those remaining in the Old Suq, only 10% are still functioning. (OCHA, January 2008)
- In Gaza Strip, isolation in the past several years continues to be in effect since Israel's disengagement in 2005. In 2007, Israel tightened its blockade on Gaza entailed that the local economy faced "irrevocable damage" and the population in Gaza more reliant on aid than ever before. (OCHA, December 2007) Reconstruction efforts for thousands displaced in 2004-2005 had been stalled, while livelihoods of all Palestinians were further impacted by low stock levels, rising prices, increased joblessness and loss of incomes with devastating consequences for the population. (OCHA, December 2007) The economy has since worsened with continual blockade in subsequent years and wide scale damages incurred during the Israel operation Cast Lead in January 2009 (OCHA, November 2009). Following Israeli offensive thousands remained displaced residing in tents, in the ruins of their houses, or in temporary shelter. Reconstruction has been hampered by the Israeli blockade that stops materials such as
- cement and steel (OCHA November 2010). Though there has been moderate easing of the closure regime, by early 2011 these were still at less than 11% of pre-2009 levels.

OCHA, December 2010

Recent economic progress in the West Bank and in Gaza and a reduction in direct conflict-related casualties since January 2010 have provided some measure of relief for Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). However, in the absence of significant structural changes to the environment, and first and foremost a just and lasting peace and the end of the Israeli occupation, entrenched vulnerability remains a reality throughout the oPt. Indeed, the situation by the end of 2010 is characterized by ongoing political stalemate, regular exposure to violence, continuing restrictions on access and movement, and persistent human rights violations, all factors leading to a protracted humanitarian situation. Macro-economic improvements conceal vast disparities on the ground, with increasing exposure to chronic poverty for many, and great concerns over longer-term prospects. They also fail to alleviate the protection crisis faced by most Palestinians, for whom few rights are ever secure.

In the West Bank, a reduction in the number of obstacles between select urban areas has yielded tangible commercial benefits, as has an improvement in law and order within Area A.1 Restrictions on movement remain pervasive, however, notably in East Jerusalem, Area C and the seam zones, where access to social services and economic resources continues to be severely constrained. Unaltered restrictions on planning and development and unabated settler violence in particular constitute constant hardships for Palestinians. In Gaza, despite a partial easing of

closure, many of the fundamental parameters of the blockade remain in place. While the June 2010 policy decision of the Government of Israel has resulted in a greater supply of consumer goods and the approval of some international construction projects, on-going restrictions on reconstruction material, exports and movement of people continue to hamper any meaningful economic revitalization, thereby maintaining large swathes of the population dependent on external aid.

OCHA, 30 November 2009

"The overall performance of the Palestinian economy remains poor, due primarily to Israel's blockade on Gaza and persistent obstacles to movement and access in the West Bank. While there has been progress in some West Bank macro-economic indicators, the destruction and devastation caused by the "Cast Lead" military offensive, along with the ongoing blockade, resulted in a further deterioration of the situation in Gaza. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has recently warned that 2009 is shaping up to be an all time low for the performance of the Palestinian economy. Substantial improvements in Palestinian access and movement are needed to generate significant economic progress; without this, the oPt will continue to be largely dependent on donor support. In 2008, the oPt continued to have the worst-performing economy in the Middle East / North Africa sub-region. ... Unemployment levels in both Gaza and the West Bank were high in 2008 and remained so during the first half of 2009, according to both narrow and broad definitions. In Gaza, unemployment is amongst the highest in the world.

Save the Children, Life on Edge: Summary of Research Findings, October 2009

"Key Findings

- Areas identified by the international community as high risk [High risk areas are those locations in the West Bank under complete Israeli control (Area C under the Oslo Accords) and locations near or adjacent to the border areas in Gaza known as the buffer zone. Approximately 61% of the West Bank is classified as Area C.] are significantly poorer, more marginalized and less protected than the general population.
- At least 49% of respondents living in or near Gaza's buffer zone or in West Bank areas under complete Israeli control (Area C) say they have been displaced at least once since 2000, compared with 15% among the general population in the OPT. Families that have been displaced fare significantly worse in terms of living conditions, socioeconomic impacts and psychosocial well-being than they did before their displacement, regardless of the reason why they were displaced.
- In high risk areas, house demolitions and the loss of income and sources of livelihoods are common triggers for the displacement of families. In the West Bank, families in high risk areas also faced forced evictions, land confiscation threats and lack of access to essential services, making them vulnerable to displacement. In the Gaza buffer zone areas, concerns for personal security and safety have caused families to move away from their communities.
- 78% of displaced families said they wanted to return to their homes.
- International organizations are not reaching those most in need of assistance, particularly in high risk areas in the West Bank. More than half of households surveyed in high risk areas in the West Bank said that humanitarian assistance from local and international organizations is 'not available,' in contrast with the approximately 8% in Gaza high risk areas who said that humanitarian assistance was 'not available.'
- Families who most need legal support are not getting it. The majority of families both in high risk areas and in the general population did not access legal services or support after receiving a house demolition or land confiscation order.

...

Income/ Poverty and Livelihood

Many families living in high risk areas in the West Bank and Gaza have lost their sources of livelihood since 2000 and face increasing poverty as a result.

§ While families in Gaza have relied on the availability of humanitarian assistance and charities to cushion the impacts, these forms of assistance have been less available to marginalized families in the West Bank.

§ Roughly 70% of respondents in high risk areas live below the poverty line compared with 35% among the general population in the OPT.

§ 34% of surveyed households in high risk areas rely on agriculture and herding activities as a first source of income, most on land that they own.

§ 45% of breadwinners in high risk areas in the West Bank and Gaza have lost their job or sources of livelihood since 2000.

§ In Gaza, humanitarian assistance provided by UNRWA and charities made up a significant source of income for high risk households at 52% and 27% respectively.

§ In the West Bank high risk areas, humanitarian assistance is not available for most families with only 12% receiving assistance from either UNRWA or charities as a source of income.

§ In the West Bank high risk areas, 10% of respondents felt they were secure economically, compared to 36% of the general West Bank population."

OCHA, 30 November 2009

"High levels of food insecurity

Deteriorating livelihoods, poverty and the global increase in food and fuel prices contributed to the maintenance of already high levels of food insecurity in the oPt, which reached 38.5% of the Palestinian population (over 1.5 million people) in 2009, compared to 38% in 2008. Seventy-five (75%) of the food-insecure population are women (36%) and children (39%). Food insecurity is primarily a consequence of food price inflation, poverty, livelihoods' deterioration and erosion of coping mechanisms, leading to increased difficulties of households to afford sufficient quantities of quality food.

Levels of food insecurity remained highest in Gaza, where 60.5% of households are food-insecure, compared to 25% in the West Bank. Food insecurity in Gaza is highest in rural areas (66.7%). In the West Bank, rates are highest in rural areas and refugee camps (both 29%). A further 11% of the population are considered vulnerable to food insecurity in the West Bank and 16.2% in the Gaza Strip."

Al Mezan, September 2009

"As illustrated below, during Operation Cast Lead, many if not most of the houses demolished were


destroyed in military attacks which violated the principles of distinction and proportionality and may

amount to grave breaches of the *Fourth Geneva Convention*. ... During Operation Cast Lead, Israeli troops destroyed thousands of shelters. The latest UN figures based on a large scale house-to-house survey reveal that 3,600 shelters were demolished beyond repair, 2,700 shelters sustained major damages and 52,000 shelters sustained minor damages. Through a Gaza Strip-wide survey, Al Mezan was able to verify the total destruction of 2,631 shelters and the partial destruction of 8,523 shelters."

Level of Damage	Governorate					Total
	North Gaza	Gaza	Middle	Khan Younis	Rafah	
Total Destruction	890	903	174	246	418	2,631
Partial Destruction	2,427	4,993	294	243	566	8,523
Total	3317	5896	468	489	984	11,154

Table 1: Destruction of civilian homes according to extent of damage and governorate. Source: Al Mezan

...



Graph 2: Number of shelters damaged or destroyed according to the method of destruction. Source: Al Mezan documentation

Reuters, 26 November 2009

"For the homeless in Gaza, this year's Eid al-Adha, which falls Friday, is a time to reflect on all they have lost in a year when already tough conditions in the blockaded territory of 1.5 million people went from bad to worse. Hundreds of Gaza families made homeless during the war still live in tents, the United Nations says. Many more are living in the ruins of their houses or with relatives. Reconstruction has been hampered by the Israeli blockade that stops materials such as cement and steel reaching the Hamas-ruled territory, despite billions of dollars of aid pledges. U.N. officials have expressed concern about the added hardship the homeless will face as winter sets in."

UN HRC, 15 September 2009

"1239. The destruction or damage of their homes forced many people to flee and find shelter with relatives or agencies providing assistance, such as UNRWA. At the height of the military operations UNRWA was providing shelter to 50,896 displaced persons in 50 shelters. This number was estimated to be a fraction of those who had become homeless, most of whom found temporary shelter with relatives. The Mission was informed that this situation created extreme

hardship for people who had to share already deteriorated and limited housing, sanitary and water facilities. It saw for itself people who were still living in tents some six months after the end of the operations.

1240. Children and women were particularly affected by the hardship caused by the destruction of homes and the displacement. Housing and Land Rights Network – Habitat International Coalition reported that “of those forced to seek shelter following the military damage or destruction of their home, over half were children. While female-headed households constitute only a relatively small percentage of the total affected families (7 per cent), their number in absolute terms, 763 such families, is significant.”

OCHA, 30 November 2009

"Partners in the Shelter and Non-food Items Cluster assisted 59,230 families whose homes were destroyed or damaged during the Israeli military operation in Gaza (3,511 homes were completely destroyed, 2,834 sustained major damage). Partners distributed 300,000 blankets, 2,500 tents, 55,000 mattresses, 30,000 clothing kits and 30,000 kitchen sets. However, since the Government of Israel did not allow reconstruction material into the Gaza Strip, the full repair and reconstruction needs could not be met, leaving 20,000 people displaced, of which approximately 650 people live in tents or pre-fabricated container homes next to their damaged houses, and approximately 260 people live in tent camps. Taking accumulated needs into consideration, a total of 30,000 houses need to be built or re-built, 3,000 need major repair, and a large number of the 53,000 houses that sustained light damage during the military offensive in January still need repair."

MAS, August 2009

"Preliminary results of the survey in the West Bank (4960 families) conclude that 24.1% of households in the West Bank suffer from food insecurity, compared with 25% in 2008. Figure 1 divides the Palestinian families in the West Bank into four groups with regard to food security ... and subdivides these between refugees and non-refugees. It is obvious from the figure that the rate of food insecurity was higher among the nonrefugees compared to refugees (25% among non-refugees, while it was 21.5% among the refugees). The proportion of households vulnerable to food insecurity is almost the same for both refugees and non refugees in the West Bank, amounted to about 12%. It should be noted that this proportion reached 16% during the year 2008. The proportion of marginally food secure households during the year 2009 rose to 26.4% compared with 15% in 2008. Most probably a considerable proportion of the food secured households in 2008 became marginally food secure during this year because of the increase in food prices. The proportion of the food secured households declined to 38.3% in 2009 compared with 44% in 2008."

Table 1: Profile of the most vulnerable groups and their needs in the Gaza Strip

Livelihood group	Profile of vulnerable sub-group	2-Immediate (1 months) needs	6 months)-Short-term (3 needs
* Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and other directly war affected households	- House destroyed and depend on others for shelter - Lost main source of income - Lost their productive assets	- Food assistance - Cash and material support to meet essential non-food needs (particularly for non-refugees who do not benefit from free services.)	- Assistance in recovering productive assets - Cash and/or food for work geared towards repair of home and productive assets If recovery materials remain unavailable, food aid will continue to be essential
* Indirectly war-affected households, including: Laid-off workers	- Lost job - Member of households already food insecure before the war	- Food assistance - Temporary employment	- Cash and/or food for work and assistance in locating employment
* Families Hosting IDPs	- Households already food insecure before the war hosting IDPs - Limited income sources	- Cash and/or in-kind support to meet non-food needs - Temporary food assistance	- If hosting is prolonged, enrollment in food and cash assistance programs

Source: WFP & FAO (Feb, 2009)

WFP&FAO, September 2009

"The fragile socio-economic situation in the Gaza Strip has been further aggravated with the closure. Currently, 77% of Gaza's population is food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity, thus depending heavily on humanitarian assistance to sustain their livelihood. While humanitarian aid represented only 3% of the total imports before the closure (14 July 2007), this percentage became eight times higher with a total of 26% of total imports. Construction raw material imports decreased to zero, while it represented 65% of the total imports prior to June 2007."

Save the Children, 3 October 2007

"58% of Palestinians in the OPT – or 2.3 million – live below the poverty line (\$2.40/day/person). 42% of households in Gaza live in extreme poverty (\$1.38/day/person) compared to 26% in the West Bank. A 2007 joint WFP/FAO survey found that one-third of Palestinian households are food insecure, i.e. cannot afford a balanced meal, and an additional 12% are vulnerable to food insecurity. Gaza is the most hard hit, with 51% of the population food insecure. Recorded levels of child labour increased from 3.1% in 2004 to 4.2% in 2006, with the highest increase recorded among girls (from 0.7% to 3.1%). The fertility rate (child/Palestinian woman) for 2006 is 4.6. The rate is 4.2 in the West Bank and 5.4 in Gaza. Israel's fertility rate is 3. The infant mortality rate in the OPT increased from 24.2/1000 infants for the period of 1999-2003 to 25.3/1000 for 2004-2005. Israel's infant mortality rate in 2005 was 5/1000. 10% of Palestinian children under five are stunted, with proportions highest in Gaza, reaching almost 30% in north Gaza. More than 70% of 9-month-old children in Gaza and 50% in the West Bank are anemic. In 2006, people in Gaza survived on an average of 81 liters of water a day, while West Bankers lived on just 58. (The

World Health Organization recommends 150 liters/day for drinking, cooking, cleaning and bathing). In the West Bank, 25% of water sources are contaminated by fecal coliform bacteria. "

World Bank (WB), 9 May 2007

"ii. Currently, freedom of movement and access for Palestinians within the West Bank is the exception rather than the norm contrary to the commitments undertaken in a number of Agreements between GOI and the PA. In particular, both the Oslo Accords and the Road Map were based on the principle that normal Palestinian economic and social life would be unimpeded by restrictions. In economic terms, the restrictions arising from closure not only increase transaction costs, but create such a high level of uncertainty and inefficiency that the normal conduct of business becomes exceedingly difficult and stymies the growth and investment which is necessary to fuel economic revival. ...

v. While GOI has shown a willingness to consider a relaxation of specific restrictions, including the provision of several hundred permits to unique categories of Palestinians such as businessmen, or the removal of certain physical impediments, incremental steps are not likely to lead to any sustainable improvement. This is because these incremental steps lack permanence and certainty and can be easily withdrawn or replaced by other restrictions. Moreover, sustainable economic recovery will remain elusive if large areas of the West Bank remain inaccessible for economic purposes and restricted movement remains the norm for the vast majority of Palestinians and expatriate Palestinian investors. Only through a fundamental reassessment of closure, and a restoration of the *presumption of movement*, as embodied in the many agreements between GOI and the PA, will the Palestinian private sector be able to recover and fuel sustainable growth. "

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 22 January 2008

"The West Bank has limited natural resources and its economy depends on trade and remittances

from jobs in Israel. Since the majority of the West Bank's trade is with Israel, the current closure regime is forcing many West Bankers into reliance on aid and worsening the already deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. UN agencies currently provide food aid to more than 790,650 Palestinians in the West Bank. A dependency, which according to the World Bank, is not temporary: "aid reliance dismantles existing economic structures and leads to a decline, which is difficult to reverse." If the West Bank economy is to recover and grow sufficiently simply to finance the basic humanitarian needs of the Palestinian population, trade must increase substantially. In 2007, with reference to the oPt, the World Bank stated that no economy can develop without mobility. Also the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan for 2008-10 (PRDP), "is built on the assumption that Israel is willing to take steps to remove administrative and physical barriers to the movement and access of people and goods". Negotiations between the Government of Israel (GoI) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) have included discussions on improving access as an essential element for security in the occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt). The 'Agreement on Movement and Access', which was signed in November 2005, has so far led to very limited, if any, improvements. [T]he examples of Nablus City and Ad Dahariya, [shows] how economic decline and the resulting humanitarian needs in the West Bank are inextricably linked to the decline in trade as a result of imposed closures and movement restrictions as well as drops in remittances from Palestinian jobs in Israel."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 22 January 2008

"..... Israeli settlements lie on the southern edge of the Old Suq [of Hebron]. They are home to approximately 600 settlers who are protected by around 1,500 IDF soldiers. The settlers are connected to the Tomb of the Patriarchs and to the larger settlement of Kiryat Arba, by a corridor lined with 87 obstacles that physically prevent access by the local Palestinian population. The presence of settlers has led to strict security measures imposed by the IDF. These have included closing markets and shops to create "buffer zones". This has left Palestinian property increasingly

at risk of being taken over by settlers. These measures have made it virtually impossible for Palestinians to bring their goods to sell in the Old Suq. Increased restrictions and fears of settler violence have also driven potential customers away to rural markets in surrounding villages. All vehicle traffic is banned by the IDF in the Old Suq and many Palestinians who were living and running businesses there have since moved out. Today, the Old Suq is almost deserted. Before September 2000 there were 1,610 shops licensed in and around the Old City. Around 650 shops are closed by military order and another 700 closed due to the drop in trade. Of those remaining in the Old Suq, only 10% are still functioning. Of the 10% of the original population who still live in the Old City, eight out of 10 adults are unemployed and an estimated 75% live below the poverty line. A recent survey conducted by the Ministry of National Economy found that the average income per household in the area is about \$160 per month while the average for the West Bank is \$405.

Ad-Dhahriya is a town 30 kilometres south of Hebron City with a population of 30,640, and is seven kilometers north of the 1949 Armistice line. Until 2000, Ad Dahiriya ,as the southernmost West Bank town, was the largest commercial centre in the district after Hebron. As well as being the hub of 26 villages and hamlets, it was the market centre for another 140,000 Arab Israeli Bedouins from the Negev in the south of Israel. Arab Israelis were attracted by the cheaper prices and traditional Arab products available. The Wednesday animal market was used by both Israeli Bedouin and West Bank herders and attracted merchants from all over the West Bank. Currently, Ad-Dhahriya is surrounded by roadblocks and there are more than eight earth mounds closing road entrances in the immediate vicinity, preventing travel south and east. To the north, poor quality secondary routes are open to Hebron, the regional trade centre. Arab Israeli Bedouin are no longer able to reach to Ad-Dhahriya. Villagers from north of the Ad Dahariya have turned to Hebron rather than negotiating the closures around Ad Dahariya to reach their traditional markets. The Ad-Dhahiriya Chamber of Commerce states that more than 140 of an estimated 650 small and medium businesses (22%) have closed completely since 2000. "

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 14 December 2007

"Since June 2007, in response to the Hamas take over of the Gaza Strip and the on-going and indiscriminate firing of rockets into Israel, Israel has increased restrictions on access of goods and people to and from Gaza. These have severe consequences for the day-to-day life of the 1.48 million Gazans. The isolation of the Gaza Strip has lasted six months, leaving the local economy to possibly face irrevocable damage and the population in Gaza more reliant on aid than ever before. If the closures are not eased, the UN predicts the need for food and direct assistance will sharply rise above and beyond the current level of 80 per cent of the population. Tight controls are imposed on all Palestinian access in and out of the Gaza Strip, including those with permission to seek essential medical treatment in Israel, East Jerusalem or overseas.

Severe shortages and restrictions on imports and exports are already beginning to distort markets in the Gaza Strip, putting anything other than the most basic goods and foods beyond the buying power of a large portion of the population. Low stock levels, rising prices, increased joblessness and loss of incomes are having devastating consequences for the population and local economy and the livelihoods of the people of Gaza. "

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 December 2007

"Gazans are getting increasingly anxious as shelves in grocery shops begin to empty because of the closure. Prices have skyrocketed, and the little that comes in to Gaza is virtually unaffordable. The prices of many foodstuffs, such as chicken, have at least doubled in the past four months, as stocks dwindle without resupply. According to the World Food Programme, some 80,000 Gazans have lost their jobs since June 2007, increasing the already high rate of unemployment to the point where around 44% of the working population is jobless. Many local industries had to shut down and fire their personnel, as 95% of local production depends on imports of raw materials from Israel. Israel has restricted imports to what it deems "basic goods" – mostly staple food

products – while other essential items needed to keep industry running or repair infrastructure cannot enter the Strip.

Gaza farmers remember how green and fertile their land was in the recent past. Rich harvests from their citrus and olive trees were exported to the West Bank and Israel. Today, a large part of their land has been levelled and their trees uprooted during the frequent military incursions. Some 5,000 farmers who rely on exporting tomatoes, strawberries and carnations to support their families are about to suffer a 100% drop in sales. The harvest season for these important crops started in June, but the embargo on exports has left them rotting in containers at the crossing points.

The infrastructure of the Gaza Strip is in a fragile state. Some eight months ago, a wastewater lagoon in northern Gaza containing hundreds of thousands of litres of raw sewage burst its embankments. Sewage flooded a Bedouin village, killing five people, injuring 16 others and destroying the homes of thousands. Since then, no substantial repairs could be carried out due to a lack of funding and Israel's restrictions on imports of spare parts.

Basic services such as hospitals, water and sewerage systems can only function if they are connected to the electrical grid. If the grid fails to provide the required power, all basic services will suffer. Since Israeli air strikes destroyed a large part of the Gaza Power Plant in June 2006, it has been working at roughly half of its original capacity. The electrical supply to the Gaza Strip is precarious, unreliable and dependent on external sources. In its current state, it cannot produce sufficient power to meet the needs of the population.

As a result, essential infrastructure such as hospitals, water systems and sewerage systems is having to use backup generators. Relying on generators is risky, and creates new dependencies on fuel and spare parts, quite apart from the higher running costs. Current import restrictions are preventing delivery of essential fuel and spare parts, which means that vital services are in danger of complete collapse."

Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA), 11 January 2008

"The number of people requiring food aid has risen sharply in the Gaza Strip since the closure of the main Karni border crossing point in June, according to figures published Friday by the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) in Geneva. A study carried out last month by the WFP showed the number of people it was helping had risen 20 per cent to 302,000 from 252,000. Combined with refugees receiving assistance through the UN agency UNRWA, it meant more than 1 million people, or almost three quarters of the population, were now dependant on food aid, WFP spokeswoman Christian Berthiaume said. The UN has repeatedly urged the Israelis to reopen the Karni border post which they closed after Hamas seized power in Gaza. WFP said 70 per cent of the population was surviving on less than 250 dollars a month. Food prices have risen significantly with households now spending 60 per cent of their budgets on food, compared with 38 per cent before June. The WFP has increased its appeal for funds from 107 million dollars to 141 million. So far 45 million dollars had been donated, but without further offers soon, the agency would be forced to begin cutting back its operations from March. "

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 4 September 2006

"A United Nations aid agency has warned that Israel's intermittent closure of crossings into Gaza is severely hampering its ability to bring in food. Every two months, the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) gives out food to Palestinian refugees living in the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian-administered area bordering Israel and Egypt. Its latest food delivery has been delayed by a lack of access. "Food distribution will not start until we can get our products into Gaza. The 830,000 refugees we feed will not have any food from us," said John Ging, UNRWA's Director of Operations in Gaza. UNRWA usually brings food supplies through the Karni Crossing, a cargo terminal on the eastern end of a barrier between Israel and the Gaza Strip. But Israel has closed

the crossing, saying it discovered a tunnel that could be used to attack its border personnel. "We had to close the checkpoint because we have civilians working there and we don't want them killed by the Palestinians," said Shlomo Dror, spokesman for Israel's Government Coordination Office, which monitors the humanitarian situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Dror told IRIN that Israel had offered to open other border crossings such as Sufa, which is farther south - but said the Palestinian authorities had refused. "We are dependent on this border opening up," said Ging. "We have no alternative. The local market cannot supply us with the quantities [of food] that we need...." "

See Also:

[Gaza faces major food problems, warns UN agency assisting over 200,000 people there](#), **UN News Service**, 15 September 2006

[New UN report highlights conflict over resources in West Bank](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 11 September 2007

[Failing the Palestinian State, Punishing its People: the Impact of the Economic Strangulation on Human Rights within the Occupied Palestinian Territory](#), **Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH)**, 20 October 2006

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[World Bank sees worst year for Palestinian economy](#), **Reuters**, 13 September 2006

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[The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories](#), **International Labour Organisation (ILO)**, April 2008

[Increasing Need, Decreasing Access: Tightening Control On Economic Movement](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 22 January 2008

[The Closure of the Gaza Strip: The Economic and Humanitarian Consequences - December 2007](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 14 December 2007

[Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan](#), **ESCWA Report**, **United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)**, 3 May 2007

[The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and other infrastructure in the West Bank](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 30 August 2007

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[The Human Rights Face of Poverty in the West Bank](#), **Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (PRMG)**, 6 November 2006

[The Economy Of Gaza](#), **The Jerusalem Fund**, 2 October 2006

[Palestinian agricultural losses top US \\$1 billion](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 28 September 2006

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[World Bank sees worst year for Palestinian economy](#), **Reuters**, 13 September 2006

[Poverty in the Gaza Strip](#), **Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR)**, 12 June 2006

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[Freshwater shortage leads to health problems in Gaza Strip](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 2 October 2006

[The Humanitarian Monitor](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 31 May 2006

[The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories](#), **International Labour Organisation (ILO)**, 26 May 2006

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[Humanitarian Update: Special Focus the Barrier and Access Points to Jerusalem](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, July 2005

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Access to Health

Impact of Closures on Access to Health in Gaza Strip and West Bank

- Since the second intifada there is increasing concern on risks to health as result of impact of closures and limited access to health in West Bank and particularly in Gaza. Post traumatic stress disorders and domestic violence also remain a constant concern. (Badil, September 2007) Compared with the rest of the OPT population, the Palestinians living in areas that are at high risk of displacement are generally worse off in terms of access to health services. (Save the Children, October 2009) This is true of communities located in closed areas between the Wall and the Green Line, in restricted localities in the West Bank, and particularly communities in Jordan Valley amongst other marginalised locations.
- In the West Bank, continued movement and access obstacles impede the access of patients and medical staff to health facilities, particularly to hospitals in East Jerusalem. (UN OCHA, November 2009: OCHA March 2011) Palestinians rely on hospitals in East Jerusalem for routine, emergency and highly specialist treatment. East Jerusalem, with its six hospitals, is the main provider of specialized care to the population of the oPt. Restrictions in access to East Jerusalem for the vast majority of the Palestinian population started before the

construction of the Separation wall however the Wall has contributed in worsening access for Palestinians from West Bank, residing in West Bank side of the Wall, and in Gaza.

- Amongst the communities of concern, include Palestinians residing in closed areas, “seam zones” between the Separation Wall and the Green Line estimated at 7,800 Palestinians who continue to suffer restricted access to services (OCHA and WHO, July 2010). Impeded access to medical care is particularly acute in the closed zones between the Wall and the Green Line, where 79% of families are separated from health centres and hospitals. (Badil, September 2007)
- The denial of passage or delays at checkpoints has significantly affected the access of civilians, particularly children, to medical care and services, causing serious threat to their physical health. (OCHA, August 2007) Since the beginning of the second Intifada, in September 2000, to 2006, 68 pregnant Palestinian women gave birth at Israeli checkpoints, leading to 34 miscarriages and the deaths of four women, according to the Health Ministry's report. (IRIN, September 2006)
- In Gaza, the Israeli blockade, the internal Palestinian divisions and the Israeli “Cast Lead” offensive have undermined the ability of the health system in Gaza to function properly. Restrictions in movement and access have stalled reconstruction of facilities and drastically affected medical referrals and recurring shortages in necessary medicines, and overall services. (UN OCHA, November 2009) This compound the situation already precarious in Gaza and limitations in access to specialised health care for inhabitants of Gaza (OCHA March 2011). Prior to the latest offensive, Israel's closure of Gaza Strip have severely impeded operation of clinics and hospitals in Gaza and restricted access to needed medical supplies and equipment, as well as restricting exits for health reasons (Oxfam, January 2008; IRIN, January 2008)

Save the Children, Life on the Edge: Summary of Research Findings, October 2009

"In the West Bank, 92% of households in high risk areas said that health services were either 'not available' or 'somewhat available' compared with 34% among the general West Bank population. In Gaza, 65% of respondents in high risk areas said that health services were 'not available' or 'somewhat available' compared with 41% among the general Gaza population."

OCHA, 30 November 2010

"Reduced access to quality healthcare

The blockade, the internal Palestinian divisions and the “Cast Lead” offensive have undermined the ability of the health system in Gaza to function properly. As a result, while most services are available to the population and there were no outbreaks of communicable diseases, there has been an overall decline in the quality of health services provided to the population. The ban on the importation of construction materials has prevented the reconstruction and expansion of health facilities. In addition, the operation of medical equipment has been undermined by restrictions on the entry of needed parts and the provision of adequate medical services has also been affected by recurrent shortages of pharmaceuticals and consumables. The referral of patients out of Gaza for medical treatment has been severely disrupted over the past year: ... A significant percentage of patients referred for treatment abroad each month receive no reply to their request for a permit from the Israeli authorities by the date of planned travel, resulting in the loss of the pre-arranged appointment at the relevant hospital. Since September 2009, the Israeli authorities have refused to process or reply to interventions by Israeli human rights organizations on behalf of Gazan patients regarding applications for permits to enter Israel for medical care. In addition, the sporadic and unpredictable openings of the Rafah Crossing contribute to the delays and uncertainty patients face in obtaining necessary healthcare abroad; on average the crossing opens only two to three days per month.

Israel's “Cast Lead” military offensive created significant challenges. Follow-up treatment for people suffering from complex injuries and permanent disabilities has created an additional

burden for a health system weakened by shortages of facilities and equipment. According to Handicap International (HI) figures, of the 1,011 persons with injuries registered in the HI database, 11% reported permanent disabilities as a result of the war. According to UNFPA, pregnant women were particularly affected during the offensive: there was an increase in neonatal death by 50%; and an increase in the number of premature births and obstetric complications. In the West Bank, movement and access obstacles impede the access of patients and medical staff to health facilities, particularly to hospitals in East Jerusalem. Access to healthcare services is especially difficult for people living in remote or closed areas of Area C. Throughout the oPt, persons with disabilities and the elderly face difficulties accessing quality health care and rehabilitation services, including lack of accessible transportation, support funds and specialized services."

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 12 September 2007

"The health status of Palestinian refugees is in transition from a developing to a developed stage. The health of women and children has improved dramatically over the course of the last five decades. The best reported health outcomes are in the 1967-occupied Palestinian territory. During the first intifada in the OPT, more than 73,000 Palestinians were killed or injured, while the number of casualties and injured in the current intifada stands at 35,000. Food insecurity and vulnerability are about 40% and 12% respectively among refugees in the OPT. The refugee population living in camps has the least food security (45%), which also indicates that food insecurity is highest in the Gaza Strip. Food aid has become increasingly significant as a source of food as agricultural areas (Qalqilya, Tulkarem, and the Jordan Valley) are affected by closures and Israeli military and settler movement, as well as restrictions on access and trade. Around 42% of households affected by the Wall in the occupied West Bank are separated from health services (hospitals and medical centres). Impeded access to medical care is particularly acute in the closed zones between the Wall and the Green Line, where 79% of families are separated from health centres and hospitals.

Low birth weight is not a significant problem among refugees; birth weights are more typical of developed countries than developing countries. Standard vaccination programs are well implemented. Infant mortality rates are also low, despite a stagnation of the infant mortality rate in the OPT. Childhood malnutrition has not been a significant problem, although increasing levels of child malnutrition in the OPT give grounds for concern: 10% of these children are malnourished, with children in the occupied Gaza Strip particularly affected. There are also signs of a resurgence of anaemia, affecting 55% and 34% of children under the age of three in the occupied Gaza Strip and West Bank, as well as micronutrient deficiencies, with 22% of children under the age of five suffering from Vitamin A deficiency..

Palestinian women in refugee camps in the OPT report high levels of spousal abuse, including psychological abuse (52%), sexual abuse (10%), and physical abuse on at least one occasion (24%). In 2006, physical disabilities and psychological problems among children in the OPT ...increased as a result of the occupation of the OPT. In the OPT, nearly all (97%) Palestinian students reported experiencing (73%) or witnessing (23%) varying levels of violence. Instances of bedwetting, psychosomatic and sleeping disorders, and behavioural changes including aggression, anti-social behaviour, nervousness and anxiety have been reported in the OPT. Most young Palestinians reported severe (32%) or moderate (58%) symptoms of hopelessness. Over 50% of students in UNRWA schools were subjected to beatings by schoolmates or teachers during the year preceding this report. Refugees in UNRWA schools may be at a greater risk of violence than students in other schools. Testimony from children recounting abuses at the hand of teachers include incidents such as putting a shoe inside a student's mouth, beatings, and pulling ears. Verbal abuse of students by teachers is also common."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 August 2007

"Palestinians rely on hospitals in East Jerusalem for routine, emergency and highly specialist treatment. There are six hospitals in East Jerusalem: August Victoria, Al Makassed, St. John Ophthalmic, St. Joseph's, Red Crescent Maternity and Princess Bassma hospitals, these offer specialist tertiary healthcare for the entire West Bank population. On average, 3,000 patients are referred by the Palestinian Ministry of Health (MoH) to East Jerusalem hospitals annually. West Bank ID card holders must have a letter of referral from a Palestinian hospital and coordination documents from the receiving hospital in East Jerusalem before they can apply to the Israeli authorities for a permit. This is a complicated and time-consuming process which can take many weeks to complete. The need to get a permit to reach a hospital, the difficulties in travelling to East Jerusalem because of the Barrier and checkpoints, in addition to the general unpredictability of access for patients, has led to a 50% drop in patient admissions in these hospitals. The number of out-patients also fell by more than half between 2002 and 2003, and continues to drop. Medical staff from the West Bank also faces difficulties getting to work. There are 1,168 employees working in the six non-governmental hospitals in East Jerusalem and approximately 70% are West Bank residents requiring permits. Permits generally need to be renewed every three months and are valid only until 7 pm. Few permits are given to people under 25 years old. Even those with permits face long lines at the four Jerusalem checkpoints open to them which can cause delays in patient care, including surgery schedules."

Oxfam, 25 January 2008

"The seven-month ongoing Israeli blockade is taking an ever-more severe toll on the health system in the Gaza Strip, says aid agency Oxfam International. The one-off relaxation of the blockade this week to allow the delivery of fuel and some other humanitarian supplies, cannot meet the needs of 1.5 million Gazan population, especially the sick, injured and vulnerable. Israeli fuel and electricity deliveries to Gaza had been reduced over the last couple of months. Even before the complete shutdown last weekend, clinics and hospitals in Gaza already largely relied on emergency generators due to frequent interruptions of electricity supply.

Unstable electricity supply and lack of fuel for emergency generators disrupt the functioning of equipment for acute care services like incubators for newborns, heart monitors in intensive care, dialysis machines for kidney patients as well as for lights and crucial equipment and machinery used in surgery. Other critical services, like machinery in prenatal care and the simple necessity of heating in wards have been also been put at risk. Last weekend, when Israel completely halted its fuel supply most hospitals were forced to close down their operating rooms and clinics and primary health care centres reduce their service delivery to an absolute minimum.

.... There is also a long list of essential medical equipment and spare parts that have not been allowed into the Gaza Strip since June 2007. Israel's escalating military attacks on Gaza have naturally put additional pressure on emergency rooms and ordinary medical service delivery. Facing dismal conditions and lacking essential supplies, more casualties in need of treatment strip hospitals of their capacity to cope. The lack of car fuel since last weekend has made it impossible for ambulances to operate and for medical personnel to reach their work."

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 28 September 2006

"A report by the Palestinian Ministry of Health says that pregnant Palestinian women are often prevented by Israeli forces from reaching hospitals to receive appropriate medical attention, causing many miscarriages and the deaths of some women. Since the beginning of the second Intifada, a Palestinian uprising against Israeli military occupation, in September 2000, 68 pregnant Palestinian women gave birth at Israeli checkpoints, leading to 34 miscarriages and the deaths of four women, according to the Health Ministry's September report... According to the Health Ministry's report, there are currently 117,600 pregnant women in the Palestinian territories. This includes 17,640 women who are suffering difficult pregnancies due to a lack of prenatal and postnatal care. "Inadequate medical care during pregnancy is the third leading cause of death among Palestinian women of childbearing age," said Abu Shaaban."

See Also:

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[The Humanitarian Monitor: December 2007](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 22 January 2008
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[OPT: West Bank patients grow increasingly desperate for medical treatment](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 18 October 2006
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[Gaza doctors say patients suffering mystery injuries after Israeli attacks](#), **The Guardian**, 17 October 2006
[One in three sick babies dying in Gaza - UNICEF](#), **Reuters**, 13 June 2006
[Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people](#), **United Nations General Assembly (UN GA)**, 3 May 2006

Access to Land

Restrictions and Limited Access to Land in West Bank & Gaza

- Restrictions and Limited Access to Land in West Bank & Gaza
- Israeli control over land through closed military areas/fire zones, nature reserves, settlement construction, and outposts has significantly limited the land available for Palestinian farming and herding communities. In West Bank an estimated 40% of land has been taken by settlements and settlement related infrastructure, construction of the Separation Wall, Israeli military zones and nature reserves. Closed zones such as “seam areas” between Separation Wall and the Green line includes some of the most fertile land and water reserves in the West Bank, access to which is governed by a restrictive Israeli permit regime, making it nearly inaccessible for Palestinian owners (OCHA, January 2008; ICRC, December 2007) Bedouins particularly Jahaleen have also faced restrictions in terms of access to land, and been subject to multiple displacement. Traditional Bedouin rights are not recognized by Israel. The Bedouin community of 3,000 remain at risk of displacement. (ICAHD, October 2007;
- OCHA, March 2007)
- Precarity and limitations in access to land is particularly evident in Jordan Valley in Area C of the West Bank (OCHA, January 2008) which is the largest land reserve in the West Bank consisting 28.8 percent of the West Bank (Btselem May 2011). It is home to 65,000 Palestinians living in 29 communities, and another estimated 15,000 Palestinians living in Bedouin communities. Some 9,400 Israelis live in 37 settlements in the area yet controls 77.5% of lands. Farmers caught grazing their livestock on the lands traditionally used by these villages located in Israeli closed areas face the risk of their animals being seized, identification cards temporarily confiscated, fines and arrest, and homes and property destroyed. (OCHA, January 2008; Btselem May 2011)
- In Gaza an estimated nearly 30% of arable land according to Save the Children report is inaccessible due to the Israeli buffer zone along the Gaza/Israeli border (OCHA May 2010; Save the Children, 2009). In Gaza, Since Israeli unilateral disengagement of Gaza in 2005,

Israel has established a buffer zone along the fence that surrounds Gaza, extending into the Strip's territory by 500m to 1km. Agricultural land is being lost through extension of this buffer zone. Frequent Israeli incursions have also levelled significant amounts of agricultural land and uprooted trees. (ICRC, December 2007) Israel incursion in January 2009 entailed destruction of an estimated 17% of cultivated lands and vast destruction of agricultural related infrastructure (FAO, May 2010). In May 2009, Israel further reduced access to Gaza agricultural land when it expanded the size of its self-declared "buffer zone. Reports suggest that up to 30% of Gaza arable land is inaccessible due to the buffer zone (Save

- the Children October 2009; FAO, May 2010).
- Restrictions in access is compounded by the precarity of various areas in OPT. Food insecurity and water scarcity remains continuing concern in various areas of the OPT. UN Interagency assessments in 2010 of 510 herder families in Area C , revealed that close to 80% of Palestinian herding population in Area C is food insecure compared to an average of 25% for the general population in the West Bank, and 61% in the Gaza Strip (OCHA, August 2010) Palestinian communities living in Area C face ongoing water shortages due to lack of rainfall, inadequate infrastructure and lack of equitable distribution of water resources. The problem is serious in remote areas, given the reliance on herding and farming, which are water-dependent livelihoods. Many remote locations have no water networks relying on costly water trucking services (OCHA August 2010) In Gaza water precarity continues to be a key concern.

OCHA, 30 November 2009

"Deteriorating agricultural livelihoods

Agricultural livelihoods in the oPt are increasingly threatened. In the Gaza Strip, the Agricultural Sector has been devastated by Israel's blockade and, most recently, damage during the "Cast Lead" offensive, which resulted in an estimated \$180 million in direct damage to agriculture-related infrastructure and the destruction of an estimated 17% of cultivated areas, including orchards and open fields. In May 2009, Israel further reduced access to Gaza agricultural land when it expanded the size of its self-declared "buffer zone", from 150 metres to 300 metres within Gaza. In addition, Israel further reduced the Palestinian fishing area, from six to three nautical miles from the shore, undermining the fishing catch which is located in deeper waters. The restriction affects approximately 3,500 households reliant on fishing. Gaza import and export restrictions have driven up agriculture production costs, reduced productivity and prevented rehabilitation of greenhouses, poultry farms, irrigation and water wells. Combined, these factors prevent the agricultural sector in Gaza from recovering and, ultimately, prevent the most vulnerable farming households from beginning to rise out of poverty. Likewise, they prevent the agricultural sector from mitigating the burden of food insecurity on the local population, which is heavily dependent on food aid.

In the West Bank, farmers face the third year of water scarcity and Palestinian access to large swathes of land remains restricted, in particular in Area C and around Israeli settlements, in closed military / "fire" zones, nature reserves and in the closed area between the Barrier and the Green Line. A joint OCHA/UNRWA survey identified around 5,200 vulnerable herding families residing in these areas, with many other families residing in nearby urban areas also dependant on land there."

COHRE, November 2009

"NO ENTRY: Facts and figures on restricted access to agricultural land

- 67 communities (about 222,000 individuals) had land isolated between the Wall and the Green Line in 2007;

- 170,000 dunams of fertile agricultural lands are affected by the Wall, equalling 10.2 per cent of the total area cultivated in the West Bank, with an average economic value of USD 38 million, equal to roughly 8 per cent of Palestinian agricultural product;
- The permit regime to access land behind the Wall has become increasingly stringent since 2003 and now requires proof of a 'connection to land' - often impossible to show under traditional ownership practices;
- The agricultural sector accounts for between 11-20 per cent of the Palestinian economy, employing about 15 per cent of the formal, and up to 39 per cent of the informal workforce;
- Dependency on agriculture has increased in recent years due to lack of access to the Israeli labour market and increasing movement restrictions inside the West Bank."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 22 January 2008

"Rural communities depend on access to land, markets and commercial centres. They also rely on farm labourers. In May 2007, 40.4% of people in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) reported difficulties getting to work in the previous six months. They cited the primary reasons as physical obstacles, such as checkpoints and road blocks (77.9%) and the inability to obtain permits from Israeli authorities (71.2%). Reaching markets has become an expensive and time-consuming problem for farmers and businesses. Since 2000, transport costs have nearly doubled mostly because of delays faced at checkpoints and the more circuitous routes that trucks are being forced to take to avoid roads primarily reserved for Israeli use (see graph below). Between 1967 and 1992, more than 1,300 military orders were issued to regulate Palestinian life in the West Bank.² Approximately one-third relate to economic issues including agriculture, land ownership, infrastructure development, water resources, tariffs and taxation and business licensing. Many of these regulations imposed additional costs, putting Palestinians at a comparative disadvantage to Israeli producers who often enjoy freer access to Palestinian markets.....

Since the start of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, the Jordan Valley has been perceived as having a strategic importance to Israel's security. The first settlements in the West Bank were established in the Jordan Valley as early as 1968. Seventeen settlements were established by 1977 and by 2005 the number stood at 32. By 2004, the settler population had risen to 7,380. Although the population is quite small, most settlers in the Jordan Valley are farmers who cultivate large land areas. For Palestinians, the Jordan Valley is an integral part of the West Bank. An estimated 53,000 Palestinians live in the Jordan Valley (including the population of Jericho) with an economy based primarily on agriculture. As detailed in Chapter 1, much of the Jordan Valley has been declared closed military areas/fire zones and/or nature reserves by the Gol. This has significantly limited the land available for Palestinian farming and herding communities who are squeezed by Israeli settler infrastructure on the one hand and areas that are off-limits to them on the other. Five Palestinian communities (Al Farisiya, Al Malih, Khirbet as Ras al Ahmar, Khirbet Humsa and Al Hadidiya) are located within Israeli declared closed military areas. Palestinian farmers caught grazing their livestock on the lands traditionally used by these villages now face the risk of their animals being seized, their identification cards temporarily confiscated, fines and even arrest. Palestinian access to the Jordan Valley had deteriorated sharply over the last two years with increased restrictions imposed by Israeli authorities. Access has improved since April 2007 although checkpoints and roads reserved primarily for Israeli use continue to restrict Palestinian movement....

...When the Barrier is completed, over ten percent (10.2%) of West Bank land will be isolated in the area between the Barrier and the Green Line. This includes some of the most fertile land and water reserves in the West Bank. In October 2003, the area between the Barrier and the Green Line in the northern West Bank was declared closed by military order. All Palestinians living in

this area are required to obtain 'permanent resident' permits from the Israeli authorities. Non-resident Palestinians who need to enter the area, in particular farmers, must apply for a visitor permit to access their farmlands and water resources through designated gates. Eligibility requirements for Palestinians needing visitor permits have become increasingly stringent. Consequently, fewer Palestinians are obtaining such permits. Those who are unable to prove direct ownership of the land - for example, relatives to landowners such as nephews, uncles, cousins and grandchildren, landless labourers, sharecroppers and leaseholders - find that their access to the closed areas is now virtually impossible.

By mid-2006, only 40% of farming families with land in closed areas could reach their family holdings. For the minority who are granted permits, access is restricted to a specific gate. Gates open and shut irregularly, and can be totally shut without warning. Only 26 gates in the northern West Bank are open to Palestinians on a regular basis, typically for short periods in the early morning, noon and late afternoon, and 'visitors' are prohibited from staying on their land overnight. Many gates are 'seasonal', open only for a limited period during the olive harvest. This regime prevents the ploughing, pruning, spraying and weeding required throughout the year that is necessary for optimum yields. Tractors and other agricultural equipment and materials may not be allowed through, and an individual's land may be located a long distance from the gate over difficult terrain. Restrictive gate openings and permit allocations are already having a negative impact on agricultural practices and on rural livelihoods. Many farmers cultivate their land infrequently or not at all, or have changed to lower maintenance and lower yield crops. The longer term consequences for these communities is uncertain, as they lose contact with the land on which they depend both for their present livelihood and for their future survival."

Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, October 2007

"Over the past few months, Jahalin Bedouin have remained under sustained pressure by the Israeli military to relocate outside the planned route of the Wall and the area set for the construction of the new E1 colony (settlement). Their forced relocation to land belonging to other Palestinian villages would cause tension with local communities, constitute forced displacement and would be detrimental to their semi-nomadic way of life. As available land shrinks, Bedouin refugees are faced with nowhere to go..... The Jahalin Bedouin are 1948 refugees originating from the area of Beersheba in the Naqab (Negev). The Jahalin Bedouin initially found shelter in the Hebron Governorate. In the 1960s they moved into the hilly Judean desert between Jerusalem and Jericho, next to Road No. 1. While all Jahalin Bedouin are 1948 refugees, only 80 to 85 percent are registered with UNRWA. Bedouin live a semi-nomadic lifestyle and - based on custom and tradition - use land they perceive as 'empty', i.e. not privately owned or used for crops. The Jewish colony of Ma'ale Adumim was built in 1976. In 1996 and 1998, Jahalin Bedouin families were forced to relocate on so-called security grounds from the vicinity of Ma'ale Adumim to the Palestinian communities of Abu Dis and Al-Azariya. Remaining Bedouin families who were not issued an expulsion order stayed in the area around Ma'ale Adumim. However, as the colony expanded, and especially since the beginning of the construction of the Wall, they too face displacement. The Wall will include Ma'ale Adumim and the E1 Block2 in Israeli-annexed Jerusalem, thus once more redrawing the boundaries of Israel's Jerusalem municipality. Approximately 3,000 Bedouin in the Ma'ale Adumim area are at risk of being forcibly displaced in this context."

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 December 2007

"The humanitarian situation in the West Bank is also deteriorating day by day. Palestinians stand by powerlessly as their land is confiscated. Over the years, Israeli settlements and roads have expanded, taking over more and more of the land that the same families have cultivated for generations..... Since the construction of the West Bank Barrier, which lies deep inside Palestinian territory, large tracts of farming land have been out of reach for farmers, as the Barrier cuts off many villages from their lands. During the summer, farmers helplessly watched as wild fires destroyed olive trees isolated behind the Barrier. They were barred from the area because

the gate was not scheduled to open or they lacked the appropriate permit. Some of the trees had taken over fifty years to grow – two generations of labour and care lost in one night....To get the permits needed to access his own land, a farmer has to fight his way through a bureaucratic maze, where he will be asked to provide an array of documents proving land ownership and residency. Most farmers spend hours at the offices of the Israeli Civil Administration applying for these permits. Many applications are eventually rejected on security grounds, which may include a relative once having been in an Israeli prison.....

Since its unilateral disengagement in 2005, Israel has gradually established a buffer zone along the fence that surrounds Gaza, extending into the Strip's already cramped and overpopulated territory, with heavy consequences for the population. More and more agricultural land is being lost through the ill-defined extension of this buffer zone, and this is endangering anyone who gets too close. Indeed, Gazans are often killed, wounded or arrested when they approach the fence.... Gaza farmers remember how green and fertile their land was in the recent past. Rich harvests from their citrus and olive trees were exported to the West Bank and Israel. Today, a large part of their land has been levelled and their trees uprooted during the frequent military incursions. Some 5,000 farmers who rely on exporting tomatoes, strawberries and carnations to support their families are about to suffer a 100% drop in sales. The harvest season for these important crops started in June, but the embargo on exports has left them rotting in containers at the crossing points."

Ha'aretz, 11 October 2006

"Harassment and attacks by settlers, who tried to terrify the villagers, existed even before 2000, but they grew more prevalent after the second intifada began. The army and the police turned out to be either absent, helpless or apathetic. The military commanders found an easy way out: They closed vast areas of farmland to their owners, the Palestinians, as a means of "protecting them" against the settlers. But in July 2006, the court handed down a ruling that obliged the security forces to protect Palestinians' property rights and their right to cultivate their land....

The Israeli occupation establishment constantly imposes various forms of harassment on Palestinians engaged in agriculture, one of the foundations of the Palestinians' existence: the separation fence, which imprisons the lands of 42 villages behind it; the settlers' constantly expanding security fences; the expropriation of lands for the construction of bypass roads and security roads; the destruction of wells; the closure of various areas (including the entire Jordan Valley) for military purposes; the closing of roads to Palestinian vehicles; the checkpoints every few kilometers; the diversion of trucks carrying produce to long and badly paved roads; the waiting in line for hours and days at Israeli crossings; the closing of the Gaza crossing for months, thereby making it impossible for Gazans to market agricultural produce; the discouraging bureaucracy required at Civil Administration bases to obtain a pass to reach one's own lands - or to not obtain it at all. All these forms of assault by the establishment, which appear to be more and more deliberate, explain why more and more Palestinian agricultural lands appear as if they have been abandoned, with unplowed soil and trees with rotten fruit. They also explain why more Israeli than Palestinian produce can be seen in Palestinian marketplaces, and why so very many farmers need food parcels."

See Also:

[Gaza Humanitarian Fact Sheet](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 28 November 2007

[The Humanitarian Monitor Number 11](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 18 May 2007

[The Humanitarian Monitor Number 10](#), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 23 March 2007

Access to Water

Water Scarcity & Sanitation Concerns in West Bank & Gaza

- Water scarcity is a major concern where access, and control over water resources is constrained. Israel uses more than 80 per cent of the water from the Mountain Aquifer, the main source of underground water in Israel and the OPT, while restricting Palestinian access to a mere 20 per cent (AI, 27 October 2009). Palestinian daily water consumption barely reaches 70 liters a day per person, Israeli daily consumption is more than 300 liters per day.
- Israel has imposed a complex system of permits which the Palestinians must obtain from the Israeli army and other authorities in order to carry out water-related projects in the OPT. Applications for such permits are often rejected or subject to long delays. A 1993 report by Peace Now found that, per capita, irrigated areas of settlers were 13 times larger than the area accorded to Palestinians. (OCHA, January 2008)
- In the West Bank, approximately 10% of the population resides in communities that have no water network, forcing already impoverished communities to pay for tankered water up to ten times the average cost of networked water. (OCHA, 30 November 2009) The lack of water has already forced many Palestinians to discontinue their involvement in agriculture and leave. In the Jordan Valley, the Israeli army has increasingly restricted Palestinians' access to water as a way of forcing them to abandon the area. In recent years the homes of Palestinians have been repeatedly destroyed and their water tankers confiscated.
- In Gaza Strip basic services such as water and sewage systems continue to be significantly undermined by import restrictions and limited capacity. ICRC in late 2007 reported that restrictions entails that vital services are in danger of complete collapse. In early 2007, raw sewage lagoon burst its embankments, and flooded a Bedouin village in Gaza, killing five people, destroying the homes of thousands, and caused displacement of 2,000. (ICRC, December 2007) At present in context of continuing restrictions, infrastructural damage as result of the conflict, 90 to 95 per cent of the water in Gaza is contaminated and unfit for human consumption. (AI, 27 October 2009)
- In both West Bank and Gaza households in high risk areas of displacement are generally worse off in terms of access to sanitation services. 2% of households in risk areas in the West Bank have access to sanitation services, in comparison with 61% among the general West Bank population. 26% in high risk areas in Gaza report access to sanitation services, compared to 60% for the rest of Gaza (Save the Children, October 2009).

Amnesty International, 27 October 2009

"On 28 July 2007, Israeli soldiers at a military checkpoint confiscated the tractor and water tanker of Ahmad Abdallah Bani Odeh, a villager from the hamlet of Humsa. An Israeli army official told Amnesty International that the vital items were being confiscated in an attempt to force the villagers from the area, which the army had declared a "closed military area". In another village, a rainwater harvesting cistern belonging to Palestinian villagers was destroyed by the Israeli army under the pretext that it was built without a permit. Permits for water projects have to be obtained from the Israeli authorities but are rarely granted to Palestinians. In recent years the homes of Palestinians living in the Jordan Valley have been repeatedly destroyed and their water tankers confiscated. Each time, the homes – tents and simple shacks made of metal and plastic sheets – are rebuilt. Because of the villagers' determination to remain on their land despite extremely

harsh living conditions, the Israeli army has increasingly restricted their access to water as a way of forcing them to abandon the area. In'am Bisharat, ...from the village of Hadidiya, told...: "... The lack of water is the biggest problem. The men spend most of the day...[going] to get water and they can't always bring it. ... "The [Israeli] army has cut us off from everywhere ... we are not even allowed basic services." The lack of water has already forced many Palestinians to leave the Jordan Valley and the survival of the communities is increasingly threatened. In Beit Ula, Mahmoud al-'Alam's livelihood is similarly at risk."

"Israel uses more than 80 per cent of the water from the Mountain Aquifer, the main source of underground water in Israel and the OPT, while restricting Palestinian access to a mere 20 per cent. ...While Palestinian daily water consumption barely reaches 70 litres a day per person, Israeli daily consumption is more than 300 litres per day, four times as much. ...Numbering about 450,000, the settlers use as much or more water than the Palestinian population of some 2.3 million.... In the Gaza Strip, 90 to 95 per cent of the water from its only water resource, the Coastal Aquifer, is contaminated and unfit for human consumption. Yet, Israel does not allow the transfer of water from the Mountain Aquifer in the West Bank to Gaza....Stringent restrictions imposed in recent years by Israel on the entry into Gaza of material and equipment necessary for the development and repair of infrastructure have caused further deterioration of the water and sanitation situation in Gaza, which has reached crisis point.

To cope with water shortages and lack of network supplies many Palestinians have to purchase water, of often dubious quality, from mobile water tankers at a much higher price. Others resort to water-saving measures which are detrimental to their and their families' health and which hinder socio-economic development. ...Israel has appropriated large areas of the water-rich Palestinian land it occupies and barred Palestinians from accessing them. It has also imposed a complex system of permits which the Palestinians must obtain from the Israeli army and other authorities in order to carry out water-related projects in the OPT. Applications for such permits are often rejected or subject to long delays. Restrictions imposed by Israel on the movement of people and goods in the OPT further compound the difficulties Palestinians face when trying to carry out water and sanitation projects, or even just to distribute small quantities of water. ...In some Palestinian villages, because their access to water has been so severely restricted, farmers are unable to cultivate the land, or even to grow small amounts of food for their personal consumption or for animal fodder, and have thus been forced to reduce the size of their herds."

OCHA , 30 November 2009

"Some 10,000 people in northern Gaza still have no access to running water due to a lack of materials to maintain and repair networks. Access to water for the rest of the population is limited to 6-8 hours from one to four days a week. Poor and insufficient wastewater infrastructure is resulting in 80 million litres of raw and partially-treated sewage being discharged daily into the environment.

The Gaza Coastal Municipalities Water Utility currently needs more than 1,250 MTs of cement for repair of waste water treatment tanks alone.

In the West Bank, approximately 10% of the population resides in communities that have no water

network, forcing already impoverished communities to pay for tankered water up to ten times the average cost of networked water. In addition, samples indicate that much of their water supply is contaminated."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 22 January 2008

"Water scarcity is a major concern in the West Bank where access to, and control over, water resources is a constant struggle. Under international law, a significant part of the water sources that Israel uses to meet its needs, including that of the settlements, should be shared equitably and reasonably by both Israelis and Palestinians. Israeli per capita water consumption is more than five times higher than that of West Bank Palestinians (350 litres per person per day in Israel compared to 60 litres per person per day in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem). West

Bank Palestinian water consumption is 40 litres less than the minimum global standards set by the World Health Organization (WHO). Under the Oslo Agreement, nearly six times more aquifer water was allocated for Israeli use. For example, of the 362 million cubic metres of water pumped from the Western Aquifer, that lies beneath Israel and the West Bank, 22 mcm is for Palestinian use while 340 mcm is for Israeli use.

Israel's agricultural settlements in the West Bank, in particular the Jordan Valley, are large consumers of water. A 1993 report by Peace Now found that, per capita, irrigated areas of settlers were 13 times larger than the area accorded to Palestinians. Mekorot, the Israeli Water Company, which sells water to Palestinian towns and public bodies, supplies an estimated 54% of all water to Palestinians in the West Bank. However, during times of shortage, such as in the summer months, the company prioritises settlements over Palestinian communities, often leaving Palestinian communities with a shortfall. In summer months, in particular, residents of a number of cities in the West Bank, such as Hebron, Bethlehem and Jenin, face water restrictions. Many Palestinian villages who find themselves short of water resort to buying supplies from water tankers at considerable expense. According to a 2005 report by the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG) an estimated 30% of surveyed communities in the West Bank (190 communities) were not connected to a water network and relied primarily on tankered water and rainwater collected in household cisterns."

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 December 2007

"The infrastructure of the Gaza Strip is in a fragile state. Some eight months ago, a wastewater lagoon in northern Gaza containing hundreds of thousands of litres of raw sewage burst its embankments. Sewage flooded a Bedouin village, killing five people, injuring 16 others and destroying the homes of thousands. Since then, no substantial repairs could be carried out due to a lack of funding and Israel's restrictions on imports of spare parts. Basic services such as hospitals, water and sewerage systems can only function if they are connected to the electrical grid. If the grid fails to provide the required power, all basic services will suffer. Since Israeli air strikes destroyed a large part of the Gaza Power Plant in June 2006, it has been working at roughly half of its original capacity. The electrical supply to the Gaza Strip is precarious, unreliable and dependent on external sources. In its current state, it cannot produce sufficient power to meet the needs of the population. As a result, essential infrastructure such as hospitals, water systems and sewerage systems is having to use backup generators. Relying on generators is risky, and creates new dependencies on fuel and spare parts, quite apart from the higher running costs. Current import restrictions are preventing delivery of essential fuel and spare parts, which means that vital services are in danger of complete collapse."

See Also:

[Monitoring Project - Impact of the Current Crisis in the West Bank and Gaza Strip Survey Report #36, Water and Sanitation Hygiene Monitoring Project \(WaSH MP\)](#), 31 October 2006

[Freshwater shortage leads to health problems in Gaza Strip, Integrated Regional Information Networks \(IRIN\)](#), 2 October 2006

B'Tselem, *Thirsty for a Solution - Resolving the Water Crisis in the West Bank in the Occupied Territories and its Resolution in the Final-Status Agreement* (Position Paper, July 2000)

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Coping Strategies & Strategies of Prevention

Coping Strategies & Prevention

- For lack of adequate monitoring, there is limited information on coping strategies of communities displaced. Information is largely anecdotal. The humanitarian community and relevant authorities do not necessarily address the concerns of those displaced, leaving coping strategies of Palestinians displaced more often than not relying on individual strategies. There is a general lack of assistance for persons displaced in the OPT. Most assistance provided by the humanitarian community is confined to provision of immediate emergency assistance, and does not extend beyond 4-5 months following the emergency phase. Palestinian authorities in West Bank and Gaza Strip have provided compensation and assistance to persons displaced but such assistance has not necessarily been consistently applied, constrained by factional politics, limited jurisdiction and continuing policies of occupation. The UN in turn is forestalled by lack of authorization to implement projects in Area C, and East
- Jerusalem in defiance of Israeli law, while reconstruction response in the Gaza Strip is circumscribed by ongoing restrictions. This is with exception to provision of general humanitarian assistance to persons displaced or not, and rental assistance for Palestinians whose homes have been destroyed.
- Though the sources of displacement are quiet evident, there is in general lack of clear information on follow up of needs of those displaced or monitoring their status. In many instances displaced have remained in close proximity to housing or land, and assisted by the community or extended family reside in makeshift shelters in proximity to the demolished housing structure, or within host community, or rented accommodation. The extent and duration of the displacement, or integration elsewhere is not clearly known for lack of systematic monitoring and follow up. A survey undertaken by the Save the Children in 2007 in the West Bank revealed that it can take up to 2 years until a household can feel a certain degree of residential stability excluding the socio-economic ramifications on the household. There are likely to be wide variations throughout the OPT. In Gaza Strip, households in proximity to Israeli buffer zones for instance have faced multiple displacement following repeated
- Israeli incursions difficult if at all possible for households to achieve a modicum of stability, while continued Israeli restrictions have rendered it more difficult to undertaken reconstruction.
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- More information is readily available on how communities respond to situations at risk of displacement signaling the efforts to reduce or forestall policies of encroachment. This is quite specific to the OPT and its contemporary history in which resilience to policies of the occupation are manifest. It is difficult to explain such resilience without placing due regard to societal value in such resilience often times described in the term sumud.. Sumud, steadfastness, represents a strategy of resilience adopted from 1967 onwards closely related to the image of the Palestinian steadfast on his land refusing to leave, and motivated by the desire to avoid a second nakba witnessed in 1948. It is not merely passive endurance but an act of resistance and defiance to retain ones house, ones land, ones livelihood which particularly for vulnerable households is all that is left. This is not to deny either societal pressures to remain which heighten the difficulties faced by households at

- risk of displacement who are unable or justifiably unwilling to remain in such precarious situations. In extremis is the fate of households that have intentionally or unintentionally sold their property to Israelis – which accounts for a very negligible part of land acquired by Israel – is for Palestinian authority punishable by death though rarely have such sentences been implemented.
- Palestinian communities at risk of displacement have resorted to various strategies in preventing efforts at compelling Palestinians to leave their land. Palestinians have resorted to various strategies to cope with attempts at displacement whether it be through for instance eviction or demolition orders, or construction of the Wall that would otherwise displace or restrict access to land. There have been notable achievements. Budrus was the first Palestinian village to effectively re-route the Wall to lie on the Green Line, instead of cutting through the village's land in the West Bank. In Budrus, villagers held 55 demonstrations over 10 months in 2003-2004 including representatives from all Palestinian political factions, Israeli and international activists. In Bilin, six years into weekly protests and four years after the Israeli High Court declared the path of the Wall in Bilin illegal it was only in June 2011 that the IDF began dismantling the Wall yet even according to the new
- path 435 acres of the village will remain behind the Wall.
- Palestinians have repeatedly rebuilt damaged or demolished homes rather than move elsewhere residing in makeshift shelters in Khirbet Tana, or caves as in South Hebron Hills – few NGOs provide assistance in shelter construction wary of Israeli restrictions, in most instances humanitarian organizations provide victims of displacement with non-food items including tent. The rare instances in which direct assistance is provided in the West Bank, such as the work of Israeli Committee Against House Destruction can only address a very limited number of households.
- Palestinians have also contested through Israeli judicial courts against demolition and eviction orders, the path of the Wall affecting their property, amongst other issues. Several national and international NGOs have provided such legal assistance. Close to thousand if not more cases have been brought forth against house demolition orders through legal assistance provided. In instances of house demolitions, legal action can put a stop to demolition orders through court injunctions yet have not to date been able to remove demolition orders. Court cases may last for years without denouement, and are costly. If successful, Court orders may not necessarily be implemented by the Israeli authorities, as the case of rerouting of the Wall in Bilin reveals.
- Palestinians have mobilized resources or sought the assistance of Palestinian, Israeli and international organizations to invest in their community, maintain a presence and contest policies or attempts to displace such as Yanoun, South Hebron Hills, or in Al Aqaba. Infrastructural projects are in most instances modest – few NGOs implement humanitarian/development projects in Israeli controlled areas without Israeli authorization which is seldom provided. These projects are not immune to demolish orders as the case in Al Aqaba in Jordan Valley in Area C demonstrates yet have continued to persist.
- Palestinians have also organised and sought the support from grassroots organisations and NGOs to provide protective presence to vulnerable Palestinian communities at risk of displacement. The Palestinian led International Solidarity Movement, Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI), the Palestinian- Israeli Tay'yush grassroots organisation have provided protective presence, and reported on human rights abuses in Yanoun, Hebron and South Hebron Hills, Al-Jiflik, Yanous and elsewhere. In late 2004, after inhabitants of Yanoun, located next to Nablus, were forced to flee as result of repeated settler attacks, such protective presence facilitated the return of several displaced families.
- Local Palestinian communities in Area C have also invested in developing planning schemes for their community that if approved by Israeli Civil Administration would allow the issuance of building permits and development of their community. The making of such plans are quite technical, require considerable investment. NGOs, such as Rabbies for Peace and Bimkom assisted local communities, as has the Palestinian authority in developing municipal plans for

communities in Area C. However these have rarely been approved by the Israeli civil administration.

- Palestinian communities have also mobilized in civil protest to evictions, demolitions or construction of the Wall encroaching on their lands. These have included Israeli and international activists. Following on the achievements of demonstrations in Budrus in 2004, popular committees with involvement of Israeli and international activists have launched weekly protests in Bil'in, Nabi Saleh, Nil'in, Massara as well as others in At Twani, Beit Ula, and Susay in Hebron district. These have formed the backdrop of other weekly civil protests elsewhere such as that of Israeli and Palestinian activists in Sheikh Jarah in East Jerusalem such as Sheikh Jarah Soladarity which equally addresses the situation of Palestinian-Israelis in Lod, and other cities in Israel.
- Palestinian and international activists have also resorted to international campaigns and litigation against Israeli policies in OPT that lead to dispossession. The International Solidarity Movement, and the Boycott, Divesment and Sanctions Campagin are such examples calling upon international community and member States against adopting policies or undertaking agreements that support Israel's policies in the OPT. The BDS movement continues to gain significant momentum. Palestinian communities have also sought to use international litigation or forums to contest Israeli policies in the OPT in the likes of the Russell's Tribunal, and litigation such as that of Bilin village Coucil against Green Park International Co, infront of the Supreme Court in Quebec, Canada.
- Forced displacement nevertheless does occur, the pressures and costs of remaining and opposing policies of encroachment are very high to bear. Civilians who protest against demolitions or evictions as these take place are subject to fine, harrasement and arrest. (ICAH, October 2007) There have been incidents in West Bank of Palestinians killed preventing house demolitions. In Gaza Strip, in extremis there were noted examples of communities shielding property from imminent destruction as a measure of last resort at great risk. Palestinians also can face additional costs, and may be compelled to pay costs incurred by the Israeli authorities in destruction or eviction process. Palestinians faced with demolition order have also demolished their homes to avoid fines or additional costs (ICAH, October 2007; OCHA March 2011) Yet more importantly it is also the cumulative costs of remaining at risk of displacement, the restrictions in access to services education, health and
- livelihoods. The risks to household members and properties are considerable whether due to settler violence, Israeli military or police intimidation and violence, and the devastating impact of Israeli incursions. There is equally the anxiety and fears of households investing considerable resources whether in reconstructing homes destroyed or damaged, or awaiting for years on court or administrative rulings on contested property claims or demolition orders, or on litigation against the path of the Wall, or family unity claims including child registration, ad infinitum.

Huffington Post, November 2010.

Budrus a documentary film now debuting across the US, tells the story of a successful protest campaign by unarmed Palestinian civilians against Israel's military occupation in my small West Bank village. *Budrus* depicts our ten month campaign of protest marches in 2003-2004, which included participation by men, women and children, and by representatives from all Palestinian political factions, along with Israeli and international activists, to resist the construction of Israel's Separation Barrier on our lands. Young women, led by my 15-year-old daughter Iltezam, ran past armed Israeli soldiers and jumped in front of the bulldozers that were uprooting our ancient olive trees. The soldiers regularly met us with clubs, rubber-coated bullets, curfews, arrests and even live ammunition. But we won in the end. The Israeli military rerouted the barrier in Budrus, allowing us access to almost all of our land. The film ends with Palestinian and Israeli activists heading to the neighboring village of Ni'ilin where the struggle to save Palestinian land continues today. But following Budrus's success and faced by a growing numbers of civilians protesting the confiscation of their lands, Israel has responded with military might, attempting to quell this new

movement. Twenty Palestinians have since been killed during unarmed demonstrations against the construction of the Separation Barrier. In Ni'ilin, in the dark of night, Israeli soldiers have staged hundreds of military raids and arrests of civilians from the village; hundreds more were injured -- forty by live ammunition, and five, including a ten year old, were shot dead. Today, a horrid 25 foot concrete wall stands in Ni'ilin, behind which lie 620 acres of village lands taken for the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements. Through a five-year protest campaign, another nearby village, Bil'in, has become an international symbol of nonviolent resistance to Israeli occupation, with world leaders from Jimmy Carter to Desmond Tutu visiting to show support.

Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, March 2007

"Needless to say, families whose homes have been destroyed are abandoned to their fate. No use looking for social workers coming to the aid of families in distress, as one finds in West Jerusalem for people in far less dire straits. The families must move in with relatives or put up tents (one family in Jabel Mukaber is living in a bus) or pay out more money to rent an apartment.... The emotional suffering involved in destruction of a family's home is unquantifiable. A home is far more than a mere physical structure. It is a symbolic centre; the site where the most intimate personal living takes place. It is a place of refuge, the family's physical representation, and its "home." It is the consistent physical presence in life, and location of familiar objects. For Palestinians, a house has added significance. Sons getting married build their homes near the parental home, thus preserving not only physical proximity but also continuity in the holding of ancestral lands. This latter aspect is of special importance in an agrarian society, and even more important to refugees torn from their homes in 1948 or 1967. Demolition of homes, similar to their expropriation, is one more aspect of the assault on a person's very being and identity."

Michael Naglar et al, March 2007

Bil'in's demonstrations have taken place every Friday for the past two years and represent a complex mix of principled (Gandhian) nonviolence, strategic nonviolence *a la* Gene Sharpe, and at times stone throwing.... Numerous Palestinian and Israeli civil society organizations work both to oppose the occupation and strengthen the grassroots for a potential mass movement. Holy Land Trust, based in Bethlehem, Palestine, conducts nonviolence training for villages in the West Bank as well as for Palestinian and international college students. Sabeel, a Palestinian ecumenical liberation theology foundation, provides principled nonviolence training for women. The Israeli Committee Against Home Demolitions (ICAHD) sends activists to impede the Israeli military's demolitions of Palestinian homes, and organizes work parties to rebuild them. By bringing together Israelis, Palestinians, and internationals, ICAHD facilitates a tangible, hands-on, meaningful act of nonviolent coexistence in the form of shared projects.⁶⁶ A variety of organizations support the growing Israeli *refusnik* (conscientious objector) movement, including the *Shministim* (high school seniors), *Israeli Youth Refusal Movement*, *Courage to Refuse*, *Refusers Parents' Forum*, and *Refusers Solidarity Network*....

For the Bil'in villagers, creativity, ingenuity, and even a wry sense of humor has been crucial in keeping the resistance strong, diverse, and effective during a two-year struggle. In addition to the standard weekly march to the route of the wall (a form of civil disobedience, because Israel declares it a "closed military zone"), the Bil'in villagers have chained themselves to their olive trees, conducted prayer sessions near the route of the wall, and even held a volleyball match that deterred soldiers from entering the village.³¹ They placed themselves inside empty water barrels in honor of Palestinian refugees who died of heat stroke while hiding inside water barrels, attempting to flee to other Arab countries. The Israeli army's use of teargas, beatings, rubber-coated steel bullets, and normal bullets have injured over 200 Palestinian protestors, including numerous children (and at least seven Palestinians have been killed in events near the wall in other locations).

Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, October 2007

".... Jahalin Bedouin are seeking ways to improve their general living conditions. A number of communities living in the area, and in particular near Kedar, have appealed to local and international organizations to support projects that will contribute to improving their conditions. They have identified the most pressing needs of their communities: water, electricity (generator), and education for their children. Projects should help the Bedouin to build sustainable livelihoods."

Al Majdal, October 2007

"Yanoun is located next to Nablus, and is surrounded by the settlement of Iteamar. As a result of repeated attacks, all the residents of Yanoun were forced to leave in 2002. They all came back after a permanent international presence had been established. Since then, the villagers have stood together against the continuous threat of the settlers.Al Aqaba, and its charismatic mayor, Sami Sadek, stands as another outstanding example of resistance against displacement. Located next to the Jordan valley, close to Tubas, the village lies in a very strategic location. Over the years, the pressure from the Israeli army has increased. ... Most houses and structures, including the mosque, the kindergarten, and the health clinic received demolition orders. Over the years, many families left the village. But Sami ... convinced some families to come back, managed to get funding from various organizations and governments to help build infrastructure, submitted petitions to the court, and mobilized a network of support from all over the world. With all his effort, Al Aqaba is far from dying, on the contrary it appears stronger every year and his villagers are more determined than ever that nobody would push them away from these beautiful landscapes. I went there for the first time four years ago. Since that time, I have seen the development of a new paved road, clinic, kindergarten, and new greenhouses, as well as a mosque whose minaret is one of the highest in the West Bank and can be seen from far as a symbol of determination."

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 22 November 2006

"Jaber Oshaah of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights in Gaza told IRIN that he agreed with HRW's statement but could understand why this strategy was being used. Using people as human shields is not good and we denounce it. It is not good for the people of any side and they should not be used in that way, no matter what pressure they are under, Oshaah said. But the Gazans are also doing this to protect their own homes because when Israel fires at a house here they often damage or destroy others nearby added Oshaah. So the people are standing together to support each other because they do not believe the rest of the world will do anything for them. But it is a negative way of doing it. Israel frequently launches air and artillery strikes on the houses of militants, sometimes telephoning the house minutes beforehand to warn those inside to get out. According to the Israeli human rights organisation B'tselem, between July and 15 November this year, the IDF destroyed 251 homes in Gaza, leaving 1,577 people homeless. "

See Also :

[Village's battle against Israel's fence](#), **International Herald Tribune**, 16 May 2008

DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP

General Documentation Needs and Subsistence

Permit Regime, Residency and Family Unity

- Permit Regime and Documentation
- Documentation and citizenship remains linked to the ongoing peace process. Israel remains in control of a restrictive permit regime and controls population registry of Palestinians in the OPT; under Israeli occupation Palestinians have been defined in various categories whose movement and residency is controlled. These affect internally displaced as well as the general Palestinian community. Palestinian Israeli citizens account for 20% of Israeli society, and have full citizenship rights as Jewish Israeli citizens. Most Palestinian Israelis reside in Israel and very few in Jerusalem. Palestinian Israeli citizens, as well as Israeli citizens, are prohibited from entering Gaza, and Areas A and B.
- Palestinian residents of Jordanian administered East Jerusalem had Jordanian citizenship until 1967. Following census undertaken shortly thereafter, those identified within Jerusalem received permanent Israeli residency without rights conferred as citizens. They do receive social benefits as full Israeli citizens however services provided are not of the same quality. Palestinian Israeli card holders are prohibited from entering Gaza, and Areas A and B.
- Palestinians who live in the OPT areas not annexed to Israel have not received Israeli residency status and remain subject to the Israeli civil administration of the military occupation, and in Areas A and B of the West Bank and in all of Gaza under the civil administration of the Palestinian Authority. Israel however administers the permit regime defining movements in the OPT, and also control of the population registry which defines Palestinian residency whether in Gaza, and West Bank.
- These measures and movement restrictions through checkpoints and other physical impediments, have limited Palestinian freedom of movement and residency throughout the OPT. Extensive permit regime defines access and freedom of movement within the OPT through mosaic of A, B and C areas, and in between Gaza and West Bank separated by checkpoints, road obstacles and other restrictions and governed by the Israeli Civil Administration of the Israeli military governing the OPT. Restrictive permit regime defines roads Palestinians can use and land that is accessible while Israeli control over population registry controls Palestinian residence including child registration.
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- Family Reunification
- Family unity is severely hampered by existing legislation and made more difficult in recent years with the construction of the Wall and its associated regime. In 2002, Israel froze all family reunification proceedings between Israeli citizens, permanent residents (Jerusalem ID card holders) and spouses from the OPT. The freeze denies spouses from the OPT who are married to Israeli citizens or permanent residents of East Jerusalem the right to acquire citizenship or residency status in Jerusalem. Family reunification proceedings under Israeli law prior to freeze in 2002, are lengthy and complicated process, and can be rejected on the grounds of security with no recourse or reason for the denial.
- Construction of the Wall, in addition to the closure system in place in the West Bank, has had a significant impact on family unity and societal linkages within the OPT entailing separation of family based on permit regime. (OCHA, November 2007) Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem face a real threat of losing their own permanent residency if they move to the West

Bank side of the Wall, or the Gaza Strip to join their spouses. The restrictive permit regime and control over population registry limits Palestinian freedom of movement, residency, and has an impact on ensuring family unity.

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- Impact of Displacement
- Forced displacement has a considerable impact on family unity. A study in 2009 by Save the Children underlined the difficulties and devastating impact of on family coping mechanisms after trauma and anxiety following house demolitions, and preceding such demolitions. House demolitions and subsequent displacement, including phase preceding house demolitions, lead to significant trauma. There are fundamental changes that arise mainly distance from the extended family, tension in the relationship between the nuclear and extended family, disrupted relations between the parent and the child. (Save the Children, April 2009)

OCHA, March 2010

"Since Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, and its subsequent annexation, Palestinian residents of the remainder of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been prohibited from residing in East Jerusalem, other than through the 'family unification' process. Since the early 1990s, Palestinian residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have also required permits to enter East Jerusalem and Israel. Under Israeli law, the majority of Palestinians living in Jerusalem are 'permanent residents' rather than citizens of Israel, and their residency status is conditional on their proving that their 'centre of life' lies within the Israeli-defined municipal boundary of Jerusalem. Consequently, their residency status can be revoked under the circumstances described in this chapter. Approximately 14,000 East Jerusalem Palestinians had their residency revoked between 1967 and mid-2010 (not including dependent children), with over 4,500 revoked in 2008. As permanent residency is not automatically transferred through marriage, a Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem who marries a Palestinian from elsewhere in the oPt, and wishes to reside in the city with his/her spouse must apply for family unification. The application process for family reunification is onerous and has become virtually impossible since 2003, when Israel introduced the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order). The Law disproportionately impacts residents of East Jerusalem, who are forbidden from family unification not only with their spouses, but with their minor children. Unlike citizenship, permanent residency is not passed on to the holder's children 'by right', and children can only receive permanent residence under certain conditions. This leads to difficulties in the registration of children – where one parent is a Jerusalem resident and the other is a resident of the rest of the West Bank or Gaza Strip – with one source estimating that there are as many as 10,000 unregistered children in East Jerusalem.⁷ As a consequence, there are numerous cases of Palestinians residing 'illegally' in East Jerusalem with their spouses, and incidences of separated families where the non Jerusalem partner is forced to live outside of the city, with or without the children.⁸ Combined with land expropriation, restrictive zoning and planning, demolitions and evictions, and the inadequate provision of resources and investment in East Jerusalem, described elsewhere in this report, this residency policy not only increases humanitarian vulnerability but risks undermining the Palestinian presence in East Jerusalem."

Save the Children, April 2009, p.38, 39

"The majority of house demolitions studied resulted in the displacement of the inhabitants. The subsequent period of migration is determined by the family's financial resources, the assistance they receive and the possibility of returning to the same land after the house demolition. Generally, migration leads to significant change, mainly distance from the extended family. It also leads to tension in the relationship between the nuclear family and extended family members due to fundamental changes in the lifestyles of both. Maintaining proximity to the original home and the family's cultivated network of resources around that home is important for a family's health and ability to cope. Our study shows that certain family mechanisms break down after the trauma of house demolition. Tension accumulates in the relationship between the parent and the child,

limiting the ability of this relationship to ease the impact of trauma. Usually the mother plays a major role in alleviating or aggravating her children's post-traumatic stress symptoms. Children may be unable to overcome the trauma of the house demolition without her help, and she may be preoccupied with her own symptoms. The father plays an indirect role, albeit one not less important. A psychologically healthy father provides a healthier family atmosphere, which helps the mother and the children overcome their crisis. Therefore, the child's psychological health is closely associated with the parents' health. These families are not only traumatized at the time of the demolition or afterwards, but also preceding the destruction of their home. Direct threat of demolition, on one hand, and daily cases of demolition in targeted areas, on the other, led participants in the study to panic in anticipation. One family in Rafah even reported feeling a sense of stability and reassurance following the demolition, explaining that daily anticipation of the demolition of their house was far worse than their feelings following the demolition. If a family seeks to reconstruct their demolished house, there is often the risk that the home will be demolished once again."

The Christian Science Monitor, 8 October 2009

"Most unacceptable, he says, is Israel's move last week – not for the first time – to limit access to the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock complex to men over the age of 50. Israeli police say it's a temporary but necessary measure to keep out rabble-rousers looking to disturb the peace for Jewish, Christian, and Muslim worshippers seeking access to the city's elbow-to-elbow religious sites. That explanation doesn't fly, Hussein says, and anger over the policy is only growing. "Even if it were only one day when they did this, we would find it offensive and problematic. It blocks our freedom of worship," says Sheikh Hussein, a slight-framed, serious-minded man who sits in a well-appointed office beneath the portrait of the man who appointed him – Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas – and another of the late Yasser Arafat. "There are military checkpoints surrounding the mosque on all sides, and they inspect anyone who tries to enter," says Hussein, himself included."

Alternative Information Center, February 2007

"1. Jewish Israeli: The most privileged (though far from most homogenous) group in Israeli society are the Israeli Jews, who enjoy the highest level of civil rights and who hold most of the political and economic power in Israeli society, specifically in Jerusalem.

2. Palestinian Citizens of Israel: About 20% of all Israeli citizens are Palestinians. Palestinian citizens of Israel are officially full citizens and share the same rights as Jewish citizens. In reality however, they are discriminated against in politics and in the allocation of national resources. As a result Palestinian citizens of Israel suffer from higher poverty rates when compared to their ratio of the population, and are at the same time underrepresented in official positions (Khaider, 2005). In Jerusalem there are comparatively few Palestinians with Israeli citizenship as most 'Palestinian Israelis' are resident in the areas that became the state of Israel in 1948.

3. Jerusalem Residents: Palestinian residents of Jordanian administered East Jerusalem had Jordanian citizenship until 1967. After the occupation and annexation of the area they received permanent Israeli residency which, crucially, is not full citizenship. These Palestinians are not allowed to vote or be elected to the Israeli parliament and their children do not become citizens of Israel. As a result they do not hold the citizenship of any country. However, they do receive social benefits like full Israeli citizens (though these benefits are often of a lower quality).

4. Green ID and Orange ID card: Palestinians who live in the OPT areas not annexed to Israel have not received Israeli residency status and remain until this day subjects of the Israeli government under the administration of the Palestinian Authority. These Palestinians have no rights in Israel, though they often seek employment in Israeli cities and settlements. Many of the residents of outlying communities around Jerusalem carry green IDs or Orange IDs, indicating that they are not citizens of Israel."

Levels of Status of Palestinians in Jerusalem			
This table shows the basic status of the residents of the Jerusalem area in their different categories. These clear distinctions have evolved since the occupation began in 1967. The second table summarizes the effects of the new wall on the status of Palestinian inhabitants.			
Status	Israeli Citizens	Permanent Residents	OPT Palestinians
Social Group	All Jews and Palestinians residing within the 1967 borders. Only a few thousand Palestinian citizens of Israel live beyond the 1967 borders.	Palestinians residing in the areas around Jerusalem that were annexed by Israel in 1967. Today they comprise more than 90% of all Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, and about a third of all Jerusalem residents.	Palestinians living in the OPT areas which were not annexed by Israel. These include the outskirts of Jerusalem. Areas which border Bethlehem, Ramallah and areas on the way to Jericho.
Rights	Formally, all Israeli Citizens are supposed to have full social and political rights. In practice, Palestinian citizens ("48 Palestinians") are subjected to systemic discrimination, under-development and political oppression.	Unable to elect and be elected to the Israeli parliament but have the right to vote for the Municipality. Formally, have full social rights which, in practice, are mostly embodied in social security benefits and public health insurance. Jerusalem Palestinians are subjected to deep systemic discrimination and political oppression of their Palestinian identity.	OPT Palestinians lived under "civil administration" of the military government. After the formation of the PA, the Jerusalem outskirts became a complex mosaic of regions C, B, and A, separated by numerous road blocks. Freedom of movement is still determined by the permanent regime of the civil administration.
Process	The city of Jerusalem has expanded rapidly with numerous Jewish suburban neighborhoods (built on occupied land) encircling the Palestinian annexed areas. There are 200,000 Jewish settlers in East Jerusalem (Hoshen, 2004).	A fierce "demographic policy" aims at "judifying" the city, especially by encouraging the building of new Jewish settlements and by bureaucratic practices and policies whose goal is to reduce the number of Palestinian residents of the city and its surroundings (see below on family unification).	The annexation, Political oppression, curfews, the permits policy and the road blocks on the main ways to the Palestinian cities—have already created a disparity between the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem and their compatriots in the city's outskirts and beyond. The difficulty individuals' encounter in trying to meet each other places their ability to maintain family, business and other relations, in jeopardy.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 June 2007

"In May 2002, the GOI decided to freeze, for the first time, all family reunification proceedings between Israeli citizens and permanent residents (Jerusalem ID card holders) and their spouses from the oPt. In July 2003, the Citizenship and Entry into Israel (Temporary Order) was enacted. The temporary order was renewed in 2004 and 2005. The temporary order denies spouses from the oPt who are married to Israeli citizens or permanent residents (Jerusalem ID card holders) the right to acquire citizenship or residency status and thus the opportunity to live with their partners in Israel and Jerusalem. In 2004 it was estimated that the law affected between 16,000 and

24,000 families²⁹. In Israel, foreign spouses who are Jewish are automatically granted citizenship under the Law of Return. In other cases citizenship can normally be obtained after a minimum of four years, and temporary residency is routinely granted. In July 2005, when the order was renewed, limited exceptions were granted based on gender and age. The amendments permit Palestinian women over the age of 25 and Palestinian men over the age of 35 to apply for temporary visitors' permits to be with their Israeli spouses (including both citizens and permanent residents). However, applying for such a permit is administratively complicated, expensive and often requires the services of a lawyer. Amnesty International, citing Israeli human rights groups, noted that prior to the freezing of family reunification proceedings, "the Israeli Ministry of Interior took an average of five years from the submission of an application to grant or deny the application. The applicant spent another five years in various statuses before receiving permanent residency or citizenship"²⁵. Furthermore, permits can be rejected on the grounds of security with no recourse or reason for the denial. The temporary nature of the permits issued means that the spouse is not entitled to apply for social services or work permits²⁶.

On 14 May 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court dismissed a petition filed by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and Adalah (The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel) requesting an annulment of this temporary law. According to Human Rights Watch, "the majority of justices did find that the current law violates the constitutional right of Israelis to equality and to family life ... However, only a minority of justices felt that the appropriate remedy was to overturn the temporary law" The temporary order expired in January 2007. In late 2006, the Israeli Cabinet advanced legislation extending the temporary order for another two years and in January 2007 the order was debated within the Knesset. It has been reported that draft revisions to the temporary order will establish a committee to deal with requests for exceptions on "humanitarian grounds" given the criticism of the temporary order by the minority judges in the Supreme Court ruling. Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem face a real threat of losing their own permanent residency if they move to the West Bank or the Gaza Strip to join their spouses. Israeli citizens are prohibited by the IDF from entering Area A (designated under the Oslo Accords as being under Palestinian Authority security and administrative control) and so have to break Israeli law in order to live with their spouses. If spouses from the oPt stay illegally in Israel with their Israeli spouse and children, they often can't leave the house for fear of arrest and deportation."

UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 28 January 2008

"A major issue of concern for my mandate is the restricted access to holy places. Muslims and Christians are impeded from worshipping at some of their most holy places in the world due to an elaborate system of permits, visas, checkpoints and the Barrier. While the Israeli Government informed me that these restrictions are necessary for security reasons, I would like to emphasize that any measure taken to combat terrorism must comply with the States' obligations under international law, including freedom of religion or belief. These intrusive restrictions strike me as disproportionate to their aim as well as discriminatory and arbitrary in their implementation. My concern also extends to problems of access to holy places revered by Jews."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), November 2007

"Closed area status also results in a severing of social relations. Communities reported that relatives and friends experience difficulties in obtaining 'visitor' permits' to attend weddings, funerals, and religious festivals in the closed areas since the gate and permit regime was established. All 15 communities also reported that proposed marriages have been prevented or married couples separated because of the Barrier and attendant permit regime. "

United Nations Human Rights Council (UN HRC), 21 September 2007

"Deeply concerned also at the Israeli policy of closures and the severe restrictions, including curfews and the permit regime, that continue to be imposed on the movement of Palestinians and their free access to their holy sites, including Al Aqsa Mosque, 1. Stresses that all policies and measures taken by Israel, the occupying Power, to limit access of Palestinians to their holy

sites, particularly in Occupied East Jerusalem, on the basis of national origin, religion, birth, sex or any other status are in violation of the provisions of the above-mentioned instruments and resolutions and therefore must cease immediately..."

Forced Migration Review (FMR), 4 September 2006

"Jerusalem permanent residency status differs significantly from citizenship. Permanent residents of Israel are entitled to live and work in Israel without special permits, to receive social benefits from the National Insurance Institute and to vote in local elections. Permanent residency is not automatically granted to the holders' children or spouses, however, and permanent residents, unlike Israeli citizens, do not enjoy the right to return to Israel at any time. "

See Also

[The Barrier Gate and Permit Regime Four Years on: Humanitarian Impact in the Northern West Bank](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, November 2007

[Visa regime splits Palestinian families](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 7 November 2006

[Perpetual Limbo: Israel's Freeze on Unification of Palestinian Families in the Occupied Territories](#), **B'Tselem**, 31 July 2006

[Condemning the Upholding of the Ban on Family Unification](#), **al-Haq**, 16 May 2006

PROPERTY ISSUES

General Property Issues

Land, Property and Remedy under Israeli Occupation

- Land access & Property under Israeli Occupation
- Israel has made use of various approaches in expropriating land property in the OPT in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law. Since 1967 Israel has made use of Ottoman Legislation to declare land 'State land', has seized private land for 'military purposes', made use of declaration of land as abandoned property and has expropriated land based on 'public needs'. (Peace Now, October 2006) Only small parts of the OPT land have been privately registered by Palestinians, mainly in northern West Bank. Though under the British mandate a process of registration of land of farmers/residents was initiated, Israel in 1968 would stop the registration leaving only one third of land registered. Land unregistered was subsequently declared 'State land', and private property subject to various forms of appropriation (Peace Now, October 2006; Badil and Cohre, May 2005)
- Since the beginning of the occupation, Israel has taken control of close to 40% of land throughout the West Bank. It has done this by declaring and registering land as "state land"; requisition for military needs, declaration of land as abandoned property and the expropriation of land for public needs. In addition, Israel has also helped its Jewish citizens to purchase land. (Peace Now, October 2006) This includes military areas and bases, settlement areas, including outposts, and linked agricultural areas, and construction of the Wall and by pass routes affecting East Jerusalem, and Area C particularly Jordan Valley (Badil and Cohre, May 2005; B'tselem, June 2011). In certain cases the appropriation of these lands has been illegal according to Israeli law. According to Peace Now, over 40% of settlements consist of privately registered Palestinian property, the appropriation of which is illegal according to Israeli law.
- In Gaza Strip, until Disengagement Plan of 2005, approximately 35-40% of land was appropriated for Israeli settlements, Israeli military areas and security zones and buffer areas. Following the disengagement, northern settlement area was made a no-go zone, and Israel retained a buffer zone in Gaza bordering on Israel, amounting to 17% of the Gaza Strip. Reclaimed land was redistributed to Palestinian owners (which amounted for a small percentage) while the Palestinian authority under administers the majority remaining as public lands. The buffer zone was reinforced and increased following 2008/2009 Israeli offensive affecting access to land, while extensive agricultural areas were destroyed and tens of thousands of housing damaged or demolished. Sanctions predating the 2008/2009 have stalled reconstruction efforts of private and public properties destroyed or damaged by Israeli military actions since 2004/2005.
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- Israeli Policies of Expropriation of Palestinian Land
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- Israel's main means of acquiring private land is "seizure for military purposes." In contrast to an "expropriation," in which ownership of the land is transferred to the State, "seizure" leaves the official ownership of the land in the name of its original owners, but transfers total control of the land, for a designated period of time, to the military. At the end of that period, the military must either relinquish control of the land to the owners – something which has rarely happened in the West Bank – or renew the seizure order. (Peace Now, October 2006; Badil and Cohre, May 2005)

- According to the Order Regarding Abandoned Property, any property whose owner and holder left the West Bank before, during or after the 1967 war is defined as an abandoned property and Israeli authority acting as a custodian is entitled to take possession of the property and to manage it as it sees fit until the owners return. (B'Tselem, May 2002) Israel has further made use of Ottoman law under which all land is considered 'State land' unless proven otherwise. To formally register land as private land, the area must be cultivated for at least 10 years, and if not registered would be considered private land if the land is cultivated and taxes paid. If the land is not cultivated for 3 successive years, it may become 'State land'. (Peace Now, October 2006; Badil and Cohre, May 2005)
- Land expropriation has also been undertaken for public purpose. This in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) has been under provisions of a Jordanian law that delineates expropriation of land for a public purpose, and in East Jerusalem based on a Mandatory order of the 1940s. (B'Tselem, May 2002) The acquisition of land for 'public purpose' is subject to compensation.
- The private acquisition of land in the West Bank was encouraged in the 1980s entailing the involvement of private entrepreneurs in the transfer of land to Jewish hands. This involvement embodied the commitment of the government to enable Jews to purchase land and settle throughout the West Bank, including areas where land could not be declared state land because it was registered in the owner's name and held according to the provisions of the Ottoman Land Law. (B'Tselem, May 2002; Badil and Cohre, May 2005) Currently less than 1% of land used for settlements is owned Jewish land. (Peace Now, October 2006)
- In August 2009, the Knesset passed legislation that seeks to replace the Israel Lands Administration (ILA), which manages 93% of land in Israel, with a new Land Authority, and crucially, will allow for the privatisation of state land. The new law allows the transfer of land from the state and the Jewish National Fund « ownership » into private Jewish ownership and applies also in occupied East Jerusalem (UN HRC, 4 September 2009). The acts of privatisation and transfer of ownership of land in the OPT, under the Israel Land Reform Law, by the occupying power, constitute a gross breach of international humanitarian law (Adalah, Newsletter, August 2009).
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- Property and Forced Displacement
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- There is no comprehensive data on the issues facing displaced and at risk of displacement. As mentioned there is no updated kadaster which Israel has been frozen since 1968 (though attempts are made to develop kadasters in Palestinian controlled areas). Most Palestinians no longer attempt to register land as the process is expensive and complicated and rejections cannot be appealed. Only about 10% of Palestinian villages in Area C have the 'master plans' required for legal construction due to the high level of costs, time and bureaucratic obstacles involved (HPN, July 2009; IDMC November 2010) while construction in practice is only permissible in 1% of the land, while in East Jerusalem only 13% is allocated for Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem. Permission to construct or repair houses and infrastructure is rarely obtained (See House Demolitions Section). In light of this Palestinians in Area C and East Jerusalem often construct or repair homes, schools and economic related
- projects outside of the Israeli law, at risk of demolition, and fines. While in Gaza Strip extensive buffer zone and no-go areas affects over 17 % of the land while external closure regime restricts what can be built or reconstructed.
- Several categories of concern may be listed which is not comprehensive but indicative of areas of that touch upon Palestinian communities displaced or at risk of displacement:
- Lack of property kadaster in West Bank, and the Gaza Strip - property registration was frozen by Israeli authorities as of 1968. There is no clear kadaster at present for property in the OPT. The lack of kadaster remains a significant challenge for Palestinians wishing to contest Israeli claims or expropriation, or in seeking claims for compensation or assistance from Palestinian Authorities.

- Lack of approved village plans in Area C. There are 149 Palestinian communities with built up area in Area C. As of June 2008, the Israeli Civil Administration has only approved plans for 18 villages and yet which retain significant restrictions. The remaining 131 communities only valid plans pre-date 1967; any construction outside of these plans is deemed illegal, and subject to demolition (Bimkom, June 2008).
- Populations affected by settlements in urban areas whose property is confiscated, or expropriated by Israeli settlers or Israeli authorities (East Jerusalem, the Old City –H2- of Hebron) including Palestinian private property.
- Rural communities affected by expropriation of land and house demolitions for settlements or Israeli infrastructure (particularly Jordan Valley but equally applicable to other localities in Area C) , and particularly farmers affected by the Wall and access to “seam zones” whose access is governed by restrictive permit regime;
- Rural and urban communities whose property has been damaged or destroyed as result of Israeli military incursions, particularly in Gaza Strip, as well as result of settler vandalism, damages and destruction of properties in West Bank, including East Jerusalem, with limited legal remedy available.
- Bedouins living in Area C (particularly the Jahlini Bedouin community) whose traditional ownership rights are not recognised by Israel (and Bedouins in Area B) and have been subject to multiple displacement, demolitions of property (homes and schools) and remain particularly vulnerable;
- Refugees in OPT are more likely to have limited tenure rights as claims are more clearly associated with property in places of origin in Israel. In prevailing situation in the OPT, refugees are therefore more vulnerable to secondary displacement in disputed property claims as illustrated for instance in Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem.
- Properties including land and housing in proximity to or in extended buffer zones along Gaza-Israel armistice line, and assigned no-go areas in northern Gaza, as well as Palestinians whose suffered housing damaged or destroyed due to ‘clearing operations’ along Rafah border area and Israeli incursions; including the situation of Palestinians who do not own property.
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- Protection and Remedy
- Protection of public and private property is well grounded in international humanitarian law and human rights law, as well as Israeli law which recognises this right in Section 3 of the Basic Law which provides that “There shall be no violation of the property of a person”. (B’Tselem, May 2002) Also Israeli jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has also reiterated that because the Occupation is not sovereign and its administration of that territory is temporary it may take only two factors into account security needs and welfare of the local population. (B’Tselem, May 2002) Israeli Sasson Report when referring to outposts built on private owned Palestinian land has stressed upon the prohibition to create outposts on private Palestinian property, and stressed upon the jurisprudence which obligates the IDF to protect the right of possession however expropriation of private property takes place with impunity (Sasson, May 2005).
- Legal redress for Palestinians in Area C and East Jerusalem is limited to applications to Israeli military courts or civil courts, or Israeli organisations filing petitions in civil courts on their behalf. However such processes take considerable time, are costly and more often than not are unsuccessful. Court injunctions against demolitions or land appropriation more often than not serve to delay pending house demolitions or land appropriation rather than ensure legal remedy (IDMC, November 2010). Furthermore attempts to regularize property ownership are beset by obstacles. Most Palestinians no longer attempt to register land as the process is expensive and complicated and rejections cannot be appealed. Less than 10% of Palestinian villages in Area C have the ‘master plans’ required for legal construction due to the high level of costs, time and bureaucratic obstacles involved (HPN, July 2009; IDMC November 2010). Of the 149 Palestinian communities in West Bank, Israeli Civil

- Administration has approved planning for only 18 villages, while the remaining 131 villages retain only plans pre-dating 1967 (Bimkom, June 2008).
- Under humanitarian law states have an obligation to provide restitution or compensation for breaches of their obligations, and numerous human rights instruments include provisions relating to the right of every individual to an effective remedy for human rights violations. It is generally remarked that the building of settlements, access roads and infrastructure, and house demolitions is done without compensation. (DIFD, February 2004). Compensation has been provided by Israel, however such compensation has not been uniform, sums awarded have been criticised as insufficient however there is limited overall information as to what has been provided, reflecting on how limited it has been applied (IDMC, November 2010).
- Mindful of statements to the contrary, compensation are more derived for particular forms of property and resulting from litigations than a clear policy. Palestinian communities are further wary of agreeing to compensations which would jeopardise future claims. (ICAHN, October 2007) For acts defined in terms of military operations which could be broadly defined, Israeli Compensation Law restricts significantly legal remedy through compensation. Israel "is not civilly liable for an act done in the course of a war operation" by the Israeli military, including acts of negligence. The breadth of scope of this law is highly contentious and is in violation of international law. (Al Haq, October 2005)
- ICJ affirmed that Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the OPT, including in and around East Jerusalem (ICJ, July 2004) UN Register of Damage Caused by the Construction of the Wall in the OPT established by UN General Assembly Resolution is to serve as a record of the damage caused to all natural and legal persons concerned as a result of the construction of the wall by Israel, in the OPT (GA UN, 24 January 2007) UNROD became fully operational in June 2008. As of April 2009, more than 1,000 claims forms were collected and delivered to UNROD in Vienna. A complementary Palestinian National Committee on the Register of Damage was also established by Palestinian Authority to assist both the Palestinian people affected by the Wall in making claims, and to coordinate with UNROD to ensure that it reaches realistic and accurate estimates regarding damages. Israel has consistently refused to cooperate with the office of
- UNROD. (COHRE, July 2009)
- There have been various critics and recommendations towards the Register mindful that the Register of Damage as envisaged by the UN resolution is not a claim mechanism.. The establishment of Register should however not be the only step the UN takes to implement the ICJ Advisory Opinion. Israel asserts that it has sought to build the Separation Wall/Barrier on public lands where possible, and where private land was used, provided opportunities for compensation. However, Israeli officials to date have refused to cooperate with UNROD stating that its mandate is illegitimate, that the route of the barrier was based simply on security needs, and that Palestinians had every right, as it is, to claim compensation through Israeli channels. (BBC, April 2008)
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B'tselem, May 2011

In its 44 years of occupation, Israel has created a regime in the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea area that denies Palestinians their rights. Israel has closed more than three-quarters of the land area to Palestinians and has prohibited them from working the area's fertile land. Israel has restricted Palestinian access to water sources such that, in some Palestinian villages, water consumption is minimal and comparable to that of disaster areas. Israel also restricts Palestinian movement and prevents Palestinians from building and developing their communities. It has also taken control of the tourist sites and enables private enterprises to exploit and profit from the minerals in the area. This regime, which exploits the area's resources to a greater extent than in other sections of the West Bank indicates Israel's intention: de facto annexation of the area. The settlers in the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea area benefit from extensive benefits, even

compared with settlers living elsewhere in the West Bank. The Jordan Valley is the only area in which settlers are given generous allocations of water, appreciably larger than the average consumption of Israel's families, both in Israel and in the other settlements. The settlements in the area have been allocated large swaths of land; their municipal area is 28 times as large as the built-up area. These benefits have enabled the settlers to develop modern, intensive agriculture, based in part on cheap labor from among the local population. The Jordan Valley contains the largest land reserves available to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank with which the Palestinians can develop a modern agricultural sector, tourism, industry, and logistic elements such as airports and roadways. However, Israel restricts the Palestinians' ability to realize any of this potential. Israel's policy in the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea area reflects, more clearly than anywhere else in the West Bank, its instrumental use of international law, local law, and Israeli law to meet its objectives. Israel justifies its acts by relying on provisions of law, but breaches those provisions when it serves its purposes. For example, Israel stopped registration of land in the West Bank on grounds that it wanted to protect the property rights of Palestinian refugees, but established settlements in the Jordan Valley on thousands of dunams of land that it stole from them. Israel contends it is committed to international law, and declares that it will not allow the occupation to become "an open field for economic exploitation," while it simultaneously takes control of natural resources of the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea, the most important being the water resources, and designates them for the sole use of the settlers. Also, Israel has refrained from preparing building and development plans for the Palestinian communities, claiming "substantive environmental reasons" and relying on antiquated outline plans, but enables the establishment of settlements on the same territory.

Adalah, Position Paper, August 2009

"On 3 August 2009, the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, ratified the Israel Land Administration Law (Amendment No. 7) 5769 - 2009, which is, in fact, a reform in the management of lands owned by the State of Israel, the Development Authority and the Jewish National Fund, constituting 93% of the area of the State of Israel (hereinafter the "Land Reform Law"). The law concerns land both within the State of Israel and in part of the territories occupied since 1967, to which Israel has applied its laws and illegally annexed them to its territory. These are the territories of the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem.

As part of the reform, the State of Israel will begin a process of privatization of built-up areas and areas planned for development in the State. The significance of the privatization process is that ownership rights in these lands will be transferred from the state to private persons. The scope of the lands to be privatized is estimated at around 800,000 dunams (4% of the area of the State). The privatization will also include the lands of the settlements and the areas planned for development located in the Occupied Territories of East Jerusalem and on the Golan Heights, which were illegally annexed to the State of Israel. That is to say, ownership of the built-up areas in the settlements in these regions as well as areas planned for development will be transferred from the state to private individuals. In fact, the State of Israel will be selling lands in the Occupied Territories, thereby taking a great deal of capital into its treasury."

Peace Now, October 2006

"To understand the mechanism of land seizure in the West Bank, one must go back to the political history of the region. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the West Bank came under the successive rule of four different powers: the Ottomans, the British, the Jordanians, and the Israelis. Each left a legal and administrative trail behind them, the implications of which play a significant role in today's legal reality. Since 1967, Israel has made use of Ottoman legislation dating back to the middle of the 19th century in order to declare land to be "State land." According to that law, all lands are considered "State Land" unless proven otherwise. To formally register land as private property, one must cultivate it for at least ten years. If the land is not registered, one would be considered the owner as long as he cultivates it and pays taxes on it. If the land is not cultivated for three successive years, it may become the property of the Ottoman State, i.e. "State Land". Israel has also exploited the fact that during the Ottoman period only small parts of

the land of the West Bank were formally registered to a specific owner. During the 1920's, the British began a process of registering the land to the farmers who cultivated it or residents who owned houses that were built on it. This process continued throughout the Jordanian period. In 1968, the State of Israel stopped the land registration process by virtue of an injunction issued by the military governor in the occupied territories.

It was claimed that the injunction was intended to protect the owners of land that had been abandoned (from other Palestinians who might try to register ownership of it in their absence), and to prevent the rights of these owners from being discriminated against. However, in reality, this injunction left thousands of square kilometers of agricultural land unregistered, where it eventually was declared "State Land" and used for the sole benefit of Israel. The occupation in 1967 brought about a change in the Palestinian economy. Many Palestinians, who in the past had worked as farmers became workers in Israel. This situation paved the way for the "Custodian of Government Property in the Area of Judea and Samaria," to declare large parts of the uncultivated land as "state land", utilizing the Ottoman law. The "privately owned land" to which this report refers is: A. Land that was registered and recognized as private property before 1968, at a time when the process of land registration was still open and available to Palestinians, or B. Cultivated land which is recognized by Israel as private land according to the Ottoman law.

In addition to the wholesale declaration that designated much of the West Bank as "State land" – land that was then allocated solely to the settlements and the settlers – there are a number of additional administrative means by which the State was able to take control of land in the West Bank. The State's main means of acquiring private land was "seizure for military purposes." In contrast to an "expropriation," in which ownership of the land is transferred to the State, "seizure" leaves the official ownership of the land in the name of its original owners, but transfers total control of the land, for a designated period of time, to the military. At the end of that period, the military must either relinquish control of the land to the owners – something which has rarely happened in the West Bank – or renew the seizure order. Many of the settlements established during the first decade of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank were built on land that had been "seized for military purposes." However, a landmark court decision in 1979, the result of the affair known as the Elon More case, brought this abusive practice to an official end. Based on the Elon More legal precedent, after 1979 the State was forced to cease using "seizure for military purposes" as a means of taking over privately-owned Palestinian land for the construction of settlements. However, during the decade following the signing of the Oslo Accords, Israel began once again to make regular use of seizure injunctions for military purposes, particularly in order to establish the bypass road system on the West Bank, intended to make it possible for settlers to travel without having to cross Palestinian population centers. Over the years, many additional seizure orders have been issued in order to create "secure zones" around the settlements, as well as to build the separation fence....

In spite of the clear ruling of the court, the State continued to initiate and allow the construction of settlements, as well as "new neighborhoods" of established settlements, on property that the State knew to be privately owned by Palestinians. Since such lands could not be declared "state land" and, based on the Elon More ruling, could not be seized under the pretext of "military purposes," these activities were carried out without any legal basis. In a harsh report regarding the conduct of the Civil Administration, the State Comptroller describes a case in which an Israeli industrial area was built, both by public and private investment, on privately-owned Palestinian land in the West Bank. Quoting the legal adviser of the Civil Administration on this affair, he writes: "This affair's severity does not indicate its exceptionality".Apart from "State Land" and "Private Palestinian Land", Israel established another category of land, "survey land." This refers to property whose ownership is in dispute, generally in cases where a Palestinian's title to the land is being challenged by the State. Under Israeli law, such land cannot be developed legally, either by the State or by the Palestinian claiming ownership. In reality..., settlement construction

has been permitted on such land, too. In addition, the category of "Jewish land" was created, referring to West Bank property owned by Jews."

B'Tselem, May 2002

"Article 55 of the Hague Regulations states the rules relating to the permitted use of government property under the control of the occupier: The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct. The terms "administrator" and "usufructuary" indicate the right of the occupying state to manage the properties of the state it occupies and use them to meet its needs subject to certain limitations. These limitations are derived from the temporary nature of the occupation and the lack of sovereignty of the occupying state. Therefore, the occupying state is forbidden, *inter alia*, to change the character and nature of the governmental properties (in the context of the settlements, state land), except for security needs or for the benefit of the local population.

The Supreme Court held that, because the occupying state is not the sovereign in the territory under occupation and its administration there is temporary, it may take into account only two factors: security needs and the welfare of the local population. In the words of Justice Aharon Barak: The Hague Regulations revolve about two main pivots: one – ensuring the legitimate security interest of those holding the land by belligerent occupation; and the other – ensuring the needs of the civilian population in the territory subject to belligerent population... the military commander may not weigh national, economic, or social interests of his country insofar as they have no ramifications on his security interest in the area, or on the interest of the local population. Even military needs are his [i.e., the military commander's] needs and not national security needs in their broad sense.

..... Protection of private property is well grounded in international humanitarian law, and is found, *inter alia*, in the Hague Regulations (Article 46) and in the Fourth Geneva Convention (Article 53). Israeli law recognizes this right in Section 3 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which provides: "There shall be no violation of the property of a person." The fundamental human rights, as they appear in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, were drafted in two international conventions that the UN adopted in 1966: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Israel signed and ratified both of these covenants. The two UN committees responsible for interpreting the covenants and monitoring their implementation have unequivocally stated that these covenants apply to all persons over whom the signatory states have control, regardless of sovereignty. Furthermore, the two committees expressly stated that they also apply to Israel in regards to its actions in the West Bank."

United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 4 December 1998

"21. The Committee is deeply concerned about the adverse impact of the growing exclusion faced by Palestinians in East Jerusalem from the enjoyment of their economic, social and cultural rights. The Committee is also concerned over the continued Israeli policies of building settlements to expand the boundaries of East Jerusalem and of transferring Jewish residents into East Jerusalem with the result that they now outnumber the Palestinian residents.

22. The Committee deplores the continuing practices of the Government of Israel of home demolitions, land confiscations and restrictions on family reunification and residency rights, and its adoption of policies which result in substandard housing and living conditions, including extreme overcrowding and lack of services, of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, in particular in the old city....

24. The Committee notes that despite State party's obligation under article 11 of the Covenant, the Government of Israel continues to expropriate Palestinian lands and resources for the expansion of Israeli settlements. Thousands of dunams (hectares) of land in the West Bank have recently been confiscated to build 20 new bypass roads which cut West Bank towns off from outlying villages and farmlands. The consequence - if not the motivation - is the fragmentation and isolation of the Palestinian communities and facilitation of the expansion of illegal settlements. The Committee also notes with concern that while the Government annually diverts millions of cubic metres of water from the West Bank's Eastern Aquifer Basin, the annual per capita consumption allocation for Palestinians is only 125 cubic metres while settlers are allocated 1,000 cubic metres per capita."

Talia Sasson, Government of Israel, May 2005

"It is absolutely prohibited to establish outposts on private Palestinian property. Such an action may in certain circumstances become a felony. But first and foremost this is a serious prejudice of the right of possession. This right is a basic right in Israel – included in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, and was defined by the Israeli Supreme Court as a constitutional right. The Israeli High Court of Justice ruled that the Commander of the area must protect the fundamental rights of the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. This means that he must also protect their right of possession. It is the Commander's duty to prevent the intolerable prejudice of the Palestinians' right of possession, which the establishment of outposts on their property causes. There is no way to validate the establishment of an outpost on private Palestinian property, not even post factum. Such outposts must be evacuated, the sooner the better."

United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UN CERD), 14 June 2007

"35. The Committee notes with concern the application in the Occupied Palestinians Territories of different laws, policies and practices to Palestinians on the one hand and to Israelis on the other hand. It is concerned, in particular by information about unequal distribution of water resources to the detriment of Palestinians, about the disproportionate targeting of Palestinians in the house demolitions and about the appreciation of different criminal laws leading to prolonged detention and harder punishments for Palestinians for the same offences. (articles 2,3, and 5).

The State party should ensure equal access to water resources tall without any discrimination. The Committee also reiterates its called for a halt to the demolition of Arab properties particularly in East Jerusalem and for respect for property rights irrespective of the ethnic of national origin of the owner. Although different legal regimes may apply to Israeli citizens living in the Occupied Palestinian territories and Palestinians, the State Party should ensure that the same crime is judged equally not taking into consideration the citizenship of the perpetrator. "

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, August 2008

"Under humanitarian law states have an obligation to pay compensation for breaches of their obligations in accordance with Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 148 Fourth Geneva Convention, and Article 91 Protocol I. The Hague Regulations annexed to the 1907 Convention provide for the individual right to demand an indemnity for losses sustained in cases of violations. The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War also provides that an Occupying Power make arrangements to ensure that fair value is paid for any requisitioned goods.Numerous human rights instruments include express provisions relating to the right of every individual to an effective remedy for human rights violations. The right to adequate, fair or an enforceable right to compensation is also found in all three regional human rights conventions (i.e., African, inter-American and European). Under international refugee law states have focused on return and housing and property restitution rather than refugee compensation. Compensation is not a substitute for return and restitution. In 1992 the International Law Commission adopted the Declaration of Principles of International Law on Compensation to Refugees.

General Assembly [Resolution 194\(III\)](#) reaffirms the right of Palestinian refugees displaced in 1948 to at least two types of compensation: (1) payment to refugees not choosing to return to their homes; and, (2) payment for the loss of or damage to (movable and immovable) property. The General Assembly rejected draft resolutions and amendments that did not include provisions for payment for the loss of or damage to property. The right to compensation applies to all refugees, irrespective of whether they choose to exercise their right of return. The phrase "loss of or damage to property which under principles of international law or in equity should be made good" indicates that the Assembly did not wish to arbitrarily limit claims to compensation for losses and damages. A broader set of claims may include compensation for human capital losses and psychological suffering.

To date, agreements between Israel and the PLO do not affirm the right of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons to compensation. The 1993 Palestinian-Israeli framework agreement ([Declaration of Principles](#)) (Article V (3)) and the [1995 Interim Agreement](#) (Chapter III, Article XVII) state that the issue of refugees displaced in 1948 will be addressed during permanent status negotiations. The 1993 Declaration of Principles [also] establishes a quadripartite continuing committee (Article XII) to decide on "the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967." Similar provisions for Palestinians who became refugees or displaced persons as a result of the 1967 occupation by Israel of the West Bank and Gaza are found in the [1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement](#) (Article XVI(2)) and in the 1995 Interim Agreement (Chapter Four, Article XXVII(2))."

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, August 2008

"[General Assembly Resolution 194\(III\)](#) reaffirms the right of Palestinian refugees displaced in 1948 to housing and property restitution. According to the UN Secretariat, the underlying principle of Resolution 194 is that Palestinian refugees should be permitted to return to their homes and be reinstated in the possession of the property which they previously held. It is clear from the phrasing "to their homes" that the Assembly intended to affirm the right of Palestinian refugees to housing and property restitution. If the General Assembly had not intended to affirm the right of Palestinian refugees to housing and property restitution, it is likely that the broader language in draft resolutions referring to the places from which they came would have remained. [Assembly Resolution 3236\(XXIX\)](#) reaffirms the "inalienable right" of Palestinian refugees to return specifically to their homes and properties.....

To date, agreements between Israel and the PLO do not affirm the right of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons to housing and property restitution. The 1993 Palestinian-Israeli framework agreement ([1993 Declaration of Principles](#)) (Article V (3)) and the 1995 Interim Agreement (Chapter III, Article XVII) state that the issue of refugees displaced in 1948 will be addressed during permanent status negotiations. The 1993 Declaration of Principles [also] establishes a quadripartite continuing committee (Article XII) to decide on "the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967." Similar provisions for Palestinians who became refugees or displaced persons as a result of the 1967 occupation by Israel of the West Bank and Gaza are found in the [1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement](#) (Article XVI(2)) and in the [1995 Interim Agreement](#) (Chapter Four, Article XXVII(2)). The agreements do not establish procedures and mechanisms to enable Palestinian refugees to repossess housing and property. They do not call upon the government of Israel to repeal discriminatory legislation used to expropriate refugee properties. On the contrary, the 1995 Interim Agreement (Annex III, Appendix I, Article 16(3) and Article 22(3)) calls upon Palestinians to respect the "legal rights" of Israelis concerning "Government and Absentee property" that was "acquired" - most often through expropriation - in 1967 occupied Palestine."

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), November 2003

"In addition to its efforts to ensure the security of its citizens, Israel attaches considerable importance to the interests of the local Palestinian residents. Israel recognizes the necessity of finding an appropriate balance between the imperative need to prevent terrorism and defend its citizens, and the humanitarian needs of the Palestinians. Most Palestinians will be on the eastern side of the fence. They will not be cut off from their commercial and urban centers. No Palestinians will have to relocate. Israel will make every effort to avoid causing hardship and interference with their daily lives. Dozens of crossing points have been set up to enable the movement of people and goods. The security fence was located, to the greatest possible degree, on unused land to avoid harming agriculture. Palestinian farmers will have access to their fields and will reach them through special gates that are being built into the fence. Trees affected by the construction will be replanted."

International Development Committee, House of Commons, 5 February 2004

"Settlements and their associated infrastructure have a major impact on Palestinians. A network of "by-pass" roads is arranged to provide access between settlements and links to Israel. Palestinians cannot use them. The by-pass roads add to the sense among Palestinian communities of being penned into enclaves, movement between which is at the discretion of the IDF. 28 Land is confiscated without compensation on which to build settlements, their access roads and infrastructure. Palestinian infrastructure is often destroyed in the process and Palestinian agricultural lands are cut through.... More than 11,000 homes have been demolished and their inhabitants left without compensation to live in ICRC tents until they can find a new home for themselves with family or friends.

Some NGOs already try to document destruction and wastage and have made suggestions for the standardising this process. NGOs such as ICAHD document demolition of Palestinian property. UN OCHA has a strong monitoring role in respect of checkpoints, movement restrictions, demolition and land confiscation. A future Palestinian state may be in a position to press for compensation or reparations, but this could only happen where destruction has been documented. DFID should investigate the possibility of its assistance to the PA being used for the systematic documentation of destruction."

Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, October 2007

"The tribe, most of whose members had been expelled by force from the area of the neighborhood once known as "06" in Ma'ale Adumim, received monetary compensation for the move to their new location. Families with more than four children received NIS 38,000, smaller families received NIS 28,000. A total of NIS 4 million was allocated to the families for the construction, in addition to about 3,000 dunams (750 acres) of pasture land..... The CA [Civil Administration] said in response to this article that "for several years the Bedouin have been squatting on state land and building illegally. The administration is acting in coordination with the heads of the Jahalin tribe and their attorney in order to enforce law and order. As part of the enforcement activities, the Bedouin have been given alternative plots on state land. The administration even undertakes the connection of the plots to the water supply and builds access roads, provides aid with respect to structures used as classrooms, kindergartens and a clinic, and in addition provides monetary compensation. The administration will continue to take action to evacuate the illegal squatters.".... The families displaced in 1996 and 1998 received a small financial compensation for their relocation, between 15,000 and 30,000 NIS each (between \$3,500 and \$7,000). Over the years, lawyers representing the Bedouin have brought over 20 cases to the Israeli High Court. None, however, have prevented their displacement."

Al Haq, October 2005

"On 27 July 2005, the Israeli Knesset (parliament) passed the amended *Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law* (the Compensation Law)..... This law proclaims that the State of Israel "is not civilly liable for an act done in the course of a war operation" of the Israeli military. Individual state

agents are also protected from such liability. The amended law narrows the eligibility of Palestinians to submit claims for compensation as a result of illegal actions carried out by Israeli forces, including acts of negligence.

Israel's Compensation Law breaches international law both directly and indirectly. Firstly, it serves to deny Palestinians in the OPT their right to an effective remedy, which as has been illustrated is a violation of both international human rights and humanitarian law, and which has a severe and disproportionate impact on Palestinians. Further, the denial of compensation enables a culture of *de facto* impunity in which Israeli authorities turn a blind eye to such grave violations as extrajudicial killings, property destruction, and torture."

COHRE, 9 July 2009

"[...]UNRoD became fully operational in June 2008, based at the United Nations Office in Vienna. A few locally recruited staff members, to collect claim forms of registration of damage, were based with the United Nations Office for Project Services in Ramallah. A pilot project began in November 2008 in four villages affected by the Wall, located in Jenin Governorate, northern West Bank. As of April 2009, more than 1,000 claims forms were collected and delivered to UNRoD in Vienna. By the end of April 2009, the Board had met and reviewed 270 claims forms which had been translated, reviewed and processed by the UNRoD staff and included the losses in the register. Only two claims forms were rejected for not meeting the eligibility criteria. A complementary Palestinian National Committee on the Register of Damage was also established by Palestinian Authority to assist both the Palestinian people affected by the Wall in making claims, and to coordinate with UNRoD to ensure that it reaches realistic and accurate estimates regarding damages. Israel has consistently refused to cooperate with the office of UNRoD. [...] International and Palestinian organisations have expressed concern at the lack of transparency regarding the establishment of the UN register, particularly with relation to appointment of board and staff members; the implementation of the Register and its field presence; and the opportunities for Palestinian organisations, international organisations and UN agencies to participate in the Register. Another well-founded concern is the lack of transparency and access to information regarding the content of the claim form and pilot project currently being conducted in Jenin. At this formative stage of the register it is essential that full public participation and debate occurs around the operation of the register, eligibility criteria for claimants and scope of damages. Potential beneficiaries also need adequate access to information in order to prepare their claims. Independent verification of the claims forms should be carried out by an appropriate Palestinian or independent organisation with the relevant expertise."

Diaknoia, 8 December 2006

"The establishment of a Register should not be the only step the UN takes to implement the ICJ Advisory Opinion. It is vital that the Palestinian society is included and consulted in the process of establishing the Register, as well as the work of the Register once it starts operating. The Register should co-operate with other UN agencies present in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), who already have obtained relevant information about damage caused by the Wall. The Register needs to operate independently from Israel's legal interpretation of land and property laws..... The Register should include not only material damage but also non-material damage that is economically assessable, such as loss of employment opportunities, mental harm etc. It is not sufficient to only list and document the damage. An evaluation and verification process is needed. To postpone verification of the damage, as suggested, will make the process later on more difficult and expensive, with the risk of evidence disappearing.... The Register should be placed in the oPt, and not in Vienna as planned, in order to be effective, and also to avoid appearing unreal and distant to potential claimants. The Register should cover not only individual claims but also collective claims, such as environmental destruction and use of water resources. The claims can, in the absence of a Palestinian state, be brought by the Palestinians as a people holding the right to self-determination."

al-Haq, November 2006

"The Register of Damage, if established as proposed, with all the above-mentioned weaknesses [cessation and restitution not addressed; no evaluations of damages or compensation; lack of field presence; addressing only individual claims and material claims; and lack of adequate verification measures], would likely contribute to the declining faith of Palestinians in the ability of the international community and international law to uphold their rights, thereby encouraging them to seek alternative means of obtaining justice. Al-Haq fears that the respect for human rights and the maintenance of international peace and security may suffer in consequence. The UN Secretary-General concludes in his Report that, "the General Assembly may wish to consider adopting a resolution requesting me to establish the Register of Damage along the lines set forth in the present report." Al-Haq respectfully disagrees with the Secretary-General on this point and calls upon the General Assembly to integrate the criticisms in the present legal brief into any future resolution establishing a Register of Damage. If and when a future Register of Damage is adopted, hopefully containing the aforementioned recommendations, it is essential that the primary obligations of cessation and restitution not be forgotten. In the Palestinian context of continuous dispossession since 1948, any talk about compensation must be very clearly accompanied by an explanation that, under international law as reflected in the ICJ AO, compensation goes hand in hand with restitution and does not replace it. Otherwise, popular hostility to the Register of Damage is to be expected."

See Also:

[Establishment of the United Nations Register of Damages Caused by the Consequence of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory](#), RES/ES-10/17, UN General Assembly, 24 January 2007

[Jerusalem Diary: Monday 14 April](#), **BBC News**, 14 April 2008

[Letter dated 11 January 2005 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly A/ES-10/294](#), **United Nations General Assembly (UN GA)**, 13 January 2005

[Revised draft resolution: Establishment of the United Nations Register of Damage caused by the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory](#), **United Nations General Assembly (UN GA)**, 15 December 2006

[Establishment of the United Nations Register of Damage caused by the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Programme budget implications of draft resolution A/ES-10/L.20/Rev.1](#), **United Nations General Assembly (UN GA)**, 15 December 2006

[General assembly establishes register of damage arising from construction of wall by Israel in occupied Palestinian territory](#), **United Nations General Assembly (UN GA)**, 15 December 2006

[What's the Problem with the UN Register of Damage caused by Israel's Wall in the occupied Palestinian territories?](#), **BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights**, 18 November 2006

[UN lays out function of office for Palestinians to claim damages from Israeli barrier](#), **UN News Service**, 27 October 2006

[Nothing New to Report': The Registry of Damage Resulting from the Construction of the Wall \(Al Majdal\)](#), **BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights**, 2005

[Peace in the Middle East: getting real on the issue of Palestinian refugee property](#), **Forced Migration Review (FMR)**, 2003

[Demolition for Alleged Military Purposes : Denial of the right to compensation](#), **B'Tselem**, August 2008

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[Where Villages Stood: Israel's Continuing Violations of International law in Occupied Latroun 1967-2007](#), **al-Haq**, December 2007

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[Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank](#), **B'Tselem**, May 2002

["And Thou Shalt Spread ..." Construction and development of settlements beyond the official limits of jurisdiction](#), **Peace Now**, July 2007

[The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, July 2007

[Breaking the Law in the West Bank: One Violation leads to Another: Israeli Settlement Building on Private Palestinian Land](#), **Peace Now**, October 2006

[Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank](#), **B'Tselem**, May 2002

["And Thou Shalt Spread ..." Construction and development of settlements beyond the official limits of jurisdiction](#), **Peace Now**, July 2007

[Peace in the Middle East: getting real on the issue of Palestinian refugee property](#), **Forced Migration Review (FMR)**, 2003

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

General Pattern of Return and Resettlement

Durable solutions for Palestinians in OPT

- The United Nations resolutions are said to have established a specific framework for durable solutions for all persons displaced in 1948 and subsequently 1967. The United Nations has affirmed the right of Palestinians in refugee-like situations due to expulsion, deportation, and denial of residency rights to return to their places of origin. (Badil September 2007; Al Haq, December 2007) Oslo Declaration provided for the establishment of a committee “to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. All such agreements, however, are notable by their failure to bring about the implementation of the right of return for those displaced from the Palestinian territories in 1967. (Al Haq, December 2007)
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- While it is recognized generally that Palestinian refugees and displaced persons have a right to return to their homes or origin realpolitik dictates that return is neither ‘realistic’ nor ‘practical’ for this group of refugees until peace process is concluded (Badil Expert Forum, July 2004) Factors impeding return include Israel’s non-recognition of the right of return, the lack of peace and protracted military occupation, length of displacement and ongoing effects of the occupation on status of OPT particularly though not exclusively East Jerusalem.
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- In discussions including question of refugees, Palestinian negotiators emphasis the right of return, while resettlement and compensation have been identified by Israel as the preferred solution. In 2006, 32% Palestinians were willing to relinquish the refugee right of return, 35% of respondents are willing to relinquish 5-10% of the land of the West Bank. (Badil, September 2007; IUED-PRU, April 2006) There are no figures regarding the return of internally displaced, or secondary displaced refugees, apart from notable publicised cases such as Yanoun village. (Al Magdal, Autumn 2007; UN GA, 14 July 2005) According to UNWRA the number of displaced registered refugees who are known by the Agency to have returned to the occupied territories since June 1967 is about 24,600.
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- With regards to internally displaced, the context has not allowed for the achievement of durable solutions:
- In the limited instances of restitution or return in the West Bank this has largely been confined to areas under Palestinian Authority jurisdiction (Areas A and B), whereas most displacement is confined to Area C and East Jerusalem. It remains however unclear extent to which Palestinians displaced since 1967 have integrated or settled elsewhere since their displacement. There are no figures available -
- UN and other humanitarian actors have been unable to ensure durable solutions for those displaced and face considerable challenges in preventing displacement occurring. Grassroot communities with support of NGOs have in certain cases as Al Aqaba and Yanoun facilitated return to areas at risk of displacement, and mitigate some of these risks
- In Gaza, return for IDPs is conditioned on reconstruction of housing and access to land which for the last several years remains impeded by Israeli blockade and buffer zone. There are currently estimated over 20,000 IDPs due to housing damages or destroyed by default this would imply that most of 120,000 displaced in 2008/2009 returned, however there is lack of

clarity as to the situation of these returnees, their humanitarian situation and whether these have attained durable solutions within the prevailing context.

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- Though durable solutions for Palestinian IDPs are impeded by the current political environment, Israel as the occupying power retains the primary responsibility and duty to ensure durable solutions for displaced Palestinians. Israel however is the leading cause of displacement. Expropriation and consequent displacement in the West Bank is often done through a complex system of Israeli legal, administrative and institutional mechanisms, while in Gaza a combination of use of force and blockade. Israel as an occupying power has responsibility to adhere to humanitarian and human rights law to cease activities that entail arbitrary displacement. Following such steps, there are several criteria that determine to what extent a durable solution has been achieved. Among these criteria is the effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property. Restitution is the preferred remedy, though in some cases the compensation to the displaced owner may be the only option or a
- more equitable one in conformity to international law (Guiding Principle 29.2, ICJ, Advisory Opinion, 2004, para. 152). (link to Methodology for working definition of IDP)
-
- Given the scope and continuity of displacement, and the sensitivity of causes of displacement, restorative actions (i.e. the right to return, housing land and property issues) will have to be included in the future political negotiations between Israel and Palestine. Without comprehensively addressing these issues the chances for viable durable solutions are likely to remain slim. The UN Rapporteur on Human Rights in the OPT has however highlighted concern of "peace amongst unequals" underlining the precarity of the Palestinian position, and the necessity of ensuring that the peace negotiations adhere to international normative framework including human rights and humanitarian law.

HPN, September 2009, p.18

"There are certainly considerable constraints in searching for durable solutions based on the individual and preferred choice of the IDP, such as return and property restitution. Restitution or return in the West Bank has largely been confined to areas under Palestinian Authority jurisdiction (Areas A and B), whereas most displacement is confined to Area C and East Jerusalem. In Gaza, Israeli sanctions on construction materials mean that reconstruction projects for over 15,000 housing units remain at a standstill, and return to the status quo ante is unlikely. For the vast majority of Palestinians displaced in West Bank and Gaza, the return of those forcibly displaced remains tied to reversal of policies of occupation which entails their displacement."

ICJ, 9 July 2004, para.152, 153

"152. Moreover, given that the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has, *inter alia*, entailed the requisition and destruction of homes, businesses and agricultural holdings, the Court finds further that Israel has the obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned. The Court would recall that the essential forms of reparation in customary law were laid down by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the following terms : "The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it - such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation

due for an act contrary to international law." (*Factory of Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No 13, 1928, P. C. I. J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47.*)

153. Israel is accordingly under an obligation to return the land, orchards, olive groves and other immovable property seized from any natural or legal person for purposes of construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In the event that such restitution should prove to be materially impossible, Israel has an obligation to compensate the persons in question for the damage suffered. The Court considers that Israel also has an obligation to compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law, all natural or legal persons having suffered any form of material damage as a result of the wall's construction."

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, August 2008

"General Assembly [Resolution 194\(III\)](#) reaffirms the right of Palestinian refugees displaced in 1948 to return to their homes of origin. Paragraph 11(a) states: "refugees wishing to return to their homes ... should be permitted to do so." The resolution also affirms the right of refugees to return to their homes of origin. The General Assembly clearly meant the return of each refugee to "his[her] house or lodging and not to his[her] homeland." The Assembly rejected two separate amendments that referred in more general terms to the return of refugees to "the areas from which they have come." [Security Council Resolution 93](#) calls upon Israel to allow refugees expelled from the demilitarized zone in the north to return. [Assembly Resolution 3236\(XXIX\)](#) reaffirms the "inalienable right" of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties. UN [Security Council Resolution 237](#) calls upon Israel to facilitate the immediate return of Palestinian refugees. The United Nations has repeatedly affirmed the right of return for those Palestinians in refugee-like situations due to expulsion, deportation, denial of residency rights, among others....

To date, agreements between Israel and the PLO establish procedures and mechanisms to address the Palestinian refugee issue but do not affirm the right of return or the right to freedom of movement. The 1993 Palestinian-Israeli framework agreement ([1993 Declaration of Principles](#)) (Article V (3)) and the [1995 Interim Agreement](#) (Chapter III, Article XVII) state that the issue of refugees displaced in 1948 will be addressed during permanent status negotiations. The 1993 Declaration of Principles [also] establishes a quadripartite continuing committee (Article XII) to decide on "the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967." Similar provisions for Palestinians who became refugees or displaced persons as a result of the 1967 occupation by Israel of the West Bank and Gaza are found in the [1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement](#) (Article XVI(2)) and in the 1995 Interim Agreement (Chapter Four, Article XXVII(2))."

Rempel, Terry and Gassner, Ingrid Jaradat, 2004

"The unresolved plight of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons encapsulates the often murky nexus between international law and international relations. While it is recognized generally that Palestinian refugees and displaced persons have a right to return to their homes or origin, *realpolitik* dictates that return is neither 'realistic' nor 'practical' for this group of refugees. Factors militating against return include the length of displacement, the ethno-national character of the state of Israel and a protracted military occupation.... Resettlement and compensation have thus been identified by Israel and the primary western powers actively involved in the past five decades of Middle East peacemaking (the 'international community') as the preferred solution. The most recent formulation is found in the April 2003 Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The plan, endorsed by the United Nations Security Council in November 2003, affirms an "agreed, just, fair and realistic solution to the refugee issue." No definitions are provided in the document."

al-Haq, December 2007

"Although the legal status of forcibly displaced persons may differ according to where they were displaced, their rights under international humanitarian law remain the same, with Article 49(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention requiring that persons forcibly displaced "shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased," clearly indicating that protected persons may not be denied return. In the same vein and on the basis of the same principle (although not itself falling within the realm of international humanitarian law), binding Security Council Resolution 237, adopted unanimously in 1969 and since reaffirmed by a plethora of General Assembly resolutions, placed similar obligations on Israel with regard to Palestinians displaced as a result of the 1967 Six-Day War by calling upon the Israeli government "to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities.".... [Furthermore] Principle 28 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement bestows upon Israel the "primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence."

As evidenced from the continuing displacement of the residents of Latroun, however, the political will to enforce this inalienable right to return has thus far been lacking. Article XII of the Oslo Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (signed by the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 1993) provided for the establishment of a committee "to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967," an idea which was reproduced in several subsequent agreements between Israel, the Palestinian representatives, Jordan and Egypt. All such agreements, however, are notable by their failure to bring about the implementation of the right of return for those displaced from the Palestinian territories in 1967. It is imperative, therefore, that any future agreements on the OPT provide more concrete mechanisms to facilitate such return, with the unassailable principles of international law as their basis. As a final point, it must be noted that displaced persons unable to return to their home because it is occupied or has been destroyed, are legally entitled to compensation for losses and suffering. However, compensation is not a substitute for the right to return to the vicinity of one's home. "

United Nations General Assembly (UN GA), 14 July 2004

"In its resolution 58/92 of 9 December 2003, the General Assembly reaffirmed the right of all persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities to return to their homes and endorsed the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to such persons. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to report to it, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, on the progress made in the implementation of that resolution. The Agency would not necessarily be aware of the return of any registered refugees who had not requested the provision of services. So far as is known to the Agency, between 1 July 2003 and 30 June 2004, 550 refugees registered with UNRWA returned to the West Bank and 148 to the Gaza Strip from places outside the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It should be noted that some of these may not themselves have been displaced in 1967, but may be members of the family of a displaced registered refugee. Thus, taking into account the estimate given in paragraph 4 of the 2003 report of the Secretary-General on the subject (A/58/119), the number of displaced registered refugees who are known by the Agency to have returned to the occupied territories since June 1967 is about 24,600. The Agency is unable to estimate the total number of displaced inhabitants who have returned. It keeps records only of registered refugees and, as pointed out above, even those records, particularly with respect to the location of registered refugees, may be incomplete..."

Jerusalem Center for Economic and Social Rights (JCESR), August 2001

"The Israeli Law of Return grants exclusive citizenship rights to members of the Jewish faith, regardless of where they are born. This right is not granted to Palestinians indigenous to the

region. Jews do not need permits to settle in Israel. Meanwhile, similar rights are denied to the Palestinian population.Israel applies double standards when it comes to refugee rights and their right to return. Israelis, for example, are allowed to retrieve the houses they owned or where they resided in the Old City before 1948. However, this same right is denied when it concerns Palestinians who wish to return to their homes in West Jerusalem or even in the no-man's land that separated the two parts of the city after 1948. No Palestinian has succeeded in reclaiming his or her property until today. Israelis, on the other hand, whether as individuals or through governmental bodies, have been able to repossess their property in East Jerusalem, particularly in the Old City. Palestinians who fled or were forced to leave their properties in Jerusalem: In 1948 64,000 – 80.000 people; In 1967 20,000 – 30,000 people."

Graduate Institute of Development Studies - Palestine Research Unit (IUED-PRU), April 2006

"The vast majority of the Palestinian public (72%) supported a peace settlement with Israel. This result indicates a 15% increase in the levels of support since November 2004. However, the level of support varies according three independent variables, namely, "refugee status", "area of residence" and "geographic area".... In principle, the respondents seemed to be willing to make considerable concessions. When respondents were asked what the Palestinian Authority should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state, 35% of respondents were willing to relinquish 5-10% of the land of the West Bank and 32% were willing to relinquish the refugee right of return. This represent a striking change from the previous survey."

See Also :

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[Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion](#), **International Court of Justice (ICJ)**, 9 July 2004, para. 152

[Israel is Selling Lands in the Occupied Territories](#), **Adalah's Newsletter**, Volume 63, August 2009

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[The Right of Return – An Analysis of Recent Debate in the Israeli Press](#), **BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights**, April 2001

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[The Right of Return and the Meaning of Refugee Choice](#), **BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights**, February 2000

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[UNRWA's Role in Protecting Palestine Refugees, from Closing the Gaps: From Protection to Durable Solutions for Palestinian Refugees, 5-8 March 2004](#), **Parvathaneni, Harish**, 8 March 2004

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[Settlements and the Wall: Palestinian Centre Information Brief](#), **Jerusalem Fund**, 19 November 2007

[Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank](#), **B'Tselem**, May 2002

Ron Pundak and Shaul Arieli, *The Territorial Aspect in the Israeli-Palestinian Final-Status Negotiations* (Peres Center for Peace, September 2004)

[Resolution 2/4: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan](#), **United Nations Human Rights Council (UN HRC)**, 9 January 2007

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

General Humanitarian Access

Humanitarian Access in the OPT

- Humanitarian Access
- Since 1967, Israel is obliged, as the occupying power, to provide humanitarian assistance to Palestinians under international humanitarian law as noted in the Fourth Geneva Convention. Provision of assistance also means that if Israel's supplies are inadequate, it should agree to relief provided by outside sources and allow the free passage for survival of the civilian population. Despite Israel's responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance, humanitarian access has often been affected. Access continues to be impeded in West Bank while the Israeli Civil Authority continues to rarely provide permission for the UN to undertake projects in Area C or East Jerusalem, and continued isolation in Gaza has significantly affected humanitarian assistance. This is in stark contrast to Israeli continual establishment of facts on the ground in violation of international law (HRC, January 2011).
- Following Oslo Accords administration of civil affairs was transferred to the newly established Palestinian authority for Areas A and B, which served to mitigate Israel's financial burden of providing public assistance and humanitarian assistance. (Badil, September 2007) The continuing occupation and subsequent boycott in 2006 to 2007, impact of Israeli interventions in Gaza in 2008/2009 and elsewhere, and continued restrictions in movement has served to reduce the latter's ability to provide basic services to Palestinians. This is particularly the case of the isolation of Gaza which has placed all rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts on standby, and the precarity of Palestinian communities in the "seam zone", Bedouin and herding communities in the Jordan valley (OCHA, May 2010; AIDA, June 2011).
- The continued lack of improvement in access in 2009-2011 in the West Bank and particularly in Gaza undermines the ability of humanitarian community to respond to Palestinians to meet basic human needs such as protection, shelter, food, water, healthcare (OCHA, October 2009 and March 2011) NGOs have highlighted that access and movement restrictions for NGOs are significant, widespread, costly and difficult to overcome entailing that vulnerable communities are not being reached, the quality of programming is compromised and the long-term impact of humanitarian and development interventions are reduced. Israeli-imposed movement and access restrictions are according to these NGOs for their operations costing donors and their tax payers at least US\$4.5 million a year (AIDA, June 2011). There is little information as to the costs to UN.
- Humanitarian and development projects are also subject to demolition by Israeli authorities and have occurred without compensation due to demolitoin orders as well as result of Israeli incursions. There are no clear estimate of the level of damage of humanitarian and development projects supported by the international community. Seeking compensation seems to have limited effect. It has also be alleged to be difficult legally by the European Commission to seek compensation from EU supported projects that have been demolished or damaged, because of the transfer of ownership of infrastructure from donor to recipient upon completion of the project. EU funded infrastructure including that of the European commission destroyed or damaged by Israel in Gaza alone (excluding the Gaza airport) is estimated at around 40 million Euros (CIDSE, June 2009).
- Humanitarian Access in West Bank
- Humanitarian access has faced various restrictions in assistance provided to Palestinian communities, displaced and host alike. Such restrictions have been significant increasing as

of mid 2008. (IRIN, April 2008) These restrictions have been more pronounced during the first and second intifada. Such restrictions have included arrest and detention of staff, restrictions of movement, imposition of special access permits for access to Gaza Strip and for access in 'closed areas/seam zones'. (OCHA, April 2008, March 2011) Restrictions have also involved closure of charities and non governmental associations. (Badil, September 2007; OCHA, November 2006) Restrictions on imports have affected all process of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts.

- Access restrictions, particularly at Israeli Wall checkpoints, continue to hinder UN operations in the West Bank throughout 2010. There was an estimated 44 incidents per month (or 528 incidents per year), and monthly average of 29 staff days lost per month (or 2,784 hours per year) (OCHA May, 2011). These were roughly slightly less than the number of incidents and hours lost in 2009. In 2009, the PRSC reported continuing violations against medical personnel, premise and vehicles, while on humanitarian duty. Perpetrators were the Israeli Army, private security guards and Israeli settlers.
- UN humanitarian response in Area C of the West Bank and East Jerusalem continues to be subject to Israeli authorisation which are seldom provided (OCHA, August 2010). An initial humanitarian response plan for Area C was first developed by the UN humanitarian community at the end of 2009 and submitted to Israeli Civil Administration in early 2010 consisting of more than dozen projects intended to ensure that vulnerable communities have access to minimum amounts of water, primary education and basic shelter. Though Israeli Civil Authority provided authorization to some aspects of these projects, Israel's continual intransigence with regards to projects in Area C is placing humanitarian actors to choose between respecting the military legislation of the Israeli Civil Authority, or the humanitarian needs of vulnerable communities. (OCHA, August 2010)
- Such restrictions in humanitarian access have contributed in impeding efforts to prevent displacement and respond to needs of displaced. For instance, OCHA in September 2009 would report how the distribution of water and fodder was occasionally prevented to rural areas in south-east Hebron, resulting in the relocation of a third of the residents of one of the affected communities. Humanitarian organisations have underlined the manner in which restrictions are hampering response to Palestinians at risk of displacement particularly among Bedouin and herder communities in Jordan Valley, and Palestinians in "seam zone" (OCHA, May 2010; AIDA, June 2011).
- Humanitarian Access in Gaza
- Restrictions on humanitarian access to Gaza were in evidence since Disengagement in 2005 and significantly increased in September 2007 when the Israeli cabinet declared the Gaza Strip a "hostile territory" and decided to implement cuts in electricity and fuel supplies to the Strip in response to Qassam rockets towards southern Israeli towns. These restrictions were validated by Israeli Supreme Court in January 2008. Such restrictions are in violation of international law, as these fail to distinguish between civilians and combatants and clearly defined as collective punishment against population of Gaza Strip. (Diaknoia, March 2008, UN SR on ME April 2008)
- Restrictions on imports have affected all process of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts. Humanitarian projects for construction of shelters affecting internally displaced have been placed on hold in light of these restrictions as have countless other humanitarian assistance programs. Restrictions in Gaza also involved in 2007-2008 closure of charities and non governmental associations by Hamas led authority in response to intra-Palestinian factional fighting. (Badil, September 2007; OCHA, 27 November 2007) During the "Cast Lead" offensive in December to January 2009, Israel denied access to aid workers, including ICRC. On 7 January, Israel instituted a daily three-hour lull in fighting during which the Gaza residents were supposed to be able to stock up on basic supplies and medicines. The lull was violated nearly every day. During the conflict, Israel was responsible for several attacks on UN premises including emergency shelters for Palestinians displaced and
- convoys. Hamas, too, is most likely responsible for one attack on a UN building (Losing Ground, HPG, July 2009)

- Three years since the Israeli offensive, continued restrictions in construction material has stalled reconstruction or major repairs of houses destroyed or damaged during the offensive. In early 2011, the flow of construction material into the Gaza Strip was still only 11 per cent of the rate before the blockade (Oxfam et al., November 2010; OCHA, March 2011). Nearly 7,900 houses were demolished or seriously damaged, and nearly 59,000 suffered minor damage, caused by IDF as a result of the offensive and subsequent interventions (OCHA, September 2009; Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster, June 2011). By mid-2011 most of the minor damage to housing had been repaired, but only about 200 of the demolished houses and 1,500 of those seriously damaged had been rebuilt - in light of existing restrictions most of the reconstruction was possible due to material brought through the tunnels along the Rafah border (Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster, June 2011)
- Humanitarian agencies have also had to bridge the gap between “no contact” policy with Hamas at the insistence of the international community including major humanitarian donors on some humanitarian actors (OCHA, May 2010), despite Hamas’s role in coordinating aid delivery (HP, September 2009). Though the UN reports contacting with all parties to the conflict and does not ascribe to the “no contact policy”(IDMC, November 2010), the UN has repeatedly called upon the international donor community to revise the strategy of ‘no contact policy’ to ensure that humanitarian needs can be addressed by humanitarian agencies affected (OCHA May 2010). Hamas has also imposed restrictions though far from as pervasive as Israeli restrictions: temporarily closed several international and local NGOs and associations, detained and questioned staff members, seized humanitarian shipments and suspended some programmes (Aida, June 2011; OCHA, March 2010 and 30 November 2009; HPN, 30 September 2009).
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AIDA, June 2011

"Movement and access restrictions increase poverty and fragment the Palestinian territory. Humanitarian agencies should help mitigate the impacts on Palestinian communities, but these restrictions also affect the movement and access of international organizations operating in the oPt. The restrictions mean that aid workers and related goods cannot move freely between the communities they serve, impeding humanitarian and development work in the territory. The restrictions decrease the effectiveness and sustainability of aid operations, deny the most vulnerable populations from needed assistance and significantly increase the costs of delivering assistance. [.....] Restrictions cost agencies an estimated additional US\$4.5 million per year. AIDA members have had to try to overcome these obstacles with costly coping mechanisms. They have introduced parallel management structures in the West Bank and Gaza, which costs time and money."

OCHA, May 2010

"In the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), however, the humanitarian community is facing a number of obstacles to the movement of staff and goods and other restrictions impacting day-to-day operations that impede the provision of humanitarian aid to vulnerable Palestinians. The current humanitarian operation in the oPt is one of the largest in the world; at the time of its launching in November 2009, the oPt Consolidated Appeal (CAP) for 2010 ranked fifth out of 12 appeals globally, in terms of requested assistance. Through the oPt CAP, UN agencies and international and national NGOs requested over US\$ 660 million for 2010. This support is intended to help mitigate the worst impacts of on-going conflict on the most vulnerable Palestinians, who continue to face a human dignity crisis, characterized by the erosion of livelihoods and the continued denial of basic human rights; nearly 40 percent of the Palestinian population is food-insecure and unemployment levels in the West Bank and Gaza Strip remain high. The humanitarian operations outlined in the oPt’s CAP occur within the context of a prolonged Israeli military occupation in which policies to alter the status and character of the territory continue to be pursued contrary to international law. The situation in the Gaza Strip, in particular, presents severe impediments to humanitarian operations. [.....]

Among the affected projects are schools, health facilities, housing units, and sewage infrastructure. Additionally, the 'no contact' policy of some donors, prohibiting contact with the Hamas authorities, continues to affect some humanitarian organizations, while Hamas's requests for compliance with its administrative procedures from UN agencies and NGOs have intensified. This 'two-way' tension is narrowing the operational independence of some organizations and, at times, restricts on-going humanitarian operations. In the West Bank, humanitarian organizations face ongoing restrictions on movement and access. Policies include a permit regime required for staff from the West Bank to enter East Jerusalem, and continued access difficulties stemming from the deployment of hundreds of closure obstacles, among others. In particular, agencies mandated with service provision are limited in doing so in Area C, due to the restrictive planning regime applied by Israel and restrictions to obtaining building permits and difficulties accessing certain areas."

The Humanitarian Monitor, OCHA, October 2009

"Access restrictions, particularly at Israeli Barrier checkpoints, continue to hinder UN operations in the West Bank. In October 2009, UN staff members reported a 38 percent increase in access incidents, compared to September (80 vs. 50 incidents previously). As a result, the UN lost 701 staff hours or the equivalent of 93 UN staff days—39 percent less compared with September. The majority (55 percent) of reported UN access delays or denials were a result of Israeli forces demands to perform an internal search on UN vehicles. While outside visual inspections are regularly conducted by Israeli forces staffing checkpoints, Israeli checkpoint personnel often insist on invasive car searches, unless a diplomat is present in the vehicle. According to the United Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities (1946), UN property and assets are immune from search and, as such, UN staff are instructed not to allow vehicle searches. In the first half of 2009, there have been 542 access incidents, which have resulted in 3,331 lost staff hours. This is roughly equal to the figures for the first half of 2008."

Humanitarian Monitor, OCHA, September 2009

"Humanitarian interventions are also impeded by the access restrictions to and from some rural areas, imposed by the Israeli authorities. In the previous month, distribution of water and fodder in three communities in south-east Hebron (Halaweh, Mirkez and Jinba) had been prevented due to obstacles blocking the only route to them, resulting in the relocation of a third of the residents of one of these communities (Jinba) to the nearby town of Yatta. However, in September, closure obstacles impeding access were removed, and water was successfully distributed to the three communities."

PRCS, September 2009

Total number of attacks, casualties and damages of PRCs Medics & Ambulances					
	2005	2006	2007	2008	Jan – Sep 2009
PRCS Personnel Killed	0	4	0	0	1
Total EMT Personnel Injured	0	17	13	7	10
Total Attacks on Emergency Teams & Ambulances	29	30	56	20	19
Number of Personnel and Volunteers Detained	1	1	2	1	1
Number of Ambulances partially damaged	5	14	16	6	22
Number of Ambulances completely damaged (out of service)	0	2	1	0	3
Delay & Denial of Access	195	275	492	501	375

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 12 September 2007
 "Since 1967, Israel is obliged, as the occupying power, to provide humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in the OPT. Under international humanitarian law, "the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate." Provision of assistance also means that if Israel's supplies are inadequate, it must agree to relief provided by outside sources and is obliged to allow the free passage of objects necessary to the survival of the civilian population. Despite Israel's responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance, it has generally failed to provide and allow humanitarian assistance to both refugees and non-refugees, or delayed such provision.Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, administration of civil affairs was transferred to the newly established Palestinian Authority in the OPT, and Israel was partly released from the financial burden of providing public services and humanitarian assistance to the population under occupation, including Palestinian refugees and IDPs. Due to Israel's ongoing occupation and colonization and the 2006 international boycott of the Palestinian Authority, the latter has been unable to provide basic services and assistance to the population of the OPT. "

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 30 April 2008
 "Increased Israeli restrictions on the checkpoints around East Jerusalem have caused more delays and more lost man hours for UN staff in March 2008 than in all of 2007, operations were significantly affected" and almost daily UN vehicles were delayed and even turned back by Israeli soldiers at checkpoints south of Jerusalem. "Movement of UN staff between the West Bank and East Jerusalem has been increasingly restricted over the years, starting with the erection of checkpoints, the requirement that national staff carry permits, and the building of the Wall," Allegra Pacheco, the acting-head of UN OCHA in occupied Palestinian territory, told IRIN. "Beyond challenging its own commitments under the convention, it is also challenging the neutrality of the UN by demanding a search," Pacheco said, adding that on 29 April she herself was delayed for over one hour after soldiers demanded a search of her UN vehicle. Most of the delays take place as staff try to enter East Jerusalem, where nearly all UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have their headquarters or secondary offices. "It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain large-scale, long-term humanitarian operations given the closures," Christopher Gunness, a spokesman for UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, told IRIN, adding that "aid is becoming more expensive and work is becoming less effective." In the Nablus and Hebron districts, as well, UN agencies and NGOs said they have suffered from delays and other problems at the checkpoints. The crossing points to the Gaza Strip remained

problematic. National UN staff members in Gaza are generally unable to leave the enclave, even on official UN duty. "Getting our [Palestinian] staff out of Gaza is next to impossible," a UN medical aid worker told IRIN. Also, when permits are issued for these workers they tend to be valid for short periods of time or may be granted only as single entry passes. International UN staff members have also been having a more difficult time obtaining documentation from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, resulting in their inability to access the Gaza Strip and carry out their duties. "Everyone who deserves a card gets one, and we would be happy to look into any specific cases of people who did not get one," Aryeh Mekel, spokesman for the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told IRIN."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 8 November 2006

"The IDF has closed down four Islamic charities in recent months and targeted many more in a string of raids across the West Bank. As a result more than 4,450 orphans, 157 widows and 3,000 destitute families are no longer receiving help.⁶ Between May and August 2006, 37 charitable institutions in the West Bank were targeted in IDF attacks, searches and raids. The IDF stated that these organisations were closed down or raided to prevent militant attacks on Israeli citizens. Israel claims Muslim charities are being used as a front for militant activities..... As well as being centres for the distribution of charity, these institutions often provide an opportunity for social interaction, offering a forum for friends and neighbours to revive social ties while delivering a service to the community. Since the Hamas victory in the PLC elections in January 2006, the role of these organisations as a social safety net for the most vulnerable in Palestinian society is more important than ever. With the rise in the levels of poverty, the non-payment of PA salaries and the decline in the provision of basic health care, more and more Palestinians are turning to Muslim charities for help. A survey conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) revealed that between March and May 2006, approximately 5% of mainly food and cash assistance, was provided by charitable institutions. According to a poll conducted by Birzeit University in September 2006, 20% of assistance delivered was provided by NGOs and charitable institutions. The charities make up anywhere between 10% - 40% of all NGOs in the oPt¹³, and directly reach tens of thousands of people, and hundreds of thousands more indirectly. Their work is mostly carried out in isolated and rural communities, refugee camps, and in communities now cut off from services by the Barrier. Their constituencies are mostly the poor and marginalised. According to the latest Institut Universitaire d'Etudes du Développement (IUED) survey, the refugees (58%) and hardship cases (55%) are the main beneficiaries."

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 12 September 2007

"UNRWA has faced various restrictions on delivery of humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees. During the first Palestinian *intifada* in the 1967-occupied Palestinian territory, for example, Israeli authorities refused to allow entry of foodstuffs and medical supplies through the port of Ashdod for so-called health and security considerations. The humanitarian aid supplies eventually had to be re-routed for use in Lebanon. Since the beginning of the second *intifada* in September 2000, UNRWA has faced a variety of restrictions and violations of the *Charter of the United Nations*, the 1946 *Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations*, the 1949 *Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, and the 1967 *Comay-Michelmores Agreement*.

These have included arrest and detention of local staff, restrictions on freedom of movement within the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip, confiscation of ID cards belonging to local staff, denying teachers access to schools, and doctors and nurses access to medical centres, the imposition of special access permits in the occupied Gaza Strip and "seam zones" created by the Wall in the occupied West Bank, and armed interference with Agency staff. These measures have affected or hindered the delivery of humanitarian aid. Other UN agencies and NGOs

working in the OPT have also reported the obstruction of the delivery of aid and/or movement of personnel by Israeli forces during 2006.

In April 2006, John Ging, director of UNRWA operations in Gaza, warned that "if Karni remains closed, we are, once again, counting down to a food crisis." He also noted that "distribution will have to be shut down entirely for the second time in less than a month if the crossing does not open immediately." During Israel's war against Lebanon in the summer of 2006, UNRWA's humanitarian operations were once again jeopardized in the Gaza Strip because of the difficulties of moving in and out of the occupied territory, which led to shortages of food, fuel and construction supplies. This led the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, to warn that "Gaza was a ticking bomb that could lead to a social explosion in 10 days, or 10 months ... you cannot seal off an area, which is a little bigger than the city of Stockholm, has 1.4 million people, of whom 800,000 are youth and children, and then have 200 artillery shells go in virtually every day, seal off the borders ... [making it impossible] for people to live or even humanitarian supplies to get in." "

Guardian, 8 January 2009

"Four exhausted children have been discovered cowering in a house next to the bodies of their mothers by staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which today accused the Israeli military of "unacceptable" delays in allowing medics safe access to injured Gazans. [...] It was a "shocking incident," said Pierre Wettach, head of the Red Cross delegation for Israel and the Palestinian territories. "The Israeli military must have been aware of the situation but did not assist the wounded. Neither did they make it possible for us or the Palestine Red Crescent to assist the wounded," he said. The Red Cross had been asking the Israeli military to allow them access to Zeitoun since Israel's ground invasion began on Saturday, but only a three-hour lull in the fighting on Wednesday allowed them to make the dangerous journey. The Red Cross said Israel had breached international humanitarian law by not allowing access to the wounded and said it "considers the delay in allowing rescue services access unacceptable". The mounting criticism of Israel's operation comes as the UN, which gives food and aid to around 750,000 Gazans, announced it was suspending all its aid work in the Gaza strip after its staff and compounds came under attack by the Israeli military. Two drivers in a clearly marked UN convoy were killed today by an Israeli tank shell. The Israeli military has attacked two UN schools, killing more than 46 Palestinians who were sheltering inside."

IRIN, 11 February 2009

"The Hamas government in Gaza has ordered international and local aid organisations providing emergency assistance to coordinate relief efforts with it. Several local NGOs in Gaza say Hamas has prevented aid groups from distributing emergency assistance after they refused to comply with Hamas regulations. "We received information that supplies brought in from abroad were being sold on the market," deputy minister of social affairs Sobhi Redwan told IRIN, saying UNRWA (the UN agency for Palestinian refugees) was bringing in supplies for non-UN institutions and donors. [...] Gaza's social affairs ministry has asked all international and local NGOs to provide a list of beneficiaries on a CD to the ministry. "We want to make sure that aid is being distributed equitably," said Redwan. International organisations like Oxfam and CARE have not complied. "We have explained to Hamas that we will not disclose our beneficiaries out of accountability to our donors and our values of impartiality," Oxfam public relations officer Michael Bailey told IRIN by phone during a visit to Gaza this week. "

Diakonia, 6 March 2008

"On 19 September 2007, the Israeli security cabinet declared the Gaza Strip a "hostile territory" and decided to implement cuts in electricity and fuel supplies to the Strip in response to Palestinian armed groups launching Qassam rockets towards southern Israeli towns. The cuts in electricity and fuel are now in effect and have caused a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip (January 2008). The cuts in electricity and fuel have had disastrous consequences in Gaza,

affecting also water supplies, sewage systems and hospital equipment, which are all dependent on a functioning electricity system. In turn, the back-up generators for electricity are dependent on fuel. Cutting off basic necessities to the population, crucial to lead daily life in the Gaza Strip, amounts to punishing the civilians in Gaza for crimes they have not personally committed. This amounts to collective punishment which is absolutely forbidden under international humanitarian law (article 33 IVGC). The cuts in power supplies are a way of pressing civilians for political purposes (trying to force the Gazans to turn against Hamas), which is also strictly prohibited under IHL. Israel has a legal right to defend its civilian population against armed attacks, but is under an obligation to do so in accordance with international law. One of the most fundamental principles of international humanitarian law is the obligation to at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants, as well as between civilian and military objects. The cabinet's decision to cut off electricity and fuel clearly targets the civilian population in Gaza, and therefore stands in clear violation of this principle. Israel, as an occupying power over both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, has the ultimate responsibility to as far as possible ensure that public order and safety are upheld in the territory it occupies, including securing the welfare of the population (article 43, Hague Convention). The Israeli High Court of Justice has earlier confirmed that "supply of electricity needed by the local population is unquestionably a function imposed on the military government, so as to ensure the proper living.... The court argued that Israel, since the disengagement in 2005, is no longer in effective control over the Gaza Strip, and therefore has no responsibility to provide the population with supplies of food and fuel, but only to abide by rules in IHL on permissible means and methods of warfare. The court did not address the petitioners' arguments that the sanctions constitute collective punishment and violate the principle of distinction, but rather focused on whether "minimum humanitarian needs" were granted the Gaza population. "

United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL), 23 April 2008

"The UN is leading the humanitarian effort to sustain the people of Gaza under conditions of great adversity. We are also very active, politically and diplomatically, pushing all parties, and the international community, to work for a different and more positive strategy for Gaza. We are giving our strong support to the current Egyptian efforts to calm the violence, and we call on all concerned to work with Egypt in that effort. In this context, the recent attacks by Palestinian militants against crossing points into Gaza are deeply disturbing. I appeal to Hamas to immediately end attacks against the crossings, whether by it or any other faction or group. These attacks endanger both international and Israeli civilians, and cannot possibly contribute to Palestinian efforts to ease the blockade of Gaza. On the contrary, they serve only to deepen and prolong it. The United Nations has repeatedly condemned the killing of civilians by Israeli military operations here in Gaza, which is a depressingly and unacceptably regular occurrence. We have also repeatedly condemned deliberate attacks on civilians at crossings or by the firing of rockets into Israel. Not just because they bring nothing but misery to Palestinians, but because all attacks on civilians are wrong. It is also wrong for Israel to punish a civilian population for such attacks. I call on Israel to restore fuel supplies to Gaza, and to allow the passage of humanitarian assistance and commercial supplies, sufficient to allow the functioning of all basic services and for Palestinians to live their daily lives. The collective punishment of the population of Gaza, which has been instituted for months now, has failed."

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 13 September 2007

"Palestinian militant groups' rocket fire and mortar attacks on crossing points between the Gaza Strip and Israel are forcing the temporary closure of crossing points and thus restricting the delivery of aid and basic supplies, according to the Israeli government. Since the Islamist group Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in June, the border crossings have only been open for importing basic goods, such as food and medicine. All exports are banned, forcing most factories in Gaza to close, as 76 percent of their products were intended for sale abroad, according to Amer Hamad, the executive manager of the Palestinian Federation of Industries in Gaza. Israel says it cannot coordinate the crossings with Hamas, which does not recognize the Jewish state."

Observers and Israeli security officials attribute the drop in imports of food supplies into Gaza in August, compared to July, to both the deteriorating economy - which has left Palestinians in the already impoverished territory with even less buying power - and the attacks on the crossings, which limit their opening hours."

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 28 November 2007

"Lack of construction materials on the local market has forced UNRWA to suspend 8 housing/re-housing and infrastructure projects worth more than USD 90 million, thereby preventing the construction of 2,474 housing units for 2,645 families, or 18,204 beneficiaries. Three projects for the repair of 1,226 refugee shelters were also suspended, affecting 1,512 families, or 8,744 beneficiaries. In addition, UNRWA suspended projects to construct 3 schools and 3 health centers at a value of more than USD 3.5 million.

UNDP has had to suspend 2 important humanitarian re-housing projects in the Gaza Strip, preventing the construction of 500 housing units for non-refugee beneficiaries.

The suspension of these UNRWA and UNDP projects translated into the loss of an estimated 1,380,000 work -days for the construction sector, thereby increasing unemployment and economic hardship for thousands of workers and their families.

Provision of rental subsidies for refugees waiting for new shelters now on hold is costing UNRWA an additional USD 150,000 per month or about USD 750,000 since June 19."

See Also:

[Press statement, AIDA](#), 9 November 2009

[Israel criticised after 'shocking' discovery of exhausted children](#), Guardian, 8 January 2009

[Confusion at Rafah border over who can enter Gaza](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 16 January 2009

[Three hour lull not enough - aid agencies](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 15 January 2009

[Limited access bedevils aid groups in Gaza](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 15 January 2009

[Israeli court backs Gaza blockade](#), **The Guardian**, 31 January 2008

[Snow further complicates relief supplies to Gaza](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 30 January 2008

[Palestinian territories: ICRC steps up aid, calls for action to avert major humanitarian crisis](#), **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**, 12 June 2006

[Humanitarian Update: Special Focus Closure Count and Analysis](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, August 2005

[OCHA Humanitarian Update](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 2005

[The Humanitarian Monitor March 2008](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 18 April 2008

[Gaza 'on point of explosion' warns UN](#), **Independent, The**, May 2008

[United Nations International Conference on Palestine Refugees concludes in Paris](#), **United Nations General Assembly (UN GA)**, 30 April 2008

[The humanitarian emergency in Gaza - "A shocking and shameful situation"](#), **United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)**, 30 April 2008

[The Humanitarian Monitor: December 2007](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 22 January 2008

See Also:

[Humanitarian Monitor](#), **OCHA**, October 2009

[Gaza Humanitarian Fact Sheet](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 28 November 2007

[The Humanitarian Monitor March 2008](#), **UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 18 April 2008

[Gaza 'on point of explosion' warns UN](#), **Independent, The**, May 2008

[UN facing increased delays at Israeli checkpoints](#), **Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 30 April 2008

[The humanitarian emergency in Gaza - "A shocking and shameful situation"](#), **United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)**, 30 April 2008

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National and International Response to Displacement & Recommendations

National response: Palestinian and Israeli Response to situations of displacement

- Israeli government response to displacement
- International community has squarely identified Israel as an occupying power in the OPT and applicability of human rights law treaties ratified by Israel to the OPT. The test for determining whether a territory is occupied under international law is effective control which remains in evident throughout the OPT. The Disengagement Plan of 2005 and the Oslo Accords do not reduce the legal responsibility of Israel towards OPT (UN HRC, 15 September 2009, p.85; UN SR on HR, January 2008; UN CAT June 2009) Following Oslo Accords administration of civil affairs was transferred to the newly established Palestinian authority for Areas A and B (15% and 25% of West Bank), which served to mitigate Israel's financial burden of providing public assistance and humanitarian assistance. Following the Disengagement Plan of 2005, Palestinian authority retained administrative and security control of Gaza.
- These interim agreements do not mitigate the responsibility of Israel in its responsibilities or duties towards Palestinians in the OPT. It must be recalled that article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that persons in an occupied territory shall not be deprived of the benefits of the Convention by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territory and the occupying Power, or by the annexation by the occupying Power of part of the occupied territory.... (UN SR on HR, January 2008) Israel however does not recognise the applicability of human rights law and humanitarian law to the OPT, and does not recognise the situation of internal displacement in the OPT.
- However since 1967, internal displacement has directly and indirectly resulted from the continuing occupation, Israeli policies of populating the West Bank including East Jerusalem with Israeli settlers, and generalised violence while limiting humanitarian access and response. This is particularly evident in Area C and East Jerusalem of the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. The widespread denial of basic human rights and the severity and consistency of some Israeli government activities attest to a systematic policy of displacing Palestinians to acquire land, redefine demographic boundaries and divest Palestinians of ownership rights guaranteed under international law (OCHA, 30 November 2009; ICAHD, March 2007; Al Haq, December 2007; Badil, 22 January 2008; CARE et al., 25 February 2008).
- Israeli institutions provide limited remedy for situations of displacement. In certain instances compensation has been provided to those affected by the construction of the Separation Wall, but applicants have been limited by onerous procedures and requirements (IDC, February 2004; IDMC, March 2008). The Israeli Supreme Court has, on occasion, addressed the causes of displacement by ordering the re-routing of the Wall to avoid disproportionate consequences for particular groups of Palestinian residents. However, in these few instances it has never decided to limit the Wall to the Green Line (OCHA, November 2009; B'Tselem, 22 March 2006; Adalah, July 2008). The Israeli Supreme Court and Israeli civil and military courts have in the vast majority of instances upheld Israeli government decisions related to displacement.
-
- Palestinian authorities response to displacement

- Under international humanitarian law, protection is the responsibility of the occupying power, Israel, and not the PNA which is a non-sovereign entity under occupation that lacks the power to protect. This applies equally with regards to Hamas as de facto local administration in Gaza which carries out various functions and responsibilities. As non-State actors, the PA and de facto authority in the Gaza Strip are bound by IHL. They also have the duty to respect human rights. (UN HRC, 15 September 2009, p.86) In practice, the status and rights of Palestinian refugees and IDPs in the 1967-occupied territory under Palestinian jurisdiction are partially regulated by Palestinian Authority civil law, but this is in turn restricted by occupation policies. (Badil, September 2007)
- The internal Palestinian divide between Hamas and Fateh has also increased the burden on an already exhausted population and has had deteriorating effects on the enjoyment of their human rights. In 2009, the UN Mission in the Goldstone report concluded that there were violations of humanitarian law amounting to war crime and violations of human rights law by Palestinian armed groups and Palestinian de facto authority (militant actions have also placed communities at risk to retaliation actions in firing from civilian areas); in Gaza and West Bank, humanitarian agencies and access has also been affected by restrictions, and other obstacles linked to the internal divide between Hamas and Fateh; and Hamas in 2010 has in Rafah in alleged effort to address illegal housing has caused displacement of scores of families.
- Palestinian Authorities in West Bank and Gaza have sought to assist victims of house demolitions, though provision of rental subsidies, compensation, and reconstruction or rehabilitation. Financial and political crisis combined with lack of clear, unified and consistent policy has limited the capacity to provide such assistance. (IDMC, March 2008; ICHR, April 2007) Palestinian Authorities rehabilitation efforts have been limited. In 2006, Ministry of Public Works and Housing in Gaza Strip is reported to have repaired 62.6% of partially demolished houses while less than 0.02% of demolished homes. (ICHR, April 2007) Following on Israeli offensive in 2008/2009, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing was a key lead in assisting victims of displacement, rehabilitation of properties damaged or destroyed, though continued sanctions imposed considerable limitations (IDMC, November 2010).
- The Palestinian Reform and Development Plans and PNA's Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza 2009 make indirect and direct reference to addressing the plight of IDPs and host community. PNA development plans make reference to widening social net to address vulnerable Palestinians, and provision of affordable housing schemes and rehabilitation/construction of houses damaged by conflict through Ministry of Public Works and Housing and Ministry of Social Affairs. (PNA, May 2 2008; PNA, 17 December, 2007 PNGO, August 2008) There are several ministries that address more specifically forced displacement including projects under the Ministry of the Wall and Settlement Affairs (MoWSA) and the Ministry of Jerusalem affairs that addresses question of Jerusalem.
- In response to Israeli incursion into Gaza in December-January 2009, PNA's Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza which targets IDPs as well as the host community provision compensation and reconstruction. However continued Israeli sanctions have placed a halt on PNA plans. Instead, Hamas Palestinian authority has played a key role in coordinating reconstruction efforts with materials available and provided through tunnels along the Rafah border, and providing assistance to Palestinians with damaged or destroyed homes. It pledged \$5,200 to each family whose home was destroyed and \$1,300 for every family with a member killed during the last Israeli incursion. Despite progress made in rehabilitating damaged housing, the continued no contact policy with Hamas authority imposed by donor community including the EU and US and continued Israeli restrictions continues to hamper reconstruction efforts. In 2010, Palestinian authority have also been a source of displacement causing
- the displacement of scores of family in Rafah in mid 2010 on alleged efforts to regularise illegal building, widely condemned by human rights organisations. The Hamas authority through Ministry of Public Works and Housing remains key instrument in responding to

displacement. In January 2011, Hamas pledged to construct 1,000 homes (Haaertz, January 2010).

Inter-Agency Shelter Cluster/Shelter Sector - Gaza, January 2011

Lack of access to raw building materials, as a result of the Israeli and Egyptian blockade, remains the major reason for the chronic lack of progress in reconstruction in Gaza. Two years after the end of Cast Lead only 875 of the 2,796 major damaged homes have been repaired and just 6 houses of the 3,487 totally demolished homes have been rebuilt. [.....] Previously the Shelter Sector has reported little progress for major damaged and totally demolished shelters due to the blockade. However, for the second six months of 2010 the sector recorded a positive change compared to the previous 6 months. 675 shelters in need of major repairs were completed, compared to just 200 in the previous six months. The vast majority of this progress was due to the use of raw materials that entered Gaza illegally from Egypt and finishing materials that have been entering Gaza 'legally' since June 2010. Additionally, by the end of 2010 47,984 families out of a total of 53,409 recorded cases for minor repairs as a result of military action had received assistance worth up to USD 5,000 per shelter[.....] Due to the blockade on Gaza, and restrictions on raw materials, UN agencies and most major international agencies continue to struggle to have any significant impact on reconstruction efforts for houses damaged and destroyed during Operation Cast Lead. Donors' reluctance to green light usage of tunnel materials has meant that the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MoPWH), and various agencies utilising materials available on the local market, are now leading the way with the reconstruction of totally demolished shelters in Gaza. During December 2010 the completion of a 36 unit multi-storey housing complex, made unfit for use during Cast Lead, marked a huge step forward and demonstrated what kind of reconstruction could be achieved despite the blockade. During January 2011 the MoPWH announced a plan to construct a further 1,000 units during the course of 2011[.....]

CAT Concluding Observations, CAT, 23 June 2009, para.29-31

"[...] the Committee is concerned over the insufficient measures taken by the State party to protect the civilian population of the Gaza Strip [...]

30. The Committee has received reports that the "blockade" imposed on the Gaza Strip, especially aggravated since July 2007, has obstructed the distribution of humanitarian aid before, during and after the recent conflict, and has limited other human rights of the inhabitants, particularly the right to freedom of movement, of both juveniles and adults.[...]31. Notwithstanding the State party's legitimate security concerns, the Committee is seriously concerned at the many allegations provided to the Committee from non-governmental sources on degrading treatment at checkpoints, undue delays and denial of entry, including for persons with urgent health needs."

UN HRC, 15 September 2009, para. 1715-1573

"1. Actions by Israel in Gaza in the context of the military operations of 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009

1716. The Mission finds that in a number of cases Israel failed to take feasible precautions required by customary law reflected in Article 57(2)(a)(ii) of the First Additional Protocol to avoid or minimizing incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. [...] The intentional strike at the Al Quds hospital using high explosive artillery shells and using white phosphorous in and around the hospital also violated Articles 18 and 19 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

[...]

1722. The Mission investigated several incidents in which Israeli armed forces used local Palestinian residents to enter houses which might be booby trapped or harbour enemy combatants [...].The Mission found that the practice constitutes the use of human shields prohibited by international humanitarian law. It further constitutes a violation of the right to life,

protected in Article 6 of the ICCPR, and of the prohibition against cruel and inhuman treatment in Article 7 of the ICCPR.

[...]

1728. The Mission concludes that the blockade policies implemented by Israel against the Gaza Strip, in particular the closure of or restrictions imposed on border crossings in the immediate period before the military operations, subjected the local population to extreme hardship and deprivations that amounted to a violation of Israel's obligations as an Occupying Power under the Fourth Geneva Convention. These measures led to severe deterioration and regression in the levels of realization of economic and social rights of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and weakened the social and economic fabric of the Gaza Strip, leaving health, education, sanitation and other essential services in a very vulnerable position to cope with the immediate effects of the military operations.

[...]

1731. The Mission concludes that the conditions resulting from deliberate actions of the Israeli forces and the declared policies of the Government with regard to the Gaza Strip before, during and after the military operation cumulatively indicate the intention to inflict collective punishment on the people of the Gaza Strip. The mission, therefore, finds a violation of the provisions of Articles 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

[...]

1732. From the facts gathered, the Mission found that the following grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention were committed by Israeli forces in Gaza: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. As grave breaches these acts give rise to individual criminal responsibility. The Mission notes that the use of human shields also constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

[...]

1733. The Mission further considers that the series of acts that deprive Palestinians in the Gaza Strip of their means of subsistence, employment, housing and water, that deny their freedom of movement and their right to leave and enter their own country, that limit their rights to access a court of law and an effective remedy, could lead a competent court to find that the crime of persecution, a crime against humanity, has been committed."

PNA, 2 March 2009, p.16, 19,51

"Immediate priority will be given to repairing the water and electricity networks, providing shelter to the dispossessed, repairing schools and hospitals, rehabilitating education and health services, and providing the appropriate conditions to return to normal life. [...] While funding requests and options are considered, the PNA has already taken measures to provide relief and recovery opportunities to our people in Gaza. These include an immediate transfer of \$50 million to provide temporary shelter solutions, \$11 million for electricity repairs, and \$6 million for urgent restoration of water pipelines and wells. Additionally, we have designed and signed agreements to provide compensation to owners of damaged or destroyed houses in Gaza through local banks. An international technical institution (CHF) will advise banks on the assessments of damage, and follow up on the progress of reconstruction. In cooperation with the European Commission, similar compensation facilities are being prepared for the industrial, tourism, commercial and agricultural sectors, and donors are encouraged to contribute to these mechanisms. The PNA already spends large portion of its recurrent expenditure on the Gaza Strip, with over \$2.2 billion (\$120 million per month) transferred since June 2007 in the form of salaries and payments for social and hardships cases, utilities and basic services... [...] Since structural damage is not always immediately evident, it is important to carry out a structural security survey of affected buildings. This would help to ensure that emergency repairs are done on housing units that are not at risk of collapse, and that people still at risk can be evacuated. In the case of totally destroyed houses, intermediate support (e.g. rental subsidies, cash assistance, transitional shelter solutions) will be needed by affected families, including those now hosting IDPs. In

addition, special attention will have to be given to making housing and public buildings accessible to the disabled."

PNA, August 2009

"Ministry of the Wall and Settlement Affairs

The Ministry of the Wall and Settlement Affairs (MoWSA) has the following objectives:

Promote steadfastness of citizens affected by the Separation Wall in cooperation with other ministries and agencies through:

- Developing and implementing development projects west of the Wall.
- Contributing to providing basic needs of citizens, including implementation of social aid programs.

Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs

[...] Launching a programs to promote the steadfastness of Jerusalemites, including:

- Provide necessary legal support for Jerusalem inhabitants to enable them confront Israeli policies and measures, including house demolitions and withdrawal of ID cards.
- Provide necessary engineering expertise to prepare and submit structural plans for houses under threat of demolition and for zoning of unclassified land to convert them into residential areas.
- Provide urgent aid to evicted families. "

UN HRC, 15 September 2009, para. 304-307;1715-1573

[...] As non-State actors [...] with regard to IHL obligations, the question being settled some time ago. As the Special Court for Sierra Leone held, "it is well settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether States or non-State actors, are bound by international humanitarian law, even though only States may become parties to international treaties." [...] In the context of the matter within the Mission's mandate, it is clear that non-State actors that exercisegovernment-like functions over a territory have a duty to respect human rights.

306. The Mission notes that the Palestinian Authority, through its public undertakings as well as those of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Legislative Council, has declared its commitment to respect international human rights law in several instances, including in the context of international agreements. This commitment is also contained in the Palestinian Basic Law.

307. The obligations of the Gaza authorities may be viewed through a different lens but leading to the same result. The Gaza authorities also reiterated to the Mission their commitments to respect human rights. Hamas has also made a series of unilateral declarations of respect for human rights. Furthermore, the Palestinian Basic Law with its many human rights provisions also applies in the Gaza Strip.

"4. Actions by Palestinian armed groups

1747. In relation to the firing of rockets and mortars into Southern Israel by Palestinian armed groups operating in the Gaza Strip, the Mission finds that the Palestinian armed groups fail to distinguish between military targets and the civilian population and civilian objects in Southern Israel. [...] Where there is no intended military target and the rockets and mortars are launched into civilian areas, they constitute a deliberate attack against the civilian population. These actions would constitute war crimes and may amount to crimes against humanity.

5. Actions by responsible Palestinian authorities

[...] if they failed to take necessary measures to prevent the Palestinian armed groups from endangering the civilian population, the Gaza authorities would bear responsibility for the damage arising to the civilians living in Gaza.

1752. The Mission finds that security services under the control of the Gaza authorities carried out extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrest, detention and ill treatment of people, in particular political opponents, which constitute serious violations of the human rights to life, to liberty and security of the person, to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to be protected against arbitrary arrest and detention, to a fair and impartial legal

proceeding; and to freedom of opinion and expression, including freedom to hold opinions without interference."

ICHR, 2009, p.15, 19

"It has become evident from the continued state of division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which deepened in 2008, that the policies taken by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the De facto authority in the Gaza Strip consolidate and deepen the differences. As of this writing, the two parties apparently, agree only on one issue, namely imposing their political agenda and prioritizing "security" considerations over human rights by continuing to violate the human rights of Palestinian citizens. Palestinian citizens were and continue to be the victims who pay the price as a result of the on-going and deepened state of division. [...]The *de facto* political division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has been exacerbated during 2008, to the point where two separate governments are running the political affairs and lives of the Palestinian people. Each government has power over a part of the Palestinian-controlled Territory, in addition to separate political and economic agendas, administrative organs, and security and civil institutions and powers. The Palestinian people have gradually lost the political and geographical unity embodied in the formation of the first Palestinian National Authority created on the national land in 1994."

HPN, September 2009, p.2

"Individuals suspected of affiliation with opposition factions have allegedly been the victims of arbitrary arrests, torture and extra-judicial executions. Schools and hospitals have been disrupted by strikes and political infighting. Meanwhile, Hamas is extending its control over every level of the social fabric [...]"

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 21 January 2008

"9. Israel has been for 40 years and remains in military occupation of the OPT. This was reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in its 2004 Advisory Opinion on the *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, when it held that the Palestinian territories (including East Jerusalem) "remain occupied territories and Israel has continued to have the status of occupying Power". The consequence of this, in the opinion of the International Court, is that the Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) applies to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as do the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Furthermore, Israel's obligations have not diminished as a result of the prolonged nature of the occupation. On the contrary, they have increased as a result of it. It is now argued that Israel's occupation has become unlawful as a result of the numerous violations of international law that have occurred during the occupation.

In its Advisory Opinion on the construction of a wall in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the International Court of Justice was not asked to pronounce on the legal status of Gaza. It, possibly therefore, confined its reaffirmation of the occupied status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory to the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The evacuation of Israeli settlements and the withdrawal of the permanent IDF presence from Gaza in 2005, has now given rise to the argument that Gaza is no longer occupied territory. On 15 September 2005 Prime Minister Sharon told the General Assembly that Israel's withdrawal from Gaza meant the end of its responsibility for Gaza.

10. On 19 September 2007 Israel seemed to give a new status to Gaza when its Security Cabinet declared Gaza to be "hostile territory" - a characterization that was shortly afterwards approved by the United States Secretary of State. Although the legal implications that Israel intends to attach to this "status" remain unclear, the political purpose of this declaration was immediately made known - namely the reduction of the supply of fuel and electricity to Gaza. The test for determining whether a territory is occupied under international law is effective control, and

not the permanent physical presence of the occupying Power's military forces in the territory in question. Judged by this test it is clear that Israel remains the occupying Power as technological developments have made it possible for Israel to assert control over the people of Gaza without a permanent military presence. According to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention have the obligation "to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention". Israel has violated obligations of an *erga omnes* character that are the concern of all States and that all States are required to bring to an end. In the first instance, Israel, the occupying Power, is obliged to cease its violations of international humanitarian law. But other States that are a party to the siege of Gaza are likewise in violation of international humanitarian law and obliged to cease their unlawful actions."

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 12 September 2007
"Almost 60 years after their initial displacement, Palestinian refugees and IDPs are still denied access to durable solutions in accordance with international law, relevant UN resolutions, and best international practice. A variety of factors have contributed to this stalemate. These include Israel's refusal to provide protection and allow Palestinian refugees and IDPs to return to their homes of origin; the collapse of UNCCP protection; the protracted Israeli occupation of the West Bank, including eastern Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip; lack of effective protection by the Arab League and host states; limited protection afforded by the UNHCR and UNRWA; varying interpretations of relevant instruments; and the lack of sufficient international will to enable refugees to exercise their fundamental human rights under international law as affirmed in relevant UN resolutions....."

Israel has a special obligation to protect Palestinian refugees and IDPs for a number of reasons: Israel as a successor state to pre-1948 Palestine is the country of origin of the majority of Palestinian refugees and IDPs; it has played a direct role in their protracted forced displacement; and a heightened protection regime applies under international humanitarian law to those Palestinian civilians, including refugees and IDPs, residing in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel thus has a primary obligation to protect, including the facilitation of durable solutions. Israel is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention (but not to the 1967 Protocol), but does not apply this in the case of Palestinian refugees. Neither does Israel apply the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement to internally displaced Palestinians. Israel is a signatory to the Fourth Geneva Convention, but does not recognize its *de jure* applicability to the occupied Palestinian territory, and argues that international human rights conventions do not apply to their population. The Israeli High Court has however accepted the *de facto* application of certain provisions to the OPT....

In the 1967-occupied Palestinian territory, 4.0 million Palestinians effectively live under the military control of Israel; at least 2.8 million of them are refugees and/or IDPs. Under international humanitarian law, their protection is the responsibility and duty of the occupying power, Israel, and not the Palestinian Authority (PA), which is a non-sovereign entity under occupation that lacks the power to protect. In practice, the status and rights of Palestinian refugees and IDPs in the 1967-occupied territory are partially regulated by Palestinian Authority civil law, but this is in turn restricted by thousands of Israeli occupation policies.... The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) characterizes the situation as "the complex interaction of a lack of protection of the civilian population materializing by gross human rights abuses and increased violence [and] a lack of access leading to restricted movement of persons and goods within, to, and from the OPT.[...]"

..... Israel's policies cause new displacement of Palestinian residents, as well as the repeated displacement of refugees and IDPs, both inside the occupied territory and across regional borders. Forcible displacement is caused by violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including unnecessary and disproportionate damage inflicted on the civilian population,

and violation of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention prohibiting the transfer of civilians (Jewish settlers) by the occupying power into occupied territory. Additional factors that induce forcible displacement include restrictions on movement, revocation of residency rights, denial of family reunification, confiscation of Palestinian land, and (since 2002) the construction of the Wall and its associated regime."

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 12 September 2007

"Palestinian refugees in the 1967-occupied Palestinian territory came under the combined jurisdiction of the PA and the PLO, which viewed the occupied territory as a host country for Palestinian refugees. However, the ability of national authorities to protect this population, including refugees and IDPs, was limited from the beginning as a result of the limited powers granted to them under the terms of the interim political agreements with Israel. The destruction of PA infrastructure by Israel since the beginning of the second *intifada* in 2000, and the imposition of sanctions against the democratically elected Palestinian Authority in January 2006, have severely curtailed the PA's ability to protect refugees and IDPs in the occupied territory."

Independent Commission for Human Rights, April 2007

"Local legislation should be enacted to regulate average apartment rentals, compatible with the average national income in the PNA territories, and to guarantee the rights of both landlord and leasee....The PNA should shoulder its responsibility of compensating citizens whose houses have been subjected to Israeli shelling in Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In the course of its military operations in 2006, the Israeli occupation forces demolished 292 houses in the occupied Palestinian territories, 279 of which were in Gaza Strip. The Israeli occupation forces also demolished 42 houses in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), under the pretext that they were built without licenses. Palestinian citizens either take responsibility individually to file cases against the demolition of homes and confiscation of land or through specific institutions concerned with this issue, or by checking with the PNA ministries, as there is no unified Palestinian policy in this regard.

9. Despite the difficult conditions during the year, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing in Gaza Strip repaired some 62.6 % of partially demolished houses, while only 62 completely demolished houses out of 4669 or only 0.013 % were reconstructed. In the period between April and November the Ministry repaired 343 houses with a value of \$ 702,000, and finished the reconstruction of 14 houses with a value of \$ 450,000. UNRWA however, focused on people affected in the regions of Rafah and Khan Yunis, through two major projects. The first project is located near the European hospital, to the east of Khan Yunis, and the other in Tel Al-Sultan neighborhood to the west of the city of Rafah."

Palestinian Non Governmental Organisations' Network, August 2008

"While Palestinian society is living through an extremely acute political and security hardship and where the Israeli military occupation is shaping and affecting the daily lives of the Palestinian community, the plan simply assumes that economic prosperity is the major goal and makes no mention of other vital aspects of life such as free access, feeling secure, not being under constant, severe distress, and other freedoms of all kinds, which are lacking for Palestinians. Furthermore, the plan does not take into consideration supporting and strengthening the resilience of the people to cope with existing, enormous hardships, whether those are related to poverty or otherwise..... Thus, while continued international aid to the oPt is vital for survival, this is why it must not draw our attention away from the root cause of Palestinian de-development and social suffering: a long lasting military occupation of Palestinian lands and the inability of the international community to facilitate and conclude a meaningful political process that could bring about a just and lasting political settlement in accordance and compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law..... The plan was developed based on the best case scenario that an anticipated improvement in the political situation will take place following the possible beginning of a meaningful political process that will ostensibly lead to a just political settlement, and that will bring about a more stable and conducive environment for

development in the occupied Palestinian territory. Furthermore, the plan assumes that Gaza and the West Bank are a contiguous entity with no restriction of movement of people and goods between the two areas and with the outside world, nor within the West Bank itself. However, the existing facts on the ground demonstrate an opposing reality. Gaza has become a prison to 1.5 million persons and is physically separated from the West Bank. The severe restrictions on movement in the West Bank render economic growth impossible, as has been stated by the World Bank and other international donors.....Indeed, the long-term geographical fragmentation as a result of the closure regime imposed by the Israeli Government on the WBGS and Jerusalem has severely impacted on social cohesion, the provision of services, access to work and to land, as well as initiatives in system building. These facts cannot be ignored and must be factored into any current development planning initiative. Yet, the current development plan has ignored these vital aspects of development."

See Also:

[Report of the HRC on its 12th Special Session](#), **UN HRC**, 21 October 2009

[Statement by Ms. Navanethem Pillay UN HCHR at the 12th HRC Special Session](#), **UN HCHR**, 15 October 2009

[Moving Beyond the Goldstone Report](#), **HRW**, 9 November 2009

[Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza](#), **PNA**, 2 March 2009

[The Status of Human Rights in the Palestinian-controlled Territory](#), **ICHR**, December 2008

[Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State](#), **PNA**, August 2009

[Progress Report on the Implementation of the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010: Report to the Meeting for the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee](#), **Palestinian National Authority**, 2 May 2008

[Building A Palestinian State: Towards Peace and Prosperity](#), **Palestinian National Authority**, 12 December 2007

[Inside Gaza: The Challenge of Clans and Families Middle East Report N°71](#), **International Crisis Group (ICG)**, 20 December 2007

[Ruling Palestine: the West Bank model?](#), **International Crisis Group (ICG)**, 17 July 2008

[Ruling Palestine: Gaza under Hamas](#), **International Crisis Group (ICG)**, 19 March 2008

See Also Humanitarian Access: Humanitarian Access in Gaza, & West Bank.

Lack of International Will & Flawed Peace Process

- A number of international and regional institutions, key states such as the EU and Arab League have condemned violations of humanitarian law and human rights law as it affects Palestinian community and IDPs alike including General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, the Human Rights Council amongst several Rapporteurs ad infinitum. The UN has repeatedly condemned the worsening situation in the OPT, and violations of human rights and humanitarian law including 'demographic manipulation' and forced displacement. (CHR, 12 June 2002; CHR, 17 January 2006; UN GA, 15 January 2007) In 2009, the Representative of the Secretary General to Human Rights of IDPs in March 2009 would also underline the effects of displacement in the OPT (UN RSG, March 2009) UN have repeated called upon the international community to respond to situations of displacement and other violations of human rights and humanitarian law (HRC, January 2011; UN May 2011)
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- Situation of internal displacement has been increasingly recognised by the humanitarian agencies in the last several years and has called upon the international community to address the situation of displacement underlining that the failure of the international community to address the underlying sources of forced displacement in the OPT including the construction of the Separation Wall, Israeli settlements and by pass infrastructure, closure

regime and effects in Gaza Strip is compromising any notion of a two state solution. (CARE et al, February 2008) Human rights and humanitarian organisations have underlined that the failure of the international community in addressing human rights and humanitarian violations are at root of the humanitarian and protection crisis faced in OPT continued displacement, not withstanding its obligation under the Geneva Conventions. These have underlined that international community including the EU – generally choose not to challenge Israel,

- preferring to support “ad hoc efforts” to improve conditions or equip families to “cope with the intolerable” and call upon serious to framing the oPt as a long-term human rights and protection crisis requiring both a principled approach by the international community and their engagement in political action to enforce adherence to agreed international norms and laws; “a focus on root causes rather than effects” (RSC, September 2010).
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- Lack of political will to act, or political engagement, by the international community including United States and European Union continues to leave a political vacuum in which violations however continue to be perpetrated. In its mission report on Gaza, the Goldstone report emphasised that the international community has been largely silent and has to-date failed to act to ensure the protection of the civilian population in the Gaza Strip and generally the OPT. (Al Haq et al, February 2011; UN HRC, September 2009) The Goldstone report also underlined the continued lack of adequate reaction to the blockade in Gaza and its consequences, and the negative impact on the protection of population that has resulted from the isolation of the Gaza authorities and the sanctions against the Gaza Strip. (UN HRC, September 2009 and January 2011) The UN has called upon the international community to act in response to Israeli making of "facts on the ground" and also highlighted policies
- adopted by the international donor community which are advertently or inadvertently complicit in supporting the Israeli occupation or delaying the provision of much needed reconstruction - latter particularly with reference to donor "no contact policy" with Hamas authorities in Gaza Strip (UN HRC, January 2011; OCHA, May 2010).
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- The international community's lack of political will to pressure parties to the conflict raises further concerns as to whether “a peace process between unequals” will adhere to international legal frameworks and respond to the needs and rights of displaced and non displaced alike. The Oslo Agreement of 1993 forms the backdrop of present negotiations, demarcating the OPT as one continuous territorial entity consisting of West Bank, and Gaza and was intended to address the conflict through interim measures. Many of the key issues were left for future negotiations which remain to be finalised (which though addressing the situation of refugees does not take into account that of displacement issues). As no final settlement has yet been agreed, this interim situation has remained frozen. The "Palestinian Papers" exposed in late 2010 are however revealing of the difficulties faced in negotiations, the intransigence of the Israeli party, level of cooperation between both parties as well as
- the compromises to which Palestinian authority are willing to agree upon to arrival at political solution to the ongoing conflict (Al Jazeera, January 2011).
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- Negotiations at present are premised on the proposals contained in the Quartet Road Map of 2003, (ICG, November 2007) or the performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict , has remained the official political framework as endorsed by Security Council resolution 1515 (2003).The Road Map does not take into account various developments and remains a performance based process with little account of violations to international law and application of relevant human rights and humanitarian law. (UN SR on HR, January 2008) Of concern is the application of normative framework to addressing durable solutions for IDPs and whether negotiations such land swaps take heed of the rights of Palestinians, concerns which were highlighted in revealed Palestinian Papers in late 2010. Negotiations to this date have foundered as result of unilateral actions

undertaken by Israeli including increase of settlements in West Bank and East Jerusalem, continued

- closure regime, incursion and blockade of Gaza and Palestinian factional fighting and divisions (UN Committee on Palestinian Rights, 14 July 2008; Ha'aretz, 28 July 2008; UN, 2011)

Al Haq et al, February 2011

While Israel's policies directly undermine the EU's positions and its objectives regarding the OPT, including East Jerusalem, and the Middle East as a whole, the EU has so far failed to use the significant leverage of its bilateral relations with Israel in order to pressure the latter to refrain from its illegal practices. Contrary to the EU's intention to link the upgrading of its relations with Israel to human rights and international humanitarian law, and despite its decision not to proceed with the formal upgrading process, the EU continues, in practice, to strengthen its relations with Israel. The EU's "business as usual" approach amounts to tacit acquiescence of Israel's systematic violations of international law. The EU's current policy of "empty words" challenges the Union's ability to positively impact the human rights situation in the OPT and to contribute to a "comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict." The upcoming EU-Israel Association Council provides an important opportunity to adopt a crucial new EU policy relating to the OPT, in particular on East Jerusalem, and to condition the upgrading of EU-Israel relations on international human rights and humanitarian law.

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 10 January 2011

"4... Thus, a strong impression is being formed within the international community that a lack of political will exists with which to implement recommendations based on authoritative findings that Israel has been guilty of flagrant violations of international humanitarian law and international criminal law. This impression of unwillingness to push forward with implementation fosters widespread perceptions of impunity with respect to the conduct of Israel, and in the case of flotilla incident limits and delays the opportunity of flotilla passengers to pursue remedies for harms unlawfully inflicted. This dynamic of evasion and delay weakens overall respect for international law, as well as the credibility of the Human Rights Council in relation to its own initiatives. More substantively, it deprives the Palestinian people living under occupation of their rights to receive the benefits of protection conferred in circumstances of occupation by international law and, specifically, the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) and the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

5. Given the long duration, the severity and continuing nature of the violations of many fundamental legal obligations of Israel as the occupying Power, these failures of implementation of international humanitarian law are experienced on the ground through various acute forms of abuse and suffering endured on a frequent, often on a daily, basis by the civilian population of the occupied Palestinian territories. Many political leaders have confirmed this assessment in recent months, and yet the organized international community remains silent....

22. Whether inadvertently or not, the role of the international donor community has led to a consolidation of Israeli control in the West Bank through the two-tiered system of roads. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has acknowledged that all its West Bank projects in Area C, including road construction, must be carried out through prior coordination with the Government of Israel.³⁸ In other words, USAID and American taxpayers are financing, and thereby further entrenching, the Israeli de facto annexation of the West Bank. In one specific example, USAID announced in June 2010 that United States taxpayers had paid for road construction in the West Bank, boasting that "after completion of a road project in the southern West Bank, trade between Dahriyeh and the neighboring city of Beer Sheva (approximately 100,000 residents total) increased dramatically". The West Bank area between Dahriyeh and Beer Sheva lies largely within Area C, thus aid funds designated for Palestinian

residents is instead helping Israel finance the occupation. In another example in a nearby area, Nidal Hatim, a resident of Battir village near Bethlehem, described his inability to use Route 60, the main road from Bethlehem to his home village and the principal north-south traffic artery through the West Bank; "To go on the highway, we have to go through the checkpoint and turn around. I have a West Bank Palestinian ID, so I can't go through the checkpoint". Instead, he takes a side road that is currently being built by the Palestinian Authority with USAID support. The side road, still under construction, weaves around and under the four-lane Route 60, which is now used mostly by Israeli settlers. Upon completion, this "fabric of life" road is expected to be the sole access point connecting the villages in the western section of Bethlehem governorate with the urban area of Bethlehem.⁴² According to the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem, "the dual road system in the West Bank will in the long run cement Israeli control. The tunnel that connects with Battir can be controlled by one army jeep".⁴³ The Palestinian Authority grants approval for some of the roads. However, that does not change the legal consequence of an outside-Government funding infrastructure that consolidates the process of de facto annexation already under way in the occupied Palestinian territory. Such funding could arguably result in the outside Government supplying the funds being deemed complicit in the illegal occupation."

UN Secretary-General, 30 November 2009

"I welcome the commitment of Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu and President [Mahmoud] Abbas to a two-State solution, but am deeply concerned that talks between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization have been suspended for almost a year. I support the clear commitment and efforts of the United States to bring about a resumption of meaningful negotiations on all final status issues, including the security of Israelis and Palestinians, borders, refugees and Jerusalem. The biggest challenge to this shared agenda is to create the conditions in which the parties have the trust and confidence to return to genuine and substantive talks. On the Palestinian side, the Palestinian Authority has made significant progress in meeting its Road Map obligations in the West Bank. I call on all Palestinians to fight violent extremism and to refrain from incitement, and to continue their unyielding struggle to build their own state institutions. These efforts have resulted in economic and security improvements, which should be sustained and extended. I welcome initial steps taken by Israel to contribute to these positive trends, and call on Israeli authorities to expand these measures so that change can become truly transformative. I am deeply concerned that, in East Jerusalem and the remainder of the West Bank, illegal settlement construction continues. I have noted Prime Minister Netanyahu's recent announcement of settlement restraint. While this is a step beyond earlier positions, it falls short of Israel's obligations under the Road Map, particularly given the exclusion of East Jerusalem. I repeat my call on Israel to meet in full its Road Map commitments to freeze all settlement activity, including "natural growth", and to dismantle outposts erected since March 2001."

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 17 April 2008

"How long is this madness to continue without serious international intervention? It has become clear to many responsible persons with experience of the conflict, both in Israel and elsewhere, that only direct negotiations or talks between the real parties involved - Israel and Hamas - can stop the killings. Israel's unwillingness to talk to Hamas is understandable, given Hamas' hostility to the State of Israel. But there is no reason why the United Nations, acting through the Security Council or the Secretary-General, should not intervene and assert its role as mediator. This is a role that the United Nations has traditionally played, even where one of the parties has been labelled as "terrorist". It is the responsibility of the United Nations, as the ultimate guardian of human rights and international peace, to open lines of communication between Israel, Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, and to bring them to the negotiating table. Such a step would also contribute to the advancement of Palestinian national unity - another area which the United Nations has to date failed to address. The right to life is the most precious and important human right. The United Nations, acting through the Security Council or the Secretary-General, must do its utmost to protect the lives of both Palestinians and Israelis. Surely it is not too much

to ask of the Security Council, and if it cannot act, the Secretary-General, to protect human life, even if it means talking to a group of which it may disapprove politically. "

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 21 January 2008

"At the time of writing negotiations leading to a peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians have commenced following an initial meeting in Annapolis on 27 November 2007. It is not within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur to comment on what is essentially a political process, except insofar as it has implications for human rights. In this context the Special Rapporteur wishes to make the following remarks.

56. The Oslo Accords have been criticized for failing to consider normative aspects of the Palestinian issue. In particular they failed to pay adequate attention to international law and to the human rights dimension. It is important that the Annapolis process does not make the same mistake. Unfortunately the first indications suggest that this is a serious possibility as the joint statement of 27 November agreed to by the parties as a starting point for the negotiations is premised on the proposals contained in the Quartet road map of 2003 rather than on the legal norms proclaimed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the construction of the wall. Indeed the joint statement makes no mention of the Advisory Opinion at all. The Secretary-General in his statement at Annapolis also invoked the road map but made no mention of the Advisory Opinion. In the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, the road map is an inappropriate and unhelpful framework for negotiations for the following reasons. First, it is outdated as it takes no account of the Advisory Opinion, Palestinian democratic elections, Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and the June 2007 separation of Gaza from the West Bank. Second, Israel attached 14 reservations to the road map in May 2003, which makes Israel's commitment to it unclear. Third, it is, in its own language, "a performance-based and goal driven roadmap" which takes little account of the normative aspect.

57. It must be recalled that article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that persons in an occupied territory shall not be deprived of the benefits of the Convention by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territory and the occupying Power, or by the annexation by the occupying Power of part of the occupied territory. This means that any agreement between the Palestinian authorities and the Israeli Government that recognizes settlements within the occupied Palestinian territory, or accepts the annexation by Israel of Palestinian land within the wall, will violate the Fourth Geneva Convention. This is but one example of the dangers of a peace process between unequals which has no regard to the normative framework of international law. In its approach to previous peace negotiations, the Israeli Government has insisted on negotiations being restricted to the agreed framework. The Annapolis joint statement which refers only to the road map suggests that Israel does not see itself as being bound by the normative framework accepted by the United Nations.

58. In the opinion of the Special Rapporteur negotiations should take place within a normative framework, with the guiding norms to be found in international law, particularly international humanitarian law and human rights law, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, and Security Council resolutions. Negotiations on issues such as boundaries, settlements, East Jerusalem, the return of refugees and the isolation of Gaza should be informed by such norms and not by political horse-trading. In this respect parties might learn from the experience of the negotiations that led to a democratic South Africa in the mid-1990s, which took place within the framework of accepted democratic principles, the rule of law and international law (with special reference to human rights law)."

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 12 September 2007

"The performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict has remained the official political framework for international peacemaking, although Israel is implementing unilateral measures, which include components of colonialism and apartheid, in violation of both the Road Map and international law. These unilateral measures are applied in order to annex de facto the main Jewish colonies ("settlements") and large areas of

Palestinian land in the occupied West Bank, while a Jewish demographic majority in Israel is maintained through an increasingly restrictive regime of separation on national grounds. There was no change in the fundamental positions of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) regarding the parameters for durable solutions for Palestinian refugees and internally displaced Palestinians, and official political negotiations remained frozen. Israel continued to advocate for a politically-driven and pragmatic solution of the refugee question which excludes recognition of the right of return, arguing that Palestinian refugees should be resettled in Arab states or third countries outside the region. Israeli official and public debate concerning Palestinian refugees focused on demography (i.e., how to maintain a Jewish majority) and separation (i.e., how to separate from the Palestinian population while keeping control of its land). Official statements by the PLO continued to promote a rights-based approach to the refugee question, including a solution in accordance with UN Resolution 194 and the rights to return, property restitution and financial compensation of Palestinian refugees and IDPs. The United States and Israel continued to vote against UN resolutions that reaffirmed the applicability of international law to the solution of the Palestinian refugee question. The European Union has not formulated a clear policy regarding Palestinian refugees and IDPs, and has not explicitly recognized the right of return, or rights to restitution and compensation of Palestinian refugees. In the absence of effective protection of their rights to return, restitution and compensation on the part of much of the international community and the United Nations, Palestinian refugees and IDPs have attempted to effect these rights by themselves. In 2006-7, for instance, public participation in annual commemorations of the Nakba of 1948 continued to expand. Palestinian citizens of Israel published four interrelated proposals for reform of Israel's political and legal system, including demands for democratisation of the state of Israel and Israel's recognition of its responsibility for the Nakba."

UN HRC, 15 September 2009, para.1709, 1710

I. The need for protection and the role of the international community 1709. International law sets obligations on States not only to respect but also to ensure respect for international humanitarian law. The International Court of Justice stated in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory that "all States Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 have in addition the obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention".[...]

1710. The 2005 World Summit Outcome document recognized that 'the international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from, inter alia, war crimes and crimes against humanity'. The document stressed that the members of the United Nations should be 'prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity'. In 2009, the Secretary-General's Report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect noted that the enumeration of these crimes did not ' detract in any way from the much broader range of obligations existing under international humanitarian law, international human rights law, refugee law and international criminal law.'

[...] The Mission notes that the international community has been largely silent and has to-date failed to act to ensure the protection of the civilian population in the Gaza Strip and generally the OPT. Suffice it to notice the lack of adequate reaction to the blockade and its consequences, to the Gaza military operations and, in their aftermath, to the continuing obstacles to reconstruction. The Mission also considers that the isolation of the Gaza authorities and the sanctions against the Gaza Strip have negatively impacted on the protection of the population.

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 12 September 2007

"No regional or international agency is mandated to provide protection to Palestinian IDPs in Israel and in the OPT, although UN agencies working on the ground do provide basic emergency humanitarian assistance to displaced Palestinians in the OPT or during humanitarian crises (e.g. Israel's War on Lebanon). However, the problem of internal displacement has not yet been officially recognized, and no comprehensive response to the needs and rights of the displaced has been developed. Special Rapporteurs of the HRC have issued statements and reports regarding the situation of Palestinian refugees and IDPs.... Human rights treaty bodies have also made recommendations pertaining to Palestinian refugees and IDPs.... The International Court of Justice, established in 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations, is the highest legal authority in the world, and issues rulings on contentious and advisory cases.... In October 2003, ... the UN General Assembly passed resolution ES-10/14 requesting the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to issue an Advisory Opinion on the [Wall]... The Court ruled that it was incumbent upon Israel to cease the construction of the Wall and dismantle the sections already built. It further requested Israel to make reparations for all damage caused by its unlawful act. Of particular relevance for Palestinian refugees and IDPs is the affirmation by the ICJ of the principle of reparation, which includes the right to return, as well as restitution and compensation for the unlawful taking of private property. Israel officially rejected the ICJ ruling and has so far failed to comply with the demands therein. The ICJ affirmed the responsibility of the international community and states "not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction." States Party to the Fourth Geneva Convention were requested to "ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law." The Court also insisted on the fact that the violation of the right to self-determination, which is a right erga omnes, entails certain obligations for states, which should "promote, through joint and separate action..."

United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), 12 June 2002

"... [It is] the assessment of the international community, including the Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations treaty bodies, that Israeli occupation has had a devastating impact on the Palestinians' housing and living conditions and that Israel bears legal responsibility. The policies of belligerent occupation and collective punishment have been marked by land confiscations, punitive house demolitions, implantation of settlements and settlers, the dismemberment of the Palestinian territories through the building of bypass roads and other infrastructure to serve illegal settlers, and the control or theft of water and other natural resources in the occupied territories. All of these have had the result of consolidating occupation on the lands occupied by force in 1967.

The principle features of the condition of housing rights in the occupied Palestinian territories arise from breaches of the laws of war and humanitarian law. These include not only violations of the Geneva Convention, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, on which Israel has reneged, but even more basic prohibitions of the Hague Regulations of 1907, which the Israeli judiciary and military have formally accepted as applying it would be a disservice to the Commission not also to remind it of Israel's long record of depopulation and demographic manipulation by way of expulsion, destruction of homes and villages, and implantation of settlers prior to and since its establishment as a State."

United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), 17 January 2006

"Israel continues with its construction of a wall within Palestinian territory in defiance of the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The wall causes great hardship to Palestinian communities between the Green Line and the wall and to Palestinians in the vicinity of the wall. The former are denied easy access to family, hospitals and schools in the West Bank while the latter are denied access to their lands beyond the wall. Israel allows Palestinians to cultivate their lands beyond the wall by means of a permit system, which is administered in an arbitrary and humiliating manner. ...Settlements continue to grow, particularly in the "closed zone" between the Green Line and the wall, which at present accommodates 76 per cent of the

settler population in the West Bank. ... Settler violence remains a serious problem, particularly in the centre of Hebron, where settlers terrorize the local population.The character of East Jerusalem is undergoing a major change as a result of the construction of the wall through Palestinian neighbourhoods. The clear purpose of the wall in the Jerusalem area is to reduce the number of Palestinians in the city by transferring them to the West Bank. In November 2005, European Union missions in Jerusalem issued a report in which they accused Israel of embarking on the encirclement of the city by the wall in order to achieve "the completion of the annexation of Jerusalem". Although Israel has abandoned its plan to build a wall through the Jordan Valley, its policies in that region are designed to drive Palestinians from the area. Settlements are expanding; Palestinian land is being confiscated, homes destroyed, access denied to non-Jordan Valley residents, and access to water and electricity curtailed. "

United Nations General Assembly (UN GA), 15 January 2007

"Expressing grave concern about the continuing systematic violation of the human rights of the Palestinian people by Israel, the occupying Power, including that arising from the excessive use of force, the use of collective punishment, the reoccupation and closure of areas, the confiscation of land, the establishment and expansion of settlements, the construction of the wall inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory in departure from the Armistice Line of 1949, the destruction of property and infrastructure, and all other actions by it designed to change the legal status, geographical nature and demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,....

3. *Condemns* all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction, especially the excessive use of force by the Israeli occupying forces against Palestinian civilians, resulting in extensive loss of life and vast numbers of injuries, including among children, massive destruction of homes, properties, agricultural lands and vital infrastructure, and the internal displacement of civilians; ...

League of Arab States, 16 March 2009

" When the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States mentioned the continuing Israeli policy of the Judaization of Jerusalem through the Palestinian eviction, it declares that these grave measures aim to contain and isolate the Old City of Jerusalem completely. Thus, the Israeli occupation authorities violate the rules of International Law and the fourth Geneva Convention, which forbids the forced displacement of residents and citizens living under occupation by the occupying power.[...] This is an illegal and dangerous measure and a new episode of the series of displacement of the Palestinian population out of their houses. It is accompanied by the closure of the Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem, as it was the case for the (Orient House), the (institution of studies) and the (Chamber of Commerce, which was built in 1936) ."

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 12 September 2007

"The League of Arab States (LAS), the primary regional organization in the Middle East and North Africa, has consistently called for the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes and properties. The LAS framework for peace negotiations refers to UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 425, UN General Assembly Resolution 194, the Madrid-Oslo agreements, and the principle of land for peace. In March 2002, the LAS adopted the Arab Peace Initiative (Beirut Declaration). This calls for Israel to: (1) withdraw fully from the occupied Arab territory; (2) arrive at a just solution to the Palestine refugee problem in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194(III); (3) accept the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied Palestinian territory. In exchange, Arab states shall: (1) consider the Arab-Israeli conflict at an end;(2) establish normal relations with Israel."

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 25 April 2007

"1. The Riyadh summit reaffirmed the need to adhere to the Arab peace initiative as adopted by the Beirut summit in 2002. It called on the Government of Israel and all Israelis to accept the initiative and seize the opportunity to resume the process of direct, earnest negotiations on all

tracks. The summit charged the Arab Ministerial Committee created to deal with that initiative with continuing its efforts and establishing task forces to make the necessary contacts with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, States members of the Security Council, the Quartet and other parties concerned with the peace process, with a view to the resumption of the peace process, the garnering of support for the initiative and the start of earnest negotiations on the basis of the agreed terms of reference...."

CARE, NRC, DIAKONIA, Doctors Without Borders, Premiere Urgence, ICAHD, MA'AN Development Centre, CISP, 25 February 2008

"Forcible displacement is both a consequence and root cause of the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict. The international community needs to address forced displacement in OPT as a matter of urgency. While restrictions on freedom of movement and closure continue to have grave consequences in both Gaza and the West Bank and many Palestinians are thus unable to leave their habitual places of residence, many of those same Palestinians have been previously displaced, and still more continue to be forcibly displaced daily. The deteriorating security situation and policies of occupation – military incursions, settler expansion, demolishing of homes, and land appropriation, revocation of residency permits, construction of the Separation Wall and its associated regime which includes fences, barriers, security systems, land and property confiscations, permits systems and regulations, and considerable environmental degradation – continues to cause displacement changing the demographic boundaries of the OPT within the confinements of a territory increasingly subject to restrictions on people's movement tantamount to a state of siege. If the international community is committed to the establishment of a Palestinian State then displacement must be systematically and comprehensively addressed as a matter of urgency. The changes to facts-on-the-ground by means of forcible displacement, and the international community's modest response is rendering a political solution to the Palestinian right of self determination increasingly bleak and unforgiving."

See Also:

[Human Rights Council Calls for Urgent International Action to End Grave Israeli Violations in Occupied Palestinian Territory](#), **UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)**, 24 January 2008

[Commissioner-General's statement on UNRWA and Palestine refugees in today's context](#), **United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)**, 29 January 2008

[In Gaza Strip, UN human rights chief decries 'massive' violations against civilians](#), **UN News Service**, 20 November 2006

[Concluding comments and observations](#), **United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UN CERD)**, 9 March 2007

[Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities](#), **Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly (UN GA)**, 20 August 2007

[Identical letters dated 28 December 2007 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council](#), **United Nations General Assembly (UN GA)**, 28 December 2007

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[Human Rights Council Opens Special Session on Violations Stemming From Israeli Incursions in Occupied Palestinians Territory](#), **United Nations Human Rights Council (UN HRC)**, 23 January 2008

[Statement by UNRWA Commissioner-General Karen Koning AbuZayd to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly](#), **United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)**, 31 October 2006

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[Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 \(A/ES-10/361\)](#), **United Nations**, 17 October 2006

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[Arab leaders offer Israel guarded peace offer](#), **The Guardian**, 3 April 2007

[After Lebanon war, focus shifts back to Palestinian issue](#), **Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA)**, 11 September 2006

[Gaza crisis deepens while spotlight on Lebanon](#), **Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 10 August 2006

[The World Bank gives Palestinian Authority \\$64 Million](#), **AP**, 6 December 2009

[The Fayyad Plan](#), **The Washington Post**, 5 December 2009

[PA says it will declare statehood](#), **Intermountain Jewish News**, 19 November 2009

[EU rejects Palestinian statehood appeal](#), **AP**, 17 November 2009

[PA to push U.N. for unilateral statehood](#), **UPI.com**, 15 November 2009

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[Obama, Netanyahu meet as U.S. peace bid flounders](#), **swissinfo.ch**, 10 November 2009

[Diplomats: Trilateral Obama meet with Abbas, Netanyahu highly unlikely](#), **Ha'aretz**, 1 September 2009

[Intense settlement activity by Israel threatens to derail Middle East peace process, Palestinian Rights Committee told](#), **UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People**, 14 July 2008

[Living with 270.000 Arabs in Jerusalem means more terror](#), **Ha'aretz**, 28 July 2008

[Briefing by UNRWA Commissioner-General Karen AbuZayd](#), **United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)**, 7 May 2008

[Statement by Middle East Quartet](#), **Middle East Quartet**, 2 May 2008

[United Nations International Conference on Palestine Refugees concludes in Paris](#), **United Nations General Assembly (UN GA)**, 30 April 2008

[Joint Submission to Human Rights Council on Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Arab Occupied Territories A/HRC/7/NGO/71](#), **CARE, NRC, DIAKONIA, Doctors Without Borders, Premiere Urgence, ICAHD, MA'AN Development Centre, CISP**, 25 February 2008

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[Decrying civilian deaths in Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Annan urges parties to talk](#), **United Nations News Service**, 9 August 2006

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Humanitarian Response to Forced Displacement

- Humanitarian assistance has mitigated the effects of the Israeli occupation and conflict on Palestinian refugees and IDPs. Though this assistance has prevented humanitarian crises from evolving it can neither prevent violations of international law, nor put an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (Badil, September 2007) Flow of humanitarian assistance reflects manifestation of donor's international political will mitigating the effects of occupation yet without corresponding political will to redress the situation. Perspectives within the donor community on how to approach forced displacement remain unclear. (Badil, September 2007; HEPG & LACC, 30 March 2006) Though the international community and UN have condemned Israeli violations, the implementation of programmes and projects in the Gaza Strip, Area C of the West Bank and East Jerusalem remain constrained by Israeli authorisation.
-
- The UN's Consolidated Appeal Process has repeatedly raised the issue of internal displacement, and the need to address the concerns of IDPs and communities at risk of displacement. In the 2008 2009, and 2010 UN CAP, prioritized forced displacement, protection concerns of communities displaced and at risk, and in 2010 addressing humanitarian needs of vulnerable communities in Area C who are at risk of displacement, and in need of basic assistance (OCHA, December 2010; November 2009). However the UN continues to face numerous obstacles in addressing displacement, as well as other

humanitarian issues. The UN implementation of programs to address protection as well as humanitarian and development needs of Palestinians displaced or at risk of displacement remains modest, constrained by Israeli authorisation in Area C and East Jerusalem, and Israeli restrictions in Gaza Strip. The Palestinian community remains highly dependent on humanitarian assistance. This is particularly the case in

- Gaza Strip where large proportion of Gaza's population is food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity, thus depending heavily on humanitarian assistance to sustain their livelihood. This is notwithstanding that lack of adequate access continues to limit response to communities in need in Gaza Strip as well as in remote areas in West Bank (Save the Children, 2009).
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- There have been repeated concerns raised by NGOs over the UN and international community provision of providing humanitarian assistance without adequate protection. Several commentators have underlined that by addressing humanitarian issues without holding Israel accountable for its specific obligations as an Occupying Power as well as failing to call on its responsibilities for internationally wrongful acts (i.e. extensive destruction of property not warranted by military necessity), international donors are relieving Israel of its legally binding responsibilities (BADIL, September 2009; RSC, September 2010). These have also underlined the tendency of the UN and humanitarian agencies to address humanitarian needs alone and pursue depoliticised approach are at odds with the demands of a human rights and protection crisis in the OPT (RSC, September 2010). In such context, UN and humanitarian agencies are at risk of invalidating their own claims of neutrality and accountability (RSC, September 2010)
- Several NGOs have also criticised the reluctance of donors to provide adequate funding to programs that provide preventive measures to displacement, that directly addresses communities at risk in Area C and East Jerusalem, and the discriminatory nature of the funding provided which does not address the plight of communities under Hamas authority by application of "no contact policy" which hampers humanitarian response (HPN, September 2009; AIDA, June 2011; OCHA May 2010).
-
- Grass root communities affected by or at risk of displacement have also underlined that the failure of the UN to address the situation in areas under Israeli jurisdiction particularly Area C and East Jerusalem is rendering it complicit in a process of forced displacement (IDMC, November 2010; See Also Self Reliance and Coping Strategies) Affected communities note the contrast of Israeli establishing "facts on the ground" while the UN remains passive in its response and by default complicit in Israeli policies of forced displacement. The UNCT has raised forced displacement as a concern but has repeatedly underlined the limited ability to operate in areas under complete Israeli jurisdiction (Area C and East Jerusalem) and obstacles to humanitarian access in OPT and specifically in the Gaza Strip. In January 2010, a UN humanitarian response plan was submitted to the Israeli Civil Administration of Area C in January 2010 to address minimum needs in Area C (OCHA, July 2010). The
- Israeli Civil Administration has however only provided a partial response to these plans, and progress in the implementation of the UN humanitarian response plan has grounded to halt. The UN has highlighted that in the absence of Israeli facilitation of permits or alternative mechanisms, humanitarian actors are repeatedly forced to choose between respecting the military legislation of the Israeli administration, or meeting the critical needs of people (OCHA, July 2010). As of 2011, there has however been little if at all progress in the implementation of UN humanitarian response plan to Area C.
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- There is no agency in the OPT mandated specifically to assist IDPs. This lack of mandated agency has entailed significant gaps in the protection response and assistance provided to IDPs. Efforts in recent years have been made to provide a coordinated response to situation of displacement. In November 2007, following advocacy from national and international NGOs on the need to address forced displacement the Inter-Agency Protection Sub-Working

Group on Forced Displacement (DWG) which is chaired by UN OCHA, was established under the Protection Working Group, led by OHCHR. The Cluster Approach which was applied to the OPT as of 2009 may address this gap by further consolidating inter-agency responses under the cluster lead, but its effectiveness is yet to be determined. The Cluster approach should facilitate mainstreaming of displacement issues however there continues to be persistent differences in the manner at which displacement is addressed and defined in the West Bank and Gaza

- Strip. For number of observers, the hierarchical relations between UN agencies, INGOs and local partner NGOs have been reinforced by introduction of the cluster system (RSC, September 2010). Palestinian NGOs have been critical of lack of substantial change in response, limited institutional capacity of the OHCHR as protection lead, the hierarchical character of the process, and question merits of the cluster system in responding effectively (IDMC November 2010).
-
- The DWG under the Protection Cluster has a broad membership, including UN agencies, international and local (Israeli and Palestinian) NGOs and donors. The working group aims to ensure an effective inter-agency response to different phases of displacement (before (preventive), during and post), and encouraging the international community to address forcible and arbitrary displacement. The DWG is chaired by the OCHA, under the Protection Cluster lead of OHCHR. The OHCHR has since the adoption of the cluster approach assumed wider protection mandate though observers note remains still very much constrained by lack of capacity and resources (IDMC, November 2010). Though DWG's mandate addresses the situation in West Bank and Gaza Strip response to the situations of displacement in the Gaza Strip is less clearly defined. In Gaza Strip, displacement issues are addressed under the Gaza Shelter Cluster that is mandated to address housing reconstruction. Though there is considerable
- efforts to raise awareness on displacement issues and communities at risk of displacement, as well as respond to immediate needs of those displaced, the DWG faces considerable challenges:
-
- Monitoring of displacement is fraught with challenges. There is however only anecdotal and limited information available on the overall situation of IDPs, their protection concerns and subsequent needs (IDMC, November 2010). There is lack of baseline information on situation of displacement and no profiling exercise has been undertaken to determine a comprehensive assessment of the number, location and protection needs of IDPs, particularly protracted displacement.
- The lack of protection for Palestinians in the oPt, including IDPs and those at risk of displacement, is probably the largest challenge facing the DWG, along with the lack of accountability of perpetrators. The operational environment remains constrained by the Israeli legal regime and policies of occupation, limiting the ability of the DWG to address situations of displacement and prevent displacement of communities at risk (IDMC, November 2010).
- The DWG has developed through its extensive network a response mechanisms to immediate needs to situations of displacement in the early emergency phase of displacement (4-5 months), mapping communities at risk of displacement, and continues to raise the profile of displacement in the OPT. However there remains limited follow up and monitoring of the situation of IDPs in the medium to long term.
- Though DWG has sought to mainstream response to displacement, there still is need to harmonise and/or mainstream operational response and definitions across the Humanitarian Country Team, and amongst DWG members, and between different bureaus and geographical locations in West Bank and Gaza Strip to address inconsistencies in response, operational definitions and particularly the situation of protracted displacement.
- Though DWG has taken number of steps in raising awareness on displacement in the OPT, there is need for more linkages with grass root communities addressing issues of

displacement and prevention, and concerted efforts in providing and advocating particularly protection, and humanitarian/development assistance to such communities in Area C (See Also Issues of Self Reliance: Coping Strategies and Prevention).

- The DWG has taken the lead in advocating on behalf of displaced and communities at risk of displacement, and developing strategies to raise the situation in the OPT internationally. These are necessary, and should be coupled with raising the profile of displacement to Israeli civil society and highlighting internally and externally the linkages between the situation of persons displaced in the OPT and unrecognised villages in the Negev, and mixed cities in Israel where Palestinian-Israelis are at risk of displacement.
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- Various agencies respond within their respective mandates to forced displacement however face considerable constraints in view of lack of resources, magnitude of the displacement issues, and donor reluctance to address these key areas. UNRWA provides assistance to secondary displaced refugees as well as to IDPs in emergency situations. ICRC undertake programs of preventive nature to forced displacement such as assistance to Palestinian communities accessing land in "seam zones" as well as response to immediate needs following displacement in provision of non-food items. Several Palestinian and Israeli NGOs, as well as several international NGOs provide assistance which is preventive in nature as well as responding to immediate emergency needs for families displaced (ICAHN, March 2008; Al Majdal, October 2007; See Also Issues of Self Reliance: Coping Strategies and Prevention):
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- This includes providing legal assistance to victims of eviction or demolition orders (targetting homes, livelihood or infrastructure such as schools), appeals against revocation of residency, family unity, or access rights. Legal litigation has been modestly successful: For instance legal action can place demolition orders on hold but has very rarely if at all revoked such orders.
- Providing assistance to Palestinians at risk of displacement such as improvement of water networks, sanitation services, and limited infrastructural projects to ameliorate conditions for Palestinians residing in Area C. Infrastructure projects in Area C are quite limited, subject to Israeli authorisation, short of which such projects are subject to demolition orders.
- Provision of emergency assistance following displacement such as provision of non-food items to communities affected including tents to families whose homes have been demolished (ICRC), or the provision of emergency shelters in case of mass displacement (i.e. Gaza Strip where UNRWA schools are often reconverted to emergency shelters for secondary displaced refugees and IDPs).
- Reconstruction efforts for property damaged or demolished particularly in Gaza Strip (i.e. housing projects by UNRWA, or UNDP) however reconstruction efforts are less likely to take place in Area C or East Jerusalem where humanitarian community relies on Israeli permits for such construction, and is seldom provided. This includes providing rental assistance to families displaced in 2009.

OCHA,

August

2010

"The exact Palestinian population of Area C is unknown, but it is estimated that as many as 150,000 Palestinians live within the zone. A recent survey conducted by OCHA and partners indicates that a total of 271 communities have more than 50 percent of their built-up areas in Area C, including many which are entirely in Area C. Most of them are small herding communities scattered in remote areas, mainly on the eastern and southern slopes of the West Bank, and are some of the most vulnerable people in the West Bank.

In addition to its importance to those residing within its confines, Area C contains the land reserves critical for the sustainability of a future Palestinian state. Area C holds the only available

space necessary for the expansion of Palestinian population centers as well as the bulk of Palestinian agricultural and grazing land. Because it is the only contiguous territorial block in the West Bank, large-scale infrastructure projects including national roads, water and electricity networks usually pass through it....

Years of neglect, especially after the Oslo Accords, have left the people living in Area C in a desperate situation, isolated from other areas of the West Bank, and highly vulnerable to forcible displacement. Those that leave swell the numbers of aid-dependant urban poor in nearby towns. However, people continue to live in Area C, despite severe hardship, because herding or subsistence farming on land in Area C is their only livelihood option. The vulnerability of Area C populations has been highlighted by aid agencies as a serious humanitarian concern and a priority area for intervention in the 2010 Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP).....

An initial response plan was developed by the humanitarian community at the end of 2009 and submitted to the ICA in January 2010. Although far from comprehensive, it aims to ensure that communities have access to minimum amounts of water, primary education and basic shelter. The plan focuses on the areas where the ability to address needs is restricted by Israeli policies, in relation to infrastructure, or where direct interventions by the Israeli authorities is required, for example to stop settler violence against school children in Area C. Thus essential food aid is not included in the plan because food distribution is being implemented smoothly.

The response plan has been closely coordinated with the relevant PA agencies, including the Ministry of Education and the Palestinian Water Authority to ensure that it is consistent with the PA plans for medium and longer term development. In July 2010 the ICA provided a written response in relation to the water component of the response plan. The education and shelter components have yet to be responded to....

The Humanitarian Response Plan package contains critical priority projects, all of which require urgent and immediate implementation. The result of the Israeli authorities' failure to facilitate implementation of the Plan will result in Palestinian communities left with a chronic lack of water, children educated in unsafe and inappropriate facilities, and families living in inadequate shelters or facing the risk of displacement due to house demolitions. In the absence of ICA facilitation of permits or alternative mechanisms, humanitarian actors are repeatedly forced to choose between respecting the military legislation of the ICA, or meeting the critical needs of people."

Save the Children, April 2009

"Current responses to displacement, both as a result of house demolition or other causes, can be described as both ad hoc and inconsistent, as significant gaps exist related to the protection of IDPs and assistance for IDPs within the OPT. Currently, first line responses to displacement are provided by UNRWA and the ICRC in the form of emergency shelter, food and other basic supplies intended to help IDPs cope with immediate material losses of home and property. This emergency assistance does not sufficiently meet the needs, as demonstrated in this survey, and also fails to address the needs of the host family or community. It is not complemented by adequate intermediate and longterm assistance responses and focused interventions to prevent displacement. Specifically, the current response does not involve searching for durable solutions as outlined in the Guiding Principles (namely voluntary return or resettlement and local integration for IDPs)."

HPN, September 2009, p.17

"In November 2007, the Inter-Agency Protection Sub-Working Group on Forced Displacement (DWG) was established under the Protection Working Group, led by OHCHR. The DWG is currently under the Protection cluster, which is chaired by OHCHR with the support of OCHA; the cluster was adopted in the oPt in March 2009. The DWG has a broad membership, including UN agencies, international and local (Israeli and Palestinian) NGOs and donors. The working group aims to ensure an effective and transparent inter-agency response to different phases of

displacement (before (preventive), during and post), enhancing the analysis and collation of information and encouraging the international community to address forcible and arbitrary displacement. The DWG is currently chaired by OCHA.[...] There has been a notable rise in awareness of forced displacement, and responses have become more coordinated. However, there are constraints and a number of shortfalls. The lack of protection for Palestinians in the oPt, including IDPs and those at risk of displacement, is probably the largest challenge facing the DWG, along with the lack of accountability of perpetrators. The operational environment remains constrained by the Israeli legal regime and policies of occupation. As the occupying power, Israel is the de facto if not de jure authority in the oPt. Organisations that do not comply with Israeli laws and regulations risk criminal prosecution or expulsion. Furthermore, most donors will not fund projects which do not respect Israeli military laws and regulations. The UN, NGOs and human rights organisations have faced harassment, intimidation and criminal prosecution. No one UN agency has the capacity to protect Palestinian IDPs and those at risk of displacement, and until recently no one agency was specifically mandated to address internal displacement and seek durable solutions. The Cluster Approach may address this gap by consolidating inter-agency responses under the cluster lead, but its effectiveness is yet to be determined. Under the cluster mechanism, internal displacement falls under OHCHR's mandate, with support from OCHA. However, OHCHR has limited capacity and resources."

Save the Children, Briefing Paper, October 2009

"In 2008 and 2009 Save the Children UK and its local partner, MA'AN Development Center, implemented an innovative project funded by the Humanitarian Aid department of the European Commission (ECHO) to prevent and respond to displacement pressures and events. This project targeted fourteen communities in the West Bank and Gaza, by providing assistance to relieve displacement pressures, create local protection mechanisms, and provide emergency assistance to families following displacement events."

End Donor Complicity in Israeli Violations, Badil, May 2009

"On 2 March 2009, major international donors convened in Sharm al-Sheikh to collectively respond to the destruction caused by Israel's 23 day military offensive on the Gaza Strip (the offensive). During the conference, a total of \$4.5 billion was pledged in reconstruction funds for Gaza. In light of the extensive destruction across the Gaza Strip, especially the destruction of civilian homes and infrastructure, reconstruction is urgent.

However, as Palestinian and Israeli human rights organisations, we must note that by agreeing to reconstruction without specific, binding assurances from the State of Israel, international donors are effectively underwriting Israel's illegal actions in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). International law – including, international human rights law, international humanitarian law (IHL), and the law of state responsibility for wrongful acts – places specific, binding obligations on the State of Israel (based, inter alia, on its duties as an Occupying Power) with respect to the maintenance and development of normal life in occupied territory. By repeatedly restricting their action to providing aid, without holding Israel accountable for its specific obligations, international donors are relieving Israel of its legally binding responsibilities.

[...]

Many of the projects funded by international donors have subsequently been destroyed by the Israeli military. In the Gaza Strip, such projects include the Gaza Seaport, the Industrial Estate, and the Gaza International Airport. Following the eruption of the second Intifada in 2000, the majority of donor aid has been focused on emergency crisis relief aimed at combating the immediate effects of Israel's occupation policy, including the impact of the Annexation Wall, restrictions on movement and the import and export of goods, the razing of agricultural land, the destruction of infrastructure, and the closure policy.

[...]

This aid is necessary to sustain the Palestinian people, and to prevent a widespread humanitarian emergency; given the extent of the destruction in the Gaza Strip it is essential to

ensure the basic requirements of human existence. However, Israel's continuing occupation is the root cause of the Palestinian's financial and humanitarian crisis. It impacts on the ability of Palestinian's to develop, to trade, and to secure their future. The State of Israel bears legal responsibility for the consequences of its actions. By underwriting the cost of the occupation, and in the process effectively disregarding Israel's international obligations, the international community is relieving Israel of accountability and facilitating impunity."

Graduate Institute of Development Studies - Palestine Research Unit (IUED-PRU),
December 2007

"Need for assistance: In May 2007, the need for assistance has reached an unprecedented level since 2004: More than 80% of the population claims that their household needs assistance...More than half of the Palestinians even claim their household needs assistance a lot. This proportion has been considered as an indicator for acute (reported) needs....The highest level of acute needs has been reached in the Gaza Strip where almost three quarters of the respondents live in a household that needs assistance a lot. Among the hardship cases of this region, this figure reaches 88%.....

Priorities for assistance: One third of the Palestinian population views employment as the top priority for their household's assistance. Roughly one fifth of them consider health and food assistance as the first priority... For those who claim acute needs for their household, employment and food are clearly of key importance....Among the households that have acute needs in the West Bank and Jerusalem, food is a higher priority than elsewhere. Considering infrastructure assistance, the access to water supply networks is valued as more important than electricity, sewage or solid waste disposal. Water is the first priority in particular for the West Bank and for the villages while the majority of Gazans report sewage disposal networks....

Assistance delivery: In May 2007, almost half of Palestinian households had received at least one type of assistance during the past six months. This proportion has significantly increased since May 2006 when one third only received aid. This result shows a clear increase in the assistance's coverage of the population....Assistance is clearly improving its targeting of the neediest segments of the population: Two thirds of hardship cases report having received assistance compared to half of those that live below poverty line and one quarter of those who are above it.... The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and UNRWA are the most visible sources of assistance. Two trends appear: the coverage of UNRWA has increased sharply since 2006 and has now reached an unprecedented level since 2004. On the other, the PNA's has decreased by 5% since last year and reached its lowest level. ...The satisfaction of the population in the delivered assistance has increased in a striking manner.."

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 12 September 2007
"UNRWA is the main provider of services to Palestinian refugees in the OPT. There is no agency providing assistance to IDPs, although UNRWA does provide ad-hoc emergency assistance to IDPs or those living under siege on an exceptional basis. However, no steps have been taken towards applying the UN Collaborative Approach to situations of internal displacement to IDPs in the OPT. In addition to UNRWA, a number of United Nations agencies (including the World Food Programme, the World Health Organization and the UN Children's Fund) contribute relief and services to Palestinian refugees in the OPT. The three main sources of international humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in the OPT in 2006 were UNRWA, the Palestinian Authority Ministry of Social Affairs and relatives. Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, where the majority are refugees, required the most UNRWA assistance.

Table 3.1: Main sources of Humanitarian/Emergency Assistance Received, as Reported by Palestinian Households in the OPT, 2006

Sources of Assistance	OPT	West Bank	Gaza Strip
UNRWA	45.6%	17.1%	61.7%
PA Ministry of Social Affairs	14.4%	11.1%	16.2%
Relatives	14.2%	25.7%	7.7%
International Organizations	9.1%	19.2%	3.4%
Other PA Institutions	5.1%	10.1%	2.2%
Charitable Organizations	3.50%	2.50%	4.00%
Friends, neighbours, charitable persons	2.1%	2.2%	2.0%
Political Parties	1.6%	1.4%	1.7%
Zakat Committees	1.1%	2.1%	0.6%
Labour Unions	0.5%	1.0%	0.3%
Local Improvement Committees	0.3%	0.9%	0.0%
Arab States	0.1%	0.2%	0.0%
Other	2.4%	6.5%	0.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%

.... In the 1967-occupied Palestinian territory, 60% of NGOs working in the refugee community were established during the 1990s. The growth of NGO activities can be attributed to the decrease in assistance provided by the PLO, greater political freedom, and growing international investment in the OPT related to the Oslo process. ... There were between 150 to 200 Palestinian and international NGOs in the OPT in 2006. Since the beginning of the second intifada, Palestinian and international NGOs have had to shift part of their activities towards emergency relief operations, such as providing food aid, emergency employment, and essential medical supplies....

Humanitarian assistance has mitigated the effects of the Israeli occupation and conflict on Palestinian refugees and IDPs. This assistance has also often prevented the worsening of humanitarian crises. Yet, humanitarian assistance can neither prevent violations of international law, nor put an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is only ever a temporary measure aimed at alleviating suffering. UNRWA concurs that "emergency assistance is no substitute for a comprehensive political solution; it can only mitigate the effects of the crisis on the most vulnerable." In 2006, UNRWA expressed regret that "the root causes of humanitarian suffering and the structural constraints to development in the OPT remain unchanged."

... The long-term provision of humanitarian assistance in a political and protection vacuum, without any prospect of a rights-based solution, generates dependency and frustration among refugees and IDPs. This is especially true when humanitarian aid comes at a price, as the recent sanctions against the Palestinian Authority show: "With the political and economic isolation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) following the January 2006 elections in the 1967-occupied Palestinian territory (OPT) ... humanitarianism has been transformed into the primary manifestation of international political will as donor states condition additional aid (beyond that required to keep Palestinians alive) on Palestinian acquiescence to conditions that Israel itself has yet to fully accept." "

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"Perspectives within the international donor community on how to approach wall mitigation and address the implications of the ICJ Opinion are far from consistent. Some donors are strongly in favour of wall mitigation on humanitarian grounds, while others express serious concern regarding undertaking any form of wall mitigation initiative on political or legal grounds. Many donors, meanwhile, have not formulated a clear position. During interviews with donors⁴ currently undertaking wall mitigation projects, three recurring issues emerged. The perceived contradiction between humanitarian obligations versus political concerns; the need for a common LACC position on how to approach wall mitigation in an effective and consistent manner, and which is legally consistent with the ICJ Opinion; and the need for the donor community to consider how to ensure compliance by the Government of Israel (GoI) with its obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL)."

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Recommendations to Address Forced Displacement in the OPT

- Recommendations to Israeli Government
-
- Recognise the de jure and de facto applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention and international human rights law to the Occupied Palestinian Territory distinguish in all circumstances between military objectives and civilian persons and objects;
- Ensure the protection of civilians from arbitrary displacement and other human rights violations in line with international human rights standards and international humanitarian law in Occupied Palestinian Territory.
- End the policy of confiscating Palestinian land; and dismantle Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which are contrary to international law and which threaten the contiguity of Palestinian lands;
- Expedite authorisation for UN and humanitarian agencies to operate in Area C and East Jerusalem toward removing restrictions and provide unfettered access to UN and humanitarian agencies to respond to humanitarian and development needs in Area C and East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip.

- Restore freedom of movement for Palestinians throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory by lifting closures, discriminatory roads, including removal of restrictions in Gaza Strip for humanitarian and development purposes, and allowing free movement of people and goods in accordance to applicable human rights law
- Cease building the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and comply fully with the provisions of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and all provisions of General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 which call upon Israel to dismantle the Wall lying in Palestinian Territory;
- Reinstate moratorium on all Palestinians home and property demolitions in Area C and extend the moratorium to East Jerusalem including evictions, and ensure that the rights and interests of Palestinians have been fully respected and protected in future implementation of planning and development policy.
- Enact legislation that provides the greatest possible security of tenure to residents of houses and land, and ensures that any evictions are carried out in a non-discriminatory way and in accordance with international human rights norms.
- Revoke policies infringing on the rights of family unity and affecting the residency rights of Palestinians residing in East Jerusalem and ensure that residency rights are provided in non-discriminatory way and in accordance to human rights laws.
- Expedite the gradual transfer of control of Area C to the Palestinian Authority as envisaged in Interim Oslo Agreements and undertake steps towards final status negotiations towards achieving negotiated settlement in line with international normative framework including international human rights and humanitarian law, and UN Guiding Principles on IDPs.
-
- Recommendations to the Palestinian Authorities
-
- Ensure the protection of civilians from arbitrary displacement and other human rights violations in line with international human rights standards and international humanitarian law in the territory under Palestinian jurisdiction.
- Ensure remedy for persons displaced in accordance to human rights law in areas under its jurisdiction. Recognising that Israel as occupying party remains primarily responsible to ensure protection of civilians, this does not absolve responsibilities of the Palestinian authorities in addressing displacement issues.
- The Palestinian Authority should develop “national policy” to address forced displacement in accordance to normative international standards and endorse a “national action plan” to implement the obligations and responsibilities set out in the national policy to address the situation of communities at risk of displacement, and forced displaced persons until such time that durable solutions are attainable.
- Establishment of Palestinian institutional body in the Palestinian authorities for West Bank and Gaza to address the situation of internal displacement and communities at risk in coordination with key line Ministries, with capacity to engage in ongoing activities addressing displacement and communities at risk and coordinate and harmonise response of the relevant Palestinian ministries, and national and international agencies.
- Mainstreaming of issues related to internal displacement and communities at risk of displacement amongst relevant key line Ministries and official bodies in West Bank and Gaza Strip (i.e. Public Works and Housing Ministries, Palestinian Negotiating Unit, Palestinian Bureau of Statistics etc)
- Ensure Palestinian assistance and compensation measures are provided and consistently applied, and be accompanied by the social, and economic measures that would address the situation of persons displaced and risk of displacement and ensure sustainability of these persons until such time that durable solutions are attainable.

- Palestinian authorities in coordination with humanitarian community proceed in mapping of communities at risk in the OPT, monitoring of Palestinians displaced and provision of support through legal assistance, development and humanitarian response to vulnerable communities at risk of displacement in Area C, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip.
- Providing support and active engagement with grass root communities addressing situations of displacement and at risk of displacement, in Area C, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip.
- Ensuring that Palestinian development plans – bearing in mind Palestinian jurisdiction - address development and humanitarian needs of communities at risk and forced displaced with adequate allocation of budgetary resources.
- Ensure that peace negotiations towards achieving negotiated settlement – including any land swaps - are undertaken in line with international normative framework including international human rights and humanitarian law, and UN Guiding Principles on IDPs.
-
- Recommendations to the UN and Humanitarian agencies
-
- Should fully implement the Humanitarian Plan of Area C for UN projects in Area C, and continue to contest Israel's intransigence toward such implementation. The UN should widen its assistance to providing humanitarian assistance and protection to communities at risk of displacement in Area C and East Jerusalem.
- Widen assistance to include the development projects of Palestinian communities at risk in areas under Israeli jurisdiction, and not confine to humanitarian assistance alone. Development-oriented initiatives should be supported particularly in Areas C and East Jerusalem.
- Strengthening provision of protection to persons displaced and at risk of displacement through active engagement and presence in Area C and East Jerusalem including active engagement with civil society grass roots communities addressing situations of displacement in OPT and providing support to grassroots communities, and protection of human rights defenders.
- Enhance protection monitoring of the situation of persons displaced, and communities at risk of displacement. There remains significant gap in protection and needs assessment of displaced communities. An integrated protection monitoring process including profiling of displaced persons would improve response
- Mainstream displacement issues in Gaza Strip and West Bank, and enhance information exchange and coordination between agencies to more appropriately identify protection, humanitarian and development needs and to enable a more coordinated and systematic response. There continues to be high discrepancies between both geographical areas.
- Support the Palestinian authorities in Gaza and West Bank in the development of a legislative framework for displacement and communities at risk of displacement, increased capacity building and consultations in planning, resource mobilisation and improvement of basic services to address these situations.
- Continue to call upon the Human Rights Council to address the situation in the OPT, and specifically the Special Rapporteurs on Adequate housing, human rights of IDPs, and human rights of Palestinians to address the situation of the OPT and particularly forced displacement; widening international advocacy in Europe, United States, and Arab world to influence public opinion and political engagement of member states.
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- Recommendations to the Quartet and International community
-
- Intensify efforts made to induce Israel to adhere to international humanitarian and human rights law in policies of occupation in the OPT as aforementioned above which are principle

cause of displacement in the OPT, actively engage in political action to enforce adherence to international law, and attach legal consequences to the failure of Israel to end such violations.

- Ensure provision of international aid and donor assistance is in compliance to international humanitarian law and human rights treaty provision obligations, and particularly erga omnes obligations, in face of continued Israeli violations of human rights and humanitarian law.
- Intensify efforts made to induce Israel to provide unfettered access to humanitarian community to address the humanitarian and development situation in Area C, and East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, and respond to communities at risk of displacement and situations of displacement.
- Intensify efforts made to induce Israel to remove restrictions in movement of goods and persons to Gaza Strip review the “no contact policy” with Hamas authority in the Gaza Strip to allow for, and facilitate, the provision of humanitarian and reconstruction needs of affected Palestinian community in Gaza Strip.
- Intensify efforts to induce Israel to cooperate with UN monitoring mechanisms including access to the OPT to the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Palestinian and Other Arab Territories, and implement recommendations of the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict on Israel and Palestinian authorities.
- Ensure normative application of humanitarian law and human rights law including the Guiding Principles in negotiation process, and particularly as it affects the human rights and durable solutions for current Palestinians displaced and at risk of displacement, and Palestinian communities potentially affected by any negotiated settlement (particularly should land swaps be envisaged placing).
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